

## REALIST-AXIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES AND IMAGES OF SOCIAL LIFE

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**PETER LANG**

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**REALIST-AXIOLOGICAL  
PERSPECTIVES AND IMAGES OF  
SOCIAL LIFE**

A Century of Sociology at John Paul the Second Catholic  
University of Lublin



**PETER LANG**

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# INTRODUCTION

Perspectives and images of social life are “subjective” and “objective.” A perspective may be defined as one’s point of view, and it implies an act of looking, which, in turn, requires a perceiving subject. An image is the result of one’s perception, and it shifts the centre of gravity from the subject onto the object. Intellectual activity produces images that follow their own logic, and each of these images is the outcome of a particular discourse applied to create a certain vision of the world. Perspectives and images are conditioned upon one’s point of view. They may be one-dimensional, reduced to one ideological point of view, or they may reflect numerous dimensions of the world, expressing the heterogeneity of points of view and the plurality of perspectives.

The present book offers an interpretation of social life developed during a century of sociological thought at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin. It accounts for both objective ideas and the subjective (authorial) role played by the scholars who developed these ideas. Such an approach results in a perspective – developed through individual research and never-ending academic dialogue – that provides a comprehensive vision of social life representative of complementary points of view. For sociological research to develop in a rational manner, it must follow two principles. First, it must be considered an independent field of study; secondly, it must be strictly connected with philosophy. It is philosophy that allows researchers to orientate themselves when confronted with complex phenomena; it provides “terms” enabling them to gradually approach truth; when rooted in sociological research, it creates a comprehensive image of social reality.

It was the authors’ intention to combine a historical perspective (the genesis of thoughts and concepts) with a detailed discussion of ideas (theoretical premises). The publication opens with a presentation of a broad image of society from the socio-philosophical and macro-sociological point of view, including a discussion of the role of new social movements in contemporary society, and the benefits sociologists may gain from the sociological analysis of literature. Once Poland regained its independence after 123 years of enslavement and partition, the Catholic University of Lublin became an important intellectual centre of Catholic social thought. Only 27 years after the publication of Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical *Rerum novarum* (1891) – believed to be the first papal document addressing the major social problems of modernity – did the scholars from Lublin undertake the task of presenting philosophical and scientific

arguments aimed at both identifying solutions compatible with a realistic vision of the world and explaining social phenomena by referring to facts. The scholars from the Catholic University of Lublin developed their ideas while turbulent History unveiled beyond the walls of the university: during the difficult years of establishing the Second Polish Republic; while German and Soviet occupants were ruining Poland during the Second World War; while the Polish people were being subjected to the criminal communist experiment; and as Poland was slowly emerging from the post-communist order. Therefore, it was of crucial importance to diagnose the real state of affairs, search for successful methods of overcoming major civilizational and spiritual threats, and provide axiological guidelines that would lead the way to the culture of love and solidarity.

The practical nature of social sciences requires a clear distinction between what is real and desirable and what is a mirage and an illusory goal based on ideological premises. For decades, the major challenge confronted by the realistic approach had been the ideologization of social life by real socialism. That mendacious formula elevated a simplified view of social order based on the idea of class struggle to the status of a universal explanation of reality capable of transforming this reality. The idea of class struggle proved to be particularly dangerous as it deprived people of their natural rights to private property, individual identity, and autonomous agency. In extreme cases, the individual became entirely subordinated to social wholes, which, in turn, resulted in totalitarian practices.

Social philosophy and sociology developed at the Catholic University of Lublin analysed the consequences of depriving an individual of his or her subjectivity and agency, focusing on both the socio-political and the spiritual dimensions of the issue. Such an approach allowed the scholars to identify the spheres of human reality most exposed to invalidation from the theoretical and ideological point of view or exclusion from the socio-practical sphere. This is how such issues as God, religion, soul, morality, private property, community, virtue, eschatology, objectivity (ontological, epistemological, axiological), etc. were dismissed as either nonsensical or ideologically dangerous. Therefore, it was necessary to conceptualize those terms and make them operational by defining their relation to reality and various theories, doctrines, and ideologies, pointing to commonalities and irreconcilable differences.

It did not take the social scholars from the Catholic University of Lublin long to recognize the godless, anti-humanistic, and totalitarian dimension of Marxism-Leninism (also known as bolshevism); the ideology met with strong opposition both during the interwar period and after War World II, when Poland was occupied by the Soviets. The goal did not change, but the tactics did. Whereas one

of the discussed authors, Franciszek Mirek, criticized communism openly (for which he was imprisoned during the Polish People's Republic and forbidden to pursue his academic career), others, such as Jan Turowski, Karol Wojtyła (John Paul II), Stanisław Kowalczyk, Franciszek Mirek, Janusz Mariański, and Jerzy Rebeta did not confront Marxism-Leninism directly but opposed its erroneous and immoral ideas by presenting true and just approaches to the anthropological and social issue. They were inspired mostly by classical thought (especially by Aristotle) and scholasticism (by Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas) which they applied side by side and in dialogue with contemporary theories (mainly with Kantianism, phenomenology, and existentialism), crucial in the development of Christian personalism. By defining man as a person, they were able to reconcile the idea of substantialist identity and ontological autonomy of an individual with the relational, social nature of human beings. Man as a person is both a separate, ontological unity and a being in itself, a self-awareness whose subjective and objective identity is shaped through relations with others. By establishing the universal rules of human consciousness, i.e. what allows humans to define themselves as a part of society, it is possible to analyse the ways in which contemporary people experience society. In the book, universal and scientific perspectives are connected with the individual experiences of the discussed authors, who traced the evolution of Polish social life. The images they created account for historically-shaped notions developed in the context of national structural and cultural heritage.





## **Part I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**



# I. FROM SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY TO PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIOLOGY

Social philosophy is, on the one hand, theoretical and speculative, and, on the other, practical and normative reflection on social life that dates back to ancient Greek philosophy and shares its subject matter with such disciplines as sociology. The deliberations on social life at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin (KUL) are as old as the university itself, but the department of social philosophy was not created until 1984 as part of the Faculty of Social Sciences (established in 1981), and its first chair was rev. Stanisław Kowalczyk (1984–2007). Before, social philosophy was practiced at the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences and the Faculty of Christian Philosophy. In the case of the former, it was strictly connected to Catholic social teaching and Catholic sociology, whereas the latter developed it as a derivative of anthropology and a part of ethics. Those early stages of social philosophy were rooted in the ideas of Christian philosophy responsible for establishing the rational foundation of a Christian world view which, in turn, allowed for the formulation of a coherent vision of the world not limited to a particular science. That social philosophy was indebted to perennial philosophy (Thomas Aquinas' reception of Aristotle) and it connected its ideas with the findings of contemporary philosophy and science, thus creating a link between the speculative approach and the positive and historical method. The dominance of existential Thomism led to the premise about the primacy of existence over being which, consequently, resulted in questions about the primary conditions of social existence. The reflection about society was, on the one hand, a consequence of the metaphysical vision of a man; on the other, it resulted from ethical analyses rooted in a particular historical context of the Polish social life.

## 1. The origins of social philosophy at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin

Social philosophy practiced as social ethics is connected to one of the university's first vice-chancellors, father Jacek Woroniecki. The author of *Katolicka etyka wychowawcza* considered social ethics to be a part of general ethics connected to individual ethics because "these two points of view are impossible to completely separate for an individual always acts within the social, and social life is rooted in

an individual's values. . . . As society lives by the individual values of its members, so do the members live by social values of their environment."<sup>1</sup>

Such a link between the individual and social dimensions of human life, a link that establishes these two perspectives as real and complementary, would become a constant point of reference for socio-philosophical thought practiced at the university. What is more, Woroniecki made a particular connection between ethics, social philosophy, and sociology. Elżbieta Hałas called this connection sociological philosophy and the author himself referred to it as sociophilosophy:<sup>2</sup> "The ethics that investigates the fundamental moral ideas such as dignity, virtue, duty, justice, trust, loyalty, or solidarity will be an integral part of this philosophical sociology."<sup>3</sup>

Already before the Second World War, social philosophy at the KUL was being developed as a comment on the social teachings of the Church. One of its pioneers, rev. Antoni Szymański, pointed out that "such diverse, and sometimes even contradictory, thoughts appear in the name of Catholic social teaching."<sup>4</sup> That is why he claimed that only "a true and humble assimilation of the truths expressed in the writings of the Holy See and Saint Aquinas will curb the squandering of Catholicism, strengthen Catholic social activities that are being hindered by the mental anarchy of social Catholicism and discord."<sup>5</sup>

This reference to Saint Thomas Aquinas' teachings and the need for their proper explication is an obligation undertaken by the next generations of philosophers of society at the KUL. In *Katolicyzm a kultura i cywilizacja*, Szymański emphasized the relevance of Catholic sociology,<sup>6</sup> stressing the fact that man

- 1 J. Woroniecki, *Katolicka etyka wychowawcza*, vol. 2: *Etyka szczegółowa*, part 1, Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, Lublin 1986, p. 11.
- 2 The term sociophilosophy was probably coined by Władysław Mieczysław Kozłowski who used it to connect ethics with social philosophy, thus establishing it as pure science that fulfills "the goal of raising and disseminating human dignity and happiness." M. Milczarek-Gnaczyńska, "Humanizm Władysława Mieczysława Kozłowskiego a transpersonalizm Gustawa Radbrucha," *Studia z Filozofii Polskiej* (eds. M. Rembierz and K. Śledziński) 2010, vol. 5, p. 116.
- 3 E. Hałas, "Socjologia a etyka społeczna w Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim (1918–1998)," in: *Pomiędzy etyką a polityką. 80 lat socjologii w Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim (1918–1998)*, ed. E. Hałas, Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, Lublin 1999, p. 18.
- 4 A. Szymański, *Katolicka myśl społeczna w uchwałach synodu*, Poznań 1938, p. 5.
- 5 *Ibid.*, p. 7.
- 6 "The catholic sociology of that time was connected with. . . the renaissance of scholastic philosophy (that is empirical, realist, and intellectual philosophy); thus, it invoked a particular approach to the ontological view of society that originated in classical

is an active subject, but [this subject] lives and develops in a society that is the function of their activity rather than an individual, substantial being. Society is above an individual human, and common good, according to Saint Thomas, is more perfect, more divine than individual good. It is, however, a means for human existence and self-betterment. As far as social features are concerned, a human being is subordinate to society; as far as individual, human rights are concerned, humans are above society which they treat as a means. Catholic civilization creates a harmony of individual and collective life.<sup>7</sup>

Another crucial guideline developed at the KUL at the time<sup>8</sup> was a warning against the deceptive theses of Bolshevism that were to be opposed by a rival, Christian project:

A revolution, and the Bolshevik revolution in particular, is remarkably anti-Christian. That is why, as far as moral and social laws are concerned, it must be opposed by Christian affirmation. There is no place for compromises or uncertainties. Only the determined win. That is why Christian forces must unite in order to increase the tension and effectiveness of their action. This action's goal will be to spread the truth, eradicate mistakes, and organize people.<sup>9</sup>

After the Second World War, Bolshevism stopped being merely a threat and became the everyday reality of the Polish People's Republic (PRL). During the subsequent decades, Marxism-Leninism threatened social thought by undermining human value through materialist reductionism and deterministic socio-historical laws. Also, censorship during that time severely restricted any possibility of a serious socio-philosophical debate. Czesław Strzeszewski, Szymański's student, was forced to publish his monumental *Katolicka Nauka Społeczna* abroad under a pseudonym.<sup>10</sup> The volume opens with a chapter devoted to the elements of social philosophy. The chapter places social sciences in relation to other disciplines, discusses relations between natural, economic, sociological, and moral laws, asks questions about human nature and the nature of social phenomena,

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philosophy and not in the Catholic doctrine." E. Hałas, *Socjologia a etyka społeczna*. . . , p. 17; see A. Szymański, *Zagadnienie społeczne*, Włocławek 1916.

7 A. Szymański, *Katolicyzm a kultura i cywilizacja*, Lublin 1936, p. 24.

8 "From the moment it was launched (1918), the University of Lublin was expected to provide effective opposition to Bolshevism. Therefore, its scholars conducted research on proletarian socialism from the point of view of personalist ethics." E. Hałas, *Socjologia a etyka społeczna*. . . , p. 22.

9 A. Szymański, *Bolszewizm*, Nakład Księgarni Św. Wojciecha, Poznań, Warszawa 1920, p. 88.

10 S. Jarocki (C. Strzeszewski), *Katolicka Nauka Społeczna*, Société d'Éditions Internationales, Paris 1964.

and, finally, presents the Thomist idea of society. Strzeszewski's idea of social philosophy originates in metatheoretical and methodological premises, and ends with the investigation of the nature of man and society. For Strzeszewski, social philosophy is a primal science that predates sociology and economy:

Social sciences seek philosophy's assistance in a way that makes them subordinate to philosophy as they depend on the outcome of philosophical investigations. What is more, a consequence of philosophy's influence on social sciences is the creation of a new branch of philosophy that may be described as practical philosophy. It is called social philosophy and – respectively – the philosophy of economics. These branches of philosophy investigate the social nature of man and the nature of social and economic phenomena. They are not concerned with the empirical dimension of these phenomena – that is a particular time and location, historical and civilizational environment – but they investigate them as theoretical problems of philosophy whose point of departure is a social being.<sup>11</sup>

By making philosophy a foundation of social sciences, Strzeszewski links sociology to a particular view of man. Consequently, his theory investigates social activity according to the principles of Christian philosophy, a philosophy that, on the one hand, recognizes revelation as a valid source of knowledge, and, on the other, follows the guidelines of eternal philosophy.

To practice science based on revelation is an important choice that bestows a specific direction to research contextualized by the ideological war waged by communist authorities against the Church. Metaphysical principles, on the other hand, give an important direction to the formal side of the study of society, which, in turn, affects sociology. Sociology often does not recognize these principles openly, and it is one of the crucial tasks of social philosophy to provide a study of hidden and often unconscious metaphysical, ontological, epistemological, and ethical preassumptions/premises of sociology. Moreover, the goal of the realist approach to social life is not merely to uncover the nature of social order and the processes that shape it, but to uncover the conditions necessary for such an order to exist. Therefore, not only is social philosophy a practical philosophy (that is social ethics), but it is also and primarily responsible for basic metaphysical, ontological, and epistemological findings. As a theoretical discipline it inquires into the necessary conditions (that is ontological grounds) of human activities so that they could be categorized as social. As a practical discipline it is concerned with moral actions and their social consequences.

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11 *Ibid.*, p. 11.

Social philosophy stresses the citizen's moral duties towards the political community and this community's obligations towards its citizens. It is the main topic of social philosophy as it develops classical Greek and Roman thought searching for the justification of a perfect social order. Human spirit became such a justification, one that was connected with the realm of ideas which, according to Plato, was completely separate from all earthly, illusory, and material things that were merely a shadow of true reality. Thus, truth, good, and beauty are timeless, and time originates their decay. The earthly order, then, is not a consequence of the ideal one, but a manifestation of degeneracy and material degeneration. This degeneration may be stopped only through intellectual activity; through dialectical cognition, one may find the origin of spiritual being of all things. Reaching the truth is simultaneously a metaphysical, epistemological, and moral challenge that is beyond an individual's capacity and duty; consequently, it requires a systemic solution that will pull the humanity out from the river of oblivion (*Aletheia*). The republic governed by wise men would provide the conditions necessary for the social order to become a foundation for reaching epistemological and metaphysical goals. That is how ontological idealism was connected with socio-political utopianism, proposing to transform wise men not only into the power elite, but also into new political gods ruling over human animals in the name of preserving the order of reality.

The royal ruler is the mediator between the divine reality of the Idea and the people; he is the Zeus who rejuvenates the order that has grown old; he is the physician who cures the soul by causing them to be reborn in the heavenly medium (*en daimonio genei*); and in causing this rebirth of the souls he provides the polis with a new spiritual community substance (*homonoia*).<sup>12</sup>

This situation was opposed by Aristotle<sup>13</sup> who believed that man, as *zoon politicon*, can be neither made into god nor reduced to animal. In order to live, man needs society and cannot live as man outside it. Aristotle stresses the fact that man is not self-sufficient in reaching the goals that are inherent to human nature. In order to successfully attain these goals, man is required to sustain and shape

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12 E. Voegelin, *Order and History: Plato and Aristotle*, University of Missouri Press, Columbia and London 2000, p. 223.

13 "Plato understood that the nature and acuteness of the crisis required an extra-constitutional government of men; this insight makes him a philosopher of politics and history superior to Aristotle, who, with a sometimes inconceivable complacency, could describe the nature and order of the Hellenic polis and give shrewd recipes for dealing with revolutionary disturbances at a time when the polis world came crashing down all around him and Alexander was inaugurating the age of empire." *Ibid.*, p. 215.

community that, in turn, may reach self-sufficiency. These actions, however, are never independent from historical forms of social life. That is why Paweł Rybicki claims that Aristotle shifted speculative investigations onto realistic – or even empirical – ground. Thanks to that shift, it is possible to perceive social reality as “an exceptional plethora of structural and organizational forms of social life.”<sup>14</sup>

Social philosophy practiced at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin draws on the classical Greek thought's focus on the social order that enables full human development in a given historical context. The philosophy refers to a given systemic framework of a society governed by rules and laws that lead to an individual's full development guaranteed by the accomplishment of common good. The classical theory of social life stresses the primacy of one's duty to the community/state. This duty is a consequence of the social nature of man. Throughout the following centuries philosophical investigations of social life were devoted to the search for a form that would allow for the attainment of both immanent and transcendent social goals. The form has come to serve as a focal point in investigating such issues as family, district, city, country, law, system, power, economy, and culture, which all take part in the creation of axiological theses. These theses take their origin in values that are present in a given society – whether a polis, a republic, or a kingdom. Even though they differ from one another, in the case of the Latin civilization they are all connected to what Christianity calls Cardinal virtues – justice, temperance, courage, and prudence. To shape social behaviours and attitudes requires particular moral duties of an individual to community (and vice versa) to be determined. Christianity and its idea of a human God significantly changed the notion of social life, its foundations and goals. Saint Augustine dismissed as superficial every social order that was not directed towards transcendental goals. Commenting on Cicero's ideas, he stressed that as moral virtue is nothing without faith, so is *politeia* without *civitas dei*. “Even though true justice and love may exist only in a Christian state, not all pagan states were evil as some of them showed signs of relative justice, which allows to describe them as states.”<sup>15</sup>

Saint Augustine's vision of socio-political reality that accounts for God's transcendence is developed and supplemented by Saint Thomas Aquinas. He

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14 P. Rybicki, *Arystoteles. Początki i podstawy nauki o społeczeństwie*, Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolińskich, Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków 1963, p. 190.

15 J. Majka, *Katolicka nauka społeczna. Studium historyczno-doktrynalne*, Fundacja Jana Pawła II, Rome 1986, p. 92.



perceives social order as regulated by natural law given by God. This way of thinking denies social and national order any inherent perfection. As noticed by Woroniecki: “Christian ethics has always been firm about that notion. One may find in Saint Thomas’ writings remarkable insight about the necessity to tolerate evil in social life; one cannot demand humanity to be perfect for perfection is unobtainable.”<sup>16</sup> According to Saint Thomas, society is a relational being whose reason for existence is weaker than that of a substantial human being whose natural inclination is to live in a community.<sup>17</sup> Saint Thomas, however, lays foundation for perceiving a human person as the most perfect individual creation equipped with reason. Social philosophy that develops ideas originated in classical antiquity and reinterpreted by Christian thinkers reacts to two main ontological mistakes – individualism and collectivism. The former rejects the social nature of man in favour of individual egoism. The latter subordinates individual subjectivity to some form of social objectivity that is often transcendent to the state.

## 2. Shaping the personalistic dimension of social philosophy

The notion of the person gave rise to a major current in anthropological and social thinking. Personalism, and most prominently Jacques Maritain’s “integral humanism,”<sup>18</sup> has been creatively integrated into the social thought developed at the KUL.<sup>19</sup> Its strength lies in establishing human dignity as both an evaluatory criterion of social order and a goal in shaping that order. Thinkers from all disciplines, from theology and philosophy to humanities and social sciences, embarked on a task of incorporating the notion of the person into their research. The person who contributed the most to that line of thinking was Karol Wojtyła.<sup>20</sup> who disseminated and developed the philosophical notion of man as a person. As Pope John Paul II, he made personalism a point of reference for subsequent

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16 J. Woroniecki, *Quaestiodisputata de natione et statucivili – O narodzie i państwie*, Lublin, 2004, p. 68.

17 K. Kaczmarek, *Prasocjologia św. Tomasza z Akwinu*, Redakcja Wydawnictw Uniwersytetu im. A. Mickiewicza Wydział Teologiczny, Poznań 1999, pp. 67–77.

18 J. Maritain, *Humanizm integralny*, trans. J. Budzisz, Wydawnictwo KRAĞ, Warszawa 1981.

19 S. Kowalczyk, *Wprowadzenie do filozofii J. Maritaina*, Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, Lublin 1992.

20 The book that contributed the most to that process was Karol Wojtyła’s *The Acting Person*, trans. A. Potocki, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht 1979.

papal documents devoted to social issues. Especially in the 1980s and 1990s, John Paul II's writings were among the most important sources of inspiration for socio-philosophical ideas developed at the KUL. The Pope's writings resonated so well with thinkers at the KUL because of the work of such social philosophers as Joachim Kondziela, Józef Majka, and Stanisław Kowalczyk.<sup>21</sup>

Joachim Kondziela believes the essence of social life to lie in achieving common good. According to him, from the ontological perspective, social life may be perceived as a relation: "From the socio-philosophical point of view, a social relation is a type of an interpersonal relation between at least two people; however, to be called a social relation, this relation cannot be unilateral (of the person A to the person B) but mutual (a reciprocal relation between the person A and the person B)."<sup>22</sup> The relation that constitutes the basis of a social relation is called a categorial relation; this relation spurs social relations into being, but it does not affect the nature of the involved subjects. Thus, contrary to transcendental relations, the categorial relation does not determine the nature of the social order.<sup>23</sup> Transcendental relations, in turn, are part of the social nature of man, which holds ontological priority over among others the common nature responsible for human predisposition towards social life, the similar way of acting, mutual dependency, or shared needs. For transcendental relations to be considered the true cause of social life, they must be perceived from both the ontological and the ethical point of view. This vantage point reveals the cognitive and evaluative dimension of human acts of reason and will. Not only do these acts establish facts, but they also distinguish between moral good and evil. "Common good recognizes the human as an ideal. This ideal is not a random goal one may – but not necessarily has to – choose, but it is an ethical imperative."<sup>24</sup>

The first premise of Kondziela's social philosophy assumes that "one may create, on the basis of the personalist notion of common good, a social theory that would explain both the nature and the dynamics of social life."<sup>25</sup> Secondly,

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21 These thinkers were directly concerned with social philosophy, but personalist socio-philosophical tropes may be found also in the research devoted to Catholic social teaching (Franciszek Mazurek), philosophy of culture (Adam Rodziński), or particular ethics (Jerzy Gałkowski).

22 J. Kondziela, "Normatywny charakter bonum commune," *Śląskie Studia Historyczno-Teologiczne* 1969, vol. 2, p. 51.

23 "The nature and being of transcendental relations is expressed not only in 'esse ad aliud,' but also in the nature of beings that remain in constant relation." *Ibid.*, p. 52.

24 *Ibid.*, p. 57.

25 J. Kondziela, *Filozofia społeczna. Zagadnienia wybrane*, RW KUL, Lublin 1972, p. 119.

Kondziela proposes an integral and harmonious vision of social and economic growth that is “an executive norm of society’s common good.”<sup>26</sup> Finally, the personalist notion of common good allows to overcome individualist reductionism and achieve a new dimension of morality rooted in “moral duty to the higher value order;” this morality can both enrich and strengthen the sense of social responsibility “that seems to be reaching a distinct global dimension.”<sup>27</sup>

Józef Majka set very high theoretical standards for social philosophy, stressing the peculiarity of its subject matter in the face of the difficult task of establishing “the identity of a social being.”<sup>28</sup> In his research, Majka attempted to deepen the understanding of general social theses (considering society to be a certain category of being or relations). His goal was “to clarify the nature of social reality, the internal structure of social relations, the basis of these relations, and the differences and similarities between social relations and other relations.”<sup>29</sup> Majka wanted his ideas to follow a metaphysical path that would distinguish them both from sociology and ethics. Also, he wanted to protect the scientific nature of social philosophy from ideological pressure. However, he was explicit about the Christian nature of his social philosophy. He believed secular social philosophy to explain social reality only partially, by referring to ‘one, usually more visible, factor, which simplifies the image and to some extent flattens it, depriving it of true philosophical depth.’<sup>30</sup> Proper insight, Majka claimed, could be achieved only if one’s ideas were rooted in Thomism. Consequently, a Christian notion of the nature of social being would result in transcendence that could be understood in at least three ways:

- 1) As a transcendental relation to common good, that is one that shapes the inner structure of society; 2) As transcendental values revealed through the analysis of common good, for common good implies an important reference to these values; 3) But also as a transcendence of an individual social being who, by giving themselves to community, surpasses themselves and is able to participate in the good approached by cooperating with others.<sup>31</sup>

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26 Ibid., p. 119.

27 Ibid., p. 120.

28 J. Majka, *Filozofia społeczna*, Wydawnictwo Wrocławskiej Księgarni Archidiecezjalnej, Wrocław 1982, p. 6.

29 Ibid., p. 6.

30 Ibid., p. 8.

31 Ibid., p. 10.

Stanisław Kowalczyk developed these ideas, radically synthesizing the main paradigms in Christian philosophy.<sup>32</sup> His research connected Thomism with Augustinianism,<sup>33</sup> enriching these two trends by contextualizing them with a number of social theories ranging from antiquity to present times. His approach to social philosophy was undoubtedly affected by his interest in metaphysics,<sup>34</sup> epistemology,<sup>35</sup> and Christian worldview.<sup>36</sup> He approached social and cultural issues as a manifestation of a broader understanding of God, world, man, and dominant worldviews.

Kowalczyk's original idea of a personalist view of society is an expression of his indebtedness to both Thomism and Augustinianism.<sup>37</sup> By referring to such thinkers as Friedrich Schleiermacher, Charles Renouvier, Wilhelm Stern, Borden F. Bowne, Immanuel Kant, Sören Kierkegaard, Gabriel Marcel, Karl Jaspers, Max Scheler, Romano Guardini, Emmanuel Mounier, Jacques Lacroix, and, especially, Jacques Maritain, Kowalczyk proposes a creative connection between the substantialist idea of man and the theological notion of the person. Such an approach deems personalism a system, a doctrine, and a fundamental interpretative category as well as a practical program, an attitude, and a basis of human action.<sup>38</sup> In his writings, Kowalczyk expresses the personalist vision of society

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32 S. Kowalczyk, *Człowiek a społeczność. Zarys filozofii społecznej*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2005.

33 S. Kowalczyk, *Człowiek i Bóg w nauce św. Augustyna*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2007.

34 S. Kowalczyk, *Metafizyka ogólna*, Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, Lublin 1998.

35 S. Kowalczyk, *Teoria poznania*, Wydawnictwo Diecezjalne, Sandomierz 1997.

36 S. Kowalczyk, *Podstawy światopoglądu chrześcijańskiego*, Wydawnictwo Wrocławskiej Księgarni Archidiecezjalnej, Wrocław 1986.

37 Kowalczyk is listed as a representative of the realist-dynamic or Thomist-Augustinian tradition which remains in a creative discussion with such movements as Augustinianism (J. Hessen, F. Sawicki, F.M. Sciacca), existential Thomism (J. Maritain, M. A. Krąpiec, M. Gogacz), phenomenological Thomism (K. Wojtyła – John Paul II), phenomenology (M. Scheler, L. Lavelle, R. Guardini, R. Ingarden, J. Tischner), axiological Thomism (T. Ślipko, T. Styczeń), socio-Christian tradition (E. Mounier, J. Lacroix, J. Piwowarczyk, Cz. Strzeszewski, J. Majka), realism/universalism (C. Bartnik). S. Kowalczyk, "Polski personalizm współczesny," in: S. Kowalczyk, *Z refleksji nad człowiekiem. Człowiek, społeczność, wartość*, Wydawnictwo TN KUL, Lublin 1995, pp. 23–43; K. Guzowski, "S. Kowalczyk: personalizm realistyczno-dynamiczny," in: S. Kowalczyk, *Nurty personalizmu. Od Augustyna do Wojtyły*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2010, pp. 235–246.

38 S. Kowalczyk, *Wprowadzenie do filozofii J. Maritaina. . .*, pp. 38–45.

by engaging in a discussion with numerous philosophical, socio-theoretical, and ideological points of view.

Kowalczyk offers an overview of all major theories of social life, paying special attention to their reductionist approach to the nature of God<sup>39</sup> and man.<sup>40</sup> These radical and oversimplified approaches are unable to perceive the complex and multidimensional nature of reality.<sup>41</sup> Trends ranging from agnosticism to atheism oversimplify God; trends ranging from idealism to materialism oversimplify the world; and trends ranging from spiritualism to biological organicism oversimplify man. These approaches coincide with the notions of society that reduce it either to individual feelings or behaviours (psychologism, behaviourism, individualism), or to social wholes (sociologism, collectivism).<sup>42</sup> Another consequence of these reductionisms is their transfer to the realm of axiology, ethics, and politics. Kowalczyk's polemics against the consolidated ideas of contemporary anti-humanism is additionally strengthened by the ideological argument with three most important ideologies of the twentieth century – Marxism,<sup>43</sup> liberalism<sup>44</sup> and postmodernism.<sup>45</sup> Personalism rejects the reductionist vision of man as an accident in the evolution of biocosmos, a social construct, or a semantic product of pre-modern cultural narrations. It advocates a vision of man as a person with a stable and universal being. This ontological ground serves Kowalczyk as a focal

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39 S. Kowalczyk, *Bóg w myśli współczesnej. Problematyka Boga i religii u czołowych myślicieli współczesnych*, Wydawnictwo Wrocławskiej Księgarni Archidiecezjalnej, Wrocław 1982.

40 S. Kowalczyk, *Człowiek w myśli współczesnej. Filozofia współczesna o człowieku*, Wydawnictwo Michalineum, Warszawa 1990.

41 S. Kowalczyk, *Współczesny kryzys ideowo-aksjologiczny*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2011.

42 He engages in a discussion with, among others, J. O. de La Mettrie's idea of man as machine, A. Comte's and O. Neurath's physicalism, Marxist dialectical materialism, H. Spencer's, F. Nietzsche's, and S. Freud's vitalist and biological materialism, G. Tarde's and G. Le Bon's psychologism, I. Pavlov's and W. Wundt's behaviourism, C. Lévi-Strauss' structuralism, E. Durkheim's sociologism, T. Hobbes' and J. J. Rousseau's liberalism, J. P. Satre's and M. Heidegger's existentialism, and J. Derrida's, J. F. Lyotard's, and M. Foucault's postmodernism. S. Kowalczyk, *Człowiek a społeczność* . . . , pp. 10–80.

43 S. Kowalczyk, *Z problematyki dialogu chrześcijańsko-marksistowskiego*, ODiSS, Warszawa 1977.

44 S. Kowalczyk, *Liberalizm i jego filozofia*, Wydawnictwo UNIA, Katowice 1995; S. Kowalczyk, *Liberalizm – jego dylematy i zagrożenia*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2016.

45 S. Kowalczyk, *Idee filozoficzne postmodernizmu*, POLWEN, Radom 2004.

point to investigate such notions as the nation,<sup>46</sup> politics,<sup>47</sup> democracy,<sup>48</sup> justice,<sup>49</sup> freedom,<sup>50</sup> culture<sup>51</sup> or sport.<sup>52</sup>

### 3. Towards philosophical sociology

Although for decades social philosophers at the KUL stressed their philosophical roots, nowadays they emphasize their link to sociology. After extensive research into such notions as the nature of man and society, the relationship between an individual and society, the role of common good in shaping community, the axiological grounds of social life, and the ideological background of the main theories of social life, the search for philosophical foundations of sociology has become a meta-reflection on the nature of social sciences.<sup>53</sup> This trend dates back to Strzeszewski who began a chapter devoted to social philosophy with establishing the relation between sociology and other sciences. Sociology must raise to the challenge of analysing situations where reflexive subjects shape social life in the age of late modernity. Social philosophy is becoming a philosophy of sociology investigating the extent to which scientific research legitimizes given forms of social life.

Social philosophy at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin is currently gaining a new dimension that synthesizes methodological and meta-sociological analyses and sociological research regarding the behaviour of social

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46 S. Kowalczyk, *Naród, państwo, Europa. Z problematyki filozofii narodu*, POLWEN, Radom 2003.

47 S. Kowalczyk, *Zarys filozofii polityki*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2008.

48 S. Kowalczyk, *U podstaw demokracji. Zagadnienia aksjologiczne*, Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, Lublin 2001.

49 S. Kowalczyk, *Idea sprawiedliwości społecznej a myśl chrześcijańska*, Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, Lublin 1998.

50 S. Kowalczyk, *Filozofia wolności. Rys historyczny*, Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, Lublin 1999; S. Kowalczyk, *Wolność naturą i prawem człowieka. Indywidualny i społeczny wymiar wolności*, Wydawnictwo Diecezjalne, Sandomierz 2000.

51 S. Kowalczyk, *Filozofia kultury. Próba personalistycznego ujęcia problematyki*, Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, Lublin 1996.

52 S. Kowalczyk, *Elementy filozofii i teologii sportu*, Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, Lublin 2010.

53 A. Jabłoński, "Stanisława Kowalczyka personalistyczna koncepcja społeczeństwa," *Roczniki Nauk Społecznych* 2012, vol. 1, pp. 9–36; A. Jabłoński, "Personalizm podstawą realizmu w socjologii," in: *Godność osoby w społeczeństwie i gospodarce*, eds. S. Fel and M. Wódka, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2014, pp. 151–165.

subjects within social structures and processes.<sup>54</sup> Interest is being shifted to the philosophy of social sciences, e.g. the philosophy of sociology.<sup>55</sup> Three significant philosophers – Peter Winch,<sup>56</sup> Józef M. Bocheński<sup>57</sup> and Karl R. Popper<sup>58</sup> – are particularly important for that shift, which is best exemplified by the monographs devoted solely to their ideas. The key position of these philosophers hinges upon their application of an analytical approach to epistemology, knowledge, and language communication in their analysis of the social, cultural, and political order. Even though the three philosophers' writings may lead to ambiguous interpretations, social philosophers at the KUL are particularly interested in the way all three define the nature of social sciences: as a type of reflection on human reflexivity, a reflection that investigates the position of individual social subjects within a particular historical social order. These thinkers explicitly oppose the one-dimensional perception of sociology as either a positivist science that applies the methodology of natural sciences (nomothetic) or a part of the humanities (idiographic).

Winch, applying Wittgenstein's idea of language as a form of life and a game whose rules are established by a given community,<sup>59</sup> provides the background for the analysis of human behaviour. The goal of the approach, supplemented by the findings of linguists and semioticians, is to establish whether there exists a "grammar" shared by numerous expressions of social life that manifest

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- 54 A. Jabłoński, "Prawda społeczeństwa jako cel krytycznych badań wiedzy, „Przegląd Socjologiczny” 2008, no. 3, s. 101-120; A. Jabłoński, Socjologiczna analiza wiedzy a kształtowanie rzeczywistości społecznej,” in: *Między unifikacją a dezintegracją – fenomen wiedzy we współczesnym społeczeństwie*, eds. A. Jabłoński and M. Zemło, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2008, pp. 97–120.
- 55 D. Little, "Philosophy of Sociology," in: *Philosophies of the Sciences: A Guide*, ed. F. Allhoff, Wiley-Blackwell 2010, pp. 293–323.
- 56 A. Jabłoński, *Filozoficzna interpretacja życia społecznego w ujęciu Petera Wincha*, Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, Lublin 1998; A. Jabłoński, "Perspektywa moralna życia społecznego w interpretacji Petera Wincha," *Roczniki Nauk Społecznych* 1997, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 185–199.
- 57 A. Jabłoński, *Status teoretyczny i funkcja techniczna wiedzy o społeczeństwie. Wokół myśli Józefa M. Bocheńskiego i Karla R. Poppera*, TN KUL, Lublin 2002.
- 58 A. Jabłoński, *Budowanie społeczeństwa wiedzy. Zarys teorii społecznej Karla R. Poppera*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2006; A. Jabłoński, "K. Popper's method of trial-and-error as basis sociological analysis of knowledge," in: *Critical Realism and Humanity in the Social Sciences*, eds. K. Śledzińska and K. Wielecki, Wydawnictwo UKSW, Warszawa 2016, pp. 73–87.
- 59 Winch refers to L. Wittgenstein (II) – the author of *Philosophical Investigations*.

themselves in particular behaviours and events. Winch successfully questions the idea proposed by structuralism and psychoanalysis, namely that there exist deep structures that determine external expressions of social life. He claims that every social event should be analysed through the prism of the motivations that guide social actors, are shaped by cultural and historical factors, and cannot be expressed as general laws.<sup>60</sup> The main shortcoming of that approach, however, is the connection it makes between the idiographic nature of social sciences and cognitive and moral relativism.

The ideas of Bocheński allow to make a connection between the logical basis of philosophy<sup>61</sup> and the analysis of oversimplifications<sup>62</sup> and superstitions<sup>63</sup> that have long affected the development of Western societies.<sup>64</sup> Commenting on the methodological premises of scientific cognition, Bocheński stresses the fact that there exist numerous forms of epistemology, which undermines the positivistic notion of the unity of sciences yet simultaneously supports the argument about the logical unity of knowledge. According to Bocheński, the basic logical laws are universal – the theorems that question them must be rejected. Moreover, objective science is governed by its own logic, independent of the subjective beliefs and actions of its makers. Bocheński's methodological remarks lead to socio-philosophical conclusions: only scientific communities that share the faith in rationality may provide objective, scientific knowledge. In the contemporary world, Bocheński claims, knowledge and reason are constantly undermined, which may pose a threat to the very existence of humanity. Only a philosophy

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60 P. Winch, *Idea nauki o społeczeństwie i jej związki z filozofią*, trans. B. Chwadeńczuk, Oficyna Naukowa, Warszawa 1995.

61 J. M. Bocheński, *Logika i filozofia. Wybór pism*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 1993.

62 J. M. Bocheński, *Sens życia i inne eseje*, Wydawnictwo Philed, Kraków 1993.

63 J. M. Bocheński, *100 zabobonów. Krótki filozoficzny słownik zabobonów*, Wydawnictwo Philed, Kraków 2004.

64 See A. Jabłoński, "Ontologiczne i metodologiczne podstawy rozumienia społeczeństwa jako systemu w ujęciu J. M. Bocheńskiego," in: *Pomiędzy etyką a polityką. . .*, pp. 241–259; A. Jabłoński, "Co to jest społeczeństwo sprawiedliwe?," *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 1998, vol. 3–4, pp. 185–199; A. Jabłoński, "Etyka biznesu a mądrość, bogobojność i autorytet," *Annales. Etyka w życiu gospodarczym* 1999, vol. 2, pp. 85–95; A. Jabłoński, "Zmiany wizji podstawowej rzeczywistości w procesie globalizacji," in: *Unifikacja i różnicowanie się współczesnej Europy*, eds. B. Fijałkowska and A. Żukowski, Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, Warszawa 2002, pp. 259–266.



that applies all available means to provide a comprehensive vision of the world can solve this problem.<sup>65</sup>

The major inspiration for the members of the Department of Social Philosophy at the KUL continue to be Karl Popper and his research on the relationship between knowledge and social life. Popper was not interested in the subjective dimension of knowledge and science.<sup>66</sup> Rather than investigate how humans reach truth, he focused on the outcome of that process – particular achievements that may be analysed as the effect of human activity. As a result, science gains an institutional dimension and may be perceived as the best indicator of social development in the spirit of critical rationalism. Therefore, Popper's analysis of the open society is related to his idea of knowledge as the opposition between facts and criteria.<sup>67</sup> This opposition is the basis of Popper's

understanding of the human position in the world and the world's relation toward humans. From that point of view, being able to use cultural tools makes humans free, even though facts are independent of human decisions. It is not the opposition between facts and criteria, between what is independent of human actions and what depends on them; rather, it is the recognition of a constant tension between the two. Considering facts as natural and independent of human actions, and criteria as artificial and created by humans, Popper stresses the importance of that opposition for understanding human knowledge and the mechanisms that shape it.<sup>68</sup>

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65 J. M. Bocheński, *Współczesne metody myślenia*, W drodze, Poznań 1992, p. 138.

66 K. R. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, Routledge, London and New York 2002; K. R. Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism*, The Beacon Press, Boston 1957.

67 Popper claims that in Greek philosophy the opposition between facts and norms took the form of the opposition between nature and convention. "The opposition is expressed sometimes as one between 'nature' and 'law' (or 'norm' or 'convention'), sometimes as one between 'nature' and the 'positing' or 'laying down' (viz., of normative laws), and sometimes as one between 'nature' and 'art', or 'natural' and 'artificial.'" K. R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford 2013, p. 547. Popper explains that the opposition between facts and criteria, or between facts and politics is less confusing than the opposition between facts and decisions, or between theorems and propositions. Thanks to the distinction between facts and decisions, however, Popper was able to express the difference between hypothetical acceptance of politics or a criterion (temporary and preceded by a discussion), and the acceptance of a fact. "For the proposal to adopt a policy or a standard, its discussion, and the decision to adopt it, may be said to create this policy or this standard. On the other hand, the proposal of a hypothesis, its discussion, and the decision to adopt it—or to accept a proposition—does not, in the same sense, create a fact." Popper, *The Open Society*. . . , p. 499.

68 Jabłoński, *Budowanie społeczeństwa wiedzy*. . . , p. 93.

The goal is not, however, to separate facts from criteria, and descriptions from directives, but to draw conclusions from the fact that every social action consists of both descriptive and normative elements. That statement no longer seems banal once we have understood that it lies at the foundation of the artificial division of sciences. By classifying sociology as an exact science (no matter whether it follows the principles of natural sciences or focuses on meaning), we repeat the mistake of focusing on facts and overlooking the criteria – values, points of view – responsible for their selection.<sup>69</sup>

Investigations conducted by the philosophy of social sciences separate a branch of sociology called philosophical sociology.<sup>70</sup> The challenges sociology must face stem from the crisis of trust regarding important social institutions such as the media, political authorities, science, religion, or banks. This lack of trust is related to the waning authority of norms and rules governing social life. Therefore, sociologists turned their attention to institutions which, instead of safeguarding values, undermine them. Anomy, differentiation, or the iron cage of rationality no longer serve as sufficient explanations.<sup>71</sup> The interest in the position of the normative sphere within social life results from the fact that, without referring to it, it is impossible to conceptualize the social. Sociological explanations point to the relation between failing institutions and individual

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69 K. R. Popper, *Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1994; K. R. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*, Basic Books, New York and London 1962.

70 “The idea of philosophical sociology seeks to elucidate the relationships between implicit notions of human nature and explicit conceptualizations of social life within sociology and argues that a normative vocation for sociology emerges out of implicit presuppositions about the shared humanity of human beings to be found inside sociological theorizing.” D. Chernilo, “The idea of philosophical sociology,” *The British Journal of Sociology* 2014, vol. 2, p. 340; see D. Chernilo, *Debating Humanity. Towards a Philosophical Sociology*, Cambridge University Press, New York 2017.

71 A. Jabłoński, “Knowledge in Forming the Public Sphere,” *Roczniki Nauk Społecznych* 2013, vol. 3, pp. 151–163. These issues are discussed during a series of conferences, *The study of knowledge*, organized by the Department of Social Philosophy; the papers delivered during the conferences were published in a series of monographs, including: A. Jabłoński and M. Zemło, (ed.), *Między unifikacją a dezintegracją. Kondycja wiedzy we współczesnym społeczeństwie*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2008; A. Jabłoński, J. Szymczyk, and M. Zemło (eds.), *Kontrowersje dyskursywne – między wiedzą specjalistyczną a praktyką społeczną*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2012; A. Jabłoński, J. Szymczyk, and M. Zemło (eds.), *Kreowanie społeczeństwa niewiedzy*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2015.

transgressions of humans who break norms and rules. Therefore, philosophical questions about values and human nature are transplanted onto the field of sociology as questions about the sources of the normative in social life and the basis of humanity.<sup>72</sup>

Sociological research into humanity is not concerned with uncovering the causal relation between human nature and society; rather, it seeks to elucidate the articulation of the idea of humanity in the normative obligations of important social circles. Chernilo refers to such a philosophically-oriented form of sociological research as a philosophically informed form of sociology.<sup>73</sup> One of the precursors of philosophical sociology is Margaret S. Archer.<sup>74</sup> Hers is a prominent example of critical realism applied to social ontology. Archer does not intend to blur the opposition between structure and action that is the point of departure for her morphogenetic analysis. Instead, she describes the opposition in terms of three main sequences of social processes.<sup>75</sup> Her analysis connects the structural and cultural conditions that precede individual actions. These actions are subsequently transformed into interactions between individual subjects who effect an institutional transformation of social structures and dominant cultural values into new forms and constellations. The analysis of the process of institutionalization of individual actions, whose goal is to achieve a structural and cultural transformation of society, may focus on a number of significant areas of social life. For instance, it may focus on: the development of the research-developmental sphere,<sup>76</sup> the social capital of Polish

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72 Chernilo, *The idea of philosophical sociology*. . . , p. 339.

73 *Ibid.*, p. 342.

74 M. S. Archer, et al. (eds.), *Critical Realism: Essential Readings*, Routledge, London and New York 1998; M. S. Archer, *Being Human: The Problem of Agency*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003; M. S. Archer, *Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995; M. S. Archer, *Culture and agency: The place of culture in social theory*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996; M. S. Archer, "Morphogenesis versus Structuration: On Combining Structure and Action," *The British Journal of Sociology* 2010, vol. 61, pp. 225–252; M. S. Archer (ed.), *Conversation About Reflexivity*, Routledge, Cambridge and New York 2010; M. S. Archer, *Social Origins of Educational Systems*, Routledge, London and New York 2013.

75 A. Jabłoński, "The review regarding the motion to confer on Professor Margaret Scotford Archer the title of doctor honoris causa of Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw," in: *Margaret S. Archer doktor honoris causa Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie*, Wydawnictwo UKSW, Warszawa 2017, pp. 27–38.

76 A. Jabłoński (ed.), *Zarządzanie wiedzą i społeczna odpowiedzialność w sektorze B+R*, Lublin 2009; A. Jabłoński (ed.), *Regulacje prawne i otoczenie finansowe sektora B+R*,

administration,<sup>77</sup> the position and role of intellectuals during the post-1989 transformation in Poland,<sup>78</sup> the transformation of higher education,<sup>79</sup> the formation of the society of knowledge,<sup>80</sup>

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Lublin 2009; A. Jabłoński and P. Kawalec (ed.), *Naukoznawstwo i ewaluacja w procesie kształcenia pracowników sektora B+R*, Lublin 2009.

- 77 A. Marek, *Kapitał społeczny powiatów a kultura organizacyjna starostw powiatowych w Polsce. Studium socjologiczne*, Lublin 2013 [PhD thesis written under the supervision of Arkadiusz Jabłoński].
- 78 T. Peciakowski, *Intelektualiści polscy. Analiza pola intelektualnego po 1989 roku*, Lublin 2016 [PhD thesis written under the supervision of Arkadiusz Jabłoński].
- 79 A. Jabłoński, “Kontrowersje wokół rozszerzania autonomii uczelni w Polsce,” in: *Segmenty aktywności społecznej a wartości: idee a praktyka*, ed. J. Szymczyk, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2012, pp. 87–109; A. Jabłoński, “Uniwersytet w Polsce – od ‘sukcesu’ ilości do ‘sukcesu’ jakości,” in: *Dostojny uniwersytet*, eds. M. S. Szczepański and A. Śliz, Oficyna Wydawnicza, Warszawa 2014, pp. 140–155; A. Jabłoński, “Akademia i Agora. Kształcenie woli i wola kształcenia,” in: *Lublin 2020. Cztery oblicza miasta*, eds. M. Sagan and K. Żuk, Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin 2014, pp. 27–36; A. Jabłoński, “Ograniczone zaufanie w działalności uniwersytetu,” in: *Zaufanie społeczne. Teoria – idee – praktyka*, ed. J. Szymczyk, Oficyna Naukowa, Warszawa 2016, pp. 287–309; A. Jabłoński, “Kształcenie na potrzeby gospodarki i rynku pracy – mity i rzeczywistość,” in: *Rynek pracy – uwarunkowania ekonomiczne, prawne i społeczne*, eds. T. Huńka, S. Lis, and P. Maciaszczyk, Wydawnictwo PWSZ w Tarnobrzegu, Tarnobrzeg 2015, pp. 163–179; M. Lipnicka, *Implementacja Procesu Bolońskiego w europejskim szkolnictwie wyższym. Instytucjonalna analiza porównawcza na przykładzie Polski i Niderlandów*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2017; N. Kopeć-Panek, *Rozumienie i realizacja idei społecznej odpowiedzialności uczelni*, Lublin 2015 [PhD thesis written under the supervision of Arkadiusz Jabłoński]; E. Pyzik, *Czynniki warunkujące pozycję kobiet w szkolnictwie wyższym. Socjologiczna analiza porównawcza Polski i Szwecji*, Lublin 2015 [PhD thesis written under the supervision of Arkadiusz Jabłoński]; A. Trawiński, *Przemiany instytucjonalne lubelskich Uniwersytetów w świetle postanowień Procesu Bolońskiego. Socjologiczna analiza porównawcza*, Lublin 2015 [PhD thesis written under the supervision of Arkadiusz Jabłoński].
- 80 A. Jabłoński, “Społeczno-etyczne uwarunkowania zarządzania wiedzą w organizacji,” in: *Praca, więź, integracja*, vol. 1: *Przedsiębiorczość, gospodarka oparta na wiedzy*, eds. U. Swadźba, B. Pactwa, and M. Żuk, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Katowice 2015, pp. 237–248; A. Jabłoński and A. Marek, “Przedsiębiorczość czynnikiem kształtowania relacji osobowych w zarządzaniu firmą,” in: *Nowe tendencje w zarządzaniu*, ed. M. Pawlak, Wydawnictwo KUL Lublin 2017, pp. 155–171; D. Rozpędowska, *Założenia i efekty realizacji programów rozwoju społeczeństwa informacyjnego w Polsce. Analiza socjologiczna na przykładzie Stalowej Woli*, Lublin 2017 [PhD thesis written under the supervision of Arkadiusz Jabłoński].

family,<sup>81</sup> discourse, or literature.<sup>82</sup>

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To conclude the presentation of the main premises that guide social philosophers in the KUL's Institute of Sociology, I would like to refer to the ideas of Fr. Franciszek Mirek.<sup>83</sup> This pioneer of Polish scientific sociology introduced a clear distinction between sociology and research concerned with the Catholic doctrine, social philosophy, or ethics. He believed, however, that

sociological research into human interactions encounters certain activities that *are clearly marked by 'obligation,' 'necessity,' 'compulsion,' 'duty' . . .* These activities, created by humans and *marked by that obligation*, are the object of sociological research. Because that intentional obligation – for all social actions are intentional – is created in one's conscience, we may claim – to borrow the term from ethics – that *the quality of one's conscience is the basis of social relationships*.<sup>84</sup>

It is the goal of philosophical sociology (or even theological sociology) to elucidate the normative dimension of social life expressed in human interactions based on social activities. Therefore, this anniversary re-examination of our beginnings allows us to uncover fresh ideas concerning the ways in which scientific sociology may be practiced, thus challenging the ideas of outstanding sociologists who claim that social facts exist independently of human subjects. To once again quote Fr. Franciszek Mirek,

Let us not, however, be deceived by that fictitious 'independence' – the way Durkheim was deceived when he considered 'social facts' to exist 'outside' and 'beyond' humans. Human conscience, the conscience of members of social groups, is awake. Whenever a social relationship, formalized by law and turned into a group institution, begins to operate against human conscience, *the ethical and individual core of the relationship is immediately revealed*.<sup>85</sup>

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81 A. Jabłoński, D. Gizicka, and M. Szyszka (eds.), *Współczesna rodzina polska. Wyzwania, dylematy, zagrożenia*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2014.

82 A. Jabłoński, "Zarys realistyczno-krytyczystycznej koncepcji socjologicznej analizy literatury," *Roczniki Nauk Społecznych* 2017, vol. 4, pp. 67–95; A. Jabłoński and P. Ćwikła, "Problem socjologii literatury," *Roczniki Nauk Społecznych* 2017, vol. 4, pp. 7–18.

83 According to E. Hałas, Franciszek Mirek was the father of sociology at KUL and he believed that sociology should be free of any form of ideology. E. Hałas, *Socjologia a etyka społeczna*. . . , p. 30.

84 F. Mirek, *Zarys socjologii*, TN KUL, Lublin 1948, pp. 460–463.

85 *Ibid.*, p. 464.

Sociology should not replace either ethics or philosophy, but it should take into consideration philosophical and social ideas that transform it into a practical science whose goal is to build a just society that reduces evil and suffering.

## II. ELEMENTS OF MACROSOCIOLOGY

Macrosociology is one of the main branches of sociology that provides its own way of conducting sociological analyses. Macrosociology investigates large-scale social phenomena; by focusing on large-scale processes, it provides general sociological theories. Its main focus are macrostructures, i.e. complex systems that operate on the basis of established patterns and the relations between these patterns' components. Macrosociology investigates large-scale social groups, institutions, systems, and social processes. Thanks to macrosociology, we learn about the nature of these phenomena and the consequences of their development, and we identify large-scale social actors or factors that determine social change.<sup>86</sup> Simultaneously, macrostructures are systems that frame and determine the direction of social life, affecting micro- and mesostructures or the functioning of social movements. Their main features include: complexity, elaborate relations between components, and relative resistance to interference and disintegration. The emotional bond between individuals within macrostructures is rooted in shared symbols, signs, and basic values. Other features of macrostructures include the lack of interpersonal relations during social communication, relative autonomy, self-referentiality (the point of reference is a given macrostructure), and self-sufficiency.<sup>87</sup> Macrosociology takes a global view on society and analyses it in terms of social order, social systems, social dynamics and social statics, social organization, the nation, the state, class and social stratification, etc.<sup>88</sup> These forms of social life are investigated by the members of the Department of Sociology of Macrostructures and Social Movements (in Polish nomenclature KSMiRS), part of the Institute of Sociology at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin.

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86 J. Szymczyk, "Struktury społeczne," in: *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. XVIII, TN KUL, Lublin 2013, pp. 1050 ff.

87 T. Parsons, *System społeczny*, trans. M. Kaczmarczyk, Nomos, Kraków 2009, p. 25; S.F. Nadel, *The Theory of Social Structure*, Free Press, Glencoe, Ill. 1957, p. 56; P. Rybicki, *Struktura społecznego świata. Studia z teorii społecznej*, PWN, Warszawa 1979, p. 67; H. Domański, *Struktura społeczna*, PWN, Warszawa 2007, p. 89; E. Wnuk-Lipiński, *Socjologia życia publicznego*, Scholar, Warszawa 2008, p. 78.

88 J. Szymczyk, "Socjologia struktur społecznych," in: *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. XVIII, TN KUL, Lublin 2013, k. 493–494.

## 1. Rudimentary sociological discourses and their relation to social macrostructures

When sociology was first established, it investigated mainly social processes occurring on a macro-social level.<sup>89</sup> At that time, the term “society” served as the main analytical category applied to structures and large-scale groups; sociology investigated these groups’ components, relations between them, the factors responsible for their stability and disintegration, and the mechanisms of their change. That is why the term “macrostructure” is even nowadays often applied to denote a system or a society. In the past, sociologists differed in their understanding of the terms “macrostructure” and “society;” some considered them equivalent, other did not.<sup>90</sup> As a result, sociologists engaged in a discussion whether society is the sum of individuals or whether it is an entirely different entity, one that cannot be identified with the sum of its component parts (the argument between nominalism and realism, or between individualism and holism). According to another approach propagated by some macrosociologists, society is not an objective, real fact, but a subjective one – people believe in society, especially if it directly affects them. The proponents of genetic modalism, on the other hand, claim that even though individuals are the only real entities, they are capable of comprehending the existence of phenomena such as community or social phenomena that transcend the individual. Contemporary attempts to overcome the aforementioned dichotomy either search for a common ground for these divergent points of view or emphasize the so-called morphogenetic approach,<sup>91</sup> according to which society is shaped and transformed by both intentional and unintentional actions of subjects.<sup>92</sup> These issues are investigated by the members of the KSMiRS in their publications and during their classes.

There are two additional approaches concerned with the relation between a structure and society. The first approach stresses the similarities between the two, such as the lack of a clear terminological distinction between a social structure and society (the latter is defined in biological terms, for instance as an organism). The second approach focuses on the differences between the two (it stresses the fact that a structure is static, whereas society is a dynamic whole undergoing

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89 Ibid.

90 J. Szymczyk, “Społeczeństwo,” in: *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. XVIII, TN KUL, Lublin 2013, k. 692–694.

91 M. S. Archer, *Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995, pp. 23 ff.

92 J. Szacki, *Historia myśli socjologicznej*, PWN, Warszawa 2002, p. 45 ff.



transformations). It must be noted, however, that some scholars consider social structures to be dynamic entities. Such an approach is represented, for instance, by Norbert Elias<sup>93</sup> (who coined the term 'figuration' to describe the ongoing process of creation, transformation, and disintegration social forms undergo) or Anthony Giddens<sup>94</sup> (whose theory of structuration emphasizes the fact that all social systems are processes).

Also, the members of the KSMiRS investigate the laws and criteria according to which the social world is structuralized. Therefore, one of the notions they research is the solution proposed by Stanisław Ossowski. Ossowski distinguished between three ideal types of a social structure.<sup>95</sup> The first type is the dichotomous model – society is divided into opposing groups connected by asymmetrical relations (e.g. the rich – the poor). This model – described as a class structure – emphasizes conflict. The second type is the functional model – the elements of the social structure are treated as parts of a certain whole. They serve different functions, but are interdependent. That is why this model stresses the importance of relations that stem from the division of labour (e.g. the employer – the employee). The functional model – defined as a socio-occupational structure – emphasizes cooperation. The third type is the gradation model – society is a hierarchy consisting of groups of people distinguished by their social positions, such as education, income, wealth, or prestige. In this model, social actors are connected by various types of relations: bonds, distances, hierarchies, and social antagonisms. The gradation model emphasizes social stratification.<sup>96</sup>

In their publications and during classes, the members of the KSMiRS notice the fact that some authors question the ontological status of macrosociology. The root of that criticism lays in the assumption that instead of structures, sociology should investigate the dynamics of social life and the subjectivity of social actors. The notion of social structures (including macrostructures) seems, however, an integral part of sociology, and the critics seem to misunderstand the very

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93 N. Elias, *O procesie cywilizacji: analizy socjo- i psychogenetyczne*, trans. T. Zabłudowski, K. Markiewicz, W.A.B., Warszawa 2011, p. 89.

94 A. Giddens, *Stanowienie społeczeństwa. Zarys teorii strukturacji*, trans. S. Amsterdamski, Zysk i S-ka, Poznań 2003, p. 55.

95 S. Ossowski, "Struktura klasowa w społecznej świadomości," in: idem, *Dzieła*, vol. 5: *Z zagadnień struktury społecznej*, PWN, Warszawa 1968, pp. 85–256; idem, "Zagadnienia struktury społecznej," in: idem, *Dzieła*, vol. 5, pp. 9–82.

96 S. Ossowski, "Struktura klasowa w społecznej świadomości. . .," pp. 174 ff; cf. J. Szymczyk, *W świecie ludzkich kreacji. Stanisława Ossowskiego koncepcja rzeczywistości społecznej*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2005, p. 452 ff.

nature of these categories. A social structure is not a static system. It maintains a dynamic balance: it is a constellation of numerous 'movable' forms of social life that perform particular actions and simultaneously undergo transformation. It is difficult to even imagine how one could practice general sociology (or one of its branches) neither understanding these basic features of a social structure nor applying that knowledge in one's research. Therefore, the sociology of social structures (including macrosociology) simultaneously provides a background for other fields of sociology and applies their findings to its own research.<sup>97</sup>

Both the Institute of Sociology and the KSMiRS consider the investigation of large-scale elements of social life an important segment of their research. Beyond doubt, Jan Turowski's writings, including the textbook *Socjologia. Wielkie struktury społeczne* [Sociology. Large-scale Social Structures],<sup>98</sup> are an important contribution to that research. Turowski's textbook is well-known outside Lublin and is often used by Polish academic teachers to conduct classes on macrosociology. The textbook discusses such issues as the nature and types of social phenomena, society and its structure (main theories of social structure), and social development (the notion of social change, development, and progress; types of society; social movements and their impact on social development).<sup>99</sup>

Turowski's next essential field of research includes: sociological analysis of the state (theories, functions, and stages of development of the state; the notion of the authority of the state and types of that authority; typologies of the state); political parties and the conditions for democracy (political pluralism versus a one-party system; local governments as the basis for democracy).<sup>100</sup> Turowski's thoughts on the political community corresponded with his ideas about the nation. He considered the nation to be an ideological and cultural community, and, consequently, analysed such notions as the plurality of the forms of national life, the genesis and various theories of the nation, the development of national culture and national consciousness, and the relation between the nation and the state.<sup>101</sup>

Another important section in Turowski's textbook is devoted to class and the stratification system. Turowski discusses various class and stratification theories, the notion of social stratification, and the transformations of the class and

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97 Ch. Crothers, *Social Structure*, Routledge, London and New York 1996, p. 123.

98 J. Turowski, *Socjologia. Wielkie struktury społeczne*, TN KUL, Lublin 1994; idem, *Socjologia. Małe struktury społeczne*, TN KUL, Lublin 1993.

99 J. Turowski, *Socjologia. Wielkie struktury społeczne. . .*, pp. 33–104.

100 Ibid., pp. 105–140.

101 Ibid., pp. 141–166.

stratification structure of modern societies (including Poland). He analyses the importance of the division of labour in societies and provides a classification of professions; also, he addresses the notion of the professionalization of societies and the transformations of the occupational structure.<sup>102</sup>

The final sections of *Socjologia. Wielkie struktury społeczne* are devoted to such issues as: local communities (different theoretical approaches to the notion); definitions, types, and forms of industrialization; and urbanization (its determinants and stages, for example in the Polish People's Republic).<sup>103</sup>

## 2. Continuations and new perspectives in macrosociology

The members of the KSMiRS believe that a social macrostructure is more than the sum of its component parts; rather, it is a system of interconnected elements. Society is an integral unity that transcends its individual members. The notion of a macrostructure is an immanent construct, a “backbone” of a dynamic society, an “internal” part of it. That is why the members of the Department understand a macrostructure simultaneously as an abstract, static category and as a reist, dynamic, objective being. The first understanding does not take into account neither the lives of individual people nor the dynamics of social life. This approach applies the notion of a macrostructure as a theoretical concept, an ideal type sociologists use to analyse, classify, and explain empirical data; it is a tool applied to better understand social life. This perspective alludes to the ancient philosophical division between the form and the content. A social structure perceived as a so-called pure form is not yet a real object. The notion of pure social forms was introduced to sociology by Georg Simmel. Pure forms may be analysed outside their particular contexts or without their content. A branch of sociology devoted to analysing such abstract and static forms is called formal sociology.

On the other hand, the reist-dynamic point of view implies that a given social whole is a real, empirical being composed of particular elements; it is not merely a creation (a model) of a sociologist but a social reality. As it is an empirical notion that refers to real phenomena and includes all manifestations of collective human life, this category (sometimes referred to as “social life”) is not identical with the idea of a social structure understood as a pure form.

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102 Ibid., pp. 167–196.

103 Ibid., pp. 211–265.

The goal of the research conducted by the members of the KSMiRS is to determine the fundamental forms of social life and analyse the structural and functional relations between them. A macrostructure is also analysed in terms of its structure and components. The structure refers to the “internal” organization, the anatomy of social categories connected through the system of social relations. When focusing on the components of a macrostructure, the scholars analyse statistical data. In this case, they consider a (demographic) macrostructure to be the composition of a population according to a particular feature (e.g. sex, age, place of residence). This approach focuses, for instance, on age, religious, ethnic, or professional structures.

During their classes, the members of the Department discuss theoretical approaches to social processes and macrostructures, the sociology of power and politics, social diversity, or the transformations of the global society. Therefore, they focus on such notions as the idea of a macrostructure (its theories, models, the aforementioned abstract-static and reist-dynamic points of view, the criteria of the structuralization of the social world), types of society, the features of macrostructures (including the determinants of social processes), as well as the notion of social change and theories of social development.<sup>104</sup>

Crucial in the discussions is the notion of class and social stratification.<sup>105</sup> The topics investigated by the KSMiRS include: theories of class; contemporary transformations of the class structure (the so-called death of traditional classes); transnational capitalism; the metropolitan class; the creative class; the precariat or classes connected with knowledge, information, and cyberspace; and classes that exist outside the system. Researching social stratification, the scholars focus on the history of the notion (e.g. Max Weber’s definition), systems, types, and research methods, as well as models of social stratification (e.g. the functional theory or the EGP model).<sup>106</sup> Finally, the members of the KSMiRS pay particular attention to the notion of the middle class, which is reflected in many theses of their students who, for instance, investigate the differences between the old and the new middle class (the role and functions of the new middle class, the living situation of the middle class in Poland).<sup>107</sup>

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104 J. Szymczyk, “Społeczeństwo,” in: *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. XVIII, TN KUL, Lublin 2013, pp. 692–694.

105 J. Szymczyk, *Struktury społeczne...*, pp. 1050 ff; idem, *Socjologia struktur społecznych...*, pp. 493–494.

106 J. Szymczyk, “Stratyfikacja społeczna,” in: *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. XVIII, TN KUL, Lublin 2013, k. 1008–

107 Cf. K. Czwalik, *Dominujące wartości klasy średniej we współczesnej Polsce*, Lublin 2007 [MA thesis written under the supervision of Jan Szymczyk].

Another important subject examined by the members of the Department is the sociological understanding of the nation (its genesis, structural elements, models, and theories; the definition and types of nationalism; a comparison of the nation and the state, and of the nation and other social categories such as society, homeland, ethnic or national minority).<sup>108</sup> The scholars investigate also another significant macrostructure – the state.<sup>109</sup> They analyse its organizational and structural elements (e.g. population and territory, the issues of authority and legal coercion) or the notions of political culture and civil society.<sup>110</sup> The members of the KSMiRS are also interested in such specific issues as the functioning of democracy (polyarchy),<sup>111</sup> the social dimension of power (the sources and types of power<sup>112</sup>), the relation between power (including local power) and the media,<sup>113</sup> the notion and types of oligarchy and relations between clients and

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- 108 J. Szymczyk, "Socjologia narodu," in: *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. XVIII, TN KUL, Lublin 2013, p. 499.
- 109 J. Szymczyk, "Socjologia polityki," in: *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. XVIII, TN KUL, Lublin 2013, p. 503; M. Pabich, "Przyczyny braku zaufania obywateli do państwa w pismach przedstawicieli Ośrodka Myśli Politycznej," in: *Zaufanie społeczne. Teoria – idee – praktyka*, ed. J. Szymczyk, Oficyna Naukowa, Warszawa 2016, p. 270–284.
- 110 M. Pabich, "Elementy kultury politycznej w świadomości częstochowskiej młodzieży ponadgimnazjalnej," in: *Wartości – interesy – struktury społeczne. Uwarunkowania ludzkiej kreatywności i partycypacji w życiu publicznym*, ed. J. Szymczyk, Norbertinum, Lublin 2010, p. 101–124; idem, "Idea społeczeństwa obywatelskiego a aktywność społeczna częstochowskiej młodzieży ponadgimnazjalnej," in: *Segmenty aktywności społecznej a wartości. Idee i praktyka*, ed. J. Szymczyk, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2012, pp. 211–229.
- 111 M. Dobrogowska, *Koncepcja poliarchii w pismach Edmunda Wnuka-Lipińskiego*, Lublin 2015 [PhD Thesis written under the supervision of Jan Szymczyk].
- 112 J. Szymczyk, "Wokół relacjonistycznego rozumienia władzy," in: *Wiedza – władza*, eds. J. Szymczyk, M. Zemło, A. Jabłoński, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2009, pp. 51–66.
- 113 The analysis of that relationship provides numerous interesting ideas regarding relations in local communities (J. Szymczyk, "Elementy interakcji: media lokalne a władza samorządowa," in: *Spółczesność, przestrzeń – rodzina Księga jubileuszowa dedykowana profesorowi Piotrowi Kryczce*, ed. M. Szyszka, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2009, pp. 201–212; idem, "Między wolnością a tendencjami uniformizacyjnymi. Z problematyki funkcjonowania mass mediów w demokracji," in: *Między unifikacją a dezintegracją. Kondycja wiedzy we współczesnym świecie*, eds. A. Jabłoński, M. Zemło, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2008, pp. 255–271). This concept is also a subject of numerous MA theses written under the supervision of Jan Szymczyk (K. Drózdź, *Aksjologiczny ogląd polskich elit politycznych na podstawie tygodnika "Polityka" w latach 1997–2005*, Lublin 2007; S. Gralec, *Wartości kultury politycznej Polaków w*

patrons,<sup>114</sup> the meaning and types of leadership in democracy, contemporary forms of the legitimization of power, and the notion of the elite (the ways of recruitment to the political elite and the methods social sciences may use to analyse the political elite).<sup>115</sup>

The issues investigated by macrosociology are connected with the factors and processes responsible for social heterogeneity and social inequality.<sup>116</sup> Therefore, the members of the Department are interested in the following issues: social heterogeneity (its determinants, levels, and criteria, for instance in the context of social position, social capital, trust, meritocracy, social mobility<sup>117</sup>); social inequality (e.g. in relation to the notion of social justice) and its sources, types, and research models. What is more, the members of the KSMiRS investigate such social problems as poverty, social exclusion, and discrimination (e.g. due to age, sex, ethnicity, religion).<sup>118</sup> They are particularly interested in the relation between poverty and social marginalization and the social capital of impoverished families. This interest is reflected in articles and papers delivered at conferences. The scholars also research social inequalities perceived through the prism of numerous ideologies (e.g. leftist and egalitarian, or liberal and meritocratic), and social heterogeneity in post-industrial societies. They discuss forms of social heterogeneity and social inequality in Poland (their causes and manifestations, the phenomenon of social stratification, the main features of Polish poverty). Finally, they analyse the notion of lifestyle, functions of national symbols, and axiological elements present in the consciousness of Poles.

The members of the Department analyse the connection between macrostructures and globalization. Therefore, they focus on the notion of

*świetle analizy kampanii wyborczych z 2005 r. Na podstawie dzienników i tygodników prasowych*, Lublin 2007).

- 114 J. Szymczyk, "Układy patronacko-klienckie w perspektywie społecznych uwarunkowań wiedzy: pomiędzy oglądami a obrazami," in: *Wiedza między słowem a obrazem*, eds. M. Zemło, A. Jabłoński, J. Szymczyk, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2010, pp. 283–298.
- 115 J. Szymczyk, *Wokół relacjonistycznego rozumienia władzy...*, pp. 51–66; cf. K. Woźniak, *Preferowane wartości lokalnych liderów partii politycznych. Na podstawie badań socjologicznych w Lublinie*, Lublin 2013 [MA thesis written under the supervision of Jan Szymczyk].
- 116 P. Blau, *Inequality and Heterogeneity*, The Free Press, New York 1977, p. 90; M. Hamilton, M. Hirszowicz, *Klasy i nierówności społeczne w perspektywie porównawczej*, ISP PAN, Warszawa 1995, p. 56.
- 117 H. Domański, *O ruchliwości społecznej w Polsce*, PWN, Warszawa 2004, p. 20.
- 118 Cf. J. Zabielska, *Ubóstwo a procesy marginalizacji społecznej*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2007.

globalization (its different aspects, stages, and research perspectives), its rudimentary dimensions, the role of transnational corporations, the sovereignty of the nation state in the age of globalization and European integration, the notion of glocalization and its manifestations, migration and social mobility in the age of globalization,<sup>119</sup> and alternatives to globalization (e.g. anti- and alter-globalism).

The final area of interest of the KSMiRS includes: the connection between macrostructures and local and regional communities (their activity, promotion, chances for and barriers to development); major theories of mesostructures; the notion of localism and the issue of local autonomy in numerous socio-political systems. The researchers also investigate elements of rural and urban sociology<sup>120</sup> (e.g. the social nature of urban space; how urban space is produced, perceived, and evaluated).<sup>121</sup>

### 3. Macrostructures and the complementarity principle

In their research (focused on a broad range of subjects, from macrostructures, social heterogeneity, and globalization, through social movements, power, politics, sport, and tourism, to non-verbal communication and the sociology of the body), the members of the KSMiRS attempt to apply the complementarity principle.<sup>122</sup> This approach is reflected both in their publications and the MA theses of their students.<sup>123</sup>

Like social life, sociological discourse is filled with numerous taxonomies, reductionist visions, or even “artificial” divisions. The discourse appears to be

119 These issues are also present in MA theses supervised by Jan Szymczyk (cf. K. Szabat, *Stereotyp Niemca w świadomości mieszkańców wsi – emigrantów zarobkowych. Na przykładzie gminy Aleksandrów*, Lublin 2009).

120 J. Szymczyk, “Socjologia miasta,” in: *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. XVIII, TN KUL, Lublin 2013, pp. 500 ff; cf. M. Januchta, *Cele życiowe jako wartości w świadomości rolników. Na przykładzie gminy Łączna*, Lublin 2009 [MA thesis written under the supervision of Jan Szymczyk].

121 A. Trojszczak, *Przestrzeń społeczna wielkiego miasta w świadomości działaczy społecznych. Na podstawie badań socjologicznych*, Lublin 2013 [PhD Thesis written under the supervision of Jan Szymczyk].

122 Cf. B. Siewierski, “Czy możliwe jest zastosowanie zasady komplementarności w socjologii?” *Studia Socjologiczne* 1988, no. 2, pp. 79–81.

123 J. Szymczyk, “Katedra Socjologii Makrostruktur i Ruchów Społecznych. W stronę realizacji zasady komplementarności,” in: *Tradycja i współczesność. 90 lat socjologii w Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim*, eds. S. Fel, J.P. Gałkowski, J.M. Zabielska, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2009, pp. 145–151.

dominated by extreme points of views that prevent scholars from bridging the gap between particular epistemological perspectives. On one end of the spectrum are those who stress universal categories characterised by a high degree of generality; the other end is occupied by those who propagate fragmentary categories that may be applied only to particular segments of social reality. On the one hand, we are affected by objective factors that are independent of individual will; on the other, we are influenced by subjective factors linked with human consciousness. One perspective stresses the continuity of social reality; the other emphasizes social change. Faced with these dichotomies, individuals often assume an arbitrary position and accept one of the criteria that organize social world. Consequently, fragmentation prevails over co-structuring and multiple perspectives, which results in the ignoring of the rudimentary assumption that each individual phenomenon consists of social categories and *vice versa*.

In their publications, the members of the Department investigate a possibility of bridging that gap and search for a way which would enable these two ends of the spectrum, the stereotypical dichotomies that are often treated as paradigms (e.g. subject-object), to cooperate.<sup>124</sup> When researching social interactions rooted in axiology and ideological premises, our goal is to establish a dialogue between individualism and holism (social wholes); when investigating social actions, we search for co-determinants from both the private and the public sphere; when examining the fragmentary world of science, we search for co-structuring or interdisciplinary cooperation. We are also interested in the connection between the objective shape and functioning of a given system or a social subject and individual, subjective factors, such as consciousness and individual actions, that form particular social structures.<sup>125</sup> The analysis of the correlation between categories (e.g. the correlation between an individual and society) does not necessarily imply that these categories are identical and thus devoid of their ontological identity. The question about the nature and quality of an interaction between social structures and individual social actors is necessary in forming sociological theories, including the theories of macrostructures.

According to the complementarity principle, a sociologist must take into account the plurality of scientific approaches. We believe that a relatively integral view of the analysed object is impossible without integrating the isolated

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124 J. Szymczyk, *Elements of the Application of the Complementarity Principle. Issues of the Sociology of Subjectivity and Social Structures*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2014, pp. 5–8.

125 J. Szymczyk, *Katedra Socjologii Makrostruktur i Ruchów Społecznych*. . . , pp. 145–151.



epistemological or theoretical approaches (e.g. without connecting interpretative sociology, subjectivity, and individualism with structuralism and holism). If a scholar focuses only on one theoretical approach, such a reductionist vision will never account for all the aspects and problems of the object under analysis. Therefore, the investigation of social structures (the objects that make up the social world) and the activities of individuals or collective actors of public life (the point of view that focuses on subjects) must not consider them as completely separate, but must be conducted through the application of the individualist-structural approach.<sup>126</sup> This approach is also called the complementarity principle. According to the main assumption of the principle, the analysis must simultaneously account for the studies conducted on the level of macrostructures (the so-called top-down perspective) and the examinations of individuals in their numerous roles: citizens, clients, employees, members of organizations, social activists, consumers, etc.<sup>127</sup>

As a consequence, the members of the KSMiRS assume that sociology investigates neither individual experiences nor “social wholes;” rather, it focuses on social interactions, practices, and actualizations that occur in particular time and space. This perspective is in opposition to monist approaches that focus on a singular factor (or a group of descriptive features) as the only or main category capable of explaining social reality, simultaneously questioning the validity of other etiologies. By applying the complementarity principle, we do not advocate for an eclectic, uncritical collage of various epistemological approaches. On the contrary, the principle offers numerous possibilities of establishing a plane where particular elements of divergent points of views may be confronted with one another; consequently, it allows for the investigation of the reasons behind the divergence and helps in finding solutions to numerous dilemmas. The complementarity principle advocates dialogue, dynamics, openness, and plurality. It opposes any dogmatic attachment to both a common way of thinking and all orthodoxies. On the one hand, it should be considered as a natural rule; on the other, it does not exclude the uniqueness of alternative approaches. What this means is that the rule should be applied with caution and moderation, even though it may prove particularly useful in analysing complex visions of

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126 P. Sztompka, *Socjologia. Analiza społeczeństwa*, Znak, Kraków 2002, p. 530.

127 Cf. M. Tomasiak, *Fenomen konsumpcji jako czynnik strukturyzacji społecznej w świadomości studentów. Na przykładzie KUL i UMCS w Lublinie*, Lublin 2012 [MA thesis written under the supervision of Jan Szymczyk].

social reality (such as macrostructures) that are threatened by reductionism and oversimplification.<sup>128</sup>

By applying the complementarity principle and accounting for the individualist-structural determinants, the members of the KSMiRS attempt to enhance the status of the subject; what is more, they try, whenever it is possible, to grasp and present the feeling of agency (theory of agency) in the consciousness of the analysed subjects.<sup>129</sup> This approach supports the thesis about the “social creation of reality” as accomplished by individual, social actors through their interactions within the context of pre-established structures. The perspective that accounts for both subjects and objects (also known as the psychosocial or relationist perspective) analyses social phenomena (situated within a particular historical and spatial context) that “appear” in individual consciousness; in other words, it coincides with the premises of the humanistic coefficient.

The complementarity principle may be first applied during the process of gathering sociological data; then, it may be implemented to analyse that data or present various visions of social reality. For instance, it may be used to discuss different types of relations: between heredity (genetics) and socio-cultural environment and their effect on individual identity; between internal and external experience; between diachronic and synchronic visions of social world; between the visions of society that stress conflict and those that emphasize integration (e.g. in terms of individuals that remain in conflict, the projects of social order, and social movements and counter-movements). By overemphasizing dichotomies, scholars present reality as fragmented and composed of extreme spheres (e.g. physical and mental states). As a result, they overlook intersubjective meanings ‘embodied’ in social reality that are a crucial component of that reality. Only by rejecting these extreme approaches and accepting the complementarity of the subject and the object may the nature of social phenomena be grasped.

The members of the Department stress the dynamic, fluctuating nature of social reality. In short, society is a sustained process. Therefore, it is possible to speak about its various transformations and metamorphoses. In turn, it is impossible to grasp these dynamics in isolation from individual potentialities, their conditions, and actualities (social events). These elements are crucial parts

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128 J. Szymczyk, “Zamiast wprowadzenia. O Katedrze Socjologii Makrostruktur i Ruchów Społecznych,” in: *Wartości – interesy – struktury społeczne. . .*, pp. 5–15; idem, *W świecie ludzkich kreacji. . .*, p. 452 ff.

129 J. Szymczyk, “Świadomość polityczna,” in: *Formy świadomości społecznej*, eds. K. Sztalt, M. Zemło, TN KUL, Lublin 2013, pp. 317–343.

of the aforementioned “social construction of reality.” That is why it is unacceptable to affirm the existence of absolute laws governing social life. Rather, one should consider the patterns in social life as a consequence of the internalization of values, norms, rules, and patterns created by humans in the process of their interaction. Therefore, it is difficult to accept either a pessimistic (chaos) or optimistic (teleology) vision of a social world. The history of numerous social phenomena indicates that the processes they undergo are diverse and ambiguous. These processes are neither ruled by some abstract laws of economy, technology, or politics, nor coincidental. A solution that oscillates between the two ends of the spectrum, the so-called fluctuating theory of social reality, seems a more acceptable choice.

One should also realize that the way numerous subjects situated on the “sociological map” (e.g. a map of social movements) function suggests a connection between individuals and social wholes (the so-called bilateralism of social reality). This phenomenon points to the interconnection between individuals and social factors. However, particular ideas about specific social phenomena are connected with general sociological theories. That is why the investigation of specific categories or phenomena must account for a general vision of society (macrostructures). On the other hand, the results of that investigation increase the credibility of a given general theory of society and undermine others.

Therefore, the thesis that the phenomena under sociological investigation may be accessed only through external observation may falsify – both in theory and in practice – the vision of social reality. Undoubtedly, one should be aware of the fact that to grasp the internal, subjective elements of the social world is no easy task. Nevertheless, sociological research must not be limited to observations and overgeneralizations so typical of behaviourists or naturalists. For even if research begins with registering external behaviours, the final analysis of the gathered data moves onto the level of deliberations about the ‘internal’ nature of human activity. Consequently, one realizes that the world of human activities (the object), unlike the world investigated by physics or natural sciences, is never entirely external to a sociologist (the subject). A sociologist (a subject) learns how to understand, experience, and recognize the phenomena he or she investigates (objects).

Research conducted by a social scientist should avoid reductionists visions of such phenomena as the status of social consciousness or the internalization of particular axiological categories. The nature of social phenomena is “rooted” in the consciousness of particular individuals, the interactions between them, or the intersubjective determinants of their views. Therefore, the application of the complementarity principle is crucial in explaining the specificity of social

interactions. What is more, in order to examine the forms of social participation undertaken by individuals, or the functioning of such phenomena as macrostructures, new social movements, centres of power, or the media, one must either take into consideration their co-determinants or account for the mutual effects the private and the public sphere may have on each other. Finally, the principle of co-structuring is an important part of interdisciplinary cooperation. In the light of the ongoing argument between the naturalist (genetic and biological) and constructivist (socio-cultural) approach, and in the context of the proliferation of visions that emphasize the fragmentary nature of reality, an approach that advocates for multiple perspectives seems especially valuable.

On the other hand, it must be stressed that by applying the complementarity principle or by accounting for co-determinants or co-structuring of particular phenomena, objects, and processes, we do not question these beings' real and methodological "sovereignty." Even though there are differences between them, the beings remain in certain symbiosis. Therefore, they cannot be considered equivalent. Consequently, the relation between individualism and holism, the private and the public, fragmentation and co-structuring indicates the existence of a sphere where both specific and singular functions and the premises and goals of given categories are accomplished. As a result, these categories may be seen as circles that cross rather than overlap each other. Having the aforementioned reservation in mind, one may argue that they are compatible or complementary.

#### 4. The axiological perspective in macrosociology

In macrostructures (e.g. the nation or the state), social communication or social and emotional bonds between individuals or groups are not established through "face-to-face" interactions; rather, they are rooted in the recognition of shared symbols and values. The sociological research of values is a well-established perspective both in theoretical and empirical approaches. Therefore, an increasing number of scholars believe that the "axiological perspective" can be applied to the research of social life, consciousness, and individual attitudes toward particular objects.<sup>130</sup> The members of the Department share that belief. The notion of values functions in sociology among other ideas with which it is connected through definitions, propositions, and hypotheses. Values form an epistemological system that humans apply to describe and evaluate the world; in that system,

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130 J. Szymczyk, "Przemiany wartości Polaków. Wybrane aspekty i tendencje," in: *Spoleczne i etyczne aspekty rozwoju spolecznego*, eds. W. Jedynek, J. Kinal, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego, Rzeszów 2015, pp. 7–34.

certain facts, phenomena, and objects are considered more significant than others.<sup>131</sup> The system reflects an individual's hierarchy of values, even though it accounts also for the horizontal connection between axiological categories<sup>132</sup>. Establishing the components of the system of values presents a challenge to not only researchers, for they must select particular axiological categories, but also respondents, who often find the choice of categories difficult.<sup>133</sup>

Therefore, one may assume that the best approach to analysing the world of values is the psychosocial perspective (or, to put it another way, the approach that accounts for the relations between the subject and the object).<sup>134</sup> Values are the consequence of the relation between an active subject and particular external objects. Within that approach, one may stress either the subject's or the object's role in forming values. Such a viewpoint is the basis of numerous sociological typologies of values. According to Franz Adler, the definitions of values can be divided into three categories: values considered as intrinsic to material or non-material objects (the object approach); values equated with actions – connected with the relation between the subject and the object (the “in-between” approach); and values intrinsic to man (the subject approach).<sup>135</sup>

The study of values may be conducted from the point of view of macrostructures (the “society approach”). The goal of such an analysis is to investigate various forms and categories through the prism of axiology. This perspective does not exclude the “individual approach” – searching for particular values or systems of values, connections, or at least a certain “axiological climate” in individual subjects. These two approaches are complementary. To some extent, they correspond to two other perspectives: the sociocentric approach (analysing axiological aspects of reality in the context of systems and social groups) and the

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131 A. Gurycka, “Systemy wartości młodzieży licealnej 1978–1989,” *Psychologia Wychowawcza* 1991, no. 2, p. 132.

132 J. Koralewicz-Zębiak, *System wartości a struktura społeczna*, Ossolineum, Wrocław 1974, p. 47.

133 U. Swadźba, “Praca, religia, rodzina. Od wartości materialistycznych do postmaterialistycznych?” *Folia Sociologica* 2014, no. 48, p. 55; S. Jałowiecki, *Struktura systemu wartości. Studium zróżnicowań międzygeneracyjnych*, PWN, Warszawa–Wrocław 1978, pp. 38 ff.

134 J. Szymczyk, *Odkrywanie wartości. Z problematyki socjologiczno-aksjologicznej*, Polihymnia, Lublin 2004, pp. 120–145; idem, *Pomiędzy marzeniami a faktami. Szkice socjologiczne*, Norbertinum, Lublin 2005, pp. 133–150.

135 F. Adler, “The Value Concept in Sociology,” *The American Journal of Sociology* 1956, no. 3, p. 272 ff.

allocentric approach (considering human beings – autonomous individuals with their own ideals and goals – as the starting point for the analysis of society). What is more, in the analysis, values are investigated through the hierarchy of goals that humans strive to achieve in various spheres of their life (e.g. family, work, religion, social activity). Undoubtedly, axiological categories undergo diversification within particular groups and cultures. Such diversification occurs also in the case of an “axiological experience” (when an individual learns about values, internalizes and applies them). Each person, in addition to the elements he or she shares with others, has his or her own way of experiencing and implementing values.

In their research, the members of the Department often use the term value-orientation, coined by Clyde Kluckhohn. Kluckhohn defined a value-orientation as “a generalized and organized conception, influencing behavior, of nature, of man’s place in it, of man’s relation to man, and of the desirable and nondesirable as they may relate to man-environment and interhuman relations.”<sup>136</sup> Value-orientations, therefore, are certain generalized tendencies of perceiving, evaluating, experiencing, and reacting to social reality.<sup>137</sup> The term “generalized” implies that these orientations consist only of the main axiological categories applied by humans to evaluate objects, even though they may include particular content. Therefore, value-orientations are general categories into which humans may incorporate – through classification, definition, or evaluation – particular subjects, objects, or events.<sup>138</sup> Thus, the orientations refer to the criteria according to which individuals make their selection. The term value-orientation, as it includes such components as attitude, seems to capture the general human attitude toward the social world more accurately than the term value. With value-orientations it is possible to establish individuals’ status in their social environment, their activity, and attitude toward numerous objects. Finally, the orientations account for the way individuals attempt to achieve or internalize particular values as their life goals, and for various mechanisms and methods that affect their identity.<sup>139</sup>

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136 C. Kluckhohn, “Value and Value – Orientation in the Theory of Action,” in: *Toward a General Theory of Action*, eds. T. Parsons, E. Shils, Harvard University Press, Cambridge–Massachusetts 1967, p. 411.

137 J. Koralewicz, M. Ziółkowski, *Mentalność Polaków. Sposoby myślenia o polityce, gospodarce i życiu społecznym 1988–2000*, Scholar, Warszawa 2003, p. 16.

138 Ibid.

139 S. Marczuk, *Orientacje wartościujące nauczycieli w III Rzeczypospolitej. Studium z socjologii edukacji*, Wydawnictwo WSP, Rzeszów 2001, pp. 40 ff.

Recently, the members of the Department proposed an extended vision of the value-orientations model.<sup>140</sup> The project may be titled *Value-orientations and the patterns of social activity*. It discusses the rudimentary definition of values (including the affective and cognitive components of attitudes) and includes the analysis of social reality from the point of view of individualist and republican-conservative perspective. The analysis focuses on the following aspects: types of status (ascribed or achieved); categories of freedom and equality; materialism and post-materialism; elements of social capital (bonding and bridging social capital); types of trust (thick and thin); behavioural components of attitudes; and the typology of life goals. This model may be applied in qualitative analysis, especially during in-depth interviews.<sup>141</sup>

In their research, the members of the Department apply the axiological perspective.<sup>142</sup> In other words, they account for the relation between a social (macro) structure and values.<sup>143</sup> The issues that are of particular interest to the scholars include: freedom versus social participation; the axiological dimension of social bonds; social functions of ideological thinking; and structural conditions of value-orientations. Also, the Department has begun investigating attitudes and values of young people.<sup>144</sup>

140 J. Szymczyk, "Wartości a zachowania i działania społeczne," in: *Segmety aktywności społecznej*. . . , pp. 30 ff.

141 This approach was applied in MA theses supervised by Jan Szymczyk, for instance: P. Więcek, *Orientacje wartościujące reprezentantów sportu kwalifikowanego. Na przykładzie klubu „Korona Kielce”*, Lublin 2010; J. Słoniewska, *Orientacje wartościujące członków organizacji AIESEC. Na przykładzie Lublina*, Lublin 2011; P. Bobrek, *Orientacje wartościujące więźniów. Na przykładzie Aresztu Śledczego w Piotrkowie Trybunalskim*, Lublin 2014; D. Ptaszek, *Orientacje wartościujące osób uprawiających futbol amerykański. Na podstawie badań socjologicznych w Lublinie*, Lublin 2014; E. Olszak, *Orientacje wartościujące polskich imigrantów w Norwegii. Na podstawie badań socjologicznych w regionie Møre og Romsdal*, Lublin 2015; K. Morlewska, *Orientacje wartościujące nauczycieli. Na podstawie badań socjologicznych w gminie Miączyn*, Lublin 2017.

142 J. Szymczyk, *Odkrywanie wartości*. . . , p. 34 ff; idem, *Pomiędzy marzeniami a faktami*. . . , p. 98 ff.

143 In sociology, there are numerous, often divergent views on the relation between social structures and values. The divergence stems from the preferred definition of a social structure, theory of values (J. Szymczyk, *Pomiędzy marzeniami a faktami*. . . , pp. 133–134).

144 It is reflected in numerous MA theses supervised by Jan Szymczyk, for instance: A. Brzeska, *Spoleczno-aksjologiczne funkcje Stowarzyszenia Centrum Młodzieży „Arka” w Radomiu*, Lublin 2007; M. Pabich, *Postawy obywatelskie młodzieży ponadgimnazjalnej*.

The connection between macrostructures and values is particularly visible in a book series initiated by the Department, entitled *Studia nad wartościami. Perspektywa socjologii makrostruktur i ruchów społecznych* [*The Studies of Values. The Perspective of Macrostructures and Social Movements*].<sup>145</sup> The monographs discuss axiological categories from the point of view of macrostructures. Their goal is to analyse the forms of social life through the prism of values. On the other hand, they also account for the aforementioned “individual approach.” They often apply a broad approach to the notion of values, combining it with the three components of attitude (cognitive, affective, and behavioural). Both the macrostructural and individual approach aim at reconstructing values expressed through individual attitudes and actions; additionally, both approaches search for the causes and effects of “axiological options” chosen by particular individuals, and investigate the functions these options perform.<sup>146</sup> Not only do we investigate the notion of values, but we also strive to uncover values in the way people think about politics, economy, and public life. In other words, we research values as a consequence of discussing the major sociological issues.

Even though values upheld by individuals may to some extent explain their behaviours, attitudes, and views, they do not necessarily determine individuals’ willingness to participate in social life or take particular actions. Values are not tools that may be directly and rationally applied to achieve a given goal. They point to a certain “horizon of possibility” that social actors may, but do not have

*Na przykładzie IX LO im. C.K. Norwida i Technicznych Zakładów Naukowych w Częstochowie*, Lublin 2009; J. Jung, *Postawy studentów wobec demokracji. Na przykładzie Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego Jana Pawła II i Wyższej Szkoły Przedsiębiorczości i Administracji w Lublinie*, Lublin 2009; A. Maciąg, *Postawy dziewcząt wobec pracy zawodowej. Na przykładzie LO im. ONZ w Biłgoraju*, Lublin 2009; F. Pruszkowski, *Postawy polityczne młodzieży ponadgimnazjalnej. Na przykładzie XVI LO im. Augusta i Juliusza Vetterów w Lublinie*, Lublin 2011; I. Maciołek, *Postawy obywatelskie młodzieży ponadgimnazjalnej. Na przykładzie Zespołu Szkół Elektronicznych i Ogólnokształcących w Przemysłu*, Lublin 2014; K. Żurkiewicz, *Postawy dziewcząt wobec pracy zawodowej. Na przykładzie Zespołu Szkół nr 3 w Tomaszowie Lubelskim*, Lublin 2015.

145 So far four volumes have been published: *Wartości – interesy – struktury społeczne. Uwarunkowania ludzkiej kreatywności i partycypacji w życiu publicznym*, ed. J. Szymczyk, Norbertinum, Lublin 2010; *Segmenty aktywności społecznej a wartości. Idee i praktyka*, ed. J. Szymczyk, Wyd. KUL, Lublin 2012; J. Szymczyk, *Elements of the Application of the Complementarity Principle. Issues of the Sociology of Subjectivity and Social Structures*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2014; *Zaufanie społeczne. Teoria – idee – praktyka*, ed. J. Szymczyk, Oficyna Naukowa, Warszawa 2016.

146 J. Szymczyk, *Wartości a zachowania i działania społeczne. . .*, pp. 9–35.



to, explore. There is no direct causal link between one's support for a given collective action (rooted in the values shared by the individual) and one's participation in that action. The latter is determined by other factors, such as one's assessment of the possible success (favourable circumstances) and numerous restrictions.

The axiological approach, applied by the members of the Department, leads to the conclusion that sociological observations, conducted from the point of view of values (the values that people admit to, and especially these they accept and internalize), provide valuable data regarding the quality of different forms and structures of social life, such as the functioning of the state and its segments, or social movements. In many cases, people's values translate into their lifestyle, mentality, social identity, and strategies applied in social interactions. Through their activities, social actors produce various forms of collective identity, consolidate existing identities, and shape solidarity within given social structures. Values, norms, and interests, whether approved of or rebelled against, are at the centre of these identities. Therefore, an increasing number of scholars argue that the "axiological approach" is one of the strategies that can be applied to the investigation of social life, consciousness, and attitudes. One of the tasks that scholars applying that perspective have to face is organizing the significant amount of available data. Even though some of the work has already been done, the task is far from finished. Also, the scholars must situate the "axiological approach" within the context of other theories and traditions devoted to exploring social life.

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Macrostructures are complex systems consisting of numerous complicated relations between particular components. Obviously, in their functioning these large structures rely on small or medium social structures. Simultaneously, they provide smaller forms of social life with the foundations necessary for them to grow. Research conducted by the members of the Department indicates that within a macrostructure an individual is affected by certain factors. These factors include: one's occupation, position, financial situation, power, ability to participate in culture and develop values important for a given structure, attitudes, aspirations, religion, and ideology. One of the factors that affect macrostructures is economy. The shape and functioning of macrostructures is influenced by such elements of the market as economic growth rate, means of production, occupational structure, workforce, property ratio, national income and its redistribution. Other important factors that affect macrostructures are demography and geography (e.g. the size and landform features of a given country, its natural resources, and climate), political systems and ideologies (e.g. the composition of classes and social strata, and the way citizens understand basic values), culture

(e.g. the level of general education and people's lifestyles), and history (e.g. in the case of Poland, the period of the Polish People's Republic and the transformation that followed). The aforementioned issues are the object of research conducted by the members of the Department of Sociology of Macrostructures and Social Movements.

### III. STRUCTURAL CATEGORIES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The term “participation” derives from the Latin word *pars* – a part. From a sociological point of view, it is an independent category defined as taking part in the matters that concern a larger community and cooperating with others to achieve a common goal.<sup>147</sup> Therefore, participation may be understood as being a part of something, taking part in something, or feeling like a part of something. In most cases, the term “participation” is preceded by an adjective that defines it, for instance social, public, civic, individual, communal, vertical, or horizontal participation. Also, it is linked to other terms, such as social mobilization, self-organization, social activity, public activity, or social animation. Therefore, some authors stress the ambiguity of the term “participation.” First, it may mean the decentralization of power and granting certain powers to lower-ranking institutions. Secondly, participation may be identified with social or political mobilization. Thirdly, participation implies engagement (or inclusion in social actions) of the marginalized and the excluded.<sup>148</sup> The second and the third meaning of the term concern the activity of new social movements (NSMs). Such an understanding of both participation and new social movements is the object of research of the members of the Department of Sociology of Macrostructures and Social Movements (in Polish nomenclature KSMiRS).

#### 1. A general description of social movements

In colloquial terms, movement is associated with such terms as “action,” “change,” or “activity.” Movement is the opposite of constancy, stagnation, and immobility; it implies life, vitality, and development.<sup>149</sup> Therefore, the term “social movement” implies dynamism – collective activities whose goal is to either introduce or oppose

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147 A. Surdej, “Partycypacja,” in: *Encyklopedia socjologii*, vol. 3, Oficyna Naukowa, Warszawa 2000, p. 83.

148 B. Jałowiecki, M. Szczepański, *Rozwój lokalny i regionalny w perspektywie socjologicznej. Podręcznik akademicki*, ŚWN, WSZiNS, Tychy 2002, p. 19.

149 P. Kuczyński, “Początki socjologii ruchów społecznych w Polsce,” in: P. Kuczyński and M. Frybes, *W poszukiwaniu ruchu społecznego. Wokół socjologii Alaina Touraine’a*, Oficyna Naukowa, Warszawa 1994, p. 160.

change in a society, a group, or a system of values. However, not all actions and social movements must necessarily lead to a revolution or a radical socio-political change. For instance, certain social movements are merely an expression of civic engagement – they are grass roots initiatives whose goal is self-development.

From a historical point of view, social movements are a universal phenomenon that has accompanied humanity for centuries; examples include the uprisings and outbursts of discontent that occurred in the antiquity, the religious movements of the Middle Ages, peasant uprisings, cultural and ethnic movements of the Renaissance, or social movements during the English, French, and American revolutions. Undoubtedly, the strategies applied by social movements have been changing throughout the ages. The so-called “age of modern social movements” dates back to the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century, when social movements became so numerous and powerful that they had a significant impact on the socio-cultural change. Therefore, contemporary Western societies have a tendency to become “societies of social movements.” Finally, social movements are an essential element of every definition of contemporary politics, democracy, civic society, social or public participation.

The notion of social movements is used by sociologists, historians, political scientists, but also by social, political, or party activists. Each of these groups stresses different structural elements or criteria of classification of social movements; in other words, each group has a different definition of who belongs to a given social movement and who does not. Therefore, some authors claim that the notion of a social movement lacks clarity and may be applied to numerous behaviours and collective actions. Consequently, various protesters, civic initiatives, or even political parties describe themselves as “social movements.” For instance, party activists believe that the term “social movement” will encourage more followers to join their organization and draw more public attention than the term “political party.” This belief is not unwarranted, as today many people seem uninterested in joining formalised, bureaucratized organizations and are more likely to join less formal structures, such as social movements.

Social movements are often grass-roots initiatives. From the sociological point of view, a social movement is a particular type of collective behaviour. On the one hand, it is different from other collective behaviours such as, for instance, a crowd at a bus stop, for it is more organized – its structures are more permanent and its members act in a more systematic fashion.<sup>150</sup> On the other hand, social movements are less organized than formal organizations for they usually

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150 P. Gliński, *Polscy Zieloni. Ruch społeczny w okresie przemian*, IFiS PAN, Warszawa 1996, p. 18.

consist of relatively dispersed communities that are not as formalized and hierarchical.<sup>151</sup> According to the members of the KSMiRS, social movements may be placed on the “sociological map” between mass behaviours (e.g. a crowd) and organized and formalized structures (e.g. a political party).<sup>152</sup>

We may distinguish two types of social movements. Movements which dominated in the early stage of modern era are called “old social movements” (OSM, in the Polish terminology SRS). They focused on the economic and political interests and values of clearly isolated segments of society, i.e. social classes (e.g. workers or peasants), professional, ethnic or racial groups. Their members were organized in a fixed and centralised manner. A classic example of an OSM is a working class or a peasant movement. Not rarely, the objective of their actions was to change the authority or the political system (e.g. taking power away from the hands of capitalists).

In the late modern phase as well as in the post-modern era, a different type of social movements emerged. At the turn of 1960s in more developed countries of Europe and America, new and less conventional forms of collective actions came into being, with time shifting into protest actions.<sup>153</sup> They were deemed “new social movements” (NSMs, in Polish nomenclature NRS). Most frequently this term was used as a descriptive category to grasp such social phenomena as students protest from the late 1960s, citizens’ initiatives for environment protection, actions against the construction of nuclear power plants as well as various initiatives for women’s equality. These actions inspired, among others, the following movements: ecological, pacifist, protecting the human rights, propagating active or municipal lifestyle. With various degrees of reference to leftist ultra-leftist ideology (gauchisme), they stemmed from the protests and counter-culture of those days.<sup>154</sup>

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151 P. Sztompka, *Socjologia zmian społecznych*, Znak, Kraków 2005, p. 256.

152 J. Szymczyk, “Specyfika nowych ruchów społecznych,” in: *Wartości – interesy – struktury społeczne. Uwarunkowania ludzkiej kreatywności i partycypacji w życiu publicznym*, ed. J. Szymczyk, Norbertinum, Lublin 2010, p. 35.

153 A. Melucci, “The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements,” *Social Research* 1985, vol. 52, no. 4, p. 789–816; C. Offe, “New Social Movements. Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics,” *Social Research* 1985, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 817–868.

154 K. Eder, *The New Politics of Class: Social Movements and Cultural Dynamics in Advanced Societies*, Sage, Newbury Park–London, 1993, p. 45 ff; M. Frybes, “Od ruchu społecznego do problemu społecznego,” in: P. Kuczyński, M. Frybes, *W poszukiwaniu ruchu społecznego*. . . , p. 63.

In the professional literature, the following synonyms for NSMs are used: “new protest movements,” “movements of the new generation,” “new politics,” “new populism,” “neoromanticism,” “unorthodox political behaviour,” or the “policy of disorder.”<sup>155</sup> The activists themselves frequently use the terms “alternative movements” or “expressive movements.”<sup>156</sup> The notion of newness found in the quoted names has two dimensions: historical and cultural. In the historic grasp “new” merely stands for social movements which come into being in a given period of time while the content and innovation which they contribute through their existence and action are not taken into account. In this sense, the movements from the turn of the 1960s do not differ from the movements which were created in towards the end of the 19th century as ‘new’ phenomena as well. In the cultural dimension, however, the idea of novelty indicates the features typical of NSMs. The movements discussed here can be differentiated from OSMs with their quality, intensity and innovativeness as the criteria.

The emergence of new social movements marks the beginning of the process of the institutionalization of the sociology of social movements as a sub-discipline of sociology.<sup>157</sup> Even though in their research sociologists used to refer to social movements, the movements were never an object of systematic analysis.<sup>158</sup> In Polish sociology, the interest in social movements begins with the

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- 155 K.-W. Brand, *Neue soziale Bewegungen*, Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen 1982; B. Marin, “Neuer Populismus und Wirtschaftspartnerschaft,” *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 1980, no. 9, pp. 157–170; U. Schimank, *Neoromantischer Protest im Spätkapitalismus. Der Widerstand gegen die Stadt- und Landschaftsverödung*, AJZ, Bielefeld 1983; A. Marsh, *Protest and Political Consciousness*, Sage, London 1977.
- 156 C. Offe, “Nowe ruchy społeczne. Przekraczanie granic polityki instytucjonalnej,” in: *Władza i społeczeństwo. Antologia tekstów z zakresu socjologii polityki*, vol. 1, ed. J. Szczupaczyński, Scholar, Warszawa 1995, p. 229.
- 157 J. Szymczyk, “Socjologia ruchów społecznych,” in: *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. XVIII, TN KUL, Lublin 2013, pp. 502–503.
- 158 D. della Porta and M. Diani, *Ruchy społeczne. Wprowadzenie*, trans. A. Sadza, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2009; A. Touraine, *The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1981; S.M. Buechler, “Teorie nowych ruchów społecznych,” in: *Dynamika życia społecznego. Współczesne koncepcje ruchów społecznych*, eds. K. Górlach and P.H. Mooney, Warszawa, Scholar, 2008, pp. 161–188; K. Eder, *The New Politics of Class: Social Movements and Cultural Dynamics in Advanced Societies*, Sage, Newbury Park/London 1993; D. Rucht, *Modernisierung und soziale Bewegungen*, Campus, Frankfurt am Main 1994; S. Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics*, Cambridge University Press, New York/Cambridge 1994.

creation of the Solidarity movement in 1980. Therefore, the phenomenon of the Solidarity movement is a constant point of reference for researchers investigating other social movements of the 1980s. Nowadays, the interest of Polish sociology in social movements is relatively low.<sup>159</sup>

New social movements have been the object of sociological research in the Institute of Sociology at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin since the creation of the Department of Sociology of Social Movements (April 2007). In June 2008, the Department merged with the Department of Social Macrostructures (established in the mid-1990s) and transformed into the Department of Sociology of Macrostructures and Social Movements (KSMiRS).<sup>160</sup>

The main features of a social movement include: 1. grass-roots, autonomous activities undertaken by social groups without the state's or local government's supervision; 2. activities that are relatively spontaneous and often take unconventional forms (picket lines, manifestations, demonstrations); 3. people's self-organization around particular values and interests that takes the form of a protest, civil disobedience, or an institution. As regards self-organization, a further distinction may be made between protest and social movements. The former constitute a stage in the creation of social movements. Contrary to social movements, protest movements are not yet independent social subjects – their structure is less stable and they do not possess any bureaucratic elements. However, they may transform into social movements.<sup>161</sup>

The KSMiRS applies the following definition of a new social movement: it is a relatively autonomous social subject, a grass-roots initiative consisting of social actors who – on the basis of particular values, ideas, and identities – create a certain organizational structure. The structure is a net of informal, non-hierarchical, and non-bureaucratic relations. The participants' level of engagement, strategies, and actions in the movement vary, thus providing the movement with a wide range of resources. These resources are applied to either introduce or stop – through numerous forms of protest – socio-cultural change. Due to this

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159 T. Paleczny, *Nowe ruchy społeczne*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2010, p. 34.

160 J. Szymczyk, "Katedra Socjologii Makrostruktur i Ruchów Społecznych. W stronę realizacji zasady komplementarności," in: *Tradycja i współczesność. 90 lat socjologii w Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim*, eds. S. Fel, J.P. Gałkowski, J.M. Zabielska, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2009, pp. 145–151.

161 J. Szymczyk, "Nowe ruchy społeczne i moralność," in: *Leksykon socjologii moralności. Podstawy – teorie – badania – perspektywy*, ed. J. Mariański, Nomos, Kraków 2015, pp. 496–502.

agenda, the movement has both institutional (government departments) and non-institutional (counter-movements) opponents.<sup>162</sup>

The members of the KSMiRS believe that social movements have become an integral element of public life and, therefore, there is a need for research on grassroots activity and social mobilization. Social movements provide an opportunity for the internalization of the plurality of values and diversified group interests. They endow individuals and small groups with an organizational structure which facilitates the coordination of actions. Self-organization in turn is the most effective way of achieving group goals in a civic society.

## 2. The organizational structure as a unique feature of new social movements

The definition of new social movements consists of a key term that may help in elucidating the unique nature of new social movements: the organizational structure of a social movement (OSSM).<sup>163</sup> We believe that the term “structure” implies that a given movement consists of both individuals and numerous collective social subjects (organizations, associations, communities, groups) who – to a different degree – identify with the goals and values of a given social movement and attempt to achieve them.<sup>164</sup> Therefore, the organization of social movements consists of small social groups who act and react “together,” even though they are loosely linked.<sup>165</sup> Each of these groups performs its activities on a daily basis, but

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162 Szymczyk, “Specyfika nowych ruchów społecznych. . .,” p. 43.

163 The term “organizational” should not be identified with a formal organization, and the term “structure” does not imply something static. In the case of social movements, the notion of “structure” implies a certain degree of transformability and a certain degree of organization, which makes social movements social actors. The term “organizational” implies interactions, bonds, and identifications within social movements. At the same time, however, social movements are not formal organizations; organized forms within the structure of social movements are groups of friends rather than formalized structures (H. Kriesi, “The Organizational Structure of New Social Movements in a Political Context, in Comparative Perspective,” in: *Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framing*, eds. D. McAdam, J. McCarthy, and M. N. Zald, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge–New York 1996, pp. 152–184).

164 J. Szymczyk, “Specyfika nowych ruchów społecznych. . .,” pp. 44 ff; idem, “Nowe ruchy społeczne i moralność. . .,” p. 496–502.

165 For instance, the civil rights movement in the US consists of many organizations: the Congress of Racial Equality, The Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the



they are transformed into an organizational structure during special actions and spectacular endeavours. In other words, new social movements grow around particular social subjects and operate using these subjects' structures. Thus, they remain decentralized and fragmentary, consisting of various groups and environments. The organizational structure of social movements is a rudimentary – even though not the only one – theoretical notion applied by the members of the KSMiRS in their research on new social movements. Due to that approach, it is possible to elucidate that social movements constitute networks that may, but do not have to, include the aforementioned social subjects. In other words, new social movements may exist and function without the organizational structure of social movements.

The application of the OSSM model allows to analyse the main subjects of new social movements as elements of an informal network of relations, namely a loose “confederation” of individuals, groups, and environments that engage in joint activities – in spite of their differences and without losing their individual autonomies – and share resources<sup>166</sup> in order to achieve common goals.<sup>167</sup> An individual organization, no matter how powerful, cannot speak for the entire movement nor can it form informal networks.<sup>168</sup> Networks within the OSSM take various forms; for instance, they may be “closed” – relations between members of the movement are frequent and close – or “open” – relations are not coordinated by any particular centre. A distinction between various types of networks is crucial in investigating a given social movement. It allows to analyse the relation between particular types of networks and collective activities. Also, it is essential to determine how particular socio-political conditions affect the relation.<sup>169</sup> An important feature of every network is the ability to mobilize resources, mostly people,<sup>170</sup> social groups, and – increasingly often – “virtual communities” via the Internet (new social movements 2.0).

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Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, etc. (P. Sztompka, *Socjologia zmian społecznych*. . . , p. 269).

166 E.g. they coordinate particular initiatives, direct individual actions, develop strategies, or conduct negotiations.

167 D. della Porta, M. Diani, *Ruchy społeczne*. . . , pp. 130 ff.

168 *Ibid.*, p. 24.

169 In addition to having eufunctions (e.g. increasing the availability of resources), the OSSM, like any other network, may generate conflicts between the members of the structure.

170 Individuals often serve as links between particular environments or organizations belonging to the OSSM.

Because of the informal nature of networks within new social movements, the analysis of the organizational structure of social movements may apply the model of a “network organization.” Accordingly, the members of the KSMiRS treat each subject as an individual entity; the subjects are integrated horizontally, their goals and strategies are relatively flexible, and they interact with each other on various levels.<sup>171</sup> Research conducted by the members of the KSMiRS indicates that the OSSM model – being flexible and decentralized – facilitates the coordination of particular actions, helps in achieving the goals of the protest, makes a given campaign more attractive for new allies, and allows for a broader campaign by dividing its consequences among all members of the OSSM.<sup>172</sup>

### 3. *Modus operandi* of new social movements and the issue of their efficiency

The modes of operation of social movements signalled above can be classified according to the significance ascribed to them by the activists into certain segments. We may distinguish the following NSM *modus operandi*: number orientation, damage generation orientation and testimony orientation.<sup>173</sup> The “perspective of numbers” is frequently raised by the activists of social movements, as “there is always some power in numbers;” the fate of the social actors in question to a considerable degree depends on how many supporters they have or how many participants have turned up at a demonstration. The size of protest demonstrations must also be considered against the backdrop of a regime they are aimed at, because the capability of an authority to control such gatherings depends on their size. At the same time, they manifest to the authorities how popular their organizers are.<sup>174</sup> Therefore, movements strive to activate as many participants to the various forms of protest as possible.

The “perspective of numbers” also manifests itself during actions of collecting signatures, the making of petitions or demanding a referendum as well as the so called “netstriking.”<sup>175</sup> The last term means a form of online protest which is

171 J. Szymczyk, “Specyfika nowych ruchów społecznych. . .” pp. 54 ff.

172 M. Diani, “Networks and Social Movements. A Research Programme,” in: *Social Movements Networks*, eds. M. Diani and D. McAdam, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York 2003, pp. 299–318; M. Castells, *Sieci oburzenia i nadziei. Ruchy społeczne w erze Internetu*, trans. O. Siara, PWN, Warszawa 2013, p. 34.

173 D. della Porta, M. Diani, *Ruchy społeczne. . .*, pp. 188–189

174 J. DeNardo, *Power in Numbers. The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1985, p. 36.

175 D. della Porta, M. Diani, *Ruchy społeczne. . .*, p. 190.

comparable to a roadblock or a march. It consists in that many people in a previously arranged time connect with the web service of the targeted entity in order to jam it and disable other users' access to it. "Mail bombing" is a similar practice. It entails the massive sending of messages to a targeted web page to block it. At any rate, the *modus operandi* in the perspective of digits, aside from the external strategic matters, performs a crucial symbolic function for the very activists of the social movements which employ it. Massive demonstrations provide their participants with the sense of strength, which stems from the sense of belonging to a large community of equals, which, in turn, certainly reinforces their identification with the given movement.<sup>176</sup>

The "perspective of damage" – employed mainly by radical movements – consists in conscious and intentional causing material damage to targeted entities: both individual and social. It manifests itself in: the destruction of property of specific actors who oppose a given movement, direct violence towards particular adversaries.<sup>177</sup> Extremely controversial as it is, resorting to violence is however related with specific social effects. Aggressive actions on the part of the movement will result in the repressions on the part of the authorities or regime, and, concomitantly, discourage the potential followers from taking up actions or joining the movement. Certain damage done by the actors in question, e.g. setting cars on fire, attacking buildings during demonstrations, may paradoxically work against the demonstrators or antagonize the social surrounding. As a result, the movement loses positive connotation.

Moreover, the strategies of protest of a certain NSM are aimed at causing economic damage in targeted entities through the reduction or even halting the production and, consequently, reducing the profits of the owners of a given facility or company. Within this repertoire we may include e.g. consumer boycott used by, among others, ecological consumer movement. Its task is to contribute to the drop in the sales of given products, and, as a result, to the lowering of the income of company owners. Such movements use the "name and shame" tactics which is to inform the public about the most drastic phenomena, such as breaking the labourers' rights, lowering the quality of products etc., and by doing so, to make a particular consumer abstain from buying the products of the targeted company. A similar tactics is also applied in the Internet, where the debasing of a given producer is attempted through the construction of their false, but similar to the original, web page which is to attract the attention of the web-users. Critical

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176 Ibid., p. 192.

177 Ibid.

opinions on the company's operational strategy or its products are published there.<sup>178</sup>

The last category – the perspective of testimony – is aimed at manifesting firm involvement of the social movement's participants for the sake of the significant cause. They are ready to face danger or risk, they are ready to lose their health or life in order to manifest their beliefs and ideological message.<sup>179</sup> The motto of actions based on the option of testimony is to make one's ideology reach the recipients directly and cause them to find out the rightness and nobleness of a given movement's programme or of a particular issue to the benefit of which the participant is testifying. The behaviour of individuals in this case is characterised by immense emotionality. This stems from the fact that NSMs prefer forms of direct democracy in that their main method of action is direct interpersonal contacts, which always raises a degree of emotions. The emotional dimension of the functioning of social movements becomes conspicuous also in the use of symbolism, which is intended to horrify the recipients (e.g. in order to represent the atmosphere of the real danger of environmental destruction or of a nuclear blast) by means of posters, artwork and multimedia shows. The aim of this symbolism is conscious reference to a provocation to affect not only the thought-schemes of the recipients but also their emotions and to shock them and make them come to their senses.<sup>180</sup>

Hence, certain researchers regard the actions, manifestations and provocations organized by NSMs as a "new type of media." These movements, as new media, are the means and subjects (or the "carriers") of new values, not rarely of an artistic vision of culture which exert pressure on politicians, public opinion, social consciousness, law and collective imagination. Moreover, they turn attention to the emergence of new social conflicts, during which they suggest new solutions (alternative lifestyles, alternative food). The activity of NSMs, however, as based on campaigns, is by a rule temporary or short-term. Its goal is to communicate to the rest of society that a given issue is important and that the solutions suggested by the movements are applicable.

178 Ibid., pp. 194–195.

179 Ibid., pp. 195–197. Self-immolation, hunger-strikes, non-violent resistance, so called altruistic suicide are at play. (A. Czabański, *Samobójstwa altruistyczne. Formy manifestacji, mechanizmy i społeczne reperkusje zjawiska*, Nomos, Kraków 2009).

180 R. Collins, "Ruchy społeczne jako obiekt uwagi emocjonalnej," in: *Dynamika życia społecznego*. . . , p. 247–261; C. Barker, "Strach, śmiech i siła zbiorowa. Tworzenie się 'Solidarności' w sierpniu 1980 roku w Stoczni im. Lenina w Gdańsku," in: *Dynamika życia społecznego*. . . , pp. 262–280.

What is another significant research issue, aside of the matters discussed above, is the problem of the efficiency of the action of a given movement and the evaluation of its functioning. Applied in explorations, it allows us to find out how aware the participants are of the effect of their campaigns exerted on the decisions taken by the centres of power in a broad sense. Without this awareness and if the actions are inefficient, the sense of harm explodes only in short-lasting demonstrations and riots with poor attendance, as they will not be able to support long-term time-consuming and hazardous actions.<sup>181</sup> As can be seen in their history, only a few movements are able to fulfil the majority of set goals or, in other words, be a good actor. The failures of most movements result from their very nature. Many of them come into being in the direct opposition to the axiology preferred by the majority of the society and, therefore, their ideals do not match the recognized framework of a political process and institutional order. Hence, they find it difficult to alter the relationships in the system of authority and in the system of values. However, despite the movement's failure, the effects of its actions may remain after its "life cycle" and become apparent in the social awareness, imagination, axiological choices as well as in social norms being applied, in people's viewpoints and in the influences on a number of legal solutions.<sup>182</sup> For this reason, researchers often ponder whether the effects of a movement's actions should be evaluated in a short-term or long-term perspective. In general, we should take into account the fact that, as regards the fulfilment of its principal and strategic goals, a movement's efficiency is relatively small. Better results can be observed in terms of the contribution of new issues to the public debate or making other actors sensitive to postulated problems.

In the analysis of the efficiency of social movements, in the activity of some of them we may distinguish: first of all, the disruptive potential, second of all, the constructive potential. In order to introduce changes or innovations, a given movements has to, in a way, "break" or at least weaken the existing structures and institutions. This is disruptive action. On the other hand, its ability to introduce new structural and institutional regulations may be considered to be its constructive potential. Certain movements skip the latter and concentrate merely on the disruptive influence, yet such movements, deprived of the creative dimension,

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181 T. Żyro, *Wstęp do politologii*, PWN, Warszawa 2004, p. 51.

182 S. Mandes, "Ruchy społeczne w Polsce," in: *Wymiary życia społecznego. Polska na przełomie XX i XXI wieku*, ed. M. Marody, Scholar, Warszawa 2007, p. 449.

are defective. For a social movement to become an “historic” and efficient actor, in the integral profile of its action the twofold potential has to be included.<sup>183</sup>

Moreover, we may add – quoting William Gamson – the following typology of the efficiency of social movements actions: 1. The postulates receive full feedback, both in the area of the modification of legal norms which are binding in a given social system and in the area of values and acceptance of the social surrounding; 2. The activity of social movements has brought changes in values and social systems, yet without success in the legal system; 3. The movement's actions have introduced changes in the legal system, yet without the social acceptance; 4. We face failure in both aspects: law and axiology as well as social acceptance.<sup>184</sup> We should explicitly note however that many a time it is relatively difficult to clearly state whether a given movement is responsible for the changes it has originated. Its success depends on many independent causes. Its origin, activity and impact on public attention must be considered in the context of the holistic changes which take place in a society.

#### **4. The object of analysis and exploration sociology of new social movements**

In their publications and during classes, the members of the KSMiRS focus on the activities and values of the members of new social movements. As regards activities, old social movements focused on political and economic issues (such as participation in the benefits of the “industrial state”), whereas new social movements concentrate on cultural ones (such as the quality and meaning of life, and a proper organization of the post-industrial society). Therefore, some researchers consider new social movements as participant in the so-called “new type of conflict” concerned with the final goal of production and the meaning of cultural messages. It is believed that the conflict is between technocrats responsible for management and consumers (broadly viewed as receivers).<sup>185</sup> Therefore, this “new conflict” no longer revolves around such issues as class (in Marxist interpretation), economy, or the division of labour (e.g. the relation between the employer and the employee in the industrial society); rather, it is concerned with culture and such notions as how to administer social needs, direct consumption,

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183 P. Sztompka, “Ruchy społeczne – struktury in statu nascendi,” in: *Socjologia. Lektury*, eds. P. Sztompka, M. Kucia, Znak, Kraków 2007, p. 226.

184 W.A. Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest*, Wadsworth, Belmont 1990, pp. 56 ff.

185 D. Lapeyronnie, “Interwencja socjologiczna, ruchy społeczne, demokracja,” in: P. Kuczyński and M. Frybes, *W poszukiwaniu ruchu społecznego*. . . , p. 95.

improve the quality of life (e.g. in terms of environmental protection, equal rights for minorities and women, gender, group identity, individual autonomy).<sup>186</sup> The aim of conflicts – including those that are connected to the activities of new social movements – is usually to introduce social change or oppose transformations in public life. Therefore, the notion of conflict (resistance, rebellion, opposition, defiance, protest) should be included in the analysis of new social movements. The researcher's goal is to analyse the genesis and stages of a given conflict, the means and symbols it applied, and the reasons for its completion.

New social movements are rooted in culture. In other words, they operate in the sphere that many scholars consider to be the main arena of collective activities. Therefore, Alain Touraine claims that they are rather “socio-cultural” than “socio-political.”<sup>187</sup> Some critics notice that new social movements either avoid or reject “institutionalized and conventional politics” and distance themselves from political parties. However, the members of the KSMiRS believe that in mapping new social movements' sphere of activity, one should avoid an arbitrary dichotomy between culture and politics for this “contrast” rather obscures than illuminates matters. All social movements originate from certain cultural conditions and prefer given symbolic functions; in other words, all social movements are cultural movements. Simultaneously, either directly or indirectly, they manifest a particular political position, discuss socio-political issues, and attempt to influence various authorities; thus, they are political movements even if they do not express any inclination to take over the power in a country, city, or region.<sup>188</sup> Therefore, their actions are governed by ulterior political motives (the development of consciousness, political socialization, the politicization of decision-making, etc.).<sup>189</sup>

The aforementioned issues (especially the realm of culture) cannot be analysed without accounting for the “axiological perspective,” especially when it comes to analysing the strategies applied by new social movements. Numerous scholars argue that new social movements are driven by post-materialistic values.<sup>190</sup> These

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186 D. della Porta and M. Diani, *Ruchy społeczne*. . . , p. 7.

187 A. Touraine, “Wprowadzenie do analizy ruchów społecznych,” in: *Antologia tekstów z zakresu socjologii polityki*, ed. J. Szczupaczyński, vol. 1, Scholar, Warszawa 1995, p. 224.

188 J. Szymczyk, *Nowe ruchy społeczne i moralność*. . . , pp. 496–502.

189 S.M. Buechler, *Teorie nowych ruchów społecznych*. . . , pp. 173–175. This does not mean, however, that they should be treated – as classical Marxism would have it – as homogenous actors endowed with powerful strategic, historical powers.

190 R. Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1977, pp. 67 ff.

concern such issues as the meaning of life, individual dignity, balance between man and nature, the sense of community or autonomy, the need for self-expression, freedom of speech, direct democracy, group identity, women's emancipation, the rights of minorities and the exploited, etc.<sup>191</sup>. These values are not new in themselves, but, as part of the ideology applied by new social movements, they assume a new form. The demands made by new social movements require a change within the system of basic values of a given society or within a particular field (e.g. women's rights, ecology), or aim at preventing a change within particular axiological categories.<sup>192</sup> The members of the KSMiRS stress the fact that some new social movements form their objectives on the basis of universal goals and values that transcend group interests. On the other hand, these movements demand that society recognize their separate identity (based on such criteria as age, gender, or religion and the values they promote) as part of the OSSM.<sup>193</sup>

Therefore, research on new social movements investigates whether individual goals and values of the members of a given movement are in accordance with the ideas promoted by the movement. Certain movements may be best described through the application of the axiological and teleological perspective. In short, it is impossible to understand new social movements without accounting for post-materialistic values. This does not mean that the members of new social movements abandoned materialistic values entirely; rather, they no longer consider them a priority. Moreover, these two orientations (materialistic and post-materialistic) are intertwined during particular initiatives undertaken by new social movements; they coexist, which makes it difficult to establish the axiological option preferred by the members of a given social movement.

Nevertheless, the axiological perspective allows us to propose a thesis that the values internalized by a given person are a crucial factor deciding whether he or she would join a particular OSSM. On the other hand, while individual values may explain certain issues, they are not necessarily responsible for one's engagement, participation, or willingness to undertake specific actions. There is no straight causal relation between one's support for a given collective action and one's decision to take part in that action. The latter is affected by other factors, such as the assessment of possibilities (favourable circumstances) versus

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191 R. Inglehart and N. Pippa, *Rising Tide. Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World*, Cambridge University Press, New York 2003, pp. 45 ff.

192 P. Sztompka, *Socjologia zmian społecznych*. . . , p. 263.

193 J. Szymczyk, *Elements of the Application of the Complementarity Principle. Issues of the Sociology of Subjectivity and Social Structures*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2014, pp. 154 ff.



limitations. The axiological perspective is, however, one of the major strategies that may be applied to the analysis of new social movements, which is why the members of the KSMiRS emphasize its importance both in their writings and teaching. In many cases, the lifestyles of the members of a given movement reflect a set of common values, creating their social identity and affecting the strategies they apply during their initiatives.

Many scholars emphasize the fact that the sole purpose of new social movements is to create new forms of collective identity, strengthen existing identifications, or form solidarity around the values, norms, and phenomena that a given movement either supports or opposes.<sup>194</sup> It often happens that the activities undertaken by new social movements contribute to the creation of that identity and solidarity to a greater extent than the goals that motivated them. Social movements rarely achieve their goals; yet, they perform actions that do fulfil their teleology. Therefore, social movements are often remembered not because of their goals, but because of the means applied to achieve them (e.g. hunger strikes).<sup>195</sup>

In addition to researching the issues mentioned above, the KSMiRS analyses social movements focusing on: the structure and goals of a movement (the organization of the movement, its main components, and connections); distinctive features of new social movements (the notion of the OSSM; movements 2.0; main areas of activity; members' background; horizontality of new social movements;<sup>196</sup> forms and methods of activity); pulsating nature and glocalization of new social movements;<sup>197</sup> the structure of conflict; collective identity (common goal and engagement in a given cause); the phenomenon of a protest

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194 J. Kubik, "Polityka kontestacji, protest, ruchy społeczne. Logika rozwoju teorii," *Societas/Communitas* 2007, no. 2; 2008, no. 1, vol. 1, p. 75.

195 J. Wilson, *Introduction to Social Movements*, Basic Books, New York 1973, p. 226.

196 New social movements are non-hierarchical, including the communication between the members of a given movement. They are situated "at the crossroads" of public and social participation. Therefore, some scholars claim that there exists the so-called fourth sector that consists of grass-roots civic initiatives that are non-formalized and spontaneous.

197 The pulsating nature of social movements indicates that they operate in cycles or stages that depend on given social mobilizations. These mobilizations are triggered by particular events (e.g. for the alter-globalization movement, such an event may be a meeting of international financial institutions or the wealthiest economies). According to the notion of glocalism, new social movements operate in local, national communities on a daily basis, but under certain circumstances they become active on a global scale, meeting during various protests and manifestations.

(the main strategy applied by new social movements and connected to the so-called street politics practiced in various ways); values that the members of movements accept, declare, and apply; the efficiency of a given social movement (the evaluation of its activities).<sup>198</sup>

Currently, among numerous issues researched by the members of the KSMiRS, there is one that concerns the most important theories and issues connected with new social movements: their specificity. The analysis of the nature of new social movements concentrates on such issues as values, collective actions, and social identity. New social movements (including those that operate in Poland) are relevant for both sociological theory and social practice. The members of the KSMiRS conduct research on such phenomena as the Solidarity movement;<sup>199</sup> movements concerned with environment, consumerism, anti- and alter-globalization, feminism, anarchism, animalism, and eco-terrorism; squatting; civil disobedience;<sup>200</sup> city movements;<sup>201</sup> male social movements in contemporary Poland. All the aforementioned social movements are analysed either by the members of the KSMiRS or by their students in their master's theses.<sup>202</sup>

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Research conducted by the members of the KSMiRS indicates that new social movements have shed new light on the meaning and costs of contemporary

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198 J. Szymczyk, *Elements of the Application of the Complementarity Principle*. . . , pp. 156 f.

199 One of the doctoral dissertations supervised by Jan Szymczyk is devoted to the analysis of the functions of the Solidarity movement (1980–1981) from the point of view of the theory of axio-normative order.

200 A. Bielecka, *Cele i metody działania ruchu obywatelskiego nieposłuszeństwa. Na podstawie literatury przedmiotu*, Lublin 2011 [MA thesis written under the supervision of Jan Szymczyk].

201 K. Lipińska, *Pojęcie miejskich ruchów społecznych. Na podstawie literatury przedmiotu*, Lublin 2015 [MA thesis written under the supervision of Jan Szymczyk].

202 M. Bobrek, *Preferowane wartości działaczy podziemnej „Solidarności.” Na podstawie wybranych tekstów autobiograficznych*, Lublin 2009; M. Biernat, *Dominujące wartości i formy działania organizacji polskiego ruchu ekologicznego. Na podstawie literatury i stanu badań*, Lublin 2009; D. Kwiatkowska, *Naczelne wartości i formy działania organizacji polskiego ruchu konsumenckiego. Na podstawie literatury i stanu badań*, Lublin 2009; O. Szyszka, *Nowy feminizm polski w perspektywie społeczno-aksjologicznej*, Lublin 2007; L. Styś, *Aktywność społeczno-polityczna kobiet a życie rodzinne we współczesnej myśli feministycznej*, Lublin 2009; K. Kubiak, *Postawy działaczy organizacji katolickich wobec Żydów. Na przykładzie Lublina*, Lublin 2009; A. Bielecka, *Cele i metody działania ruchu obywatelskiego nieposłuszeństwa. Na podstawie literatury przedmiotu*, Lublin 2011 [MA theses written under the supervision of Jan Szymczyk].

(also local) democracy; also, they allow scholars to pose questions about the determinants of contemporary conflicts that are often affected by the relation between declared values and actual interests. In their activities, new social movements connect the past with the here and now. Therefore, they should be treated as the major cause of socio-cultural change. On the other hand, new social movements are the consequence of social processes that predate them (e.g. modernization, urbanization). Thus, even though they operate within a relatively stable, historical frame, they also contribute to the change of political discourses, power relations, and cultural symbols.



## IV. ASPECTS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE SOCIAL BOND

Social life entails constant change, which we experience either as individuals or as members of various social formations and contexts. As sociologists see it, society does not so much “exist” for it “is happening,” or “becoming” in the sense of being subjected to various transformations. On the other hand, however, we can observe efforts undertaken by subjects within various interactions to coordinate social behaviours or deeds, individual or intersubjective experiences, and make them correspond, for example, to basic values or social norms. These endeavours generate the existence of varied social bonds within both the physical (material) and virtual space. These bonds constitute a group of relationships that are based on, among others, axiological or pragmatic categories (the latter signifying interests), institutions, social positions and roles that integrate, network, and organize the life of the community.

Finding its inspiration in Jan Turowski’s thought, this chapter aims to outline a rudimentary sense of the category of the social bond in the context of its various aspects and functions. Selected statements of Turowski will be treated solely as a starting point for the presentation of various ideas connected to the issue in question. The chapter does not aspire to comprehensively analyse the notion of the social bond as developed by Turowski.

### 1. Understanding the social bond

Jan Turowski sees the social bond as a constitutive element of a social group that denotes, in his view, “a fact of the dependence on or consolidation of members of a given group of people around specific values or performed social functions.”<sup>203</sup> The definition sheds light on the rudimentary criteria governing the formation of the social bond, namely the identification of subjects with a given social group as their own, and their recognition and realization of basic values and common good in the context of existing interactions, positions held and social roles played. Understood in this way, the social bond corresponds to the notion of intergroup cohesion. According to Robert Merton, the latter category may be shaped and strengthened culturally – through the internalization of a given group of axiological categories, organizationally – through the achievement of

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203 J. Turowski, *Socjologia. Małe struktury społeczne*, TN KUL, Lublin 1993, p. 85.

individual or group goals, and structurally – through the distinctness or juxtaposition of one's own group vis-à-vis other communities.<sup>204</sup>

Stanisław Ossowski's texts – which frequently served as inspiration for Turowski – in turn evince a two-fold understanding of the bond. The first approach is related to the concept of identification, that is, a sense of community, a sense of the social "we" (thus, in Cooley's understanding of the term). The second proposition is associated with the notion of intentional cooperation,<sup>205</sup> the term borrowed from Florian Znaniecki.<sup>206</sup> Identification is a psychic phenomenon, while intentional cooperation constitutes a behavioural phenomenon, its element of consciousness notwithstanding. These two interpretations of the bond are not mutually contradictory, as Ossowski would have it. Identification, after all, entails cooperation, while cooperation implies common goals, analogous attitudes towards objects or persons, and a sense of sameness. The differentiation proposed by Ossowski (identification vs. intentional cooperation) is undoubtedly of a disjunctive/complementary character: the two categories encompass different spheres of phenomena but at the same time they complement and condition each other, hence contributing to the clarification of the polysemous notion of the social bond.

By contrast, Jan Turowski distinguishes, first, a psychosocial understanding of the bond (individual awareness of social connectivity) and, secondly, its structural aspect (the totality of social relations).<sup>207</sup> He does not treat the two dimensions as alternative conceptions but as complementary interpretations that address various facets of the same phenomenon. In other words, the notion of the social bond encompasses both the totality of social relations linking members of a given community and the totality of individual and intersubjective experiences referring to the group as a whole or to objectified facts. It seems that Turowski's decision (influenced undoubtedly by Ossowski's approach) to perceive the two aspects of the social bond in an integral way is the most effective approach, postulating more in-depth studies of the bond from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. The complementary character of psychosocial and structural dimension of the bond does not mean that they are identical. This is corroborated by, among others, studies showing that some people formally

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204 R. Merton, *Teoria socjologiczna i struktura społeczna*, trans. E. Morawska i J. Wertenstein-Żuławski, PWN, Warszawa 2002, p. 366.

205 S. Ossowski, "O osobliwościach nauk społecznych," in: idem, *Dziela*, vol. 4: *O nauce*, PWN, Warszawa 1967, p. 158.

206 F. Znaniecki, *Socjologia wychowania*, PWN, Warszawa 2001, pp. 46 ff.

207 J. Turowski, *Socjologia. Małe struktury społeczne*. . . , p. 85.

belonging to a given community on the basis of some objective criterion do not in fact identify with the community in question. This phenomenon was defined by Ossowski as the “asymmetry of the social bond,”<sup>208</sup> while Turowski called it the “two-dimensionality of the bond.”<sup>209</sup> The essence of these terms lies in the fact that the two aspects of the bond – psychosocial and structural – do not correspond to each other. The asymmetry of the social bond occurs both in huge communities (e.g. a nation)<sup>210</sup> and in small ones. It is connected in Ossowski’s view with the idea of “conscious and unconscious members of ideological groups.”<sup>211</sup> The typology emphasizes the fact that members of the same group may exhibit diversified attitudes to the objects, symbols, ideologies, and people that connect them. This diversity is an extremely vital and relevant issue whose exploration undoubtedly enables a more adequate understanding of, for example, national consciousness<sup>212</sup> or some behaviours or attitudes of people in religious groups.

It is thus vital for a scholar to be aware of the existence of the two-dimensionality of the social bond and of the consequences of such differentiation visible in the pluralism of interactions, behaviours and actions of members of a given community.<sup>213</sup> What is at play here is a tension between objective and subjective criteria, between group consciousness and individual consciousness. As a result, subjects experience a plurality of group identification, affiliation or participation in various social contexts. Another difficulty that a sociologist needs to be aware of is the definition of the designatum of the social bond in its psychosocial understanding, which in turn implies – as Turowski argues – certain complications with the operationalization of the bond, that is with concretizing its empirical sense and determining the criteria with which a group bond can be analysed.<sup>214</sup> This research problem can to some extent be solved by accepting

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208 S. Ossowski, *O osobliwościach nauk społecznych*. . . , pp. 153–154.

209 J. Turowski, *Socjologia. Małe struktury społeczne*. . . , pp. 91 ff.

210 This fact is noted by, among others, Stefan Czarnowski, who at the same time emphasizes the significance of cultural phenomena and products for the existence and functioning of bonds within a nation (S. Czarnowski, “Studia z historii kultury,” in: *Dziela*, vol. 1, PWN, Warszawa 1956, p. 12).

211 S. Ossowski, *O osobliwościach nauk społecznych*. . . , pp. 158–162.

212 J. Szacki, “Ossowski i współczesne teorie narodu,” in: *Koncepcje socjologiczne Stanisława Ossowskiego a teoretyczne i praktyczne zagadnienia współczesności. Materiały z Konferencji Naukowej w Zielonej Górze 20–21. 10. 2003 r.*, eds. M. Chałubiński, J. Goćkowski [et al.], Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2004, p. 347.

213 S. Ossowski, *O osobliwościach nauk społecznych*. . . , p. 162.

214 J. Turowski, *Socjologia. Małe struktury społeczne*. . . , p. 93.

Ossowski's ideas. Even though Ossowski does not treat the idea of the social bond as a criterion for the existence of social groups, operative in terms of consciousness, social relations can be grasped, observed and analysed when the second aspect of the social bond – that is its structural or behavioural aspect – is taken into consideration. Generally speaking, the level and intensity of the social bond may be empirically studied by referring to interactions, behaviours or actions of members of a given community.

Apart from being treated as a constitutive element of a social group, the social bond may be understood as synonymous to group organization, signalling the features, functions and internal structure of a given community.<sup>215</sup> Some call this approach an integrative conception of the social bond.<sup>216</sup> The term “integration” denotes tight-knittedness and harmoniousness. It does not signify sameness, or unity in the sense of homogeneity, but rather indicates unity in diversity. In the sociological sense, integration – when applied to a social system – implies the processes of unifying individual elements and parts into a single whole. In society, processes of integration encompass all the interactions between the elements that lead to their connection, cooperation, coexistence or solution of conflict. These processes may be more or less advanced. Thus, a given system can be integrated to a smaller or larger degree, depending on the extent its elements cooperate to make the social whole achieve its desired aim. From the structural perspective, an integrated social system seems an arrangement of various bonds that unify people as they participate in the realization of the teleology of a given community. Integration can be purely external – when it is achieved through the mandatory subordination of behaviours and actions to specific rules – or internal – when it reaches deep into the sphere of motivation, which is symptomatic of a complete internalization of these rules. For this reason, integration can be measured with the use of indicators revealing the state or degree of the elements' mutual connections, or the absence thereof, which would illustrate disintegration.<sup>217</sup>

For integration to exist, common social values and norms need to be recognized and realized. Axiological categories, interactions, and mutual influence of the subjects on one another are merely initial prerequisites for integration. Integration as such is achieved only when a given social system manifests – in the context of the psychosocial perspective – a sense of communality, a sense of

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215 J. Szczepański, *Elementarne pojęcia socjologii*, PWN, Warszawa 1970, p. 239.

216 J. Turowski, *Socjologia. Małe struktury społeczne...*, p. 86.

217 *Ibid.*, pp. 129 ff.



the social “we.” Conducting or analysing empirical research into the conditions of the increase or decrease of integration, one needs to take into account the fulfilment of all these conditions, that is the presence in the social consciousness of common social values and norms, of actions and interactions that integrate the group, and of identification with the group. It can be concluded that the social bond refers to the existence of a group, while integration (coordination, close-knittedness, etc.) – to the functioning and organization of a given community. Naturally, the quality of the social bond has a bearing on the integration or disintegration of the group. An integrated group possesses what may be called “forces of cohesion,” that is social bonds. Integration is an outcome of the existence of the social bond or, in a way, its state. However, integration is easier to observe than the bond, for lack of integration signals the dissolution of an organization or community.<sup>218</sup>

## 2. Contexts of the social bond

Many authors do not give a precise definition of the social bond but instead carry out its taxonomy or approach it in various contexts. Ossowski’s texts analysing ideological groups, especially patriotic attitudes, distinguish between the “ideological bond” and the “habitual bond.”<sup>219</sup> The latter is related to the place where one currently lives, works or resides, while the former is linked to the mother country. Ossowski, the classic of Polish sociology, also deployed the term “convictional bond.”<sup>220</sup> This means that although all the members of a given nation are not in personal, direct contact, they are unified through their conviction that all their compatriots share a similar attitude to the canon of basic values or cultural legacy characteristic of a given nation. Without this conviction, the social bond at such a large scale would not be possible.

Paweł Rybicki, in turn, distinguished the following types of the bond: natural, associative, and constituted. The first one seems granted to an individual on account of the social conditions of his or her birth (e.g. family, clan, ethnic bond).

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218 W. Jacher, *Więź społeczna w teorii i praktyce*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Katowice 1987, pp. 27 ff; idem, *Zagadnienie integracji systemu społecznego. Studium z zakresu teorii socjologii*, PWN, Warszawa 1976, pp. 108 ff.

219 S. Ossowski, “Analiza socjologiczna pojęcia ojczyzny,” in: idem, *Dzieła*, vol. 3: *Z zagadnień psychologii społecznej*, PWN, Warszawa 1967, p. 211. Such a differentiation of bond by Ossowski refers to another taxonomy of his within which he distinguished ‘private homeland’ and ‘ideological homeland.’

220 *Ibid.*, p. 217.

The constituted bond is the opposite of the first one, as it emerges whenever there are social divisions imposed on human communities: either by force or by law, or by a combination of the two. It decreases or disappears with the disappearance of the conditions and situations that brought it to life. By contrast, the associative bond is generated when people willingly choose to associate. Rybicki proposed two other divisions of the social bond. Based on its scope, he distinguished the bond of small, middle and large scope, which goes hand in hand with his idea of small, middle and big collectivities. Secondly, he categorized the bond on the basis of the scope of matters and interests that unify people in various ways. This division harks back to Ferdinand Tönnies's famous differentiation between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*.<sup>221</sup>

The scholarship on the phenomenon of the social bond also makes use of the term "moral bond," treated as a special relationship of obligation, presupposing trust, loyalty and solidarity towards others that belong within the social "we."<sup>222</sup> Some scholars argue that it is only when the social bond reaches the status of the moral bond, and is not reduced to potential directions of interactions within various forms of social life, that it becomes a permanent component of given social structures and individuals who participate or are engaged in them.<sup>223</sup>

Discussing the social bond, one needs to be aware of its virtual context. This is to say that the contemporary structure and condition of the social bond is affected by the phenomena occurring both in the real world and in cyberspace. As Magdalena Szpunar argues, three types of contact may be identified to illustrate the relations between the real and the virtual world. The first type refers to relations initiated and continued in the virtual world. The second one encompasses contacts forged in the virtual environment that eventually go beyond cyberspace (e.g. face-to-face meetings). The third type are bonds forged in the real world for which the virtual sphere serves only as a platform of communication (e.g. formal business email communication).<sup>224</sup> Undoubtedly, the way in which people communicate is important for all these relations, but what is most crucial for the

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221 P. Rybicki, *Struktura społecznego świata. Studia z teorii społecznej*, PWN, Warszawa 1979, pp. 677 ff.

222 P. Sztompka, *Socjologia. Analiza społeczeństwa*, Znak, Kraków 2002, p. 187.

223 Ibid.

224 M. Szpunar, "Społeczności wirtualne – realne kontakty w wirtualnym świecie," in: *Społeczeństwo informacyjne. Aspekty funkcjonalne i dysfunkcjonalne*, eds. L.H. Haber, M. Niezgodna, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2006, p.163–164.

quality of the interaction is a conscious 'sense of bond' (the power of internal cohesion, of "sticking together").

One way or another, some subjects, e.g. new social movements (NSMs), deploy state-of-the-art communication technologies to realize their aims (social mobilization, protest campaigns, self-organization). This phenomenon is termed "electronic support"<sup>225</sup> or e-mobilization (or, alternatively, on-line mobilization or participation).<sup>226</sup> Thanks to virtual media, despite its decentralized organizational structure, a social movement is capable of mobilizing its participants and supporters in a brief period of time and of undertaking coordinated actions. The new media are a key resource for the NSMs as a functional tool for enhancing their organizational structure and for shaping and developing group bond and identity. Virtual media constitute a powerful instrument for articulating, shaping and unifying convictions and for formulating and disseminating ideological messages. Thanks to these media, one has a chance of comparing their life to those of others and of familiarizing themselves with other convictions and postulates, which oftentimes contributes to forging various interactions or creating social bonds. On the basis of media material, people overcome "pluralist ignorance"<sup>227</sup> and learn that they are not alone with their views, their discontent or even their fear. Latest communication technologies enable unparalleled possibilities of immediate reaction to current events.<sup>228</sup> Local activists of social movements may be in touch via these various means of communication to share their experiences and coordinate common actions.

This new method of social communication, of reaching consensus and of self-organization, is linked with the idea of the so-called network society. In turn, new social movements that make use of this "electronic support" are sometimes called "networked social movements."<sup>229</sup> Their structure has a character of loosely

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225 D. della Porta, M. Diani, *Ruchy społeczne. Wprowadzenie*, trans. przekł. A. Sadza, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2009, p. 188; S. Hick, J. McNutt, "Communities and Advocacy on the Internet. A Conceptual Framework," in: *Advocacy, Activism and the Internet*, eds. S. Hick, J. McNutt, Lyceum Books, Chicago 2002, p. 8.

226 A. Chadwick, *Internet Politics. States, Citizens, and New Communication Technologies*, Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford 2006, p. 114.

227 P. Sztompka, *Socjologia zmian społecznych*, Znak, Kraków 2005, p. 261.

228 Cf. H. Kriesi, "The Political Opportunity Structure of New Social Movements. Its Impact on Their Mobilization," in: *The Politics of Social Protest*, eds. J.C. Jenkins, B. Klandermans, University of Minnesota Press-UCL Press, Minneapolis-London 1995, pp. 185 ff.

229 M. Casttels, *Sieci oburzenia i nadziei. Ruchy społeczne w erze Internetu*, trans. O. Siara. PWN, Warszawa 2013, p. 15.

organized networks. Yet, despite such an organizational “anatomy,” a small group of their activists can immediately mobilize vast social circles to participate in some activity or spontaneous action. This is done through the internet, cell phones, and satellite connection.<sup>230</sup> Members of networked social movements share their experiences and emotions, build contacts, work on strategies, and make decisions in cyberspace.

Internet communication is characterized by substantial heterogeneity and horizontality (absence of supervisor-subordinate relations, which is a crucial feature of NSMs). Cyberspace may perform an instrumental function, enabling debates about local issues or encouraging social activity and self-organization. Based on this assumption, it can be claimed that in the times of mediatization, relations between the real and virtual worlds (offline and on-line) are interwoven and complement each other. In this way, communality may be said to have two dimensions: real and virtual. World wide web frequently generates the intensification of social interactions. This means that some connections made or sustained over the Internet may play eufunctions for the users, which means that they do not always disintegrate social bonds in the real world. According to some, the so-called network relations develop alongside – and not instead of – real, mutual interactions in the community.<sup>231</sup>

Despite such an optimistic stance, what is of import is obviously the assessment of the quality of Internet social bonds. For this reason, one should not forget about the dangers to interpersonal relationships that exist in cyberspace. This notwithstanding, on account of the networks of interactive and multidirectional communication on the Internet,<sup>232</sup> the new media play a crucial role in the processes of social mobilization and organization of protests; they contribute to the development of cooperation and intragroup solidarity. Virtual social networks enable various subjects to engage in a discussion – to some extent open – and to coordinate their actions. Thus, the sphere of contemporary social activity has a two-fold dimension, i.e. the participation of people in the urban space is linked to and interwoven with their activity in cyberspace. Real and virtual networks are strictly connected when it comes to social involvement of some subjects. Obviously, neither the Internet nor wireless communication are

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230 I. Krzemiński, “Wprowadzenie,” in: *Wolność, równość, odmiennność. Nowe ruchy społeczne w Polsce początku XXI wieku*, ed. I. Krzemiński, WAIp, Warszawa 2006, p. 12.

231 Y. Benkler, *Bogactwo sieci. Jak produkcja społeczna zmienia rynki i wolność*, trans. R. Próchniak WAIp, Warszawa 2008, p. 372.

232 M. Castells, *Sieci oburzenia i nadziei*. . . , p. 18.

direct and sufficient causes of the existence of networked social movements, for their aetiology frequently has a truly complex character. Still, the new media and interactive communication networks enable various subjects to forge mutual relations and to share their indignation, their experiences of relative deprivation or personal injustice, etc. Thus, they play a significant role in the process of social mobilization and people's self-organization.

### 3. The concept of the regional and the neighbourly bond

Connections and contingencies of a regional and neighbourly character are a crucial aspect of the social bond. Turowski mentions the regional bond in the context of the so-called socio-cultural regions.<sup>233</sup> Various factors played an important role in their creation, e.g. historical divisions (during the Partitions of Poland) or functional settlement and administrative arrangements (lands, counties, voivodships). These construed frames for the interactions between the inhabitants of these areas and between individuals and institutions. Hence, a sense of identity varies in different regions of Poland on account of these factors. There are regions characterized by a high sense of regional distinctness, reflected in self-awareness and in behaviours and activities performed for the sake of the local homeland (e.g. Podhale, the region of Opole Silesia). But there are also regions of a low level of social cohesion.<sup>234</sup> It may be the case that one's bond to his or her region is of a potential character, that is to say that it surfaces as a result of various experiences, e.g. threats (natural disasters) or events raising the prestige of a given region (its high position in some rankings). The bond in question may find its reflection in the activity of various socio-cultural or economic associations, regional social movements or organizations of "aficionados" of a given area. According to Turowski, the creation of regions of various sizes and scopes as socio-economic wholes and the creation of a sense of local identity may constitute a basis for the administrative division of the state<sup>235</sup> as well as an opportunity for the realization of the idea of empowerment and self-government within these communities.<sup>236</sup> Understood in this way, regionalism or localism may to some extent fill the "social void" between an individual/family

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233 J. Turowski, "Regiony – regionalizm, lokalizm," *Zeszyty Społeczne* 1998, no. 6, pp. 23 ff.

234 *Ibid.*, p. 24.

235 It is worth noting that Turowski's text comes from 1998, that is from the period when an administrative reform was being planned in Poland, which introduced a three-level structure of the state's territorial division.

236 *Ibid.*

and the state, while in the sphere of social consciousness all its supporters bear a responsibility for the development of activities fostering social involvement, for entrepreneurship, for the fate of the region and for authentic identification with “the little homeland.”

The neighbourly bond signifies, in turn, social connectivity forged on the basis of spatial proximity, that is of people’s residence within a given area. Such a relation results in the contingency of socio-cultural phenomena on interpersonal connections occurring within a given territory.<sup>237</sup> It can be assumed that a segment of social space filled with neighbourly cooperation is situated between active individuals or family units and (more or less) complex structures (non-governmental organizations, institutions of self-government or state government). In the context of neighbourly bond, various forms of interpersonal communication, cooperation and mutual help may turn out to be possible within the space occupied by a given community. Hence, a relatively stable neighbourly bond does not emerge automatically just because people live close to one another. Crucial unifying factors need to be present, such as affirmation of certain values and interests, mutual affinity, engagement for the sake of common goals, and similarity of lifestyles. At times the following categories may be noticed within the neighbourly bond: trust, inclusivity, bridging social capital or the norm of generalized reciprocity.

The creation of the neighbourly bond is fostered by an analogous social status of people who live close to one another and – similarly to the regional bond – by certain mutual dependencies with the view to completing a certain task or dealing with an existing situation. For this reason, natural disasters or unexpected phenomena frequently generate intense, though short-lived, neighbourly relations. Often, people in these relations may be “united” by the so-called common enemy, e.g. a dishonest developer, an eviction specialist in the context of the re-privatization scandals, or a polluter of the natural environment, etc. Neighbourly cooperation, as a type of confrontation with an inimical and hazy context, e.g. institutional one, frequently acts as a kind of defence against negative repercussions of various phenomena. What is more, as research or participant observation shows, community relations may exist in urban districts that are considered problematic. It is frequently the case that when faced with difficult living conditions people forge closely-knit, stable relations and networks of connections. Their willingness to survive makes individuals and families abide by the rules of mutual help.

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237 S. Ossowski, “Urbanistyka i socjologia,” in: idem, *Dziela*, vol. 3, p. 346.

On the other hand, though, sociologists note the weakening of the spatial aspect of neighbourliness; relations between people living close to one another are looser now than they used to be. This suggests that physical proximity in itself does not create intense social interactions. Especially in big cities and even more so in metropolises<sup>238</sup> people as if brush against one another (e.g. on the staircases in their apartment buildings) but live in social distance (they do not greet one another, do not know their neighbours by their first and last names, do not visit one another or offer help to one another). The loosening of neighbourly ties stems from the phenomenon of individualism or self-isolation prevalent in contemporary culture,<sup>239</sup> but also from a tendency to ensure personal or familial safety (people avoid contact with others on account of some dramatic experiences, such as, for example, break-ins to their apartments or undesirable contact with, for instance, frauds or door-to-door salesmen). Maintaining anonymity and social distance is then a manifestation of defence against various threats. The transformation of the neighbourly bond is also affected by social inequality, e.g. when it comes to material status. Egalitarianism in interpersonal relations is conducive to opening up one's house or apartment to neighbours; if the interior design or equipment in the neighbours' houses is similar, there is no reason to create barriers for neighbourly contact or to hide one's property from others. In such situations, individuals engage in intense, unhindered interactions with one another. The formation of neighbourly ties is enhanced by the so-called street furniture, for example benches in front of rural households, which are now unfortunately becoming rare in many villages.

One way or another, the phenomenon of social distance in big cities has found a response, mainly in Western countries but to some extent also in Poland, in the form of the idea of the so-called localism, which is realized – as Turowski writes – in people's migration from downtown areas of urban agglomerations to mid-size or small towns or rural areas and in their preference for the so-called urban-rural lifestyle. The process is frequently called suburbanization.<sup>240</sup> It essentially denotes working in the city while living in the country or in the suburbs. It constitutes an escape from the mass urban society, in which people to a large extent live in

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238 As Turowski writes, metropolises, especially in developing countries, are characterized by immense social contrasts. Urbanization improves living conditions but does not nullify social polarization of the population (J. Turowski, "Metropolitalna urbanizacja świata," *Zeszyty Społeczne* 2001, no. 9, p. 148).

239 U. Beck, *Społeczeństwo ryzyka. W drodze do innej nowoczesności*, trans. S. Cieśla, Scholar, Warszawa 2002, p. 203.

240 J. Turowski, *Regiony*. . . , p. 24.

anonymity and in which impersonal relations are of material and sectional character (work, consumption, residence). People come into contact here mainly on account of the roles they play, while interpersonal relations or ties disappear. Despite physical proximity (e.g. in the street, in the neighbourhood, in the shop), social distance, indifference and alienation prevail.<sup>241</sup> A return to localism, that is living in the country, a small town or in the suburbs, among familiar people, in constant contact with nature, while at the same time maintaining a civilized standard of life is treated by many as a rescue from uprootedness, anonymity, and loss of individual and social identity.<sup>242</sup> Close neighbourly ties are treated by some as a remedy for the diseases of the mass society, among others, a sense of alienation within a crowd.

Naturally, the spatial (local) dimension of the neighbourly bond is not diminishing for all. It is significant, for example, for the elderly. Frequently, due to their state of health or limited financial resources, they are not able to be socially mobile outside their own local environment. What is more, not everyone is able, for various reasons, to partake of the benefits of suburbanization. For this reason, grassroots initiatives are undertaken in cities to reactivate neighbourly ties and to integrate the inhabitants of a given housing estate or district. Actions are taken with the view to improving the residents' standard of life. It can be claimed, then, that the phenomenon of neighbourliness does not disappear but adopts new forms. It may be observed that the traditional neighbourly bond, in the form of social organization within a given space, is interwoven with a new conception of neighbourliness, which is to an ever larger extent founded on social proximity and is only later spatially installed.<sup>243</sup> Social proximity occurs when people come into contact to embark on an activity together. It is based on acknowledged and realized values and interests (including a capability of working for the common good), trust, cooperation, long-term relationships, the presence of socio-cultural milieu and institutional infrastructure. In other words, the essence of the new neighbourliness is determined by psycho-social factors that make subjects willing to trust one another and cooperate with one another, both in their places of residence and when they interact on the basis of common axiology or pragmatics and acceptance of adequate institutional

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241 Ibid., p. 25.

242 Ibid.

243 *Sąsiedztwa i mikroorganizacje w polskiej przestrzeni społecznej – próba diagnozy i rekomendacje. Badanie mikroorganizacji – grup sąsiedzkich*, ed. W. Łukowski, Ministerstwo Pracy i Polityki Społecznej, Departament Pożytku Publicznego, Warszawa 2009, p. 24.



equipment (the existence of local neighbourly or civic movements or organizations, participation procedures, or formal and legal procedures).

Apart from its traditional and new form, neighbourliness varies according to the extent of the inhabitants' involvement in mutual contacts. Taking this perspective into consideration, Piotr Kryczka distinguished the following types of neighbourliness: restrictive, informed, conventional, provisional, solidaritizing, and social.<sup>244</sup> The first one is based on a specific structure of expectations of and obligations towards one's neighbours. Its basic element is an awareness of limitations stemming from the proximity of neighbours. Informed neighbourliness, in turn, refers to conscious and unconscious collecting of data about one's neighbours. The next type boils down to an exchange of conventional salutations and greetings. Provisional neighbourliness is a type of relation close to those occurring in traditional local communities: it is characterized by direct, intense interactions between members of a given community (people in these communities frequently do small favours for and visit one another). For solidaritizing neighbourliness, integration oscillates around a sense of unity and common interests stemming from being in an analogous situation on account of living close to one another. The last type of neighbourliness is a form of interaction of the highest personal involvement.

In the context of the taxonomy of neighbourliness given above, it is worth citing the results of some research. Polish students in general declare attitudes of solidarity:<sup>245</sup> 53 percent notice the necessity of being sensitive and willing to help others. On the other hand, 26 percent accept the attitude of "social egoism" (that is to say that 'now one needs to concentrate more on fighting for their own causes, without taking heed of others').<sup>246</sup> Hence, when it comes to declarations, solidarity clearly predominates over egoistic approaches. Still, 21 percent of students chose a different answer, namely "it is hard to say."<sup>247</sup> What is more, declarations of supporting others do not necessarily correspond to actual acts of help.

The CBOS survey from 2017 on neighbourly relations showed that the vast majority of Poles (89 percent) do not avoid their neighbours or contacts with them, but at the same time the majority of them (65 percent) admit to maintaining

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244 P. Kryczka, *Spółeczność osiedla mieszkaniowego w wielkim mieście. Ideologie i rzeczywistość*, PWN, Warszawa 1981, pp. 113–157.

245 The attitudes in those studies refer not only to one's neighbours.

246 A. Guzik, R. Marzęcki, Ł. Stach, *Pokolenie '89. Aksjologia i aktywność młodych Polaków*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Pedagogicznego, Kraków 2015, p. 125.

247 Ibid.

distance in these relations. The results of the survey indicate people's willingness to have proper, but not too close, relations with co-inhabitants of a given area.<sup>248</sup> In practice, these relations are reduced to the so-called courtesy contacts (exchange of greetings, saluting neighbours). 84 percent of respondents maintain such contacts at least with some of their neighbours, with 27 percent claiming that such a type of relation characterizes their contacts with the majority of their neighbours. When it comes to doing small favours, such as borrowing something or watching over somebody's child, 72 percent of those surveyed claim to perform such activities. Still, the majority (64 percent) admitted to having such close relations with only a few neighbours. 35 percent of those who took the survey claim that they maintain social contacts with their neighbours (mutual visits, participation in the name day and other family celebrations). Typically, these are not too frequent relations (32 percent of respondents claim that they have from 1 to 5 of such neighbours).

As far as the neighbourly relations of a conventional, provisional and social character mentioned by Kryczka are concerned, the CBOS survey shows that they have remained at a similar level over the last few years. However, a group of neighbours with whom Poles have conventional and provisional relations is becoming smaller (they concern the majority of neighbours less and less frequently, more often – only a handful).<sup>249</sup> Neighbourly bonds depend to some extent on the type and size of a local community. Neighbourly contacts of a provisional and social character, and not only the conventional one, are more frequent in rural areas than in the cities. On the other hand, more intense and direct neighbourly relations in the country are conducive to the emergence of conflict. Provisional neighbourly relations are, in turn, more frequent in small towns.<sup>250</sup> Close neighbourly relations are reported mainly by people aged 45 to 54 (44 percent), those attending religious service a few times a week (44 percent), persons of a relatively low income per capita (42 percent) and those living in the country (40 percent). When the indicator of good neighbourliness (maintaining social and provisional contacts with at least some neighbours) is juxtaposed with comments on keeping distance from the neighbours, it corroborates the hypothesis given above that the absence of closer relations is related to a preference for having proper but not too close relations. 79 percent of those who

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248 *Relacje sąsiedzkie. Komunikat z badań*, CBOS, no. 146/2017, Warszawa, November 2017, p. 1.

249 *Ibid.*, pp. 2 ff.

250 *Ibid.*, p. 4.

claim not to have social or provisional relations with their neighbours maintain that they try to behave in such a way so that none of their neighbours bear a grudge against them and thus they prefer to keep social distance from them. Among people declaring close relations with their neighbours the percentage is 52 percent.<sup>251</sup>

In the context of the results of the research cited here, it can be stated that a sense of bond with various communities or neighbourly networks affects individuals' social engagement. Networks of bonds have a bearing on groups with which or for the sake of which an individual is willing to act. These bonds frequently determine self-organization or mobilization to group activity. They constitute a relatively strong source of readiness to act for the sake of others. For this reason, individual activity for the sake of others undoubtedly decreases in situations of social distance. It has to be noted that the social bond constitutes not only the foundation of social engagement, including neighbourly one, but also its result. One way or another, the weaker the bond between subjects or between a person and the teleology of their activities, the lower the possibility of their social involvement.

#### 4. The social bond and the value of family life

Undoubtedly, for many Poles genuine familial and communal bonds, that is those occurring in basic groups of belonging and identification, function as a defence against various forms of marginalization, exclusion, alienation, etc.<sup>252</sup>

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251 Ibid, p. 5.

252 The CBOS studies show that an adult Pole has on average three people with whom they may talk about all their problems, while slightly over one-fifth of the respondents (22 percent) have only one such person (*Więzi społeczne. Komunikat z badań*, CBOS, no. 151/2017, Warszawa, November 2017, p. 6). Even if a percentage of people who do not feel abandoned or lonely in difficult situations and who feel they may always count on somebody's help has slightly increased since 2012, at the same time the average number of people who – according to the respondents – will never refuse to offer help, advice or even a loan, if need be, has decreased (ibid, p. 9). The feeling of loneliness in difficult life situations is most frequently reported by those who are dissatisfied with their life situation (28 percent), aged between 55 and 64 (18 percent), and with primary education only (17 percent). It has to be noted that at the same time the number of people who claim they have never experienced loneliness has increased since 2005 by as many as 24 percentage points (from 34 to 58 percent) (ibid., p. 10).

Familial ties continue to be of great value for Polish citizens.<sup>253</sup> The level of Poles' satisfaction with their family lives also remains high. The CBOS surveys indicate that people whose support one can always count on are invariably primarily close family members, that is spouses, parents, siblings and children, and for people in informal relationships – their significant others.<sup>254</sup> It comes as so no surprise that over half of those surveyed (54 percent) treat family as the highest value.<sup>255</sup> It is also the closest family, that is parents, siblings and children, that Poles most willingly spend their free time with. Such a preference is reported by 37 percent of those who took the survey.<sup>256</sup> This family-orientation, which is still present in the consciousness of the respondents and is positioned at the forefront of their preferred axiological categories, may be treated as the axis of the Poles' system of values.<sup>257</sup> Family ties help individuals survive various social changes.<sup>258</sup> That is why in situations of personal problems and failures the majority of Poles (88 percent) may count on the help and support of others, primarily closest family members and friends.<sup>259</sup> Thus, for the respondents, the family constitutes the basic environment of their activity and self-realization.

Generally speaking, the majority of the respondents accept a traditional family model, based on a stable, long-term marriage, in which having children and the maternal role of women are particularly emphasized.<sup>260</sup> On the other hand, it has to be noted that on account of various transformations of Polish families (changes of their structure and intrafamily relationships, professional activity of both spouses), at the macrosocial level the preferred family model has changed from the patriarchal one to the egalitarian one (partnership). Over half

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253 J. Szymczyk, "Przemiany wartości Polaków. Wybrane aspekty i tendencje," nm. N. v *Spoleczne i etyczne aspekty rozwoju społecznego*, eds. W. Jedynak, J. Kinal, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego, Rzeszów 2015, p. 25–28.

254 *Więzi społeczne...*, p. 7.

255 *Sens życia – wczoraj i dziś. Komunikat z badań*, CBOS, no. 41/2017, Warszawa, April 2017, p. 3.

256 *Więzi społeczne*, p. 1.

257 U. Swadźba, "Praca, religia, rodzina. Od wartości materialistycznych do postmaterialistycznych?" *Folia Sociologica* 2014, no. 48, p. 56.

258 M. Ziółkowski, K. Zagórski, J. Koralewicz, "Wybrane tendencje przemian świadomości społecznej," in: *Pierwsza dekada niepodległości. Próba socjologicznej syntezy*, eds. E. Wnuk-Lipiński, M. Ziółkowski, ISP PAN, Warszawa 2001, pp. 250 ff.

259 *Więzi społeczne...*, p. 11.

260 A. Jasińska-Kania, "Zmiany wartości Polaków a procesy transformacji, europeizacji i globalizacji," in: *Wartości i zmiany. Przemiany postaw Polaków w jednoczącej się Europie*, ed. A. Jasińska-Kania, Scholar, Warszawa 2012, p. 326.

of the respondents (56 percent) prefer the latter model, in which the man and the woman devote comparable amounts of time to professional activity and to taking care of the household and the children.<sup>261</sup> What is more, the norms regulating the Poles' behaviour in the sphere of marriage and family are undergoing progressive individualization and are influenced by various "imitative categories," mostly borrowed from wealthy Western countries.<sup>262</sup> For this reason, alternative forms of marriage or family are considered ever more acceptable. Research indicates more frequent instances of cohabitation and non-traditional relationships. The number of divorces and out-of-wedlock births is increasing, while the number of new marriages is decreasing. At the same time, people get married later and have children later and fewer than in the past.<sup>263</sup> Fewer Poles believe that "one needs family to feel truly happy" (a drop from 92 percent in 2008 to 85 percent in 2013).<sup>264</sup> The causes of the changes signalled above are low birth rate, poor financial situation, lack of stable occupation, economic emigration and migration, single motherhood, fluctuating relationships, increasing acceptance of informal relationships, etc. For student respondents, in turn, the most important determinants against taking the decision to get married are: fear of financial problems (59 percent), choosing the so-called freedom, that is life without commitments (52 percent), lack of housing (51 percent), fear that family will

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- 261 R. Boguszewski, "Modele rodziny, podział obowiązków domowych i problemy w rodzinie," in: *Rodzina plus. Sytuacja polskich rodzin i oceny polityki prorodzinnej*, eds. M. Grabowska, M. Omyła-Rudzka, B. Roguska, CBOS, seria Opinie i Diagnozy, no. 37, Warszawa 2017, p. 14.
- 262 M. Ziółkowski, "Uniwersalne wartości a regionalne doświadczenia (Europa Środkowa wobec współczesnych debat o wartościach i celach rozwoju), *Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny* 2003, no. 3, p. 218.
- 263 Birth rate in Poland remains at a very low level. Poland belongs to countries with the lowest birth rate in the EU (in 2013 only Portugal and Spain had lower birth rates than Poland). The average number of children per woman of a reproductive age in Poland is one of the lowest not only in Europe but in the whole world. Even though according to the CBOS surveys the governmental programme "Rodzina 500 plus" generates social optimism when it comes to the increase of birth rate (80 percent of parents hope that birth rate will increase on its account), it is too early to evaluate the impact of the programme on Poles' procreative attitudes (M. Omyła-Rudzka, "Postawy prokreacyjne," in: *Rodzina plus*, pp. 42 ff; M. Gwiazda, "Kryzys dzietności i polityka prorodzinna państwa," in: *Rodzina plus*, pp. 66 ff; B. Roguska, "Opinie o programie Rodzina 500 plus" in: *Rodzina plus*, pp. 111 ff).
- 264 *Rodzina – jej współczesne znaczenie i rozumienie. Komunikat z badań*, CBOS, BS/33/2013, Warszawa, March 2013, p. 3.

hinder their professional careers (48 percent), fear of an unsuccessful marriage (20 percent), lack of a suitable candidate for a spouse (18 percent).<sup>265</sup>

However, sociologists notice a significant problem in the emphasis on the value of family ties in Poles' consciousness. According to researchers, a specifically Polish version of individualism, termed "amoral familism," threatens the development of interpersonal relations in a broader, extra-familial aspect. Amoral familism signifies concentration on aims and actions that primarily benefit the family. Individuals exhibit a decrease of social engagement or treat it solely instrumentally, subjecting this activity to the interests of their own families or clans. Because of that, strong intragroup ties are created and a familist model of socialization emerges.<sup>266</sup> Familism is a type of the so-called extended individualism and it hinders the formation of strong neighbourly or civic ties. Its emergence was undoubtedly affected both by the communist period and by the transformation of the political system after 1989. During the Polish People's Republic, family life offered a respite from artificial, imposed social activity. During the Third Polish Republic, in turn, especially during the 1990s, family constituted protection against, among others, negative outcomes of the Balcerowicz Plan (bankruptcies of numerous enterprises, soaring prices of goods and services, decreases of real income, rapid increase of unemployment, a huge increase of the percentage of people living at or below the poverty threshold, too hasty and ill-conceived dissolution or privatization of state-owned farms). It is no wonder that the somewhat irrationally conducted liberalization (privatization) of the Polish economy after 1989 made it difficult for genuine social bonds to emerge among Poles. Economic liberalization did not always go hand in hand with an efficient system of welfare and support for the unemployed, the socially excluded, and those experiencing relative deprivation. All of these phenomena constituted significant barriers to the creation of extra-familial ties, to cooperation beyond the familist model of socialization and to the formation of intergroup sense of community or – to use republican terminology – of a "political nation."<sup>267</sup>

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265 A. Guzik, R. Marzęcki, Ł. Stach, *Pokolenie '89...*, pp. 148–149.

266 A. Miszańska, "Erozja więzi społecznej w III Rzeczpospolitej," in: *Obszary ładu i anomii. Konsekwencje i kierunki polskich przemian*, eds. A. Miszańska, A. Piotrowski, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2006, pp. 141–170.

267 J. Szymczyk, "Rudymentarne wartości republikańskie. Zarys problematyki," in: *Segmety aktywności społecznej a wartości. Idee i praktyka*, ed. J. Szymczyk, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2012, pp. 111–152.

Naturally, one's attachment to family relations and the family hearth is not destructive in itself. What is problematic is that – from the perspective of building integrating (bridging) social capital in Poland – the majority of the respondents do not apply the norm of generalized reciprocity in relation to strangers or to vaster social circles or environments. Helping others or strangers, in the hope that in some indefinite future one of them may help us is not our biggest strength. The fact that such rules of conduct are not formed has a negative impact on the networking of individuals in a broader social context and on the level of integrating social capital and 'scattered' trust.<sup>268</sup> As a result of the choice of "amoral familism" and the fear of having one's trust abused by others, many Poles prefer holding fast to their families to trying to deal with everyday problems in cooperation with somebody from outside their closest group. This phenomenon of Poles' concentration on family life may be one of the reasons for their limited activity within the public sphere, in the form of membership in associations, organizations and social movements, which leads to a growth of individualistic attitudes and indifference to public issues.

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Jan Turowski's conceptualization of the social bond evinces the influence of Stanisław Ossowski's thought as well as that of other authors. Turowski treats the social bond as a constitutive element of a social group. A given community is a social group when specific social ties exist and function within it. The social bond is formed by all the "internal forces" that unify the group and encompass objective dependencies and subjective aspirations; they make it possible for a given community to exist, function, and develop. Just like Ossowski, Turowski subscribes to a psychosocial understanding of the social bond and its structural significance. Turowski notes the two-dimensionality of the social bond, which is an interesting category, applicable to research. An analysis of Turowski's texts leads to the conclusion that the social bond consists of some objective foundation for interpersonal relations (e.g. the area in the context of regional or neighbourly bond), specific relations between people (based on exchange of values, goods, mutual fulfilment of needs), a sense of community and social identity as well as the manifestation of this connectivity in behaviours and actions. The simplest method of determining the existence and state of the social bond within a given group is an observation of behaviours and actions of individuals, their

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268 J. Szymczyk, "Zamiast wprowadzenia. W stronę socjologii zaufania z perspektywy wartości," in: *Zaufanie społeczne. Teoria – idee – praktyka*, ed. J. Szymczyk, Oficyna Naukowa, Warszawa 2016, pp. 7–31.

mutual relations, types of interaction, manifestations of affinity with or antipathy towards one another. These and other signs of the bond can be grasped empirically. Sociological research operationalizes the notion of the bond and verifies the aptness of accepted terms and definitions. Bond-creating factors need not be faithful and authentic reflections of reality but may also have the form of imagined categories, some myths and social fictions or ideological content.

Furthermore, the social bond may be univocally experienced by the “whole” group when the consciousness of its members is focused in a special context on one object (e.g. anxiety, threat, hope, victory) and experienced by “all,” e.g. as a success or failure by the whole community and each of its members. A sense of social unity manifests itself also in situations of confrontations with other communities or their representatives (conflicts between families, clan revenge, fight for national or class freedom, or sports competition). These phenomena and circumstances may thus be granted a bond-forming function, while the social bond in itself may be treated as a constitutive factor of a given social group.

Discussing the phenomenon of the social bond, it should be emphasized that one engages in numerous activities in his or her life. Some of them are to our liking, so doing them poses no problem. Others are not particularly interesting but still we do them. Frequently, an individual begins a disliked activity related to another person because they care for the person in question and he or she is important for them. Performing such a disliked activity, one takes care of good interpersonal relations. On the other hand, strong polarization of Poles does not contribute to voluntary grassroots social activism. Experience shows that the potential for participation inherent in many Poles is frequently torpedoed and annihilated by the political auspices under which some activities take place. This means that there could be many people ready for social engagement, but when they hear that a person of a different political predilection takes part, they simply resign from social participation.

The postulate of forging intense interactions or creating social ties is meant to dynamize or activate Poles’ social participation. The current level of social activism is relatively low; few people are willing to regularly and disinterestedly support or take part in the activities of trade unions, civic organizations or social movements. The aetiology of such a state of affairs includes, among others, the phenomenon of the so-called privatizing of some Poles, that is of a certain narrowing-down of their social engagement to private or family life (the phenomenon of “amoral familism”). A low level of regular social participation is a permanent feature of both individual and group conduct. Moreover, socio-economic changes, the development of the new media and increased social mobility generate various transformations of interpersonal relations or social



ties. As a consequence, the following phenomena may now be observed: social distance, isolation of people, disappearance of intimate interpersonal or neighbourly contacts, or increase of a sense of loneliness despite having numerous contacts. This notwithstanding, research shows that Poles continue to have strong and authentic family and communal ties, that is ones taking place in basic groups of belonging and identification. In turn, neighbourly relations of a conventional, provisional and social character have remained at the same level for at least several years, though the number of neighbours with whom Poles have these relations is getting lower. The phenomenon of neighbourliness does not disappear but takes new forms. For the sociologists who analyse and study the phenomenon of the social bond, the relations between the real world and cyberspace offer an interesting challenge. One way or another, the new media and interactive communication networks play a significant role in the process of social mobilization and make it possible for various subjects to forge mutual bonds and share their diverse individual and intersubjective experiences.



## V. AN OUTLINE OF THE REALIST-CRITICISTIC THEORY OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF LITERATURE

The realist-criticistic perspective that may provide additional justification for the sociological study of literature is based on Karl R. Popper's critical rationalism and sociological critical realism. Popper's theory<sup>269</sup> will be applied here as a criticistic analysis of the products of knowledge.<sup>270</sup> The perspective will be supplemented by the theory of critical realism,<sup>271</sup> especially the sociological approach of Margaret S. Archer.<sup>272</sup> The goal of the realist-criticistic approach is to demonstrate that it is possible to treat the themes of a given text as key in analysing all types of social factors responsible for the creation of art, including literature.<sup>273</sup> The root of critical realism is the morphogenetic cycle that consist of three parallel levels: structural or cultural conditioning, sociocultural interaction, and structural or cultural elaboration. The link between a structural or cultural system inherited by a given society and its future form is human reflectiveness that, in ontological terms, may be described as objective subjectivity, and, from the epistemological point of view, is characterized by subjective relativity and uncertainty. From the sociological point of view, this reflectiveness is

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269 K. R. Popper, *Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1994; K. R. Popper, *The Myth of the Framework: In Defence of Science and Rationality*, ed. M. A. Notturmo, Routledge, London and New York 1997; K. R. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*, Basic Books, New York and London 1962.

270 A. Jabłoński, *Budowanie społeczeństwa wiedzy. Zarys teorii społecznej Karla R. Poppera*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2006.

271 R. Bhaskar, "Philosophy and Scientific Realism," in: *Critical Realism: Essential Readings*, eds. M. Archer, et al., Routledge, London and New York 1998, pp. 16–47.

272 T. Brock, M. Carrigan, and G. Scambler (eds.), *Structure, Culture and Agency: Selected Papers of Margaret Archer*, Routledge, London and New York 2017; see K. Wielecki, "Socjologia na rozstaju dróg. Znaczenie teorii Margaret S. Archer," *Uniwersyteckie Czasopismo Socjologiczne* 2015, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 47–59.

273 See A. Jabłoński, "K. Popper's method of trial-and-error as basis sociological analysis of knowledge," in: *Critical Realism and Humanity in the Social Sciences*, eds. K. Śledzińska and K. Wielecki, Wydawnictwo UKSW, Warszawa 2016, pp. 73–87.

best expressed by the term collective mentality. By joining the aforementioned perspectives, the realist-criticistic approach offers an interesting tool for analysing literature as a sociological phenomenon.

## 1. Criticistic analysis of literature

In my research, by focusing on the relationship between knowledge and social life in Karl R. Popper's writings, I attempt to justify the value of an approach that focuses on the problems expressed in products of knowledge. I christened this line of study a criticistic approach,<sup>274</sup> thereby referring to the tradition of critical social thinking (even though the term sounds slightly awkward). I focus primarily on the practical side of the approach that originates in the eighteenth-century idea of the rationalization of social life. Due to Marxism and neo-Marxism (especially the Frankfurt school), that idea became associated with the fight against false consciousness. That is how it entered sociology. As a result, sociology used to treat all products of knowledge – ranging from science to literature – as expressions of corrupted capitalist consciousness (whether this consciousness belonged to the bourgeois, landowners, nationalists, or some other group). In order to free the 'progressive part of humanity' from the dominion of those false constructs, a method for uncovering them was devised. The method was followed by a plan to disseminate alternative forms of knowledge consistent with and helpful in directing anticipated historical changes.<sup>275</sup>

Instead of uncovering various forms of false consciousness, Popper asks a fundamental question: What problem does a given text address? The question is neither scientific nor literary but rather meta-textual, as it calls for considering a given text in its broadest context. This approach investigates the strategies applied by an author to express the tension between facts and criteria/values. In other words, the approach focuses on the particular way a given author (either in a literary or scientific text) makes distinctions between natural and conventional laws, natural and ethical laws, facts and norms, nature and contract, nature and convention, facts and choices, statements and proposals, facts and politics. According to Popper, every creator makes these distinctions within the space of public life on a trial and error basis<sup>276</sup> – each trial solution is accompanied by a critical discussion. As

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274 A. Jabłoński, *Budowanie społeczeństwa wiedzy*. . . , pp. 86–130.

275 A. Jabłoński, "Świadomość zakłamana," in: *Formy świadomości społecznej*, eds. K. Sztalt and M. Zemło, TN KUL, Lublin 2013, pp. 345–370.

276 Popper has characterized the underlying pattern of this continuous development in the formula:

a result, it is possible to distinguish between facts and criteria presented in a given text; this in turn provides people with knowledge necessary to cope with reality.

Popper claims that the trial and error mechanism is one of humanity's evolutionary achievements, one that found its best application in the scientific cognition of the world. It is no accident that the rise of scientific descriptions of the world was accompanied by the emergence of a form of writing called "literature." Therefore, we may nowadays distinguish between a plethora of writing forms, ranging from scientific works (formal, real, and socio-humanist sciences) to literature with its numerous genres. The position a given text occupies on the spectrum is determined by the way it positions itself in relation to reality. Whereas science favours facts and scientific criteria, literature blurs the distinction between facts and fiction. Thus, the former is considered to provide an objective description of the world, whereas the latter is believed to be a subjective creation. In the case of science, however, reality is reduced to its particular aspects determined by the desire to establish a clear border between facts and the criteria responsible for choosing these facts as the basis for solving particular problems. The basic scientific criteria are the correspondence between statements and reality, the internal coherence of a text, and the pragmatic effectiveness of proposed solutions. Consequently, there exists an entire conglomeration of interdependent institutions responsible for evaluating the results of scientific investigations and rejecting the results deemed false, incorrect, contradictory, or leading to failure and suffering.<sup>277</sup> This way of evaluating science is meant to show that humans have reached a relative certainty that allows for the application of scientific solutions; it is rooted in a belief that the institutions that have gained social recognition assume the uncertainty of every solution and recognize the fact that some solutions are temporary and may be replaced with better ones in the future.<sup>278</sup> According to Popper, we gain subjective certainty

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P1 → TT → EE → P2

"Here 'P1' means the problem from which we start. It may be a practical or a theoretical problem. 'TT' is a tentative theory, which we offer in order to solve that problem. 'EE' means a process of error elimination, by way of critical tests, or of critical discussion. 'P2' means the problems with which we end-the problem, which emerge from the discussion and tests." Popper, *The Myth of the Framework*. . . , pp. 10 ff.

277 Jabłoński, *Budowanie społeczeństwa wiedzy*, pp. 404–422.

278 Contemporary, postmodern social growth results in increasing uncertainty and mistrust of scientific solutions. It is the result of the fact that the basic metacriterion or the binary code – true/false – that sanctions the very existence of a scientific system has

thanks to the institutional guarantees of uncertainty of all scientific solutions. This insight is corroborated by sociological theories that associate increasing mistrust toward science (a distinctive feature of people living in late modernity) with the lack of guarantees that scientific institutions, in their search for the truth, actually eliminate mistakes. By realizing that scientific institutions follow their own agendas, no longer aiming to simply uncover the truth and eliminate falsity, we enter a new era, one that no longer believes in the power of scientific cognition.<sup>279</sup>

Still, before people lost their trust in science, the Enlightenment project excluded entire parts of the empirical world from scientific investigation, as they would not fit the distinction between facts and criteria and the solutions based on the investigation of these elements of reality could not be verified. As a result, science remained blind to a whole range of issues affecting human ability to cope with reality – such as God, love, patriotism, courage, history, motherhood, fatherhood – or treated them in a selective way that could not offer satisfactory solutions.<sup>280</sup> To find solutions that would be more satisfactory and could be accepted freely and rationally, scientists used the knowledge not bound by the aforementioned restrictions. It was possible with the use of trial and error systems, as, alternative to science, these systems allow to test solutions. Some of these solutions have become routine behaviours dictated by either custom or convention, replacing facts with values consistent with human nature. As these solutions offer no alternatives sanctioned by class, environment, or institutions such as family, nationality, or religion, they are considered certain and indisputable. The aforementioned institutions tend to be in turn regarded as the source of certainty for people searching for solutions to their problems.

In order to avoid oversimplifying knowledge (that is reducing it to social and institutional conditions), Popper argues that there is the Third World, the world

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been undermined. U. Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*, trans. M. Ritter, Sage Publications, London 1992, pp. 14–15.

279 U. Beck, *Społeczeństwo światowego ryzyka. W poszukiwaniu utraconego bezpieczeństwa*, trans. B. Baran, Wydawnictwo Naukowe SCHOLAR, Warszawa 2012, p. 17.

280 “Yet human exultation and sorrow, anguish and jubilation, love and hatred, will continue to demand shaped expression. They will continue to press on language which, under that pressure, becomes literature. The human intellect will persist in posing questions which science has ruled illicit or unanswerable.” G. Steiner, *Grammars of Creation: Originating in the Gifford Lectures for 1990*, Open Road Integrated Media, New York 2013, Conclusion, Par. 5, EPUB File.

of ideas, of objective truths, or the world of the library.<sup>281</sup> This is a real world, Popper claims, because it is autonomous and causally linked to the human mind through which it affects the outside world. It is not, however, the world of eternal ideas that compelled Plato to banish poets from Callipolis. For Plato, poets merely imitated reality, turning their backs on the truth in order to face the world of *doxa*. The author of *The Republic* believed poetry to be a threat to the order of the *polis* for it introduced irrationality into human life.<sup>282</sup> While he considers Plato one of the enemies of the open society, Popper does not undermine the need to rationalize social life. He is, however, against excluding those who choose art (*techne*) over true knowledge (*episteme*). According to Popper, Plato's position stems from him treating the world of ideas as independent from the subject and inevitably distorted in the products of human cognition.<sup>283</sup> The author of *The Open Society* considers the Third World as a perception of reality from the point of view of all possible products of human knowledge. That is why Plato's monism of facts or criteria (real, mental, social, historical) subordinate to an overriding idea (interchangeable and interconnected ideas of good, truth, and beauty) is replaced in Popper's theory by the pluralism of solutions. This approach may be treated as a way to uncover the properties of knowledge obtained in the process of coping with reality (*techne*). The Third World is a human construct, and, thanks to language, it consists of numerous, often incommensurable narrations organized around a stable core comprising the rules that have been shaped throughout the ages and are called human rationality.<sup>284</sup>

By considering literature as a part of the same reality as science, it is possible to analyse the ways in which literature affects human minds and, consequently, the order of the world. Thus, the question arises: how is it possible

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281 "To see this more clearly, we may imagine that after the human race has perished, some books or libraries may be found by some civilized successors of ours (no matter whether these are terrestrial animals which have become civilized, or some visitors from outer space). These books may be deciphered. They may be those logarithm tables never read before, for argument's sake. This makes it quite clear that neither its composition by thinking animals nor the fact that it has not actually been read or understood is essential for making a thing a book, and that it is sufficient that it might be deciphered." K. R. Popper, *Objective Knowledge*. . . , p. 116.

282 R. Mordarski, *Filozofia polityczna Platona wobec sporu filozofii z poezją. Interpretacja Leo Straussa*, "Filo-Sofia" 2009, vol. 1, no. 8, pp. 189–206.

283 K. R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford 2013, pp. 70–74.

284 Looking for the border between science and non-science. A. Jabłoński, *Status teoretyczny i funkcja techniczna*. . . , pp. 56–91.

that fiction – an appearance of reality – is often more important than scientific knowledge when it comes to perceiving the world? According to Popper, even if contents and directives come from a fictitious reality, this reality may be analysed in terms of the problems it addresses. Instead of considering all human products as expressions of a particular form of life that originate from a given social, historical, and cultural context,<sup>285</sup> one may analyse them in the context of language's communicative capabilities and linguistically conveyed contents and directives that help cope with problems. The goal of such research is not to uncover the universal logic of linguistic communication; rather, it analyses how statements and directives that guide human actions gain their credibility. The objective is to establish the means that validate a given solution as most likely to succeed in a particular situation. Thus, the aim is to uncover how a subject, acknowledging a form of rationality shared by his or her social group, accepts a particular idea. Such research will help in understanding the criteria according to which a reader of a text rejects some statements as false while accepting others as a guarantee of better solutions.

The Third World is not, then, a collection of rules independent of socio-historical conditions. It is rather a hierarchy of content deemed useful at a given time. To notice that a text was written in a given language and fulfilled certain criteria required for publication is the first step in a criticistic analysis – it reveals the socio-historical guarantees of the autonomy of the content (e.g. what is being published in a given language, in which publishing house, and in how many copies). Next, the analysis may focus on the distribution, availability, and the publicity literary works receive (for instance, it may establish the forms of distribution, the awards a given text qualifies for, or the way it is reviewed); it may also analyse how a given text describes reality or presents an argument (i.e. by focusing on such elements as genre, style, or rhetoric). Therefore, the analysis of the Third World expressed in a text will take into consideration all its content, as it is responsible for the text being accepted in a given social context. Such an analysis will not be limited to semiotic or symbolic issues, but will focus on social ones – it will establish the form of rationality that, in a given socio-cultural context, serves as a guarantee of solving particular problems.

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285 Regarding different approaches that reduce the products of knowledge expressed in language to semiotics, which found its most influential expression in the writings of L. Wittgenstein and his followers. See A. Jabłoński, *Filozoficzna interpretacja życia społecznego w ujęciu Petera Wincha*, Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, Lublin 1998.



Throughout the ages, different types of texts – mythical, religious, philosophical, scientific, literary – have developed their own strategies for legitimizing the reality they represent: myths – mimetic literalness; religion – symbolic manifestation; philosophy – axioms and definitions; science – notional and empirical reductions; literature – autonomy of fiction. As a consequence, the tension between facts and criteria, responsible for the uncertain nature of all texts, has been replaced by a fictitious belief in primary meanings and the truth of beliefs based upon them.<sup>286</sup> These strategies stem from the primary meanings isolated by the receivers of culture and aimed at determining the meaning of expressions and statements in texts. The criticistic approach endeavors to uncover these claims as they disregard the complex tension between fact and criteria, the tension that determines whether a text may be applied to a given problem.

As I attempted to prove in another text,<sup>287</sup> in order to analyse the subject matter of a text, a critic must face the liar's paradox inherent to all texts. According to the liar's paradox that Eubulides attributed to Epimenides of Cnossos, if all Cretans are liars, then the Cretan who calls them liars is also lying (self-referentiality). In the case of literature, the liar's paradox is the consequence of the stress placed upon the fictitiousness of literature that suspends its truthfulness. Fiction does not have to provide a false image of reality, but the assumption that a text is fictitious results in a dilemma: a text does not lie if it is fiction, but whenever it mirrors reality, it is a lie.<sup>288</sup> All literary studies that follow the structuralist approach in considering the reality of a text a complete system composed of signs and meanings must face the dilemma posed by the liar's paradox.<sup>289</sup>

Literature mixes reality (facts that are confirmed by empirical reality/experience) with fiction (events or persons that are either made up or cannot be unequivocally confirmed by empirical reality) all the time. On the one hand, it forces the reader to admit that the act of reading engages imagination (emotions and reason) and requires one to question the reality of the events described in the

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286 A. Jabłoński, "Iluzja językowa i ikoniczna w społecznym widzeniu świata," in: *Wiedza między słowem a obrazem*, eds. M. Zemło, A. Jabłoński, and J. Szymczyk, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2010, pp. 13–31.

287 See A. Jabłoński, *Budowanie społeczeństwa wiedzy*. . . , pp. 352–366.

288 Umberto Eco presents a reverse situation: a story whose title suggest that it is true, yet whose author admits to having lied, disguising his lies as truth. U. Eco, *Sześć przechadzek po lesie fikcji*, trans. S. Kowalczyk, Wydawnictwo Znak, Kraków 1996, p. 138.

289 Umberto Eco points out the shortcomings of such a solution, arguing that all fictional words parasitize the real world. *Ibid.*, pp. 104–105.

text; on the other hand, the text acts on the reader's emotions and reason so that he or she would admit that the events described in the text could take place. This paradox cannot be solved through a logical distinction between language and meta-language, between reality and literary reality. It is through the language that humans use to describe reality that the illusion of literary worlds demands recognition. The uncertainty of the illusions evoked by language (be it the language of mathematics or colloquial speech) that required confrontation with facts and confirmation with empirical knowledge has been replaced with the unquestionable certainty of an illusion of a different kind, one that restricts reality to the sphere of meaning. The goal of the criticistic analysis is to reveal these restrictions. By focusing on the argumentation, content, or narration of a given text, the analysis shows that due to authoritative and arbitrary juxtapositions of meanings that reflect the collective mentality of a given community,<sup>290</sup> literature recognizes only particular problems. The objective is to establish the patterns (such as perceptions, value judgments, feelings, and reactions to reality) responsible for the way of thinking presented in a given text. Thus, literature is treated as an indirect medium for mentality – its language conveys ideas, describes behaviours, expresses prejudices or preferences, and gives shape to a particular form of discourse. Value judgments expressed in literature are treated “as a testimony to a particular mentality rather than its content: their form and content are to some extent controlled (or even ‘imposed’) by a given mentality/mind.”<sup>291</sup>

## 2. Literature and critical realism

A specific understanding of literature emerges from what we have stated so far. Although literature is a subjective creation, it may be also seen as an intersubjective result of social life. The criticistic approach aims to uncover a problem that a given text addresses. It assumes that it is due to that problem that a given text gains recognition in a particular historical and social context (in other words, that

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290 “It consists, to a lesser or greater extent, of features which: 1) apply to all members of a given community; 2) are considered, or at least suspected or assumed, as shared by all members; 3) accompany or originate certain practical activities that take a form of either individual or collective actions.” J. Koralewicz, M. Ziółkowski, *Mentalność Polaków. Sposoby myślenia o polityce, gospodarce i życiu społecznym*, Wydanie nowe zmienione, Scholar, Warszawa 2003, pp. 223–224.

291 J. Faryno, “Менталитет (Mentalność),” in: *Mentalność rosyjska. Słownik*, eds. A. de Lazari, et al., Interdyscyplinarny Zespół Badań Sowieologicznych UŁ, Katowice 1995, pp. 50–51.

is why a book becomes a classic, a bestseller, a work praised by the critics, etc.). The problem a text addresses – how it is presented, solved, and how it originates a discussion that brings the reader’s attention to other problems – is responsible for the text’s status in the eyes of literary critics and ordinary readers. The three issues that emerge at this point are of particular interest for the sociology of literature. First, the question of the language of a literary text: was it responsible for a given group of readers recognizing the validity of a solution proposed in the text? Then, the medium: was the text published as a paper book or an e-text? Finally, the issue of genre: has it contributed to the text’s recognition?

For a sociologist, the aforementioned questions become even more pressing if juxtaposed with the premises of critical realism that call for a distinction between reality and facts.<sup>292</sup> From that point of view, reality is a broader term that refers to the structures and mechanisms of the world and encompasses factuality that refers to specific events. However, reality extends beyond the realm of empirical facts. It manifests itself in the way it affects the world. The structures and mechanisms of the world consist of not only physical and biological but also social structures such as the means of production and ideas. As a result of these influences, particular events take place. These events are either interconnected and originate in a social context, or take more complex – and thus less predictable – forms. Therefore, the events analysed by sociologists comprise collections of subjective experiences and notions that shape these experiences. In short, the experiences form a mass mentality which is, however, only the tip of the iceberg – underneath rest multiple, invisible forces and conditions. From the sociological point of view, it is crucial to establish why people act, what motivates them, and how they manage to accomplish their goals when faced with the constant risk of failure. Next, it is important to establish how social properties affect human actions and how people apply their reflexivity while using them. Finally, it is necessary to clarify why – in a similar social context – people’s reflexive actions tend to vary.<sup>293</sup>

In order to conduct a sociological analysis of literature that would follow the premises of critical realism, it is necessary to account for Margaret Archer’s distinction between the Cultural System and the Socio-Cultural System. According to Archer, the former “is held to be roughly co-terminous with what Popper

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292 R. Bhaskar, *Philosophy and Scientific Realism*. . . , p. 41.

293 M. S. Archer, *Making our Way through the World. Human Reflexivity and Social Mobility*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007, pp. 5 ff.

called Third World Knowledge.”<sup>294</sup> We have already discussed how Popper’s approach may be helpful in the sociological (criticistic) analysis of literature. Looked at from the point of view of the Socio-Cultural System, literature exists as an emergent environment of human life. It is a space where the forms of human dominion over external reality (whether biological or cultural) are tested. The world that emerges is recognizable thanks to human reason and the human ability to test the world’s validity through social interactions. A human being, consisting of both body and spirit, directly or indirectly interacts with others. Yet, these interactions should not be considered as merely responses to stimuli or symbols; they are rather attempts to situate oneself within the complex net of socio-cultural influences.

The approach I propose stands in opposition to what Archer calls conflationary theorizing. According to Archer, conflationists reduce two or more things to just one, thus depriving the remaining ones of any reality. Archer lists three main conflations:<sup>295</sup> Downwards conflation,<sup>296</sup> Upwards conflation,<sup>297</sup> and Central

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294 M. S. Archer, *Culture and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996, p. 104.

295 ‘Downwards conflation means that the properties of the “people” can be “upwardly reduced” to properties of the system, which alone has casual powers. Upwards conflation means that the properties of the “parts” can be “downwardly reduced” to properties of the “people,” who alone have casual powers. . . . However, . . . there is a third form of conflation which does not endorse reductionism at all. There is Central conflation which is a reductionist, because it insists upon the inseparability of the “parts” and the “people.” . . . Epiphenomenalism is not the only way in which the “parts” or the “people” are deprived of their emergent, autonomous and causally efficacious properties and powers, and that in consequence their interplay is denied.’ M. S. Archer, *Being Human: The Problem of Agency*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003 pp. 5 ff.

296 Downwards conflation grants autonomy and real existence to social structures and cultural systems; these structures and systems are codes that express the nature of all social behaviours and actions. Archer considers the origin of that approach to be the sociology of A. Comte, and the most advanced version of that approach to be the sociology that follows the ideas of É. Durkheim. M. S. Archer, *Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995, p. 3.

297 Upwards conflation is connected with psychologism and is manifested in such approaches as phenomenological sociology, symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, or postmodernism in sociology. In this approach, reality is reduced to individuals and their relations. Society, culture, or social whole are considered empty terms or – according to a less radical view – phenomena that are beyond cognition. *Ibid.*, pp. 3 ff.

conflation.<sup>298</sup> Her approach may be juxtaposed with Terry Eagleton's remarks about the sociology of literature. Eagleton's first claim is that literature is always rooted in its social context, so literary criticism that does not account for the social cannot offer a complete reading of a text.<sup>299</sup> For Eagleton, this is a realist approach and it seems to mirror Archer's Downwards conflation. Secondly, a pragmatist approach accounts for numerous factors that shape literature and make it susceptible to context-dependent, political readings.<sup>300</sup> This coincides with Archer's Upwards conflation. Finally, Eagleton lists the third approach that is a synthesis of realism and pragmatism. On the one hand, it acknowledges the role of socio-historical factors in shaping literature; on the other, it accounts for the pragmatic justification of political reading.<sup>301</sup> This seems to coincide with Archer's Central conflation.

It is not always possible to unambiguously consider a given theoretical approach as conflationary. For example, some versions of Marxism lean towards the structuralist and functionalist approach that stresses the influence of the economic base on the cultural superstructure. Or, as in the case of Margaret Archer, one may stress the dependence of structures on a particular form of class struggle. Such a conflationary approach is put forward by the Marxist sociology of literature, voiced by its most prominent representative, György Lukács. He states:

Each Marxist analysis of literature assumes that literary works are merely 'components of general social development.' Only such an approach allows to consider them as necessary products of a given stage of social development. Having abandoned the approach, one is immediately thrown back into the mythologizing deliberations of the bourgeois history of literature which attempts to explain an epoch through its 'great figures' and art through the notion of 'genius.' This, obviously, is a vicious circle for genius may be

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298 Central conflation appears in numerous sociological theories, such as the theory of Charles Cooley, Pierre Bourdieu's theory of habitus, and especially Anthony Giddens' theory of structuration. M. S. Archer, "Morphogenesis versus Structuration: On Combining Structure and Action," *The British Journal of Sociology* 2010, vol. 61, pp. 225–252.

299 T. Eagleton T., "Two Approaches in the Sociology of Literature," *Critical Inquiry* 1988, vol. 14, no. 3 (*The Sociology of Literature*), p. 469.

300 Ibid.

301 „Insofar as I want to say that there are central aspects of literature which actually are, regardless of my own political predilections, closely bound up with social exploitation, I give offence to a certain kind of pragmatist; insofar as I also want to argue that there are social phenomena which at particular times are in no very relevant sense so bound up, I give offence to a certain kind of Marxist realist." Ibid., p. 476.

explained only through art. Therefore, as class is responsible for the literature of a given epoch, it is justified to consider class as a starting point for the study of the history of literature. Also, as social classes use literature to voice their ideologies, one should look for social conflicts that stand behind the clashes of literary movements.<sup>302</sup>

Another type of conflationary ambiguity may be the case pointed out by Terry Eagleton, where society is considered from a realistic point of view, whereas literature is approached pragmatically. "One can hold that structures such as class and patriarchy genuinely are vitally determining forces in historical development but see no reason why every literary work should be centrally concerned with them, and so justify one's attention to such themes in a particular work from a pragmatist perspective."<sup>303</sup> That is why Eagleton believes the Marxist distinction between the base and the superstructure so crucial – it grounds literature (an element of the superstructure) in the socio-economic base.

Structuralism oversimplifies literary analysis for it upholds the distinction between the base and the superstructure. For structuralists, the nature of social order is tantamount to literary structures being part of the general sign theory. It is undeniable that structuralism is responsible for significant advancements in the field of text analysis (such as proposing binary oppositions as the main interpretative category,<sup>304</sup> or making text the main object of analysis<sup>305</sup>). However, as noticed almost half a century ago by Beda Allemann, its goal is to create a universal inductive theory of literature based on linguistic premises.<sup>306</sup> Nowadays, this goal manifests itself in an attempt to equate culture with

302 G. Lukacs, *Powstawanie i wartość utworów literackich (1923)*, trans. R. Turczyn, Studenckie Koło Filozofii Marksistowskiej (Uniwersytet Warszawski), Warszawa 2006, p. 3.

303 T. Eagleton, *Two Approaches in the Sociology of Literature*. . . , p. 470.

304 Linguistic structuralism, adapted to anthropology, is one of the attempts to analyse, or rather establish, certain general laws governing the human mind and its products. Structural linguistic was originated by Ferdinand de Saussure who distinguished between language as a system [of signs] and its individual applications (speech). A. Szabelska, "Claude Lévi-Strauss i strukturalna analiza mitu a przyczynek do badań kognitywnych," *Via Mentis* 2012, vol. 1, p. 100.

305 M. Bachtin, *Estetyka twórczości słownej*, trans. D. Ulicka, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warszawa 1986, p. 403.

306 The "grammar of poetry," originating in the "poetry of grammar" which may, according to structuralism, be the final goal, is, if the matter is to be understood literally as a fully-developed model of literature based on linguistic premises, still a utopia. B. Allemann, "Strukturalizm w literaturoznawstwie," trans. K. Krzemięń, *Pamiętnik Literacki* 1974, vol. 3, p. 302.

cognitive phenomena: “linguistic categories are simply the consequence of the transformation of universal structural features of the human mind into universal categories of culture.”<sup>307</sup>

On the other hand, there are approaches that consider literature as the creation of individuals and their emotions. In an essay *Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming*, Sigmund Freud compares writers to children at play, describing play and reality as two opposites. “The creative writer does the same as the child at play. He creates a world of phantasy which he takes very seriously – that is, which he invests with large amounts of emotion – while separating it sharply from reality.”<sup>308</sup> By connecting the phantasy of a literary work with the writer’s emotional states, the father of psychoanalysis stresses the significance of time – it is the phantasy that establishes the link between a present experience, a memory of a childhood pleasure, and a wish for future gratification. That is why, according to Freud, “The work itself exhibits elements of the recent provoking occasion as well as of the old memory.”<sup>309</sup>

Applied in literary studies, individualism may also underline the lack of objectivity of a text, which, in turn, presents any interpretation as the outcome of an agreement in a given community. In the Polish context, this point of view is advocated by A. Szahaj, who claims: “From my point of view, it is clear that the notion of ‘interpretative objectivity’ (or rather interpretative Objectivity) is misleading. It would make sense only if the term ‘objectivity’ in its numerous degrees was an approximation applied to express certain social relations. Also such as control and dominion.”<sup>310</sup> As this point of view does not account for any stable reference points, it creates a paradoxical situation where dominion and control become the only stable reference points. As noticed by Terry Eagleton: “The position of a pragmatist who takes ‘interest,’ ‘power,’ or ‘desire’ as his or her epistemological baseline [. . .] is still open to argument: are such interests and desires actually worth holding in the sense that they might, for example, have beneficial effects?”<sup>311</sup>

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307 A. Szabelska, *Claude Lévi-Strauss*. . . , p. 108.

308 S. Freud, “Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming,” in: *The Freud Reader*, ed. P. Gay, W. W. Norton and Company, New York and London 1995, p. 437.

309 *Ibid.*, p. 442.

310 A. Szahaj, “Granice anarchizmu interpretacyjnego,” *Teksty Drugie* 1997, no. 6, pp. 20–21.

311 T. Eagleton, *Two Approaches in the Sociology of Literature*. . . , p. 471.

### 3. The realist-criticistic analysis of literature

The weakness of conflationary approaches stems from the fact that they consider literature (its content, style, and genres) as a surface-form determined by social structures or individual experiences. As a result, they disregard the heterogeneity of texts and the stylistic/linguistic differences between them. Also, these approaches do not account for the fact that the surface may affect the deeper level of meaning. For instance, a literary text may cause significant social changes by strengthening human motivations and connecting them under the banner of a common idea. What is more, in order to establish the extent to which deeper mechanisms affect the surface-level, it is necessary to analyse their properties and capabilities. Therefore, all attempts to evaluate the effect of social structures and individual experiences on literature must originate from a clear distinction between what is and what is not literature, for the latter cannot be explained by the influence of social structures and individual reflexivity. Our goal, however, is not to identify the nature of literature, but to portray literature as the product of knowledge that occupies a particular position within public space and plays an important role in determining mass mentality.

From this point of view, literature may be seen as a fold of two emergent realities: (1) literature as texts that affect reality, (2) and literature as texts shaped by social interactions. This results in a complex net of relations that may be untangled in three analytical steps:<sup>312</sup> (1) by indicating textual representations of mass mentality as justified ways of solving problems (descriptions and arguments); (2) by strengthening or weakening mental structures embodied in a given text by reflexive subjects that interact with each other; (3) by transforming mental structures, represented as the meanings of a given text, into new problems. The three steps help to analyse the reality represented in a given literary text as a way of addressing particular problems characteristic of the mass mentality of a given society at a given point in time. From that point of view, literary worlds reflect the social world and individual reflexivity, and may serve as a point of departure for a sociological study of literature.

It is crucial to maintain analytical dualism that requires scholars to begin their analysis by studying mental structures (problems and ways of solving them) represented in a given text, and then proceed to analyse how a particular social environment (interactions) sustains or questions them, thus transforming them into new problems. Therefore, the present text considers a literary text as a reality

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312 It is my proposition of an analysis that combines K. Popper's trial and error method with M. Archer's morphogenetic analysis of culture.



with a particular ontological status. As claimed by Roman Ingarden, the world represented in a text is both connected and separated from the meaning of the text.<sup>313</sup> Ingarden's analysis of the properties of objects represented in a text and of how these objects diverge from the meaning of the text is a collection of subtle remarks about both ontological and epistemological properties of the setting. The plethora of points of views noticed by Ingarden is particularly useful in literary studies. A sociological approach to literature may benefit from connecting the setting with a set of solutions to particular problems; these solutions, due to the effect they have on humans and, consequently, on the reality external to the text, are endowed with their own autonomy and reality. Commenting on Ingarden's idea of literature, we may add that the Polish philosopher describes that situation as an epistemological phase that occurs after the text has been read. It is an argument against identifying a work of literature with the feelings of either its author or its readers. According to Ingarden, literature transcends individual acts of reading.<sup>314</sup> I concur with Ingarden: to treat a work of literature as an expression of its author's mentality is an oversimplification that deprives literature of its polyphonic nature.

The second analytical step considers literature as a particular text that exists in a system of interactions that verify the validity of the solutions it proposes. By undertaking an analysis of a particular text, a scholar must inquire about

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313 For instance, a work of literature may present the plot in a non-chronological order. In order to recognize the independence of the literary world, the reader must perform "synthesizing objectivization," thus becoming independent from the text. The very construction of a literary work requires that independence on the part of the reader in order for him or her to reconstruct the object matter of the text. Only through that objectivization may the world represented in literature become a separate quasi-reality with its own events and transformations. The reader becomes a witness to the creation of a literary world. However, the reader is an active participant of that process, for synthesizing objectivization is an intention responsible for the creation (or, to be more precise, re-creation) of the literary world. As a witness, the reader both recognizes and learns about the literary world, reacting to it. That process is a combination of perception, reception, and creation: by understanding the meaning of sentences, the reader creates (recreates) certain objects; then, he or she learns about these objects as if they were "ready-made;" this, in turn, transforms them, allowing for yet another aesthetic perception. R. Ingarden, "Formy poznawania dzieła literackiego," *Pamiętnik Literacki*, 1936, vol. 3, pp. 174 ff. See R. Ingarden, *O dziele literackim. Badania z pogranicza ontologii, teorii języka i filozofii literatury*, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa 1988.

314 R. Ingarden, *Formy poznawania dzieła literackiego*. . . , pp. 190 ff.

the problem it presents and the solution it proposes. Therefore, it is assumed that each text offers a solution to some main problem, and the way it solves that problem may be analysed in the context of existing literary conventions (previous discussions) or social reactions it evoked (new discussions), thus generating new problems. The criticistic approach disregards the issue of the text's type – whether it is scientific, biographical, or literary. It rather focuses on how systemic determinants that reduce a given text's subjectivity and uncertainty validate the solutions it proposes. Therefore, even the most personal texts written in elaborate style may become expressions of a particular mass mentality. Why do some texts present a view of reality that is harmonious with human expectations and needs, whereas others do not? Which texts gained recognition within a particular social group? What mechanisms are responsible for the narratives that humans use at a particular historical moment? What stylistic means (descriptions and arguments) decide about a particular vision of reality becoming more helpful in addressing the problems we face? What major problems does a particular text emphasize, what solutions does it offer, and what institutionalized mechanisms support these solutions, thus linking them with a mass mentality of a particular historical moment?

The realist-criticistic analysis of literature focuses on its goal rather than on the technical tools of analysis. According to its main assumption, all texts, although to a different degree, engage in phantasy, illusion, and fiction. However, there are institutions responsible for the critical evaluation of literary worlds – they accept some of them, yet remain suspicious of those which threaten the system of best solutions to problems accepted at a given time. Therefore, we believe that even though not all texts mirror reality, all of them address problems important to humans at a given time. If a text combines descriptions with judgments, the statements concerning empirical reality it proposes are cross-checked against various institutionalized mechanisms that either validate or reject these statements. This leads to other questions that may be answered during a sociological analysis of literature: What criteria decide whether a statement is accepted or rejected? How does a literary community (writers, critics, readers) supplement or even replace science laboratories, churches, or customs?

As noticed before, according to the criticistic approach, literature, contrary to science, does not claim to mirror reality; it rather presents a reliable vision of a literary world that stands in opposition to the complexity of the external world. Readers of fiction are introduced into a world governed by patterns that are free of constant surveillance of the external world. Literature may use human habits and expectations that are rooted in the experience of the external world; however, as long as they comply with readers' affective and cognitive expectations, they

neither legitimize nor undermine the validity of the literary world. Therefore, it would be beneficial to analyse the arguments a given text proposes to justify certain solutions as well as to determine who (which groups) expect these solutions to be successful. Also, it would be crucial to inquire about how ambiguity is replaced by a consistent narrative that becomes a valid vision of reality.

As the external world does not provide literature with a set of criteria to evaluate the truth of a literary world, a literary text must constantly justify the validity of its vision of reality. Consequently, readers are more likely to accept that vision as it meets their cognitive expectations.<sup>315</sup> Thus, the question arises: which literary worlds gain that position? The objective is to analyse how a given literary text increases certainty (even if it negates a common vision of reality) by replacing (often unintentionally) rational doubt. This objective may be achieved by uncovering the information that lies at the foundation of a narrative and legitimizes it even when it is not confirmed by any facts or experiences. The goal, therefore, is to investigate what information, thanks to its easy availability (the ease with which humans relate to it), transforms a text into a narrative that is sanctioned by readers' experience.

The certainty offered by a literary text is possible due to particular values of communication that require institutional legitimization. As noticed by John Searle, meaning is often the result of collective intentionality capable of endowing it with status function.<sup>316</sup> That is how language contributes to the creation of institutional facts. Even though I disagree with the thesis about language being the foundation of human reflexivity, I must stress the importance of language in

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315 "The strong bias toward believing that small samples closely resemble the population from which they are drawn is also part of a larger story: we are prone to exaggerate the consistency and coherence of what we see. The exaggerated faith of researchers in what can be learned from a few observations is closely related to the halo effect, the sense we often get that we know and understand a person about whom we actually know very little. System 1 runs ahead of the facts in constructing a rich image on the basis of scraps of evidence. A machine for jumping to conclusions will act as if it believed in the law of small numbers. More generally, it will produce a representation of reality that makes too much sense." D. Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York 2011, 'The Law of Small Numbers,' 'A Bias of Confidence Over Doubt,' Loc. 1924, Par. 5, EPUB File).

316 "It is generally the case with institutional structures that the structure cannot perform its function in virtue of its physics alone but requires collective acceptance. Where human institutions are concerned, the functions, in short, are status functions." J. R. Searle, *Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World*, Basic Books, New York 1999, p. 126.

creating institutionalized social and cultural structures. Therefore, rather than focusing on language as a symbolic expression of human reflexivity, research must analyse language as a system of patterns of description and argumentation that contextualize a given text, allowing for the distinction between literature and scientific, religious, journalistic, or documentary texts.

John Maxwell Coetzee stresses the importance of historical context in the formation of both literary and musical classics. To a large extent thanks to professionals, he argues, certain valuable yet obscure pieces of music have a greater chance of surviving than obscure works of literature:

This is the point where parallels between the literary classics and the musical classics, begin to break down, and where the institutions and practice of music emerge as perhaps healthier than the institutions and practice of literature. For the musical profession has ways of keeping what it values alive that are qualitatively different from the ways in which the institutions of literature keep submerged but valued writers alive.<sup>317</sup>

In its critique of conflationary approaches to literature, critical realism stresses the social dimension of literary works, arguing that they are tangible products of social practice. Society provides patterns and institutions that form a heterogeneous system of mechanisms and processes responsible for incorporating each work of literature into the system of knowledge. Therefore, we do not consider literature merely as a part of the communication system whose uniqueness is based on binary oppositions such as fiction-nonfiction or interesting-boring.<sup>318</sup> The realist-criticistic approach focuses on the binary opposition between the certainty and uncertainty of the literary world. Considered as the subsystem of the system of knowledge, literature acquires its identity as a structure that, through descriptions and arguments, shapes the mass mentality of particular groups, reinforcing beliefs and the automatism of solutions to problems. Therefore, it needs to be stressed that the approach does not evaluate the artistic position of a given work of literature; as a result, it may focus on texts that are socially and cognitively influential even though devoid of artistic value. However, the impact a given text has on the mass mentality may stem from the text's artistry – when

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317 J. M. Coetzee, *Stranger Shores: Essays 1986–1999*, Vintage Books, London 2002, Loc. 330, Par. 4 – Loc. 343, Par 1, EPUB File.

318 “Of course, literature may be analysed from the point of view of another system as either true or false, moral or immoral, beautiful or ugly, yet the only distinction acknowledged by literature as an autopoietic system is between interesting and boring.” E. Kuźma, “Od linearnej do cyrkularnej komunikacji literackiej, a stąd do milczenia. O sytuacji we współczesnych doktrynach literackich,” *Przestrzenie Teorii* 2002, no. 1, p. 63.

properly emphasized, the style of a literary work may be a crucial factor contributing to collective, reflexive subjects accepting the cognitive value of the work at a given moment in time.

According to Daniel Kahneman, human reflexivity is the crucial factor in transforming intuitions, feelings, impressions, and intentions into beliefs and voluntary actions.<sup>319</sup> In Kahneman's view, human reflexivity is, to a large extent, an expression of concerns rooted in human body and emotions. Consequently, it constitutes our conscious, yet intuitive, metaphorical, and causal way of thinking that is rarely corrected by the rules of logic, mathematics, or statistics. To control its automatic impulses, the human brain requires effort and focus. This leads to discomfort, as it deprives humans of the certainty of their actions and choices. However, in order to perform their daily activities, people usually rely on routine and habit. To control, suppress, overcome, or modify habits, one has to relinquish certainty, an act that may be encouraged by institutional rules which support rational thinking. Therefore, a question arises: how does literature attempt to change mental habits? To what extent does it sustain certain habits while undermining others, and to what extent does it correct and modify them?

In most cases, people misjudge reality when they are distracted. Literature is usually read for pleasure, when the reader's attention is weakened; as a result, the reader is more likely to accept the message a given text conveys. The decision to either reject or accept the message does not concern the truth of the literary world; rather, the reader considers the associations evoked by the text as a form of argumentation that is perceived as normal, unproblematic, and causing no doubts. It is worth analysing what factors have contributed to the text's position. These may include the book's graphic layout (paper, font, typesetting), style, semantic associations, main issues and elements of the plot. The goal is to establish the means that are responsible for the text being cognitively familiar. These

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319 To describe this process, Kahneman applies the metaphor of a link between two systems of thinking. The first system is fast and intuitive – it determines the limits of human cognition and controls the second system. The second system is slow, and it is responsible for creating a coherent interpretation of reality and strengthening one's beliefs. "System 1 runs automatically and System 2 is normally in a comfortable low-effort mode, in which only a fraction of its capacity is engaged. System 1 continuously generates suggestions for System 2: impressions, intuitions, intentions, and feelings. If endorsed by System 2, impressions and intuitions turn into beliefs, and impulses turn into voluntary actions. When all goes smoothly, which is most of the time, System 2 adopts the suggestions of System 1 with little or no modification." D. Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*. . . , 'The Characters of the Story', Loc. 381, Par. 1.

means, however, transcend the author's intentions – the aim of the analysis is to uncover even those elements that are unknown to the author.

Therefore, it is crucial to distinguish between a text that precedes given beliefs and actions, and a text that is entangled in beliefs and actions within a given literary community. We are not interested in the genesis of a text, for such an approach is susceptible to infinite regression. A text is the outcome of neither individual nor communal (social) effort.<sup>320</sup> Therefore, the analysis considers literature to be an emergent reality that may be evaluated in terms of its internal consistency and possible contradictions. The notion of consistency, however, does not apply to the whole text, but concerns the most dominant aspects of the literary reality. A particular text, being a point of reference that shapes the mentality of the participants of the literary field,<sup>321</sup> is confronted with the individual reflexivity of its readers. Through their interactions, the readers either support the text or transform it so that it would better fulfil their psychological, practical, and cultural expectations.

However, even if a text is believed to be a complete object, we cannot ignore the historical context that determines significant social processes. Historical processes do not dictate the content of literary works, but they may serve as an analytical point of reference for establishing the historical background of a given text. For instance, in the case of the twentieth-century Polish literature, 1918,<sup>322</sup>

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320 A particularly interesting approach that coincides with the realist-criticistic perspective is the analysis that accounts for social actions. As the notion of agency gains increasing recognition in Polish sociology (see A. Mrozowicki, O. Nowaczyk, and I. Szlachcicowa (eds.), *Sprawstwo. Teorie, metody, badania empiryczne w naukach społecznych*, Zakład Wydawniczy NOMOS, Kraków 2013), the idea of 'social actions' may be a beneficial contribution to the sociology of literature. F. Mirek F., *Zarys socjologii*, TN KUL, Lublin 1948.

321 The notion of the literary field refers to the research conducted by the sociology of literature that applies the analytical perspective proposed by Pierre Bourdieu. The realist-criticistic approach may benefit from the research concerning such issues as the literary market, the impact of the state on the literary field, numerous forms of publications (e.g. e-books), literary prizes, literary manifestos, literary criticism (see G. Jankowicz, P. Marecki, M. Sowiński (eds.), *Literatura polska po 1989 roku w świetle teorii Pierre'a Bourdieu. Podręcznik*, Korporacja Ha!art, Kraków 2015). These approaches, however, are firmly rooted in the conflationary link between the individual and society, expressed in the notions of habitus and social violence. P. Bourdieu, *The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field*, trans. S. Emanuel, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1955.

322 "On November 11, 1918, Polish literature became something different from what it used to be during the 123 years of the Partitions of Poland. The forces that would

1939,<sup>323</sup> and 1989<sup>324</sup> are significant socio-cultural turning points. These are somewhat ad hoc dates based on general research concerning the history of Polish literature; they may be supplemented with more specific events such as the end of the Second World War (1945), the end of Stalinism (1956), the anti-Semitic purge of 1968, or the anti-communist breakthrough of 1980. One may be even more specific, focusing on a period of time especially significant for a given community; the research could analyse the number of copies of a given book purchased during that time, the reviews of that book, promotional materials, etc. By focusing on a particular period of time, the researcher could analyse how given authors argue for the validity of the solutions proposed in their work. The impact and range of those arguments will be verified by literary texts that either strengthen or weaken their effect on the mass mentality.

Many Polish literary scholars, essayists, and feature writers seem focused on problems similar to those addressed by the realist-criticistic approach. In other words, the perspective presented in the present text is an attempt at a conceptual presentation of certain analytical practices that are already visible in the works of biographers, literary critics, or literary historians, e.g. in Stanisław Brzozowski's *Legenda Młodej Polski*, Karol Irzykowski's *Beniaminek*, Czesław

remain dormant in a different historical context were suddenly released, and literature no longer had to serve the purpose it was fulfilling for over a century. Similarly, on September 1, 1939, Polish literature had to face the problems and choices it never before had to face. In this peculiar case, the two historical dates are also – so to speak – immanently literary. Independence allowed literature – and poetry in particular – to take the shape it has never known before.” M. Głowiński, J. Sławiński, “Wstęp,” in: *Poezja polska okresu międzywojennego. Antologia*, vol. 1, eds. M. Głowiński and J. Sławiński, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław, 1987, p. IV.

323 An interesting point of view on 1939 is offered by Bohdan Urbankowski's analysis of poetry: “1939. History turns back time – after twenty years of freedom, Poland may test another variant: a double occupation. All of a sudden, independence becomes a dream, a failed project of the God of history that He himself abandoned. . . . Not only did 1939 put an end to the Second Polish Republic, but it also marked the end of the Free Polish Republic of Poetry. The history from before the November of 1918 repeats itself: poetry returns to serve the nation.” B. Urbankowski, *Czerwona msza czyli uśmiech Stalina*, Wydawnictwo Alfa, Warszawa 1998, pp. 16, 18.

324 For instance, scholars researching the literary field in Poland consider 1989 to be the turning point of structural and institutional change. Not only did the transformation change the political system, but it also transformed the literary field – literature, released from under the state's control, became dependent on the market. G. Jankowicz, et al., *Literatura polska po 1989 roku w świetle teorii Pierre'a Bourdieu. Raport z badań*, Korporacja Ha!art, Kraków 2014, pp. 93 ff.

Miłosz's *Zniewolony umysł* and *Człowiek wśród skorpionów*, Jacek Trznadel's *Hańba domowa*, Jarosław Marek Rymkiewicz's *Leśmian* and *Żmut*, Aleksander Fiut's *Pytanie o tożsamość*, Jan Błoński's *Miłosz jak świat*, Joanna Siedlecka's *Czarny Ptasiór* and *Pan od poezji*. I do not claim that all of these works fulfil the objectives of the realist-criticistic analysis; however, they contain ideas that require further investigation by the sociology of literature. Even though, applying various theoretical approaches, these works address numerous issues that are not relevant from the point of view of the realist-criticistic perspective, they all exemplify the ways in which literature affects reality (through descriptions and arguments that advocate for certain solutions to problems inherent in the literary world and the mass mentality of the Polish nation) and they were all affected by the relations within the literary community (e.g. authors' political entanglement, contradictory interpretations of their work, disagreements among critics, political references, literary market, readers' reactions). These works, to a different degree, shape the collective mentality of the Poles. Even though they are based on different analytical premises, there are certain sociological studies that I consider close to my approach. These include the works of the scholars from the University of Silesia: Krzysztof Łęcki,<sup>325</sup> Paweł Ćwikła,<sup>326</sup> and Piotr Kulas.<sup>327</sup>

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The most important element of the realist-criticistic approach is that it considers a text (its problems, descriptions and arguments that shape the literary world) as an inaugural object of analysis. On the one hand, a work of literature is an element of literary heritage; on the other, it is situated in a particular historical context and it shapes (and is shaped by) concerns, institutions, regulations, rules, or social norms, especially those shared by writers and readers. To capture a particular time that shaped a given text is to notice that even though the text is the work of a writer, it has its own ontological independence. It is governed by its own logic that affects various social circles. The extent of that effect varies

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325 K. Łęcki, *Św. Gombrowicz. Zinstytucjonalizowane formy komunikowania o literaturze: socjologiczna analiza zjawiska*, Śląsk, Katowice 1997; K. Łęcki, *Inny zapis. „Sekretny dziennik” pisarza jako przedmiot badań socjologicznych. Na przykładzie „Dzienników” Stefana Kisielewskiego*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Katowice 2012.

326 P. Ćwikła, *Boksowanie świata. Wizje ładu społecznego na podstawie twórczości Janusza Zajdla*, Śląsk, Katowice 2006; P. Ćwikła, *„Poznaj Żyda” – Antysemityzm wg Teodora Jeske-Choińskiego*, Wydawnictwo Bezkresy Wiedzy, Saarbrücken 2017.

327 P. Kulas, *Turniej Garbusów. Problematyka tożsamości w twórczości Witolda Gombrowicza i Czesława Miłosza*, Śląsk, Katowice 2009.



depending on the level of reflexivity of the subjects participating in literary life, whether they are writers or readers. A literary text – in its institutional and cultural dimension – does not operate in a void, but both affects and is affected by the socio-literary system, that is individuals who interact with each other in the literary field and the fields adjacent to it. Therefore, literature may be defined as a collection of texts that affect a given community. The goal is to analyse social practices that link the structural element with individual agency.



**Part II. PEOPLE – THE HERITAGE OF  
SOCIAL THOUGHT**



# I. FRANCISZEK MIREK'S APPROACH TO SOCIOLOGY

The search for a link between a scholar's personal views and their field of research seems interesting for many reasons; the humanities show a particular inclination for investigating that connection as humanists find it impossible to avoid a certain degree of "axiological entanglement." That is why numerous branches of sociology, such as the sociology of knowledge, interpretive sociology, or the sociology of values, explore that link. On the other hand, sociology's entanglement with ideology takes different forms. Sometimes, yielding to ideological and political objectives, sociology loses its methodological independence. As Stanisław Ossowski notices, sociologists often seem no different than party propagandists.<sup>328</sup>

The aforementioned problem will be illustrated through the analysis of the writings of Fr. Franciszek Mirek, both a sociologist and a Catholic priest. The goal of the article is to identify the relation between the way one conducts one's research and one's personal views. Shedding light on the nature of Fr. Mirek's sociology, the text will attempt to answer the following questions: What is Fr. Mirek's approach to the relation between the researcher's personal views and values, and the object of their research? What is Fr. Mirek's attitude toward the so-called "Christian sociology"? What is Fr. Mirek's methodological background? Why is Fr. Mirek no longer a recognizable representative of KUL's sociology? Finally, does Fr. Mirek's idea of sociology still have epistemological merits or is it rather an anachronism?

## 1. Biographical note

Rev. Franciszek Mirek was born on June 20, 1893, in Naprawa, to a peasant family. He attended school in Naprawa, Jordanów, Myślenice, and Cracow. In Cracow, he attended Saint Anna's Gymnasium – now B. Nowodworski High School No. I – which he finished with honours in 1912. The same year, he joined the seminar in Cracow and began theological studies at the Jagiellonian University. He graduated in 1916, but received the certificate of completion of studies on January 8, 1921. In 1931, he defended his M.A. thesis, *Podstawa obowiazku, jako*

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328 S. Ossowski, "Nauki humanistyczne a ideologia społeczna," in: idem, *Dzieła*, vol. 4: *Ontologia*, PWN, Warszawa 1967, p. 103.

*zagadnienie moralne* [The Roots of Duty as a Moral Issue], in the Department of Catholic Theology at the University of Warsaw. He received the Holy Orders in 1916. From 1922 to 1924 he studied in Strasburg, where he received a Ph.D. in law and philosophy. Doctoral studies developed Mirek's critical and logical thinking, and equipped him with a wide knowledge of philosophy, which would become visible in his sociological writings. Since 1929, he had been associated with Florian Znaniecki's department of sociology in Poznań. In 1929, he received a Ph.D. in sociology for a thesis about the sociology of Ludwik Gumpłowicz (*System socjologiczny Ludwika Gumpłowicza*) written under the supervision of Florian Znaniecki. Znaniecki's impact on Mirek's academic achievements was invaluable. At that time, Mirek frequently wrote for *Przegląd Socjologiczny* [The Sociological Review]. In 1930, he received a post-doctoral degree for his dissertation *Metoda socjologiczna. Przyczynek na podstawie analizy krytycznej metod Tarde'a i Durkheima* [The Sociological Method. A Critical Analysis of the Methods of Tarde and Durkheim]. In the 1930s, he lectured at the School of Political Sciences – part of the Department of Law and Administration at the Jagiellonian University – and at the Faculty of Law and Economy and the Faculty of Philosophy and History at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. The lectures he gave during that time are the basis of a few coursebooks: *Czynniki dynamiczne życia społecznego* [Dynamic Factors of Social Life] (Cracow 1935), *Styczności społeczne i teoria kultury* [Social Contacts and the Theory of Culture] (Cracow 1936), *Masy, związki i ustroje z uwzględnieniem teorii państwa* [Masses, Relationships, and Political Systems, Including the Theory of State] (Cracow 1937).

Mirek combined academic research with church duties and community work. Also, he participated in Polish political life – he published in a pro-Piłsudski journal *Dziennik Poznański* and was a member of the Nonpartisan Bloc for Cooperation with the Government (BBWR). He fully supported the government's social, political, and economic policy. He tried to convince the Catholic community and the clergy to cooperate with the government. That is why in his journalistic texts he encouraged Catholics to vote for the BBWR list. He was against the political interests of Catholics being represented by the Christian Democracy party.

From 1946 to 1949 Mirek taught sociology at the Catholic University of Lublin, where the Department of Sociology was initially part of the Faculty of Law and Social and Economic Sciences. The first chair of the department was Józef Gajek, an ethnologist from Maria-Curie Skłodowska University. Fr. Mirek took over Gajek's sociology course. Mirek's lectures became the basis for the first Polish coursebook of sociology published after 1945: *Zarys socjologii* [The

Outline of Sociology] (1946). The book consisted of a broad overview of the history of sociology. It was used by a whole generation of sociology students from a number of Polish universities. It was based on the achievements of Florian Znaniecki and Max Weber. The book discussed major issues from the fields of micro- and macrosociology. It was not, however, a lucid work as it presented terms, definitions and typologies in a rather inexact manner. Nevertheless, the book taught how to think in sociological terms and, thanks to its rich content, was, at the time, a valuable repository of sociological knowledge and could supplement didactics. In fact, the colloquial, vivid language of the book made it approachable to all readers interested in sociology. From this point of view, Mirek's book undoubtedly fulfilled its intended role: it informed and organized.

The Department of Sociology at the Catholic University of Lublin (KUL) conducted research regarding the history of social thought, general sociology, and the sociology of religion. Sociologists from Lublin – and Fr. Mirek in particular – were interested in the Polish philosophical and social thought of the nineteenth century. They also conducted research into the transformation of the Polish village and into the city's influence on village structure. In the academic year 1945/46, KUL established the School of Social and Economic Issues Concerning the Village.<sup>329</sup> The school educated the future intelligentsia in the culture, economy, and sociology of the village; it took two years to receive a degree. Sociology classes were taught by such thinkers as Franciszek Adamski, Franciszek Mirek, Józef Gajek, and Jan Turowski.

Introducing a new paradigm of practicing science, Franciszek Mirek significantly contributed to the development of sociology at KUL and he may be thus considered the father of KUL's sociology. Mirek was not, however, the only prominent sociologist connected with KUL. The person who practiced sociology at KUL first was Fr. Aleksander Wóycicki (1878–1954). Following the guidelines of Frédéric Le Play, Wóycicki conducted empirical research into the working class, social movements, and trade unions. Influenced by the research conducted in Louvain, Wóycicki followed the principles of the so-called Catholic sociology. On the other hand, Fr. Antoni Szymański (1881–1942) understood that the true task of sociology is empirical research into social processes – the ways in which social groups are created, develop, and disintegrate, as well as relations between an individual and a group and between groups. However, Szymański

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329 "Studium Zagadnień Społeczno-Gospodarczych Wsi," in: *Księga jubileuszowa 50-lecia Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego. Praca zbiorowa wydana w rocznicę 50-lecia istnienia uczelni*, eds. S. Kunowski [et al.], TN KUL, Lublin 1969, pp. 249–252.

was not consistent in his views and the frequency with which he used the term “Catholic sociology” suggests that he wanted to deepen the link between sociology and ethics. Finally, Czesław Strzeszewski (1903–1999), commenting on his branch of “Christian sociology,” noticed that it was merely a “formal term for Catholic social teaching.”<sup>330</sup> That approach, in spite of its intentions, contributed to blurring the border between sociology and Catholic social teaching.

In *Zarys socjologii*, Franciszek Mirek criticizes a sociology rooted in a pre-established point of view, especially if it imposes an ideology. Therefore, he opposes both Christian and Marxist sociology. He claims that a sociologist should remain faithful to truth rather than to an ideological social group, especially if that group is the party. Moreover, following a publication titled *Elementy społeczne parafii rzymsko-katolickiej. Wstęp do socjologii parafii* [Social Elements of the Roman Catholic Parish. An Introduction to the Sociology of the Parish] (1928), Mirek is sometimes considered the international pioneer of the sociology of the parish.<sup>331</sup> Undoubtedly, he is the creator of the Polish sociology of the parish. In *The Sociology of the Parish. An Introductory Symposium* (1951), Celestine J. Neusse and Thomas J. Harte claim that Mirek's study is the first book devoted to the sociological analysis of the parish in the world.

Franciszek Mirek was arrested by the Communist authorities on September 9, 1949. He remained in prison until May 5, 1951. He was falsely accused of collaborating with the Nazis during the war, when he was a parish priest in Nowa Góra. After he was released in 1951, he did not resume lecturing at KUL. In 1954, he became dean of the Podgórze Deanery. He was an administrator of the Saint Joseph parish until April 14, 1966, when he became its parish priest. Due to health problems, Fr. Mirek resigned from his post on May 27, 1968. His resignation was accepted by cardinal Karol Wojtyła. Franciszek Mirek died on March 16, 1970, and was buried in Łętownia.

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330 Qtd. after E. Hałas, “Socjologia a etyka społeczna w Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim (1918–1998),” in: *Pomiędzy etyką a polityką*. . . , pp. 33.

331 F. Adamski, “Ks. Franciszek Mirek: pionier socjologii parafii,” in: *Szkice z historii socjologii polskiej*, ed. K. Z. Sowa, Instytut Wydawniczy Pax, Warszawa 1983, pp. 384–397; see J. Kościelniak, *Pastoralne aspekty socjologii parafii ks. Franciszka Mirka (1893–1970)*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe UPJPII, Kraków 2013.



## 2. Sociological analyses of the individual experiences of the subject

In his study of the parish, Fr. Franciszek Mirek argues that in order to perceive social facts as humanist acts it is necessary to interpret them through the prism of individual experiences; it is crucial to analyse how they “appear” in human consciousness. In so arguing, Mirek follows in the footsteps of his master, Florian Znaniecki. A sociologist may speak of a social group’s (e.g. a parish’s) religious beliefs only if the members of the group recognize these beliefs. Mirek stresses the fact that a sociologist may investigate a social reality only if the people responsible for “creating” it, the people who inhabit, understand, and present it to the researcher, are conscious of that reality.<sup>332</sup> Mirek’s point of view corresponds to that of Stanisław Ossowski, who wrote: “We are interested in a social reality as something that is created and takes place in human consciousness.”<sup>333</sup> The observations of such thinkers as Znaniecki, Mirek, and Ossowski, even though obvious for contemporary sociologists, were especially valuable during the time when the ideas of humanist sociology were formed and played a crucial role in debates with such movements as logical empiricism.

Mirek was interested in analysing people’s views on the religious doctrine they were preached. As a sociologist, he wanted to distinguish the elements necessary for the parish to be recognized both by its members and the outsiders. In other words, Mirek argued for the internal perspective on a social phenomenon (how the phenomenon is perceived by its participants, for example parishioners) to be supplemented with an external one (e.g. to perceive the same phenomenon through the prism of the entire society, or analyse its relevance for other parishes). Mirek’s idea of research into the nature of social life was to juxtapose the meanings shared by individuals with the analysis of objective structures. Accepting the main premise of the humanistic coefficient – namely, that a group exists in the social consciousness of individuals and groups – he claimed that how people perceive themselves and others is more important than objective data.

To some extent, Mirek’s understanding of the individual subject corresponds with Karl Mannheim’s analysis of the nature of human thinking and his idea of social knowledge.<sup>334</sup> Both scholars stress the direct connection between theory

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332 F. Mirek, *Elementy społeczne parafii rzymsko-katolickiej. Wstęp do socjologii parafii*, Fiszer i Majewski – Księgarnia Uniwersytecka, Poznań 1928, p. 24.

333 S. Ossowski, “Z zagadnień psychologii społecznej,” in: *Dziela*, vol. 3: *Z zagadnień psychologii społecznej*, PWN, Warszawa 1967, p. 9.

334 K. Mannheim, *Ideologia i utopia*, trans. J. Miziński, Wyd. „Test,” Lublin 1992, pp. 34 ff.

and practice, between theoretical investigations and the socio-cultural context of human actions and behaviours. They share Ossowski's idea that thinking is an important element of social reality. Therefore, a sociologist's goal is to explain how people think, how they "create" knowledge, and why they think the way they do. Mirek suggests that thinking, even though subjective (individuals believe their thoughts to be their own creations), depends on certain objective, social phenomena. This means that society (often imbued with ideology) affects the "creation" of individuals' knowledge. Of course, neither Mirek nor Mannheim believed in Karl Marx's idea of knowledge overcoming all ideologies (the consciousness reached by the proletariat).<sup>335</sup>

Mirek's analysis of social activities, behaviours, relations, and actions accounts for the categories characteristic of the individual subject, such as subjective meaning, individual understanding, or individual consciousness. Mirek argued that in order to understand the social nature of such categories as contacts, activities, interactions, or groups, the analysis of social phenomena should focus on the "external" human consciousness. On the one hand, he stressed the fact that all social phenomena must be available to senses – they must possess an external form; on the other hand, these external forms must have their internal counterparts – the way they are understood by individuals. Therefore, the aim of a sociological (sociographic) analysis is to reach that internal aspect of a social phenomenon. To uncover how individuals understand and interpret actions, interactions, and contacts is, according to Mirek, the goal of sociology. A sociological point of view must account for the way individual subjects understand and experience other individuals and groups.<sup>336</sup>

For Mirek, understanding is both a methodological directive and an immanent quality of a social phenomenon. Following Max Weber, Mirek stresses the importance of subjective meanings and interpretations that social actors bring with them to every social situation. He argues that for sociological understanding (*verstehen*) to be valid, it must account for that entire subjective dimension. Therefore, if sociologists are to understand society, they must interpret the

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335 Mannheim rejected the Marxist thesis according to which one's thinking is dependent on class; instead, he accepted the thesis about the existential roots of knowledge according to which thinking is a social activity. Mannheim was against considering the development of knowledge as a sum of individual, isolated acts of thinking. However, he did not believe knowledge to be independent of history and social space. One may find analogous reservations in Mirek's writings.

336 F. Mirek, *Zarys socjologii*, TN KUL, Lublin 1948, pp. 45 ff.

meanings that society produces. This point of view is shared by contemporary hermeneutics.

### **3. The nature of social activities: a sociological perspective on religious groups**

In order to develop sociology – an empirical science concerned with social life – it was necessary to address two extreme sociological positions represented by such thinkers as Gabriel Tarde and Emile Durkheim: sociologism and psychologism. At the beginning of the twentieth century, these two approaches dominated the discussion about the best way to explain social phenomena. Having rejected biologism, naturalism, and geographical, demographical, racial and anthropological determinism, the Poznań school of humanist sociology was in need of a similarly clear theoretical direction. Mirek's postdoctoral thesis, focused on the theories of Tarde and Durkheim, was meant to find that direction. Mirek put forward a thesis that the misunderstanding between psychologism and sociologism stemmed from the fact that these approaches were too radical in juxtaposing an individual with society. The ambivalence, he argued, is fictitious, for one cannot exist without the other. However, Mirek recognized Tarde's contribution to humanist sociology, appreciating Tarde's theory for the stress it placed on the fact that social phenomena consist of human actions and that in social reality, individuals affect other humans.<sup>337</sup> Mirek's sociological analysis of social phenomena followed a realist-objective approach (its goal was to discover the nature of things); prescriptive analysis (deciding what the nature of things should be) was, according to Mirek, better left to moral philosophers, politicians, and social activists.

For Mirek, the task of sociology was not to inquire about the reasons (in a philosophical sense) behind human actions but to explain what actions humans take and how these actions affect others. He admitted that sociology could analyse causality, that is how one social phenomenon causes or affects others. However, Mirek did not make a distinction between actions and social processes (such as revolutions, social opinions, or accommodation). In that area he was influenced by German sociology, especially Leopold von Wiese's classification of social actions, relations, and processes.

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337 F. Mirek, *Metoda socjologiczna. Przyczynek na podstawie analizy krytycznej metod Tarde'a i Durkheima*, Jan Jachowski, Poznań 1930, pp. 67 ff.

It should be stressed that in spite of certain methodological shortcomings, Mirek advocated for a 'hard' analysis of social facts. He stressed that an analysis of a religious group must differentiate between social phenomena and religious factors. In his analysis of religious phenomena, Mirek applied the humanistic coefficient – he investigated the meaning of the phenomena for the members of a religious group (e.g. a parish). He believed that if any visible social group may be the object of sociological analysis, so may be a parish.<sup>338</sup> To conduct a sociological analysis of religious life was a courageous academic decision on Mirek's part, for at that time only philosophy and theology investigated religious phenomena. Moreover, Church authorities were reluctant to subject the social life of religious groups to sociological scrutiny. One should also remember that at the time Mirek conducted his research, the sociology of religion was still a budding discipline. Thus, while from a contemporary point of view Mirek's remarks may seem obvious, they were definitely innovative at the time of their formulation.

Even Florian Znaniecki noticed the originality of Mirek's approach to the analysis of religious groups. He wrote that "the work of Fr. Franciszek Mirek is, as far as I know, the first fully intentional attempt to apply sociological premises to the methodological analysis of the social life of the Catholic Church. By focusing on social facts alone, and by considering them with their humanistic coefficient, the monograph remains within the strict limits of sociology and is a modest scientific contribution to the field. Even if the form of the study – especially during the descriptive parts – reveals the author-priest's beliefs and sympathies, it does not blur the theoretical objectivity of the analysis. Neither followers nor opponents of Catholicism will find in the study grounds for theological, metaphysical, or ethical controversies. [...] The monograph contributes to sociology by offering a range of new observations and general remarks which, if confirmed by comparative studies of other social groups, will be of great importance."<sup>339</sup> Mirek's goal was not, then, to confirm or justify the beliefs of the members of a religious group, but to analyse what the faithful really think about the doctrine, how the doctrine manifests itself to the subjects.

Czesław Strzeszewski, the father of the Lublin school of Catholic social teaching, disagreed with Mirek. He believed that fact-finding alone was not a proper method for the sociology of the parish; rather, the social dimension of the parish should be analysed through the prism of theology. According to

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338 F. Mirek, *Elementy społeczne parafii rzymsko-katolickiej*. . . , p. 56.

339 F. Znaniecki, "Przedmowa," in: F. Mirek, *Elementy społeczne parafii rzymsko-katolickiej*. . . , p. XIII.

Strzeszewski, the analysis of the parish had to follow a set of epistemological premises rooted in Christian philosophy.<sup>340</sup> Strzeszewski's remarks contain at least a partial explanation of why Mirek is no longer remembered at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin. Strzeszewski's position corresponds to Józef Majka's vision of the sociology of the parish. In *Sociologia parafii* [The Sociology of the Parish], Majka criticizes Mirek and proposes his own "integral definition of the parish" that, on the one hand, contains sociological elements, and, on the other, consists of elements that canonical law and theology consider to be prescriptive.<sup>341</sup>

Mirek claimed that a parish must consist of certain constitutive elements (the elements that are necessary for a parish to be recognized both by external observers and its members). These elements include: 1. a priest – sent by Church authorities; 2. a social relation between the priest and a group of people established with the help of tools that facilitate social contacts; 3. a Christian ideology that must be accepted by the members of the group; 4. an institutionalized function of the priest and the parishioners.<sup>342</sup> Mirek conducted a detailed sociological analysis of each of these elements. On the one hand, one may claim that Mirek analysed a dynamic development of the parish; on the other, that he provided a list of factors necessary for a parish to be established. He isolated these constitutive, social components of the parish by comparing particular organizational units of the Church. Mirek's goal was to uncover the components and determinants of the bond between parishioners. He attempted to achieve that goal by analysing the genesis of the parish in its different socio-cultural contexts.<sup>343</sup>

Mirek's analysis demonstrated that the parish is a formal religious group occupying a particular territory; it consists of people remaining in social contacts with the priest fulfilling his pastoral mission; the parishioners profess the religious ideology preached by the priest in the name of the Church, and, together with the priest, they participate in particular social activities. Majka criticizes

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340 Cz. Strzeszewski, "Rozwój chrześcijańskiej myśli społecznej w niepodległej Polsce," in: *Historia katolicyzmu społecznego w Polsce 1832–1939*, ed. J. Skwara, ODiSS, Warszawa 1981, p. 267.

341 J. Majka, *Sociologia parafii. Zarys problematyki*, TN KUL, Lublin 1971, pp. 45 ff.

342 F. Mirek, *Elementy społeczne parafii rzymsko-katolickiej*. . . , pp. 24 ff.

343 Mirek analysed a few parishes in four different geographical and temporal contexts. His analysis included a few parishes at the outskirts of Paris (Vanyes, Petit, Ivry, Bobigny, and Coutures), the New Norcia parish in Australia, a rural parish Kościelisko near Zakopane, and one of the earliest Christian parishes established in Corinth during the times of Saint Paul.

Mirek's definition for its lack of a crucial component characteristic of all social groups, namely the "centre of a cluster."<sup>344</sup> It is, undoubtedly, a serious shortcoming of Mirek's definition of the parish. Nevertheless, the sociological point of view applied by Mirek to his analysis of the structure and function of the parish raises no doubts.

#### 4. Humanistic sociology versus "Christian sociology"

Having accepted the programme of Florian Znaniecki's "Poznań school of sociology," Mirek believed that the goal of sociology was to understand the processes occurring in society. This point of view was affected by Max Weber's interpretive sociology (*Verstehende* or *Neosociologie*). Even though Mirek named it 'synetic sociology' (from Greek *sunemi* – to understand), his vision of sociology fully approved of Weber's ideas.<sup>345</sup> He believed that sociology is an empirical science whose goal is to uncover subjective meanings of social phenomena rather than investigate their objective meanings. Mirek wrote that a sociological analysis of such phenomena as a family, a state, or a joint-stock company considers them as real, that is seen through the prism of the subjective meanings they hold to people who create them. Any other perception of social reality, Mirek added, is not a sociological but legal, philosophical, or normative point of view.<sup>346</sup> Therefore, the aim of sociological investigations is to analyse how particular individuals – social partners – understand numerous actions, behaviours, and social forms such as the state or the parish. Consequently, the notion of 'understanding' proposed by Mirek should be treated as a methodological directive to be applied by sociologists.

Such a vision of sociology<sup>347</sup> implies a particular methodology. According to Mirek, one must distinguish between sociological theory, which provides general theses, defines and classifies social phenomena, and analyses their constitutive elements, from sociography, which investigates phenomena situated in particular time and space. Mirek claims that sociology should not be a science based solely on logical reasoning. It should be an empirical science that proves its theses or corrects them if the actual human coexistence requires such corrections. According to Mirek, the goal of sociography is straightforward: to

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344 J. Majka, *Socjologia parafii*. . . , p. 23.

345 F. Mirek, *Zarys socjologii*, p. 59; see D. Malinowski, *Franciszka Mirka koncepcja socjologii humanistycznej*, Zakład Wydawniczy Nomos, Kraków 2005.

346 F. Mirek, *Zarys socjologii*. . . , p. 61.

347 Mirek also used the term "sociography" (*ibid.*, p. 218).

find, uncover, and analyse external manifestations of internal human beliefs and desires.

Therefore, Mirek may be considered a representative of humanistic sociology because his research accounts for both the external observer and the subjective meanings of social phenomena. The study of Mirek's writings demonstrates that sociology analyses humans in their conscious (not merely physical) existence and actions toward other people. To present his findings, Mirek wrote monographs, for instance about the parish. He applied a historical and comparative method whose goal was to describe particular parishes and establish their constitutive elements – the elements necessary for a parish to become a community. Next, he tested his findings. Mirek applied the terms of Znaniecki's analytical sociology, such as social proximity, social distance, social individuals, institutions, power, ideology, or social organization.

Another thinker whose contribution to the development of humanistic sociology was recognized by Mirek was Ludwik Gumplowicz. Even though Mirek was critical of some of Gumplowicz's ideas, he thought highly of Gumplowicz's notion of “sociological” perception and his description of social groups, and appreciated Gumplowicz for isolating sociology as a separate field of study with its own object – the study of relations between individuals and social groups. According to Mirek, Gumplowicz was the first sociologist who not only considered social phenomena as distinct from other events, but also defined them as relations between humans developed through cooperation and fight.<sup>348</sup> However, Mirek rejected Gumplowicz's thesis that the core of social interactions is hostility caused by the fight for survival. Even though Mirek disagreed with Gumplowicz's socio-philosophical premise about racial conflict (or rather a conflict between numerous social groups), he admitted that Gumplowicz's analyses of social groups and social relations contributed to the development of empirical sociology.

It must be noted, however, that Mirek's methodology is not clearly presented. In his writings, Mirek often neither offered clear solutions nor used precise instruments (this lack of precision is for example visible in his analyses of the internal aspects of social phenomena). Still, one should remember that Mirek approved of the thesis that sociology is not a normative science; he believed that the goal of social studies is to describe and explain social reality. That is why he was against mixing sociology with such disciplines as philosophy, ethics, or law.

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348 F. Mirek, *System socjologiczny Ludwika Gumplowicza. Studium krytyczne*, Księgarnia I. Zamecznika dawniej M. Arcta, Poznań 1930, pp. 89 ff.

Sociology does not replace ethics for it does not study “what should be” but “what is and how it is manifested in the consciousness of social partners.” Sociologists do not conduct their research motivated by ethical standards; rather, they search for the norms approved by particular communities. On the other hand, certain activities motivated by duty may be the object of sociological investigations. Mirek claimed that practical judgments about the meaning of good and evil are the root of social relations. He quoted Edward Abramowski, who believed there to be a correlation between the human conscience and a social world, that is between the dimension of subjects and ethics, and the dimension of objects and institutions.<sup>349</sup> Mirek, similarly to Znaniecki, believed that sociologists need moral philosophers, even though he did not elaborate on the nature of that need. Sociologists cannot replace moral philosophers for there should be a clear boundary between normative and descriptive sciences; similarly, there should be a clear distinction between descriptions of an actual social order and visions of a new order.<sup>350</sup>

Mirek's theoretical approach stressed the fact that sociological knowledge should be scientific and free of value judgments. Among his colleagues, he encountered two approaches to sociology. The first group considered sociology to be a practical, autonomous science devoted to describing actual reality, its findings proving useful to such disciplines as pastoral theology. The second approach was represented by the so-called Christian sociology. Fr. Mirek was inclined to agree with the first group. That is why, in a widely discussed text published in 1932 in “Gazeta Kościelna,” he expressed his reservations about the name and functions of “Christian sociology.” He openly stated that no science should be connected with religion.<sup>351</sup> He excluded from sociology any and all reformatory or religious tendencies. Simultaneously, he stressed the benefits that sociological research may bring for the Church.<sup>352</sup> In short, Mirek considered sociology to be a specialist knowledge, whereas “Christian sociology” in

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349 E. Abramowski, *Pierwiastki indywidualne w socjologii*, Księgarnia E. Wendego i S-ki, Warszawa 1899.

350 Mirek himself gave an example of that separation when he adopted a role of a moralist to present his idea of moral order in a society in a book published before the war: *Idea odpowiedzialności w życiu społecznym. Studium socjologiczne*, Księgarnia i Drukarnia Katolicka, Katowice 1925.

351 These views may be the reason why he was not granted a position of a lecturer of Catholic sociology at the Jagiellonian University and at the seminary in Cracow.

352 F. Mirek, *W sprawie socjologów chrześcijańskich*, „Gazeta Kościelna” 1932, no. 25, p. 5.



the 1930s treated it as a compendium of sociological, philosophical, social, economic, ethical, and theological knowledge.

Already at the outset of his academic career, Franciszek Mirek chose a sociology that was not affected by religious views. Even though he realized Christians practise sociology, he believed that qualifying science as "Christian" does not result in greater epistemological certainty. He opted for the sociology that would account for the humanist coefficient, one that would maintain its methodological independence from normative sciences or Catholic social teaching.

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In addition to analysing the argument between psychologism and sociologism, Mirek's writings offer a perspective characteristic for the so-called new humanistic sociology (represented, for example, by Alfred Schütz): Mirek identifies social phenomena on the basis of their common interpretations. Consequently, sociology becomes for him an interpretation of an interpretation, a reflection on a reflection; its goal is to reconstruct the "world of meanings."<sup>353</sup> Therefore, Mirek uses the very notion of "understanding" (*verstehen*) to describe both a method applied by social sciences and a way to capture the unique ontology of social life. What this means is that a researcher has access only to a reality that had been "interpreted" by other people before it became the object of sociological exploration and interpretation.

Certain ideas proposed by Mirek, however, raise questions. For instance, at which point of the analysis should a sociologist stop investigating ideological factors? Is it even possible to eliminate subjective determinants from socio-humanistic research? Or, is it possible for sociological writings to be entirely free of subjective determinants? Mirek's texts neither address such questions nor provide unequivocal answers to them. Especially ambiguous is Mirek's approach to the notion of sociology's axiology (to use contemporary terminology), that is sociology's "entanglement" in values. Many social scientists address the problem of sociology that is ethically involved (e.g. Weber; Ossowski, whose axiology is acceptable to some interpreters). A more serious problem occurs when sociology (or science in general) becomes entangled in values and is strictly connected with the researcher's political or ideological activities. In this case, Ossowski's point of view seems more realistic than Mirek's.

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353 Cf. J. Szacki, *Dylematy historiografii idei oraz inne szkice i studia*, PWN, Warszawa 1991, p. 186.

Ossowski clearly states that the subject-object relation in social sciences is fundamentally different from the analogous relation in natural or exact sciences. He claims that texts written by mathematicians or physicists do not reveal their authors' ideological inclinations as easily as works authored by sociologists, humanists.<sup>354</sup> This does not absolve sociologists from the responsibility to constantly increase the objectivity of their work. On the other hand, sociology is entangled in values (irrespective of researchers' declarations) because it must account for the sphere of values. Still, scientists' intentions and deliberate actions may fill that entanglement with particular content.

Moreover, Mirek does not explain such issues as the genetic relationship between researchers' views and the subject matter of their research. If one looks at scholars' biographies, one may notice a plurality of behaviours and attitudes regarding the relationship between a given scholar's views and his or her field of study. It often happens that some sociologists exclude certain problems from their research; also, views and attitudes affect the way researchers formulate questions and reach conclusions. The sociology of knowledge stresses the fact that preferences (or aversions), such as researchers' political views, often deform and distort their perception of social reality.<sup>355</sup> Mirek's works, however, do not provide "detailed" insight into these matters.

In spite of these critical remarks, it should be stressed that Mirek made a significant contribution to the sociology of the parish and the sociology of religion; also, he contributed to the development of the humanistic sociology of Florian Znaniecki; finally, he treated social phenomena as interpersonal events. For Mirek, the key to explaining human interactions was the way social actors understood their own actions. According to his student, Jan Turowski, it was Mirek that departed from Polish sociology's attachment to information and bibliographical introductions, and concluded the discussion about the object of sociology – he organized sociological knowledge and provided basic definitions of social actions, relations, and beings.<sup>356</sup> Mirek was the creator of the first Polish outline of "positive knowledge" about particular social activities, relations, and groups; he described their features, differences, and constitutive elements. He revealed to other researchers the vast field of

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354 S. Ossowski, *Nauki humanistyczne a ideologia społeczna*. . . , p. 110.

355 For example, sociologists who are involved in a political campaign may be biased in favour of a political party they support, which may affect the way they read the poll results.

356 J. Turowski, "Socjologia rozumiejąca Franciszka Mirka," in: *Pomiędzy etyką a polityką*. . . , p. 150.

social phenomena that required exploration and extensive empirical research. Even though Franciszek Mirek's *Zarys socjologii* may raise certain objections, its contribution to establishing and propagating sociology as an empirical science in Poland is undeniable.



## II. A REALISTIC VIEW OF SOCIETY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF JAN TUROWSKI

The characteristic trait of the sociology of Jan Turowski is a realistic view of social reality. According to the Lublin sociologist, it is associated with the desire to recognize the existence of a reality independent of human cognition, but also with the definition of the existential hierarchy which marks the place of man in the world and amongst other people. In his writings, this appears in more technical considerations concerning the nature of sociology as a science and determines the true subject matter of sociology. The chapter has a sketch character without the ambition of a comprehensive and synthetic approach to Turowski's sociological thought, but with the aim to exhibit the elements of its specifics, development process and polemical grounding.

### 1. Realism in the recognition of man and society

Realism is primarily treated as an attitude towards the world which focuses on recognizing the primacy of the world order against the order of thought and identifying the most important features of the situation, regardless whether these characteristics are in line with our expectations and desires or not. It is, in other words, the ability to capture reality as such and avoid ambiguity. The patrons of this approach are classical thinkers: Plato and Saint Augustine on the one hand, and Aristotle and Saint Thomas on the other. Plato taught the art of wisdom, *Epanodos*, meaning a turn from the splendours of a moonlit night (*nykterine*) towards the real day (*alethine*). St. Augustine changes the direction towards a true enlightening source of wisdom from temporal words, thoughts (*logos*), onto the level of divine Transcendence. However, such intellectual patrons of juxtaposing realism with appearances can, as it has turned out in the history of ideas, lead to the monistic depiction of reality and its identification with the Absolute, spirituality, idea, thought, meaning, or language. Therefore, the ideal of detachment from appearances towards the recognition of eternal and non-variable truth is complemented by two other intellectuals, Aristotle and Saint Thomas. The Stagirite and Aquinas base their realism upon ontological and epistemological presumptions that emphasize not only the intelligibility of being, but also

its pluralism and empirical congruity, which constitute the basis for a plausible vision of reality.<sup>357</sup>

As a science, sociology attempts to avoid unnecessary venturing into areas of philosophical speculation, paying the price of adopting simplified ontological and epistemological presumptions. In sociology, the ontological assumptions of realism are often limited to a dispute between holistic and individualistic treatment of social reality. An intermediate position would be to recognize that social structures precede interpersonal interactions, but do not determine them, being only transformed as a result of collective agency in the direction of an open future. Turowski presents this issue in the following words:

Humanity creates history and culture thanks to the fact that they are equipped with reason, nature capable of development, and an ability to transmit biomental properties through inheritance and through the fact that they participate in social life. Human personality is the work of the Creator, it is also the result of human self-education and the impact of the natural environment people live in. A human being can, therefore, be scientifically researched from various points of view, i.e. theology, moral philosophy, biology, psychology, anthropology, and sociology. These different points of view give the basis for the formulation of various concepts concerning humans. Quite often, one can encounter an opinion that the theological concept, which claims that humanity as God's creation is born 'human,' is inconsistent with the concept of sociological affirmative by which the individual develops humanity only through social life.<sup>358</sup>

Before we move on to the analysis of selected contents of this fragment, it should be noted that it appears verbatim in Turowski's two separate publications. For the first time, he used these words as a young doctor, at the beginning of an article published in *Tygodnik Powszechny* in 1952. The second time, after over forty years, already a professor emeritus, he quoted the same words in the beginning of the first chapter of his textbook *Sociologia*. The context for the emergence of the words quoted above in the Krakow journal was undoubtedly raging ideological Stalinism and its background in the form of Marxism-Leninism. It ruled out any form of ideological pluralism, which met with a natural reflex on behalf of the student of sociology – still called Christian at that time – to bring back to light sociology's not only anthropological but also theological principles. It was a year before the arrest of Primate Stefan Wyszyński, in the time of searching, however hopeless, for a dialogue with the communist regime and its ideological

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357 S. Judycki, "Realizm i idealizm: struktura problemu," *Analiza a Egzystencja* 2009, no. 9, pp. 7–34.

358 J. Turowski, "Przez życie społeczne do pełni człowieczeństwa," *Tygodnik Powszechny* 1952, no. 28.

background in socio-political matters, following the guidelines coming from the social teaching of the Church.<sup>359</sup> Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that a text of a rather journalistic profile contains such a clear reference to God, to man as a divine creation, as well as an indication of the lack of contradiction between the assumptions of sociology and theological theorems. It is an objection to the ideologically imposed way of thinking about the social world shaped as if God did not exist. In Marxism this was related to materialistic realism, which is why it was so important that, in opposing that reductionism, one should not fall into spiritualism, generating a sociological “pretentiousness” – a detachment from concrete problems. It was also a matter of legible discovery in classical positions, especially those of M. Weber and E. Durkheim, unambiguous instrumentalization of religion and theology or their reduction to social fact.

Therefore, it appears that Turowski’s repetition of the passage was equally deliberate in 1993, when Poland had been coming out of communism for already four years, facing socio-economic and political transformation. In this way, the Lublin sociologist worked out a stance according to which you cannot build reality on the fundamental anthropological error which undermines the truth about the human being as a person who has gained his or her nature thanks to the divine Creator. What I mean is that, regardless of Turowski’s personal motivations (of which we do not know), in the words written originally during the raging of Stalinism and mentioned again after forty years, I find an opposition to easy deprivation of sociology of its truth about man, also in the transcendental dimension. The question is: to what extent was it a declarative formulation and to what extent was it rooted in his concept of sociology as science?

Turowski was well aware of the approach present in sociology according to which sociology is not at variance with theology, but rather treats it as an expression of thought that is pre-scientific. This stance was represented among others by the extremely idealized coryphaeuses of the so-called critical versions of sociology, who drew from the neo-Marxist Frankfurt school and its different strains in the neo-leftist movements. The same is found in the postmodern concepts of social life, whose prominent representatives in sociology, such as Zygmunt

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359 P. Nitecki, *Zarys rozwoju katolickiej nauki społecznej w Polsce do 1989 roku*, „Społeczeństwo,” vol. 4, 1996, pp. 705–706; C. Strzeszewski, “Rozwój chrześcijańskiej myśli społecznej w niepodległej Polsce,” in: *Historia katolicyzmu społecznego w Polsce 1832–1939*, eds. C. Strzeszewski, R. Bender and K. Turowski, Ośrodek Dokumentacji i Studiów Społecznych, Warszawa 1981, pp. 237–239.

Bauman, were the former 'frontmen' of Stalinist Marxism.<sup>360</sup> In addition, even in sociology which refused to demask different forms of false consciousness or manifest interests of the excluded and marginalised groups, the reference to religion and theology takes the form of universally ideologized (in Mannheim's sense) meanings, rather than forms of expressing reality. That is why Peter Berger regarded all sociological attempts to overcome the problem of Descartes' demon as highly suspicious which, given the possibility of outsmarting our senses and the mind, forces people into a methodical search for the Archimedean point resistant to relativity. Berger recognizes as pointless any attempts in theological considerations to overcome relativism of the multiplicity of religions and their historical manifestations in favour of the objective nucleus of faith or mystically seized divinity.<sup>361</sup> In return, Berger proposes a creative development of theology, which takes into account all empirical knowledge about humanity and religion as its creation. However, following Saint Thomas Aquinas, Turowski states that various forms and types of social life such as the Church, state, nation, and family allow us to achieve goals and fulfil our human needs. Thus, he notes that the starting point are the goals and needs inscribed in human nature by their divine (transcendent) origin. They determine the nature of human communities within which they can develop:

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360 "The former Marxist dialectician Bauman glorified the collective, denying individual rights and thus trying to destroy community. This fortunately did not happen. Today's post-Marxist, to apply fashionable nomenclature, wants to destroy the community, allegedly glorifying the individual. The community is for him only an illogical postulate, not a reality." Anna Pawełczyńska, interviewed by Jerzy Szczęsny, *Międzynarodówki zmieniona melodia*, „Arcana” 2013, vol. 114, p. 19; see A. Pawełczyńska, *Głowy hydry. O przewrotności zła*, Wydawnictwo Test, Warszawa 2004.

361 "A particularly interesting point in this attempt is the differentiation between 'religion' and 'Christianity', or between 'religion' and 'faith.' 'Christianity' and 'Christian faith' are interpreted as being something quite different from 'religion.' The latter can then be cheerfully thrown to the Cerberus of relativizing analysis (historical, sociological, psychological, or what have you), while the theologian, whose concern, of course is with 'Christianity' -which-is-not- 'religion,' can proceed with his work in splendid 'objectivity.' . . . It is interesting, incidentally, that a very similar possibility exists where Christianity is understood in fundamentally mystical terms. . . . Wherever one can maintain that, in the words of Eckhart, 'All that one can think of God, that God is not,' and immune sphere is posited ipso facto. Relativity then touches only that which 'one can think of God' – a sphere already defined as ultimately irrelevant to the mystical truth." P. L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion*, Open Road Integrated Media, New York 2011, Appendix II, Par. 10–11. EPUB File.



The realistic concept comes from the assumption that the human individual is a social being. . . . As a human being, the human person is the subject of social life, and human communities exist through the relationships that individuals form with one another. Therefore, modern sociological theories 'discovering' suddenly the human subject as an actor of social life, just evoke or uphold the long-known true realist conception of the human person.<sup>362</sup>

Thanks to the relation to divine transcendence, putting mankind at the centre of social ontology prevents not only the holistic subordination of man to society, but also the risk of accepting different forms of individualism. The idea of man is viewed in the context of a certain tension between the 'social being' and the enlightened 'modern persona.' According to Turowski, the approach presented by Pitirim Sorokin, called functional theory, is a realistic one. Turowski treats it as the implementation of the philosophical theses of St Augustine and St Thomas in sociology. The Lublin professor links this realism with the assumption that "to a certain extent the human person is autonomous and grows beyond the group. On the other hand, they are to a certain extent subordinated to the community. Therefore, the realistic theory, and within it the Thomistic theory, rejects the stance of the platonic-organic theory, according to which the human person is completely subordinated to society. It also opposes an individualistic position that, in turn, deprives the human person of their connection with society."<sup>363</sup> Realism expressed in this way is, to a large extent, negative in character, because its content consists in an indication of the limitations resulting from the reduction of an individual to the element of a larger whole, or making it an atom unrelated to any other ties.

In the ontological order, starting from a person involves emphasizing their relational character, indicating the natural tendency to interact in building the individual and cultural identity. This identity provides the basis for micro-structural natural communities (*gesellschaft*), especially families, which transform into complex macro social structures. Such a way of perceiving reality in the ontological order is sufficient in opposition to the reductionist trends which promote either collectivism (e.g. Marxism) or individualism (e.g. liberalism). This does not mean, however, that the relationship between collectivism and individualism leads to a search for a dialectical synthesis.<sup>364</sup> Turowski points to

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362 J. Turowski, *Socjologia. Małe struktury społeczne*, TN KUL, Lublin, 1993, p. 14.

363 Ibid. p. 26.

364 J. Szacki, "Indywidualizm i kolektywizm. Wstępna analiza pojęciowa," in: *Indywidualizm a kolektywizm*, ed. A. Morstin, Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, Warszawa 1999, pp. 9–21.

clear moral and political consequences that make the two seemingly contradictory variations treat an individual as a means to achieve goals. The solution to this dispute, therefore, does not come with an artificial balance point, but rather with a completely different view of the logic of social reality.

## 2. Realism in understanding the subject of sociology

Ontological focus on the human person requires further decisions regarding the subject of sociological research. The comprehension of the human person as 'an individual substance of rational nature' may easily lead to the conviction of the universality of behaviour, actions, and social interaction. It also encourages the adoption of phenomenological or even constructivist solutions binding social life with the symbolic-meaning sphere produced by its participants. Furthermore, if social life constitutes a derivative of an unchanging human nature manifested, first of all, in the spiritual realm, then sociology that remains faithful to this idea may escape too far into abstract solutions that do not refer to any historically shaped society. Therefore, realism in Turowski's sociology also concerns the subject of research, which is formulated as avoiding the extremes of nominalism and organicism (mechanicism or social agreement).<sup>365</sup> In order to demonstrate the specifics of the Lublin scholar's approach to this problem, it is worth looking again at the text which has appeared twice in his writings almost unchanged:

Many authors treat the problem of the relation between the individual and society as fictitious and the result of a misunderstanding. According to them, the distinction between 'individual' and 'social' is actually blurred in social reality. Every so-called individual phenomenon includes social elements, and every so-called social phenomenon consists of individual features. This is especially true in the light of the fact that, according to these views, a human being is shaped in their expression by society, while society is in turn the work of human individuals. This view is right in terms of the opposition against the absolute, ontological juxtaposing of man and society, and vice versa. However, one cannot agree with it when it proclaims the impossibility of considering and determining

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365 "Both the organicist theory and the nominalistic theory turned out to be anti-humanist. Both of them ultimately led to the violation of human rights and dignity, and prevented human individuals from developing their personality. By hypostasizing community, and in particular the state, the organicist theory led to the total absorption of the human by the collective, and made them a measure of the community, and in reality of groups of people directing the life of the community. Individualistic theory, by acquainting the common good and the community and rejecting social bonds, has made the majority of people a tool and a means in the hands of a few individuals.' J. Turowski, *Socjologia. Małe struktury społeczne*. . . , p. 24.

the relationship of man to community. The dependence between a person and community does not deprive either of their distinctiveness, and does not equate them with each other, but, on the contrary, implies their separate subjectivity. The existence of relationships between man and society requires the mutual scope of dependence and subordination to be established.<sup>366</sup>

Taking up the issue of the ontological relationship between man and society, Turowski points to the problem of dependence between structural conditions and subjective influence. Even terminological issues are of value to him. In the version of the text from 1958, he uses the phrase “man and society;” in 1993, he changes it to “individual and society.” This change is, in my opinion, conditioned by participation in creative thinking, which was developed at the Catholic University of Lublin in the spirit of social personalism. Already in the first footnote to the subheading of the chapter [*History and the Actuality of the Problem*], Turowski explains that the terms “human person,” “person,” and “human individual” will be used interchangeably.<sup>367</sup> The version of the 1958 text also contains

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366 J. Turowski, “Człowiek a społeczeństwo,” *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 1958, vol. 2, pp. 3–28. This slightly modified text was also published in *Socjologia. Małe struktury społeczne*: “Many authors treat the problem of the relation between the individual and society as fictitious and the result of a misunderstanding. According to them, the distinction between ‘individual’ and ‘social’ is actually blurred in social reality. Every so-called individual phenomenon includes social elements, and every so-called social phenomenon consists of individual features. This is especially true in the light of the fact that, according to these views, a human being is shaped in their expression by society, while society is in turn the work of human individuals. This view is only valid in so far as it is treated as an opposition to the absolute, ontological juxtaposing of man to society, and vice versa. However, one cannot agree with this view when it proclaims the impossibility of considering and determining the relationship of man to community. The existence of the relationship between a person and community neither deprives any of them of separateness nor equates them; on the contrary, it implies their separate subjectivity. The existence of relationships between man and society demands the establishment of their mutual scope of dependence and subordination.” J. Turowski, *Socjologia. Małe struktury społeczne*. . . , pp. 17–35.

367 “I use the terms ‘human person,’ ‘person’ and ‘human individual’ interchangeably. Similarly, I temporarily use the terms ‘community,’ ‘social group,’ ‘collectivity,’ and ‘society’ to describe any social union of people for a common purpose. The term ‘society’ is also used to describe a complex of social groups subordinated to one basic group. In this case, the change in the meaning of the term is marked in the text.” J. Turowski, *Socjologia. Małe struktury społeczne*. . . , p. 17, index 1. “I use the terms ‘human person,’ ‘person,’ and ‘human individual’ interchangeably. Similarly, I use the terms ‘community,’ ‘social group,’ ‘collectivity,’ and ‘society’ to describe any social union of people for a common purpose. The term ‘society’ is also used to

a sentence which is later to be omitted: "It should also be noted that the term 'person' is not used in this work in the analogical sense, as Stefan Świeżawski points out."<sup>368</sup> This subtle philosophical remark indicates a high level of anthropological awareness, which requires a reference to the understanding of man formed by the Lublin philosophical school, pointing to different levels of human existence as a person. Leaving this sentence out in the textbook may result from the didactic nature of the text and the author's awareness that the topic gained a broad and competent study in separate publications created in his immediate environment.<sup>369</sup> It was also a time when, after breaking with the remnants of Marxist restrictions, Polish sociology attempted to regain its autonomy, also by freeing itself from the philosophical issues that had been present therein through the imposed ideological perspective.

In this context, a reference to the section cited above, regarding the fact that many social scientists believe the problem of the relationship between an individual and society to be artificial and rooted in a misunderstanding, seems even more interesting. In the text version from 1958<sup>370</sup> the footnote refers to the text

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describe a complex of social groups subordinated to one basic group. In this case, the change in the meaning of the term is marked in the text." J. Turowski, *Człowiek a społeczeństwo*. . . , p. 3.

368 Ibid., p. 3. Cf. "In this being, which is God himself, they participate in an analogous manner to all other non-Godly, but created beings. Analogy concerns not only the immeasurable variety of beings, but also, and above all, existence. Only in God is this existence self-perpetrated and necessary; in all other beings it is granted by and dependent on Him. Amongst the multitude of beings existing in dependence of God, there are also those which, with all their radical dependence, are, however, independent, not indestructible in an absolute way, endowed with an indestructible nature; once they exist, they do not cease to exist. This concerns spiritual beings: the pure spirit – the angel, and the spirit related to matter – man; created persons in whom the being differs from existence." S. Świeżawski, "Problem filozoficznej teorii człowieka," *Znak*, 1959, no. 60, p. 710.

369 For example, created almost at the same time as Turowski's textbook, S. Kowalczyk's *Człowiek i społeczność. Zarys filozofii społecznej*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2005.

370 Father Franciszek Mirek writes: "The 'individual – social' problem with its varieties of 'the individual – nation,' 'individual – society,' 'individual – supra-individual' (Durkheim) wanders like an eternal Jew through various sociological books. All this is, in my opinion, a misunderstanding. The antithesis 'individuality – society,' 'individual – social' is a pseudo-antithesis, just like the pseudo-antithesis is 'mine – yours,' 'one – five,' 'cold – colder.' In every interpersonal activity, the 'mine,' or 'ours,' uses the 'not-mine' and 'not-ours,' but 'common,' to enable the cooperation of 'mine' and 'ours,' and separation from 'yours' and from 'ours'" (Mirek, *Zarys socjologii*, TN

of F. Mirek in which he outlines the sociological principles regarding the understanding of social actions. Turowski's polemic with his master<sup>371</sup> concerns the sense in which the opposition of the individual (man) and society is used. It seems that the student has not entirely understood the intentions of his master, writing that 'the problem of the relationship between the individual and society is not about the construction of social activities, but about the limits of mutual rights and duties.' Mirek actually referred to the issue of social activities. This does not mean that he did not see that this affected the issues of rights and duties, but only that he attempted to give this dimension a direct reference to the classical debate on social issues,<sup>372</sup> originally developed as part of practical philosophy.<sup>373</sup> Mirek had a deep awareness of ideological, not to say theological history

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KUL, Lublin 1948, pp. 266–267). Father Mirek justifies the fictitiousness of the individual – society problem with the fact that the contribution of the individual occurs in every interpersonal act, but for the activity to occur the act makes use also of common accomplishments. This is certainly correct, but the problem of the relationship between the individual and society is not about building a social activity, but about mutual limits of rights and duties." Turowski, *Człowiek a społeczeństwo*. . . , p. 3.

371 In the author's *Afterword* in *Zarys socjologii*, Mirek mentions, among others, Turowski: "I would like to thank Prof. Ignacy Czuma for a lot of substantive comments which I used, and Mr. Jan Turowski, PhD, Senior Assistant to the Department of Sociology at the Catholic University of Lublin, for proofreading." F. Mirek, *Zarys socjologii*, p. 737.

372 For example, Mirek combines the advantages of the institution of the parish with the determination of activities for the benefit of the group. "The parish group has distinguished, from a whole range of factual or possible activities, those which in its opinion are most appropriate under given circumstances. It defines them clearly and thus facilitates its and its members' duty towards the poor." F. Mirek, *Elementy społeczne parafii rzymsko-katolickiej. Wstęp do socjologii parafii*, Fiszer i Majewski – Księgarnia Uniwersytecka, Poznań 1928, p. 279.

373 Aristotle's practical philosophy associated human activities with the virtues and possibilities of proper fulfillment of their duties within the community. "The functional viewpoint – the division of people according to the type of activities they perform and the tasks carried out through these activities – is very important for Aristotle's thought. We also find it in the 7th book of *Politics*. In this work, Aristotle clearly details the tasks faced by the polis of which there are six. The first is nutrition; the second is to meet the needs through technical skills; third is power, supported by weapon on the inside and defense against possible assaults from the outside; the fourth is possession of monetary resources to cover domestic needs and war expenses; the fifth is religious cult; and the sixth is to adjudicate on what is important to the public and to resolve disputes between citizens. These tasks are fulfilled by the six basic elements of the collective: farmers, craftsmen, military forces, citizens distinguished by wealth, priests,

of sociology, which in the place of God interceded the human being, once as an individual, other times as a collective.<sup>374</sup>

It seems that the issue of proposing an opposition between an individual and society is a result of modern and also, in a broader sense, gnostic alienation of man from the world. H. Jonas depicts this as “a basic experience of an absolute rift between man and that in which he finds himself lodged, the world.”<sup>375</sup> This is the effect of the gnostic undermining of the ontological truth that, developing from the cosmos to the polis, the whole has always preceded a part. “Thus this whole, making possible first the very life and then the good life of the individual, was at the same time entrusted to the individual’s care, and in surpassing and outlasting him was also his supreme achievement.”<sup>376</sup> This approach allows us to perceive man and his actions in the context of the whole community, without the need for artificial duality. Therefore, through the analysis of social activities, Mirek wanted to emphasize the moral and communal nature of social life. “The first feature of social activity is the combination of ‘mutual’ and ‘personal.’ This human connection of ‘mutual’ with ‘personal’ gives activities a new ‘meaning’ and thus enables mutual, definite concrete understanding. The indefinite ‘humanistic coefficient’ which some people use becomes irrelevant.”<sup>377</sup>

members of the Council, and judges.” P. Rybicki, *Arystoteles. Początki i podstawy nauki o społeczeństwie*, Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolińskich, Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków 1963, p. 82.

374 This stance is shared by a number of contemporary authors, including I. Berlin: “Messianic preachers – prophets – such as Saint-Simon, Fourier, Comte, dogmatic thinkers such as Hegel, Marx, Spengler, historically-minded theological thinkers from Bossuet to Toynbee, the popularisers of Darwin, the adoptors of this or that dominant school of sociology or psychology – all have attempted to step into the breach caused by the failure of the eighteenth-century philosophers to construct a proper, successful science of society. Each of these new nineteenth-century apostles laid some claim to exclusive possession of the truth. What they all have in common is the belief that there is one great universal pattern, and one unique method of apprehending it, knowledge of which would have saved statesmen many an error, an humanity many a hideous tragedy.” I. Berlin, *The Sense of Reality: Studies in Ideas and their History*, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York 1997, p. 42. See also Jabłoński, *Budowanie społeczeństwa wiedzy, Zarys teorii społecznej Karla R. Poppera*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2006, pp. 248–270.

375 H. Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion: The Message of the Alien God and the Beginnings of Christianity*, Beacon Press, Boston 2001, p. 251.

376 *Ibid.*, p. 248.

377 F. Mirek, *Zarys socjologii*. . . , pp. 267 ff. ‘Sociology, as a special science, does not deal with what exists outside of social facts, but with them as such. Therefore, also for

Fifty years after the publication of *Zarys socjologii* [The Outline of Sociology], Turowski believes that neither in this work nor in others did Mirek go beyond critical and polemical reflections, while his “lecture on specific activities, relations, or social groups is often limited to giving a name, defining a model system of features or constitutive elements of a given phenomenon, and does not contain more cognitive content or information.”<sup>378</sup> This assessment is the result of Turowski’s self-determination as a scientist who thinks about sociology primarily as an empirical science. For this he also values the achievements of his teacher (“a serious contribution to the establishment and popularization of sociology as empirical science”), noting, however, “that he was inclined towards German formal sociology, which was busy building a conceptual scaffolding for general sociology.”<sup>379</sup>

### 3. Realism in sociological empirical research

The aforementioned difference between the master and the disciple reflects a plethora of dilemmas confronted by Polish sociology seeking its foundations as a field of science.<sup>380</sup> The post-war period brought about severe ideological limitations, but difficulties sprung also from the peculiarity of the science, immature compared to the achievements of natural sciences. Turowski repeatedly expressed the opinion that the development of sociology as a mature science had to be combined with its empirical character. With his monograph on rural and agricultural sociology and textbooks on micro and macro social structures, he sums up his own research path. In both these works, despite their different character, Turowski attempts to see empirical data not only as a description of facts, but also in the context of research on causes behind goals, plans, desires,

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this reason, one should reject the postulate of Durkheim’s “supra-individual social consciousness” not only as illogical and not explaining anything, but also as having nothing to do with the science of sociology.” F. Mirek, *Metoda socjologiczna. Przyczynęk na podstawie analizy krytycznej metod Tarde’a i Durkheima*, Jan Jachowski, Poznań 1930, p. 179.

378 J. Turowski, “Socjologia rozumiejąca Franciszka Mirka,” in: *Pomiędzy etyką a polityką...*, p. 151.

379 Ibid.

380 ‘In the interwar period, as sociology underwent institutionalization and became, to use Thomas Kuhn’s phrasing, a “normal science,” general discussions over the foundations of sociology started to disappear, replaced with detailed theories and empirical studies. One of the exceptions in this respect, important here, was the book of Franciszek Mirek, published in 1930.’ F. Mirek, *Metoda socjologiczna...*, p. 31.

and goods of particular people. In my opinion, this constitutes a continuation of Mirek's great heritage, conducted within the framework of institutional and ideological constraints in post-war Poland.<sup>381</sup> Turowski does not try as effectively

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381 The Second World War is a natural turning point in the development of sociology at the KUL, the cultivation of which was continued from the first months after the liberation of Lublin, still within the Faculty of Law and Socio-Economic Sciences. In 1944, Lviv ethnographer Józef Gajek moved to Lublin, took over the Chair of Sociology, and lectured, among others, on general sociology. In the years 1946–1949, the Chair of Sociology was headed by Fr. Franciszek Mirek, a great researcher of the parish and its formation in various socio-cultural contexts. The academic year 1948/1949 marked the beginning of functioning of the Sociology Department Mirek managed. In the academic year 1945/1946, Czesław Strzeszewski and Jan Turowski organized at the KUL the Center for Social and Agricultural Studies of the Village, whose graduates later played prominent roles in the economic life of the country and in state administration. In 1949, increasing communist terror and repression directed towards Church institutions resulted in the suspension of the Faculty of Law and Socio-Economic Sciences at the KUL, together with all the institutions operating within its framework. The Academic Senate of KUL decided to maintain the continuity of certain disciplines in the field of social sciences, such as sociology, through the creation of a specialization in Practical Philosophy (from 1975, specialization in Philosophy and Social Science) at the Faculty of Christian Philosophy. Thanks to that, sociological studies were able to continue, and between 1950 and 1956, the KUL was the only university in the country where lectures in sociology were officially held. The new framework included the Chair of Christian Sociology, headed by Czesław Strzeszewski (1948–1950 and 1957–1974). In 1975, the Chair was transformed into the Department of Catholic Social Teaching, headed, until 1992, by Fr. Joachim Kondziela. The Department of Sociology was also maintained, and until 1968 it was headed by Jan Turowski, who then took over (1968–1993) the newly established Department of General Sociology. In the same year, the Second Chair of Christian Sociology was created. It was headed by Fr. Józef Majka. The year 1958 saw the establishment of the Department of Sociology of Religions at the Faculty of Theology, headed by Fr. Józef Majka, and, from 1970, by priest Władysław Piwowarski. Since 1972, there has existed also the Department of Family Sociology, which until 1981 was led by Franciszek Adamski. During this time, influential directions of sociological research and education were formed; they concerned the notions of parish, religion, family, city, village, nation, and countries cultivated in the spirit of social teaching of the Church. E. Hałas, “Socjologia a etyka społeczna w Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim (1918–1998),” in: *Pomiędzy etyką a polityką. . .*, pp. 13–44; J. Mariański, “Sekcja społeczna Wydziału Nauk Społecznych KUL,” in: *Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski. Wybrane zagadnienia z dziejów Uczelni*, eds. G. Karolewicz, M. Zahajkiewicz, and Z. Zieliński, Redakcja Wydawnictw Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, Lublin 1992; N. Kraśko, *Instytucjonalizacja socjologii w Polsce 1970–2000*, Wydawnictwo UW, Warszawa 2010, p. 66; K. Kwarciańska, “Instytut



as Mirek to expose the weaknesses of Durkheim's sociological or Tarde's psychological ideologies but, at times even somewhat eclectically, combines different perspectives (without a deeper analysis of all the consequences of their adoption) and seeks a third path between them. He is aware that they are only primary theses that, instead of verification, demand a falsified exposure of their limitations in the face of the heterogeneous reality of specific people's lives.<sup>382</sup>

In the monograph *Socjologia wsi i rolnictwa* [Sociology of Rural Areas and Agriculture], and especially in its second extended edition of 1995, Turowski strives to recapitulate on the 40 years of empirical research on the title issues. It is not, however, a recapitulation aimed at collecting the results of previous research in the form of generalizations, regularities, trends, or even laws. It is not even an effect of building Merton's middle-range theory. It is a presentation of a set of problems and possible solutions which show the possibilities and limitations of sociology as a science. Contemporary reading of this monograph demonstrates all the shortcomings of the search for the maturity of scientific sociology in collecting and generalizing the results of empirical research. It is significant, as mentioned by the author himself in the introduction, that in comparison to the publication from 1992, only the first, methodological chapter of the work remained unchanged. According to Turowski's declarations, the chapter, encompassing the review on "research practice" and the account of the criterion of existence of a conceptual link between the parts or elements of the research process, allows to extract the following kinds of methods used in sociological studies: 1) the monographic field method, 2) the biographical method 3) the historical-comparative method, 4) the survey method, 5) the experimental method, and 6) the socio-metric method.<sup>383</sup> This is the original division of methods developed on the basis of, among others, research practices within specific sociological subdisciplines, relevant for the whole sociology. The second part of the monograph, bearing the title *Wyniki badań* [Research Results], after many years turns out to be a collection of information containing historical knowledge about the ways in which sociologists perceived villages during the

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Socjologii na Wydziale Nauk Społecznych Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego Jana Pawła II," *Uniwersyteckie Czasopismo Socjologiczne* 2008, no. 2, pp. 123–129; K. Olechnicki, and T. Szlendak, "Polska socjologia akademicka w świetle rankingów prasowych," in: *Socjologia w szkołach wyższych w Polsce. Kształcenie socjologów i nauczanie socjologii po 1989 roku*, eds. K. Szafraniec, and W. Winclawski, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, Toruń 2003.

382 J. Turowski, *Socjologia. Wielkie struktury społeczne*, TN KUL, Lublin 1994, pp. 33–50.

383 J. Turowski, *Socjologia wsi i rolnictwa*, TN KUL, Lublin 1995, pp. 16 ff.

Polish People's Republic period. We are therefore faced with a general lack of accumulation of research results as the basis for making generalizations which could lead to the establishment of possible rules or trends. We may gain a diagnostic confirmation of an axiological statement articulated at the end of the book: "The country is alive, not threatened by disappearance, and will continue to develop."<sup>384</sup>

The epistemological assumptions adopted by Turowski allow to consider sociology as a form of cognition, which, being rational and scientific, is not limited to empirical data, but rather constitutes a whole continuum of reality, from ideological foundations to observable individual events. This results in a methodological pluralism which avoids both assumptions of holism and individualism and considers sociology as a reflection on the unintended consequences of rationally motivated deliberate human action. The opposition to the Platonic ontological idealism undermines clear and unambiguous forms of reductionism, which Popper referred to as the enemies of the open society. The question is settled on the epistemological not the ontological level. In constructivist terms, epistemological 'generosity' leads either to the blurring of subjective agency in favour of depersonalised structures and networks, or to excessive subjectivism or even psychological ideology and cognitivism, which in turn leads to the substitution of subjective agency for a mere description of the activity of mind structures or even the brain. Therefore, in the spirit of epistemological realism, Turowski notices that methodological pluralism is indispensably conditioned by the search for solutions to problems.

Structuralists and functionalists reach social consciousness and people as reflections of the bearer of the 'objective world'; representatives of 'humanistic sociology', on the other hand, do so because social phenomena are objectively what they are in the experience and activity of people who create this consciousness. Therefore, we can adopt a conventional definition of a sociological method as covering all the ways of reasoning, techniques for obtaining sources, and methods of analysis of social phenomena that apply to both consciousness and objectivity. . . . In specialist literature, there is a widespread division of methods of sociological research . . . into 'quantitative methods' and 'qualitative methods.' . . . This is an erroneous division. . . . Each method comprises both a quantitative and a qualitative analysis, although in varying degrees and to a different extent.<sup>385</sup>

Turowski appears to be an epistemological realist; in his work, he clearly assumes that what we experience (i.e. forms of cognition) is independent (real) of acts

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384 *Ibid.*, p. 255.

385 *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 17.

of cognition. Within the framework of epistemological realism, he defends the view that the basic feature of cognition is the ability to represent objects of a different nature than the products of cognition (classical view on the concept of truth). Turowski associates the recognition of sociology as an empirical science with the need to emphasize its readiness not to ascribe value to certain phenomena. However, he remains an axiological realist who assumes the objective existence of values, including moral ones, as a set of duties, norms, and rules that bring order to both the biological and socio-cultural worlds. He expresses this by stressing the possibilities of the practical use of sociology:

Research and analysis result in certain conclusions and practical recommendations, the formulation of which is in principle not a matter of sociological description. The aforementioned causes of various phenomena of hotel life suggest both directions and types of reforms. . . . One must come to the conclusion that there should be no workers' hotels designed as a form of permanent residence for the employees of a given company.<sup>386</sup>

It is a logical mistake to derive duties or directives leading to social changes from theoretical sentences, which is why Turowski tried to follow a path which, at the time of his scientific activity, was most clearly set in Polish sociology by, among others, Adam Podgórecki.<sup>387</sup> The path consisted in formulating practical applications indicating that on the basis of research it can be stated that if we want to achieve the desired effect, certain things should be done.

Turowski understands the specifics of the theorems formulated within social sciences, which contain value judgments endowed with logical value. Following W. Marciszewski, one can distinguish descriptive and axiological predicators,<sup>388</sup> which are complex in content. On the one hand, in their content they refer to physical, biological, psychological, social, and other similar features; on the other, they express a positive or negative assessment of these characteristics. Summarizing his research on Polish cities on the example of Lublin, Turowski states:

Thus, the city loses its individuality, the readability of its layout, the beauty of architecture. Large residential 'warehouses' are being built. They take the form of several dozen thousand residential districts, without economic and social and cultural subcentres or a polycyclic network. . . . In this way, we try to follow the path of inertial growth of large

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386 J. Turowski, "Hotel robotniczy jako środowisko społeczne," *Przegląd Socjologiczny* 1959, no. 1, p. 135.

387 A. Podgórecki, *Charakterystyka nauk praktycznych*, PWN, Warszawa 1962.

388 W. Marciszewski, "Realizm aksjologiczny. Rzecz o wartości logicznej sądów wartościujących," *Kwartalnik Filozoficzny* 2005, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 293–325.

American and European cities from the period of the nineteenth-century dynamism of industrialization.<sup>389</sup>

In the spirit of piecemeal social engineering,<sup>390</sup> Turowski wonders why Poland has not used the urban experiences of other countries and has not introduced the necessary corrections to eliminate errors and undesirable consequences of urban development, so as to reduce the annoyance of living in such cities.

The treatment of sociology as science is unequivocally linked with the rejection of practicing it as a natural science. The Lublin sociologist not only challenges the constructivist and naturalistic reductionism, but also avoids the Diltheyan division of sciences into *Naturwissenschaften* and *Geisteswissenschaften*. In his view, scientific theories give us a true description of the unobservable reality, but they are only this reality's description, temporary and closer to truth; consequently, under the influence of empirical research, they can be replaced by other theories. He clearly states:

Is it possible to critically synthesize all these discrepant results of research and studies? Comments made in the course of previous analysis indicate this possibility. . . . Such a critical synthesis of theoretical positions on the subject of the relation between the individual and urban environment allows at the same time for a synthesis of the existing empirical research in the field.<sup>391</sup>

The proposed synthesis is not merely a simple generalization of empirical data, but the result of abductive reasoning,<sup>392</sup> leading to the best explanation of

389 J. Turowski, "Lublin – idee przewodnie w planowaniu urbanistycznym miasta," in: *Procesy urbanizacji i przekształcania miast w Polsce*, eds. E. Kaltenberg-Kwiatkowska, and B. Jałowiecki, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław 1988, pp. 257–258.

390 "According to piecemeal social engineering: (1) one should not give up scientific research in problem solving, as it brings us closer to better results without eliminating constant tension between various possible solutions; (2) institutions established by men should protect the freedom of the individual, defend man against abuses of power, reduce evil and suffering; (3) solving social problems must be designed for a human being, stimulating their responsibility while not eliminating uncertainty and risk during decision-making." A. Jabłoński, *Status teoretyczny i funkcja techniczna wiedzy o społeczeństwie. Wokół myśli Józefa M. Bocheńskiego i Karla R. Poppera*, TN KUL, Lublin 2002, p. 116.

391 J. Turowski, "Człowiek w środowisku mieszkalnym," *Studia Socjologiczne* 1979, no. 1, pp. 152, 154.

392 Abductive reasoning has a number of different interpretations and models (explanatory-deductive, explanatory-coherent, and apagogic), but I would like to draw attention only to the basic dimension in which the method differs from induction,

problems solved by trial and error, eliminating everything that is clearly wrong, and recognizing as closer to truth the aspects which have withstood criticism. Turowski clearly distinguishes between theories that provide a better explanation and understanding of social phenomena from the loudly-sounding influential concepts which, thanks to their generality, are always somehow true or propose an ideologically imposed interpretation confirmed by biased data. For example, in this tone he evaluates the distinction – influential in sociological considerations – between the private and public spheres:

Although the concepts of private and public spheres of life do not satisfy the methodological and logical requirements of analytical theory, the advocates of these concepts form an important and interesting statement about the state of modern societies. . . . Empirical research could and should deal with the problems of deformation of private and public life and, based on developed indicators, verify or falsify the existing hypotheses on the topic.<sup>393</sup>

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Summing up the above findings regarding a realistic view of society, it should be said that Turowski takes into account the postulates of theological and ontological (metaphysical) realism, recognizing social reality as a manifestation of the activity of man as a being with unchanging nature created by God. He is also an epistemological realist, concluding that the contents of cognition proper to sociology are not identical to the mechanisms of their production, which is why sociological research might be useful in understanding and explaining social phenomena, but not in their construction and transformation. This is related to scientific realism, which avoids the extremes of constructivism and naturalism, and treats sociology as a knowledge approaching the truth about the nature of social phenomena, thanks to abductive checking of hypotheses leading to the best explanation of social relationships. The proper understanding of social phenomena is also manifested in Turowski's axiological realism, according to which on the basis of the adopted system of values and a verifiable set of hypotheses, recommendations of practical changes for limiting evil and suffering in social life can be made.

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“because we are not merely making a simple generalization of available data here. We are looking for a link between the general (known) rule and a certain phenomenon, where the fact that the former is related to the latter does not have to be obvious.” See M. Urbański, *Rozmowania abdukcyjne. Modele i procedury*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe WAM, Poznań 2009, p. 18.

393 J. Turowski, “Dychotomia prywatnej i publicznej sfery życia (Koncepcje i diagnozy),” *Studia Socjologiczne* 1989, no. 3, pp. 77–78.



### III. SOCIOLOGICAL AND AXIOLOGICAL MOTIVES IN JOHN PAUL II'S *LABOREM EXERCENS*

Human work is a key [...] to the whole social question.<sup>394</sup>  
Values [...] are the lights that lighten up being, and  
as man continues to develop himself, they shine even  
brighter on the horizon of his life.<sup>395</sup>

1989 marks the beginning of a new Poland, whose building required a considerable effort. The systemic premises of the new Republic are still being shaped, and we continue to make choices regarding particular sectors of our socio-economic life (health care, agriculture, social policy, etc.). In addition, there is an ongoing discussion about the values necessary to maintain the socio-political order, and those that constitute the foundation of culture and its development, including the broadly defined culture of work.<sup>396</sup> The relation between work and values is limited. Work itself is often treated as a value (e.g. in the context of unemployment). Simultaneously, it is a natural, most common means of obtaining or internalizing numerous values.

#### 1. Work and capital in the context of the “personalistic argument”

John Paul II defined work as every type of human activity, either venturesome, managerial, executive, scientific, or practical.<sup>397</sup> Consequently, work can be seen as serving many functions; for instance, it is a means of self-creation, it

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394 John Paul II, *Laborem exercens*, sec. 3.

395 John Paul II, *Pamięć i tożsamość. Rozmowy na przełomie tysiącleci*, Znak, Kraków 2005, p. 35.

396 According to Józef Tischner, there is a deep and direct connection between the values of culture and the values of work (J. Tischner, *Polska jest ojczyzną. W kręgu filozofii pracy*, Éditions du Dialogue, Paris 1985, p. 41).

397 John Paul II, *Laborem exercens*, sec. 1, sec. 9.

socializes, and, according to believers, it may even lead to salvation.<sup>398</sup> This high value of work, however, does not imply its absolutization or even deification. Marxism valued humans for their work and the ability to maximize their efforts to reach a given level of efficiency, exhibiting thus a naturalistic, almost mystical fascination with work. Classical capitalism evaluated man on the basis of the effects of his creativity and work. Christian personalism stresses the dignity of the working man; as a result, it argues that work should not be treated merely as a commodity that follows the laws of supply and demand. John Paul II stressed the fact that work is both human right and duty.<sup>399</sup> Therefore, it should take into consideration both the human *logos* (it should refer to human reason) and *ethos* (it should be properly remunerated).<sup>400</sup> Work is undoubtedly an important factor responsible for moulding human personality and character. Due to work, people feel needed by society and create values that serve the common good. This fact affects major issues regarding the formation of the system of work (the state – employer – employee) and managerial norms. In other words, the crucial issue here is the fundamental relation between labour and capital.

John Paul II stressed the supremacy of labour over capital.<sup>401</sup> This rule is part of the broader notion of “principlism” described by Gabriel Marcel as the primacy of “to be” over “to have.”<sup>402</sup> The distinction was often mentioned by the Polish Pope. He perceived labour to be the key to socio-economic questions. He claimed: “We must emphasize and give prominence to the primacy of man in the production process, the primacy of man over things.”<sup>403</sup> Man is not a machine; he is a person, the subject of work. Christian social teaching takes this fact for granted because it believes work to be a human, personalistic expression of life; capital, on the other hand, is seen as a thing, a tool, and the outcome of labour. However, in no way does assuming the primacy of work over capital answer the question about the rules that need to be followed for companies and enterprises to function properly. Neither does such an assumption provide guidelines for

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398 Cf. C. Strzeszewski, *Praca ludzka. Zagadnienie społeczno-moralne*, TN KUL, Lublin 1978, pp. 23 ff.

399 John Paul II, *Laborem exercens*, sec. 14–16.

400 S. Kowalczyk, *Człowiek w poszukiwaniu wartości. Elementy aksjologii personalistycznej*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2006, p. 169.

401 John Paul II, *Laborem exercens*, sec. 12.

402 G. Marcel, *Być i mieć*, trans. D. Eska, IW Pax, Warszawa 1962; see J. Mariański, *Mieć czy być? Konsumizm jako styl życia – wyzwaniem dla Kościoła*, Wydawnictwo Unum, Kraków 1998.

403 John Paul II, *Laborem exercens*, sec. 12.



maintaining proper relations between employers and employees. In applying this principle to socio-economic life, one should take into account numerous conditions (e.g. just payment, workers' rights, functions fulfilled by the workplace, profit, empathy towards employees).

However, in spite of these determinants, it is extremely difficult to fulfil all the requirements proposed by John Paul II who argued that the production process should be so organized that the worker “could feel that he is working for himself.”<sup>404</sup> The humanization of labour through the reduction of human reliance on matter is an ongoing challenge. Employers and entrepreneurs, due to their position and function, tend to favour objective and material regularities and functions. A great challenge for the people responsible for shaping the socio-economic life of a given country is to find a way to reconcile the rights of the worker with the entitlements of the employer and the functions of the enterprise.

Nevertheless, the primacy of work over capital should not depreciate the latter. On the contrary, the two realities are complementary. Work requires capital and capital requires work. This relation has a deep anthropological, axiological, and cultural dimension (thus the term the culture of work, or the culture between employer and employee). Therefore, the thesis about the primacy of work over capital cannot lead to the glorification of labour at the expense of capital (as was the case in Marxism). According to the basic rules of socio-cultural axiology, glorification of one level of the hierarchy of values leads to the crisis of values, anomy, and cultural chaos. To remain consistent, axiological categories require all levels of the hierarchy of values. In other words, from the point of view of axiological equilibrium, hedonistic, vital, ethical, and religious values are equally important, even though they are not equal since basic values must serve higher values. If one level of values (even if it is occupied by religious values) is glorified, other levels become displaced. Consequently, human axiological sensitivity is upset. People become sensitive to certain values, whereas they do not see or deprecate others. This is accompanied by a tendency to perceive the values they are most sensitive to in absolute terms. This pathological phenomenon is called axiological totalism and it may take various forms, for instance hedonism, vitalism, intellectualism, moralism, or aestheticism.<sup>405</sup>

The relation labour-capital is also connected with the notion of ownership, including private property. The right to private property indicates not only the

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404 *Ibid.*, sec. 15.

405 J. Galarowicz, *Powołani do odpowiedzialności. Elementarz etyczny*, Oficyna Naukowa i Literacka „T.I.C.” Kraków 1993, pp. 39–40.

ownership of personal objects but also private ownership of the means of production (e.g. farms, shops, plants, houses, etc.). According to Marxism, private ownership of the means of production was the basic source of alienation, that is human enslavement. Christian social thought has always recognized human right to private property: it was stressed, among others, by Saint Thomas Aquinas,<sup>406</sup> and continues to be stressed by contemporary popes. In his Encyclical *Laborem exercens*, John Paul II referred to the so-called personalistic argument<sup>407</sup>, arguing that private property secures man's and his family's freedom. The Church's social teaching reminds, however, that human right to private property is not absolute and may be restricted for the common good; in special cases, the law even allows private property to be expropriated. Therefore, Saint Thomas made a distinction between individual, private ownership of material means and their social, communal application.<sup>408</sup>

Commenting on the social functions of private property, John Paul II asserted that this type of ownership is possible only in the context of economic freedom.<sup>409</sup> Totalitarian regimes do not allow such freedom, which is exemplified by communist states. The notion of full economic freedom is emphasized in the idea of free market. In the Encyclical *Centesimus annus*, John Paul II explicitly approved of the idea of "free economy,"<sup>410</sup> considering it an inspiration for human economic activity; however, he warned against a "radical capitalistic ideology" that leads to exploitation and human alienation. The Church's social teaching supports economic freedom but disapproves of the ideology of economism that does not subject economic life to any ethical scrutiny. The Church's (as well as John Paul II's) position stems from the fact that economic values are not situated at the highest level of the axiological hierarchy but are meant to serve humans and society. Therefore, economy must account for ethical and social norms.

On the other hand, the position of economic values in human life must not be underestimated. It is both human right and duty to own property as this ownership allows for attaining basic human goals. However, no material values should be considered as autotelic for they are merely the means to achieve higher goals (e.g. scientific, moral, social, ideological, or religious). Man should not be treated

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406 S.th. II-II, q. 68, a. 2; cf. C. Strzeszewski, *Własność. Zagadnienie społeczno-moralne*, ODiSS, Warszawa 1981, pp. 45 ff.

407 John Paul II, *Laborem exercens*, sec. 15.

408 S.th. II-II, q. 66, a. 2.

409 John Paul II, *Laborem exercens*, sec. 7.

410 John Paul II, *Centesimus annus*, sec. 42.

only as *Homo laborans*; he is also *Homo sapiens* and *Homo meditans*.<sup>411</sup> Certain values (e.g. truth, good, solidarity, kindness, brotherhood) cannot be reduced to economy; therefore, economy must not ignore ethics.

However, the obvious truth about the hierarchy of values is not always followed either by individuals or societies. Replacing values with needs (especially lower ones, such as material-hedonistic) is one of the causes of axiological imbalance.<sup>412</sup> On the one hand, needs are similar to “desires;” on the other, they are close to “benefits” and “interests.” Neither definition may be identified or mixed with values. Obviously, there is a connection between values and needs. It is a mistake, however, to claim that something is valuable because it is needed, or that something has high value because it is needed the most. It is a mistake to claim that everything shares the common denominator with values. On the contrary, values have their own distinct space, they are a separate world. Values, especially higher ones, often require sacrifice, yet people who make sacrifices in the name of values often feel happy and fulfilled because of that. A perfect example may be a person sacrificing his or her own life defending their country, faith, or truth. In the end, value is not estimated according to the benefits it brings; valuable things bring happiness and are useful.<sup>413</sup> It must be noted that citizens who have only needs often present autocratic states with a problem, especially when they start noticing that “basic needs” are not the only needs available. Once they begin demanding repossession and just redistribution, they become a dangerous force within non-democratic systems.<sup>414</sup>

In spite of these obvious ethical guidelines regarding the proper relation between axiological categories and economic needs, one should take into account the social context and socio-economic determinants that affect the lives of contemporary Poles. According to Marek Ziółkowski, the introduction of free market in Poland has resulted in the “pragmatization of consciousness” – the Polish society has become more materialistic, focused on financial success or, more often, on defending their material standard of living.<sup>415</sup> In some cases, the sign of that pragmatization of consciousness is increasing consumerism. Even though certain contemporary Polish individuals or groups cherish higher or

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411 S. Kowalczyk, *Człowiek w poszukiwaniu wartości*. . . , p. 170.

412 A. Tyszka, *Kultura jest kultem wartości. Aksjologia społeczna – studia i szkice*, Norbertinum, Lublin 1993, p. 116.

413 L. Dyczewski, *Kultura polska w procesie przemian*, TN KUL, Lublin 1993, p. 58.

414 A. Tyszka, *Kultura jest kultem wartości*. . . , p. 115.

415 M. Ziółkowski, *Przemiany interesów i wartości społeczeństwa polskiego. Teorie, tendencje, interpretacje*, Wydawnictwo Humaniora, Poznań 2000, p. 127.

post-materialistic values, the materialistic orientation seems to strongly affect the values and life goals Poles internalize. In their pastoral work, the clergy is constantly faced with the problem of promoting higher values to people whose lives are ruled by economic and social ones.

## 2. The meaning of freedom and equality versus the organization of socio-political and economic life

In his teaching, John Paul II stressed the fact that human freedom is both right and duty.<sup>416</sup> He did not consider freedom to be an autotelic value; rather, he believed it to be a means to internalize other values. Freedom has numerous important functions also in socio-political life. Lack of freedom leads to the atrophy and death of rudimentary interactions and social structures.<sup>417</sup> At the same time, however, John Paul II accounted for diversified conditions of human freedom. He argued – in accordance with the idea of Christian social personalism – that the manner in which the individual exercises his freedom is conditioned in innumerable ways. While these certainly have an influence on freedom, they do not determine it; they make the exercise of freedom more difficult or less difficult, but they cannot destroy it.<sup>418</sup> The Pope's position coincides with autodeterminism, but stands in clear opposition to two extreme ideologies regarding freedom: determinism (there is no freedom) and indeterminism (freedom is the absolute value).<sup>419</sup> Among different types of freedom, the Pope paid special attention to religious freedom which he believed to be the source and synthesis of basic human rights; he understood it “as the right to live in the truth of one's faith and in conformity with one's transcendent dignity as a person.”<sup>420</sup> Simultaneously, the Pope's writings allow us to differentiate between different aspects of freedom, for instance internal and external freedom. This

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416 John Paul II, *Homilia podczas jubileuszowej mszy św., Jasna Góra 19 VI 1983*, in: idem, *Nauczanie społeczne. Druga pielgrzymka do Polski, 16–23 czerwca 1983*, vol. 6, ODiSS, Warszawa 1986, pp. 68 ff.

417 John Paul II, *Centesimus annus*, sec. 25.

418 Ibid.

419 Stanisław Kowalczyk lists the following forms of freedom: 1. freedom as self-determinism, that is the possibility of choice (ontological sense); 2. freedom as autonomy, namely self-development (psychological and moral sense); 3. freedom as activity, namely self-actualization (existential and pragmatic sense); 4. freedom as human right, namely self-responsibility (social sense). (S. Kowalczyk, *Zarys filozofii człowieka*, Wydawnictwo Diecezjalne, Sandomierz 1990, pp. 108 ff).

420 John Paul II, *Centesimus annus*, sec. 47.

differentiation coincides with a taxonomy present in philosophical or sociological scientific discourse.<sup>421</sup>

John Paul II argued that “freedom attains its full development only by accepting the truth. In a world without truth, freedom loses its foundation and man is exposed to the violence of passion and to manipulation, both open and hidden.”<sup>422</sup> The Pope analysed the relation between truth and freedom in terms of “to be” and “to have.”<sup>423</sup> He claimed: “A person who is concerned solely or primarily with possessing and enjoying, who is no longer able to control his instincts and passions, or to subordinate them by obedience to the truth, cannot be free: obedience to the truth about God and man is the first condition of freedom, making it possible for a person to order his needs and desires and to choose the means of satisfying them according to a correct scale of values, so that the ownership of things may become an occasion of growth for him.”<sup>424</sup> John Paul II’s teaching indicates that the search for truth is one of the basic human challenges, and man uncovers truth through discussion and intellectual arguments, not through force.

John Paul II noticed: “Nowadays there is a tendency to claim that agnosticism and sceptical relativism are the philosophy and the basic attitude which correspond to democratic forms of political life.”<sup>425</sup> According to the Pope, it is extremely difficult for truth to triumph in such social reality. Because of the presence of agnosticism and sceptical relativism in public, media, or academic life, people whose actions are dictated by the logic based on the coherence of judgements and reality are not granted social trust. People who accept the classical definition of truth do not consent to the majority dictating truth, nor do they accept the view that truth changes together with the shift in political balance.<sup>426</sup> It should not come as a surprise that the proponents of agnosticism and

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421 Internal freedom is defined as independence from internal compulsion. Man can be deprived of external freedom, but he cannot be coerced into a particular way of thinking; his internal acts of will cannot be ordered. However, being internally free does not change the status of a person deprived of external freedom – such a person remains in prison. On the other hand, external freedom entails independence from external coercion. There exist numerous types of external freedom: physical, political, religious, economic, socio-cultural, etc.

422 John Paul II, *Centesimus annus*, sec. 46.

423 G. Marcel, *Być i mieć*. . . , pp. 34 ff.

424 John Paul II, *Centesimus annus*, sec. 41.

425 *Ibid.*, sec. 46.

426 *Ibid.*

sceptical relativism do not subscribe to that point of view. The Pope's teaching remains valid even in democratic countries (such as the Third Polish Republic) for, according to John Paul II, all people are constantly required to be critical recipients of the ideas promoted by the media and politicians.

John Paul II analysed the value of freedom and truth in the context of totalitarianism. He reminded his readers that every form of modern totalitarianism is rooted in the negation of transcendent human dignity and objective truth. Without transcendent truth, no rule can guarantee just relations between people; consequently, power triumphs, interests of a state or a party gain absolute value, individual subjects strive to maximize their personal gain and achieve their egoistic goals, and some people begin to impose their ideological views on others, simultaneously violating their rights.<sup>427</sup> As a result, it becomes easier to treat a person's ideas and views as a means to achieve the goals of various authorities or patron-client networks.<sup>428</sup>

The idea of freedom (e.g. freedom of an individual, a family, or economic freedom) and the issue of social equality (egalitarianism) are connected also with the notion of labour. Even though *Laborem exercens* did not address that problem directly, it discussed numerous issues descriptive of the relation between freedom and equality. For instance, the Pope analysed the connection between property and freedom, and between labour and particular socio-political systems (socialism, communism, capitalism). Moreover, when the Pope signalled a threat to the right order of values,<sup>429</sup> discussed "the conflict between labour and capital in the present phase of history,"<sup>430</sup> or wrote about the rights of workers, including the right of association and forming trade unions,<sup>431</sup> he implied the connection between these issues and the relation freedom-equality. Therefore, the Encyclical provides inspiring ideas for the discussion of freedom and equality in social life. The relation between these values should be taken into consideration by the people responsible for designing socio-economic strategies in the state, social and family policy, property rights, labour relations, etc.

The relationship between freedom and equality is a complex and complicated issue; also, it is a pressing matter that is not only theoretical but also pragmatic.<sup>432</sup>

427 *Ibid.*, sec. 44.

428 J. Szymczyk, "Układy patronacko-klienckie w perspektywie społecznych uwarunkowań wiedzy: pomiędzy oglądami a obrazami," in: *Wiedza między słowem a obrazem*, eds. M. Zemło, A. Jabłoński, J. Szymczyk, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2010, pp. 283–298.

429 John Paul II, *Laborem exercens*, sec. 7.

430 *Ibid.*, sec. 11–15.

431 *Ibid.*, sec. 16, sec. 20.

432 Cf. J. Rees, *Equality*, Macmillan, New York 1971, p. 45.

As regards social life, the connection between freedom and equality takes different shapes in divergent political and economic systems (e.g. in the Polish People's Republic and in post-1989 Poland). For instance, real socialism stressed the notion of 'equality of conditions' (*urawniłowki*). Because of the "economy of scarcity," people were equal in their deficiency. Almost all resources were nationalized, and their redistribution depended on the political priorities of the party (PZPR). Because of that, social policy was an integral part of the top-down internal policy whose goal was a total reconstruction of society. Moreover, the wage policy of the state was not to remunerate workers for individual work but to provide them and their families with equal living conditions, which in fact implied their equal deficiency. It should come as no surprise that such a total social policy proved unable to eliminate social, political, and economic inequalities,<sup>433</sup> whether in terms of achieving social position or awarding individuals occupying equal positions.<sup>434</sup>

Theoretically, social policy was the only policy in state socialism, since redistribution – as noticed above – was a complete strategy (all resources belonged to the state which controlled and was responsible for all spheres of life). In contrast, an orthodox liberal social order does not account for social policy at all. According to the theoreticians of that system, people should take responsibility for their lives. The main issue faced by people responsible for social policy in contemporary Western democracies is how to reduce social inequalities without breaking certain basic economic and civic liberties.<sup>435</sup> In contrast, post-communist states grapple with increasing basic economic and civic liberties

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433 Political inequality occurs when citizens do not have equal rights or equal civic status, or when there is no civic society. Social inequality appears when citizens have neither equal possibilities to gain education or employment nor equal chances for promotion, or when they receive divergent benefits for equal contribution to society. Finally, economic inequality concerns disparities in the wage structure in a given society (e.g. economic privileges, access to rare goods and services). (E. Wnuk-Lipiński, *Socjologia życia publicznego*, Scholar, Warszawa 2008, pp. 66 ff).

434 Numerous sociological studies indicate that the main reason for social discontent in real socialism was not caused by disparities in wages but by the inequality in access to goods and services. Money was not considered the main factor in the redistribution of goods. This function was replaced, at least to some extent, by one's position in the party, and distribution was conducted according to the rule "to each according to his functional usefulness to the system" (E. Wnuk-Lipiński, *Demokratyczna rekonstrukcja. Z socjologii radykalnej zmiany społecznej*, PWN, Warszawa 1996, p. 73).

435 Cf. F. Lammertyn, "The Impact of Policy on Social Inequality a Sociological Analysis of the Belgian Situation," *Roczniki Nauk Społecznych* 1993, vol. 1, pp. 117–134.

without increasing inequality and social stratification.<sup>436</sup> The post-communist era originated an entirely new context for the question: freedom or equality? Whereas political, social, and economic freedoms have increased, economic inequalities have been rapidly growing. Economic freedom results in unequal redistribution of income and deepens inequalities in the quality of life. Wealth and poverty are more visible than before. Unemployment has become an integral element of socio-economic life.

The freedom obtained with the fall of communism in 1989 implies more individual responsibility for one's life and leads to more personal career choices. For some people this freedom is a severe burden. Therefore, there is a need for efficient non-governmental redistribution. Secondly, both non-governmental and governmental subjects of social policy must focus not only on providing financial or material benefits to the needy but also on reducing learned helplessness<sup>437</sup> that prevents people from participating in free market and democracy.

If highly developed societies are (and must be) hierarchical, and if social equality cannot be introduced neither by democratic means nor by violence, then we must salvage from democracy what can be salvaged, namely social freedom. It does not mean that equality is no longer a desirable value. Rather, the realization of the principle of social egalitarianism should be limited to a certain minimum, for instance under the banner of "the society of equal opportunities." Even though this proposition will not be met with general approval, it is worth the effort. It goes against common sense to expect the state to provide all its citizens with equal means and goods. If too much stress is put on the idea of equality, all differences between people disappear; and if all people are made "too equal" (as in the case of *urawniłowka*, which eradicated all competition and healthy rivalry), growth, resourcefulness, or individual initiative atrophy.

Democracy should thus promote equality of opportunities. No person should be doomed to a worse fate because of their look or background. Equal opportunities allow every person to reach for the goods and goals they find particularly interesting, provided that they do not destroy the rights and chances of other people on the way. Therefore, equal opportunities result in diverse goals. Undoubtedly, at the heart of the principle of equal opportunities lies the growth

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436 Cf. Wnuk-Lipiński, *Demokratyczna rekonstrukcja. . .*, pp. 63 ff; J. Koralewicz, "Jak daleko do przyjaznego społeczeństwa? Z zagadnień postrzegania społecznego," in: *Grupy i więzi społeczne w systemie monocentrycznym*, ed. E. Wnuk-Lipiński, IFiS PAN, Warszawa 1990, p. 110.

437 This phenomenon, originated during the era of real socialism – the system referred to as "paternalistic clientelism" – is still visible in post-1989 Poland.



imperative. For instance, each state aims to reach a level of wealth that will allow it to fulfil the needs of its citizens. Therefore, the most rational way to achieve equilibrium between equality and freedom is to gradually increase people's level of existence and, consequently, increase their opportunities.

### 3. Solidarity in social life and workplace

Work is a meeting of people connected by an effort that requires partnership and solidarity. Work may fulfil its social and integrating function only if it is performed in a rational, non-compulsory manner and if it is properly appreciated (including proper financial remuneration). To achieve the common good, including the well-being of individuals, it is necessary for members of society to cooperate. Therefore, solidarity is one of the basic values. The *arche* that lies at the core of society and determines its development is not, then, the ceaseless conflict between members of social life; it is the solidary attempt to reach the common good (defined in personalistic terms).

The solidarity principle takes into account inequalities between members of society, simultaneously accounting for the dignity of every individual. It demands that no person unable to help themselves be left on their own, pushed to the margin of social life. However, the form of help (e.g. for the unemployed) must become the object of social negotiations. Public discourse cannot ignore the fact that the subjects responsible for redistributing that help must not be overburdened with duties beyond their capabilities. On the other hand, the 'recipient' of benefits must not abuse others' solidarity but should "receive" its "proper" amount.<sup>438</sup> John Paul II supported that point of view. He recognized human ability to create community (*communio personarum*). Such a community is not based merely on being and performing actions together. At its core lies something much more primal and deeper, a factor responsible for humans being and acting together, and, consequently, forming communities and societies. This factor is the very human nature – in order to actualize one's full potential and grow as a person, an individual requires other people.

For John Paul II, the solidarity principle was not a compromise between individualism and collectivism. Since it originates from human dignity and social nature, the Pope believed it to be an entirely new and original relation between an individual and society. On the one hand, it is rooted in the social bond between

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438 Cf. L. Roos, "Zadania państwa w gospodarce," in: *Katolicka nauka społeczna. Podstawowe zagadnienia z życia gospodarczego*, eds. J. Kupny, S. Fel, Księgarnia św. Jacka, Katowice 2003, p. 171.

an individual and community; on the other, it expresses moral responsibility that stems from that bond. Thus, the principle is simultaneously ontic and ethical, and it cannot be reduced to either a person or society.<sup>439</sup>

For John Paul II and other personalists, man's "direction" is another human being. The social bond is the condition of one's self-development. Solidary coexistence and cooperation are the ontic sources of social life.<sup>440</sup> Both John Paul II and the advocates of Christian social thought consider solidarity to be a social principle, that is a social and moral norm that demands solidary cooperation between people and groups on every level of social life (e.g. family, neighbourhood, work, university, country, or in international relations). Therefore, the solidarity principle indicates a bilateral relation and bilateral obligation between an individual and social structures (e.g. between an individual and their workplace or, in personalistic terms, between an employee and an employer). Thus, the application of the solidarity principle requires a particular moral and social attitude for, as claimed by the Pope, solidarity is a way of life.

Solidarity is a necessary condition of individual participation in a given community. It is a willingness to accomplish one's share of the common good. Simultaneously, in the case of authentic solidarity, the common good is a constant reference point, which means that a person knows when it is necessary to shoulder more than one's share of responsibility. The solidarity principle implies true and unconditional acceptance and propagation of equal dignity of every person – a human being endowed with basic rights. As argued by John Paul II, the principle is a necessary condition of the communion of people.<sup>441</sup> Therefore, the solidarity principle is an expression of participation.

Solidarity implies the ability to take responsibility for another person. From the point of view of a certain culture of solidarity, only a large community of solidary people is capable of managing large enterprises in a non-authoritarian manner. In order to establish goals and forms of participation, these people need to engage in a dialogue on different social levels (e.g. in a workplace). This is impossible without specific cultural contribution or, to put it another way, without an axiological revolution. Contemporary times require a cultural model

439 J. Höffner, *Chrześcijańska nauka społeczna*, trans. S. Pyszka, WAM, Kraków 1993, pp. 29 ff.

440 Cf. J. Kondziela, *Pokój w nauce Kościoła. Pius XII – Jan Paweł II*, RW KUL, Lublin 1992, p. 61.

441 John Paul II, *Solidarność w imię przyszłości człowieka i ludzkości*, in: idem, *Odwagi! Ja jestem, nie bójcie się*, Wydawnictwo Polskiej Prowincji Dominikanów „W drodze,” Poznań 1987, p. 103.

of man who is neither an individualist nor a conformist.<sup>442</sup> That man must be aware of the burden of responsibility that he must carry together with other people.

The solidarity principle allows for an individual to be incorporated into the life of a community. For a solidary member of a community, the choices motivated by the choices made by other members of the community gain intrinsic value.<sup>443</sup> In other words, solidary individuals engaged in *bonum commune* (e.g. of a workplace) create and develop in themselves and their communities a good which transcends the goals of the social group (such as individual benefits, profitability, conformism) or the means of human work (such as resources, tools, techniques).<sup>444</sup>

A subject must make a decision to accept authentic solidarity and express it through cooperation with others on their own; it is also the subject's individual decision to reject solidarity and remain a spiritual cripple. Authentic solidarity releases creative abilities. Human creativity, in turn, is a criterion evaluating social engagement of individual members of a community. A person who either does not care about the common good or was not allowed to become an active agent in the community will perform their duties in a mechanical way.<sup>445</sup> What this entails is that solidarity cannot be comprehended without accounting for the moral dimension, both subjective – of human conscience, and objective – of the axio-normative order.

On the one hand, this phenomenon requires solidarity between subjects; on the other, it justifies why material progress should be subordinated to the moral order. Human solidarity is a moral attitude that manifests itself in moral and social actions and directs individual freedom toward the common good. Consequently, the anatomical structure of solidarity consists of two parts. The first part is manifested by individuals who are constantly ready to accept and realize the responsibilities they share as members of a given community. The second part is one's readiness to express opposition whenever the common good is being achieved in an improper manner.<sup>446</sup>

*Laborem exercens* discusses two forms of the solidarity principle. The first approach is manifested in joint activities whose objective is to eliminate errors

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442 R. Buttiglione, *Suwerenność narodu przez kulturę*, „Ethos” 1988, no. 4, p. 109.

443 K. Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn*, PTT, Kraków 1985, p. 308.

444 John Paul II, *Laborem exercens*, sec. 5.

445 Cf. A. Szostek, *Communio personarum przez pracę*, in: John Paul II, *Laborem exercens. Tekst i komentarze*, ed. J. Gałkowski, RW KUL, Lublin 1986, p. 163.

446 K. Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn*, p. 185.

and injustice. Workers expressed this type of solidarity during the early stage of industrialization, when the proletariat was being formed. The Pope noticed that the proletariat question “and the problems connected with it gave rise to a just social reaction and caused the impetuous emergence of a great burst of solidarity between workers, first and foremost industrial workers.”<sup>447</sup> That burst of solidarity, a call to action aimed at transforming the conditions of life and work, is how “solidarity fronts” crystallized. According to John Paul II, “there is a need for ever new movements of solidarity of the workers and with the workers.”<sup>448</sup> Solidarity defined as a social fact is a search for consensus through compromise and a creation of authentic community.

The second definition of solidarity is broader and more correct. It connects two poles of social life: a person and the common good, or, to put it another way, two poles of the same reality, “downward” and “upward.”<sup>449</sup> Consequently, solidarity is expressed in one’s care to secure the well-being of a person and their rights as well as the rights of a community. What is then the relation between the solidarity principle and the common good principle? To put it in general terms, solidarity serves and protects. The anatomical structure of solidarity includes the common good of the whole community, both national and international. Its main imperative, addressed to all subjects, is to realize justice and truth in social life. In order to achieve that goal, solidarity must vanquish the foundations of hatred, egoism, and hypocrisy that are often presented as ideological rules or basic laws of social life. John Paul II’s solution was to search for the conditions of unity within human nature rather than focus on divisions and oppositions. He believed that solidarity serves and protects the common good when it objects to a vision of society as conflict and social relations as uncompromising class struggle.<sup>450</sup>

It must be added, however, that the relation between solidarity and the common good is also a creative one. A solidary society grows every day (social creation of reality), first by creating and then by protecting the efficient conditions for free participation of all social members in their common work. The solidarity principle accounts for the common good in the existence and activities of

447 John Paul, *Laborem exercens*, sec. 8.

448 Ibid.

449 W. Piwowarski, *Zasady społeczne w encyklice Laborem exercens*, in: John Paul II, *Laborem exercens. Powołany do pracy. Tekst i komentarz*, ed. J. Krucina, Wydawnictwo Wrocławskiej Księgarni Archidiecezjalnej, Wrocław 1983, p. 103.

450 Cf. John Paul II, *Praca jest znakiem jedności i solidarności*, in: idem, *Nauczanie społeczne 1982*, ODiSS, Warszawa 1986, p. 682.

social groups and work environments. To implement the principle, it is crucial to propose a definition of the common good for various spheres of life. Also, it is important to instil a sense of duty in all social members regarding the need to achieve the common good. Finally, all members of society must agree on the means that need to be applied in order to attain it (e.g. during protests or strikes).

The Pope believed solidarity to be not only a moral and social attitude, but also a virtue, or a socio-moral skill. In other words, the bond that makes people one big family is a moral one. This bond is a virtue that in many ways coincides with Christian love. Being a living image of God, each person connected with others through solidarity, deserves the same love that God feels towards His creation.<sup>451</sup> John Paul II claimed that to contrast solidarity with love is a mistake. He believed these two axiological categories to be complementary. The Pope dissociated himself from a natural, almost deterministic notion of human interdependence<sup>452</sup> and solidarity. Contrary to solidarists, who perceived the interdependence of both people and nations to be a physical phenomenon, he believed it to be a moral one, namely one that is dependent on human judgments and responsible decisions that may be controlled.<sup>453</sup> Economy is not the only dimension in which the interdependence of people and nations increases. This connection is also spiritual and cultural, related, for instance, to human rights. The last aspect is the most visible one, for whenever human rights are being violated, the world community experiences syntonic solidarity with the people enduring that suffering, even if they are in a distant country.<sup>454</sup>

Defining solidarity as a social principle and a socio-moral attitude and skill, John Paul II noticed vast individual, national, and international spheres that required solidarity. Proper subjects (including those connected with human labour) should realize that solidarity is a duty, and implementing it should become their priority. The Pope believed that “solidarity education” should originate in human conscience, be affirmed in ethical imperatives, and finally be codified (e.g. by labour laws).

The idea of solidarity proposed by John Paul II stands in opposition to the process of marginalization or the notion of the “social margin.” These phenomena are present in contemporary Poland. The social margin is defined as a state of

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451 Ibid.

452 Cf. J. Mazur, *Katolicka nauka społeczna. (Skrypt dla studentów teologii)*, Wydawnictwo Unum, Kraków PTT, 1992, p. 176.

453 F. Fiorentino, “Laickie i chrześcijańskie podstawy sprawiedliwości społecznej,” *Znaki Czasu* 1991, no. 22, p. 45.

454 J. Kondziela, *Pokój w nauce Kościoła. . .*, p. 61.

particularly severe poverty and degradation of individuals or groups (e.g. the unemployed, the homeless, the underclass, the disabled). Social marginalization is the process responsible for the creation of the social margin; it relegates certain individuals to the margins of the mainstream social order, making it difficult for them to participate in social life.<sup>455</sup>

Undoubtedly, rapid social and economic transformations or periods when social control is weakened stimulate the growth of marginalization, thus extending the scope of the social margin. Factors that exacerbate social marginalization include: high level of social disintegration, weak horizontal bonds, inefficient institutional order, increasing social stratification (the poor versus the rich), unstable economy, unemployment, "social diseases" (alcoholism, drug abuse, mental diseases), rivalry propelled by free market economy (and disrespect toward competitors), various types of social rejection, ostracism, exclusion. Marginalization is a sign of axiological imbalance in social life (e.g. disrespect for human dignity, including the dignity of workers, solidarity, and the common good). Finally, marginalization leads to passivity and apathy; it results in people pinning their hopes upon luck rather than taking action (e.g. rebellion, opposition, participation, taking part in decision-making).

According to sociological studies, another factor contributing to the crisis of solidarity in the Polish society is the increasing feeling of solitude (being alone in the crowd). This phenomenon correlates with the aforementioned rivalry one encounters having "stepped onto" (in metaphorical terms) various "markers," "stages," or "arenas." The winners are admired, applauded, and become idols, whereas the losers must leave the stage and withdraw to their "hideouts." Consequently, a new type of man is created: an anxious and lonely individual. Freedom, necessary to enter the places where people perform and compete, may also lead to loneliness. Not all people have equal strength and the capabilities to meet the requirements of contemporary freedom and responsibility. Family and other similar communities remain basic strongholds of belonging and identification that shelter individuals from loneliness. In post-1989 Poland, family and friendship remain significant values. Numerous sociological studies indicate that most Poles are satisfied with the quality of their family and social life; family and friends provide support necessary during difficult times and help in adapting

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455 A. Kojder, "Spojrzenie na przemiany ustrojowe w Polsce w latach 1989–1997," in: *Imponderabilia wielkiej zmiany. Mentalność, wartości i więzi społeczne czasów transformacji*, ed. P. Sztompka, PWN, Warszawa-Kraków 1999, pp. 25 ff.

to the new reality of the transformation period.<sup>456</sup> However, many people find the transition from real socialism (paternalistic clientelism) to democracy challenging, for they believe that the Third Polish Republic lacks clear rules, including the rules in the sphere of human labour.

Trust undoubtedly strengthens solidarity. Competition in the labour market, among other factors connected to the transformation from real socialism to democracy, resulted in mistrust between individuals; also, it became a common belief that certain individuals and groups pose a threat to individual freedom, security, etc. The general lack of trust toward people is accompanied by relatively low confidence in numerous public institutions.<sup>457</sup> Trust, however, is one of the components of a bond between members of social organizations whose goal is to implement values and achieve common objectives; these organizations are meant to fill the 'social void' between a primary group (e.g. family) and the state.

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In his Encyclical *Laborem exercens*, John Paul II stressed the double nature of labour. On the one hand, its objective nature is expressed in the products of labour; it stresses the fact that labour leads to remuneration, which secures one's existence. On the other hand, its subjective nature implies that man develops in social environment. A proper socio-economic system cannot be created if the two natures are not in equilibrium. Without a proper hierarchy of values, man becomes a slave to work and profit. John Paul II broadened that personal perspective by supplementing it with a Christian definition of work as man's participation in God's creation. The personalistic definition of labour (labour as an important value) is a crucial field of research conducted by socio-cultural axiology.

Values are the source of social dynamism and social change. One of their crucial functions is to integrate society. They inspire significant social initiatives and reforms. Central values in particular explain the nature of crucial social endeavours, including those undertaken in a workplace. Therefore, various social transformations (e.g. revolutions or political transformations) disturb the axiological order and result in social groups changing their systems of values. The post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe exemplify numerous

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456 M. Ziółkowski, K. Zagórski, and J. Koralewicz, *Wybrane tendencje przemian świadomości społecznej*, in: *Pierwsza dekada niepodległości. Próba socjologicznej syntezy*, eds. E. Wnuk-Lipiński, and M. Ziółkowski, ISP, PAN, Warszawa 2001, pp. 250 ff.

457 *Ibid.*, pp. 251 ff.

dilemmas caused by that phenomenon (e.g. how to find balance between the welfare state and the auxiliary state, between freedom and equality, or between self-government and centralization). These dilemmas are both theoretical and practical. However, in order for values to exist in social world, they must be the object of human desire, creativity, and reflection; they must be constantly re-discovered and updated; finally, they must be the centre of life. Values (also in the realm of human labour) that are not juxtaposed with life, that do not undergo a constant process of verification, and for whose justification no new arguments are being proposed stop being the force of development. They undergo atrophy and become invisible in the anthroposphere.



## IV. STANISŁAW KOWALCZYK'S PERSONALISTIC CONCEPTION OF SOCIETY

The greatest philosophical and social achievement of Stanisław Kowalczyk is his personalistic conception of society. The starting point for this reflection on social life is the question of who a human being is. Personalism rejects the reductionist treatment of man as an accidental creation of biocosmic evolution, social construction, a semantic product of pre-modern cultural discourse. Instead, it advocates for understanding human beings as having a permanent and universal structure of being. It is about personalism, which is, simultaneously, a system, a doctrine, a fundamental category of interpretation of reality, as well as a practical program, an attitude and the foundation of human action.<sup>458</sup> In Kowalczyk's writings, the interpretation of his assumptions and the theses about the personalistic vision of society is articulated in the form of a discussion with all the achievements of philosophical, theoretical and social, and ideological thought. A reconstruction of this dispute would require presentation in a large volume of studies. Therefore, in this text I will limit myself to its general introduction and to a presentation of its main partners, and I will focus on the positive content of Kowalczyk's personalistic message. The assumption is that the article is of presentational character, rather than of a polemical or critical one.

### 1. The assumptions of personalism

Kowalczyk's personalism is situated in the perspective of struggling with the simplifications of radical naturalism in understanding the origins, nature and calling of man. Thus, he engages in a polemical discussion with, among others, the Enlightenment mechanistic materialism (e.g. "the human-machine" of J. O. de La Mettrie), physicalism (e.g. A. Comte, O. Neurath), Marxist dialectical materialism, vitalizing and biologizing materialism (e.g. H. Spencer, F. Nietzsche, S. Freud), psychologism (e.g. G. Tarde, G. Le Bon), behaviourism (e.g. I. Pavlov, W. Wundt), structuralism (e.g. Cl. Lévi-Strauss), sociologism (E. Durkheim), liberalism (e.g. T. Hobbes, J. J. Rousseau), existentialism (e.g. J. P. Sartre,

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458 S. Kowalczyk, *Wprowadzenie do filozofii J. Maritaina*, Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, Lublin 1992, pp. 38–45.

M. Heidegger) and postmodernism (e.g. J. Derrida, J.-F. Lyotard, M. Foucault).<sup>459</sup> Polemics with well-established concepts of contemporary antihumanism is additionally strengthened by ideological discussions with the three key ideologies of the twentieth century – Marxism,<sup>460</sup> liberalism<sup>461</sup> and postmodernism.<sup>462</sup> Polemics with the above trends of philosophical, social, and ideological thought are positively reinforced by references to the writings of Greek and Roman classical thinkers, as well as medieval Christian ones: among others, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Saint Bonaventure, and a series of contemporary thinkers who affirm the value of humanity.

Kowalczyk regards the eighteenth and twentieth century as the beginning of personalistic reflection, as this was when the term ‘personalism’ was used by such thinkers as Friedrich Schleiermacher, Charles Renouvier, Wilhelm Stern, Bordon F. Bowne, Immanuel Kant, Sören Kierkegaard, Gabriel Marcel, Karl Jaspers, Max Scheler, Romano Guardini, Emmanuel Mounier, Jacques Lacroix, and Jacques Maritain.<sup>463</sup> These thinkers influenced, to a varying degree, the conception of the Lublin personalist, who is classified as belonging to a realistic-dynamic<sup>464</sup> or Thomistic-Augustinian trend, which remain in a creative relation to, among others, the Augustinian trend (J. Hessen, F. Sawicki, F. M. Sciacca,) Thomistic-existential trend (J. Maritain, M. A. Krąpiec, M. Gogacz), Thomistic-phenomenological trend (K. Wojtyła – John Paul II), phenomenological trend (M. Scheler, L. Lavelle, R. Guardini, R. Ingarden, J. Tischner), Thomistic-axiological trend (T. Ślipko, T. Styczeń), Christian-social trend (E. Mounier, J. Lacroix, J. Piwowarczyk, Cz. Strzeszewski, J. Majka), realistic/universalist trend (C. Bartnik).

Recognizing the above methods of classifying Kowalczyk’s personalistic thought on the basis of philosophical anthropology, when it comes to the social dimension of his thought, I propose defining it as personalistic-national. On the one hand, it is the effect of a clear complementation of universal and widespread

459 S. Kowalczyk, *Człowiek a społeczność. Zarys filozofii społecznej*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2005. pp. 10–80.

460 S. Kowalczyk, *Z problematyki dialogu chrześcijańsko-marksistowskiego*, ODiSS, Warszawa 1977.

461 S. Kowalczyk, *Liberalizm i jego filozofia*, Wydawnictwo UNIA, Katowice 1995.

462 S. Kowalczyk, *Idee filozoficzne postmodernizmu*, POLWEN, Radom 2004.

463 S. Kowalczyk, *Nurty personalizmu. Od Augustyna do Wojtyły*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2010.

464 K. Guzowski, *Posłowie. Stanisław Kowalczyk: personalizm realistyczno-dynamiczny*, in: S. Kowalczyk, *Nurty personalizmu. . .*, p. 236.

content which results from the understanding of the human being with the recognition of the nation as a natural community, and one which is primary with regard to the state.<sup>465</sup> On the other hand, the content which refers to the civilizational situation of the Polish nation and Poles, as well as of other nations in the era of globalization, is treated as contextual conditioning in understanding the human being. This stance, seen in political terms, has nothing to do with nationalism, but is a realistic vision of the presence of values serving the development of man in society. The political order of the state is based on the natural national community, which uses it as a tool to achieve the goal of satisfying human needs.

An idiosyncratic feature of both scholarly and popularizing considerations of the thinker from Lublin is to draw on the whole tradition of Christian thought – from the Bible, through the writings of the Fathers of the Church and official church documents, to the work of contemporary authors. Particularly important from the point of view of Christian philosophy is his pursuit of closing the divide between the tradition of Augustinian focus on subjective human experience and the tradition of Thomistic metaphysical realism. Instead of deepening such an overly simplified opposition, he proposes finding ways to synthesize these positions. This is, according to the scholar, all the more justified that, contrary to popular belief, Saint Augustine was not at all an idealist of a Cartesian type, and in his analyses he began from the fact of thinking, and found the reality of man on three levels of existence: being, life, and thinking. St. Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, although he based his analysis of human existence on the general theory of being, did, however, allow subjectivist approaches.

The area of Kowalczyk's problem-based research concerns the nature, activities, and creations of *homo sapiens*, in a situation of great civilizational and

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465 Kowalczyk unequivocally acknowledges the ontological naturalness of the state as a perfect community. However, in genetic terms, according to him, the primacy of the nation prevails in the world; and the nation cannot be treated only as the biological basis of the state, but above all as a cultural and moral reality that provides the state with basic rules and values. "The complex ontological structure of the nation arises over the centuries, therefore it is a misunderstanding to treat the nation as a result of an ad hoc formal agreement. The nation is a biological community of origin, existing on the native land, its most important material is widely understood culture. That is why Pope John Paul II said: 'The nation is the great community of people who are connected by various binders, but above all, culture. The nation exists «from the culture» and «for the culture».' Material culture is the basis of the daily existence of the nation, while the main material of the nation's community is the mental, moral and religious culture." *Współczesny kryzys ideowo-aksjologiczny*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2011, pp. 57 ff.

political upheavals. In his systematic studies in philosophical anthropology, he focuses both on the historical and ideological profile, as well as on the theoretical and systemic profile. He avoids the simplifications of egocentric individualism and deterministic reductionism, which establish the vision of man as a responsible subject striving to realize his own personal potentiality. On the basis of anthropological findings, Kowalczyk creates a framework for the description of society. In a polemical-critical spirit, he formulates theses which reveal the weaknesses of conceptions aspiring to represent the Hegelian 'end of history' in the historical pursuit of building a socio-political order. A criticism of these proposals, especially regarding their weaknesses in the axiological sphere, is connected, in Kowalczyk's view, with constructive studies which provide understanding of basic values, principles, and manifestations of social life: culture as a form of mental and spiritual development, social justice understood as equal participation in the common good, freedom as self-determination, democracy as deliberative participation, nation as a community of values, postmodernism as a simplification of philosophical and anthropological ideas, politics as a service for the common good, human corporeality as an integral element of the human being. In his studies, the author demonstrates a connection between interdisciplinary analysis and solid methodological discipline. In Kowalczyk's writings, we find references to theology of liberation, processes of political transformation, European integration and globalization. The studies contain a skilful combination of an approach appropriate to philosophical analyses and syntheses, comparative studies, as well as one that makes use of empirical data and theological reflection. The Lublin thinker's scholarship, starting with the inviolable foundation of personal dignity, reflects the turbulent times of change and the most important dilemmas and controversies of the present that are connected with it. Based on the available observation of empirical reality, he subjects the results of his findings to a rational analysis in the perspective of personalism inspired by the evangelical contents of the Church's teaching.<sup>466</sup>

## 2. The notion of a human being

Kowalczyk makes etymological analyses concerning the word 'person' the starting point for the personalistic reflection on society. He derives the concept from the Greek *prosopon*, meaning the mask used by actors during a

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466 A. Jabłoński, *Posłowie*, in: S. Kowalczyk, *Współczesny kryzys ideowo-aksjologiczny*. . . , pp. 193–199.

performance on stage, from Latin *persona*, also pointing to the mask in relation to the actions or the character of a human being, and Hebrew *phaneh*, meaning a figure, a human entity, the subject of action (translated as *prosopon* and *persona*). According to the Lublin personalist, this term developed as part of the discussion on the dogma of the Holy Trinity and the dual nature of Christ – divine and human – especially in the writings of Saint Augustine. As the basic definition of a person, he adopts the articulation of Boethius: “Persona est naturae ractionalis individua substantia.” He decides, however, that it is not sufficient and it requires further development, especially on the basis of the philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, which would allow for taking into account, apart from the attributes of naturalness, rationality, individuality, and substantiality, also the reality of existence, spirituality, subjectivity, non-transferability, self-development, axiological sensitivity, dialogicality, and orientation on social life.<sup>467</sup>

Such an approach brings out the ontological foundation of a person which does not allow for limiting the understanding of the notion of a person to the actualistic and functional interpretation, which is shaped in accordance with the modern and contemporary approach and within which the human person is reduced to a set of acts, experiences, feelings of consciousness, self-awareness, freedom or memory. According to Kowalczyk, the advocates of such anthropological antisubstantialism were J. Locke and D. Hume, as well as A. N. Whitehead and other proponents of ‘process philosophy.’ Their negation of the substantial dimension of the person casts doubt on man’s ability to make decisions and take responsibility for his own actions. The combination of the negative achievements of the current monistic-materialist trends – mechanistic materialism, Marxism, Nietzscheanism and Freudism – led to the proclamation of ‘the end of man’ in contemporary post-modern trends, questioning the existence of human nature, the spiritual dimension of man, freedom of will, consciousness, the needs of humanism.<sup>468</sup>

Following Saint Thomas, the Lublin scholar considers rationality and freedom to be manifestations of the spiritual dimension of a human being. They are, at the same time, basic attributes of a person. In this understanding, the spiritual dimension of a human being is permanent and goes beyond the limits of matter, and this determines the possession of the soul, that is, the subjective self, maintaining ontological and juridical autonomy. Thanks to this, the human

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467 Cf. S. Kowalczyk, *Zarys filozofii człowieka*, Wydawnictwo Diecezjalne, Sandomierz 1990, pp. 198–213.

468 S. Kowalczyk, *Idee filozoficzne postmodernizmu. . .*, pp. 65–75.

person is characterized by autofinalism, which means that human beings are ends in themselves and not means to achieve other goals. Constituting a being in oneself and for oneself, a person cannot be taken as part of a larger whole, but at the same time human beings do not lose their prosocial character. Following Aquinas, Kowalczyk emphasizes a person's individuality – an existence as a structurally and functionally complete being that determines its uniqueness and originality. Clearly, however, he points to the difference between human individuality understood in this way and the approval of egocentrism and egoism, characteristic of sociological and liberal interpretation. Individuality is connected with non-transferability, that is the inability to relinquish one's subjectivity and one's ontic status of being oneself. These attributes are related to the fact that people look for other people, communicate with them and convey to them their own experiences and values.

In developing his own concept of a person, Kowalczyk draws on the tradition of linking Thomism and personalism which can be found in the works of Jacques Maritain. From the French author's point of view, the human person is the subject and goal of action, understood in opposition to both Marxist collectivism and liberalism associated with extreme individualism. Instead, he advocates for an integral view of man as a person, emphasizing the unbreakable connection between corporeality and psycho-mental life based on the authorities of the intellect and free will. The author of *Humanisme integral*, stressing the inalienable dignity and subjectivity of a human being, points to the obligation to create good in the social community.

Properly understood, a human being as a person must, according to Kowalczyk, refer to terms that are synonymous, such as personality. The term 'personality,' understood in the psychological and moral sense, refers to positive or negative manifestations of attitude, lifestyle, internal moral work, an already shaped character of a particular person. If a human being as a person never loses this ontic status and in this sense people are equal to each other, they differ with respect to their personality, which is worked out by a particular individual; it can develop and degenerate. Kowalczyk is positively inclined to the proposal of W. Granat,<sup>469</sup> who distinguishes three facets of human personality – mental (the subjective 'I,' consciousness, psycho-mental properties), ethical (a morally evaluative being) and social (a man in social relations) – and he perceives them

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469 See W. Granat, *Osoba ludzka. Próba definicji*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2006, pp. 169–226.

as different aspects of man as a person. This does not mean, however, that he consents to the 'dismembering' of the human being into isolated ontic sectors.

A holistic view of the human requires taking into account all his aspects, which makes Kowalczyk postulate that perspective should not be limited to the problem of the human being, but it should also include attempts to discover the human's origins and openness to higher values: truth, goodness, beauty, and holiness personified in God. In this approach, while maintaining the methodological autonomy of various approaches, one should skilfully use a multiplicity of forms of cognition – external and internal experience, sensory and intellectual cognition, intuition and conceptual-discursive reflection, awareness and self-awareness. This should be combined, if possible, with connecting the perspectives of humanistic sciences interpreting psycho-mental life, the intentionality of intellectual cognition, boundaries of freedom, axiological sensitivity, inventive creationism, openness to personal-transbiological values, with the perspective of natural sciences discovering the determinants of human life – biological, mental, and social. Such a position is a derivative of the epistemological realism of the Lublin scholar, who treats reality as a cognitive subject independent of man, in opposition to epistemological idealism, which is overly focused on the influence of the subjective self on the conceived reality.<sup>470</sup>

A realistic approach, both in the epistemological and ontological dimension, is regarded by Kowalczyk to be consistent with the need to take into account personal and axiological experience. The former is an experience, characteristic of man, of one's own intellectual power despite biological and physical weakness. Axiological experience is strictly connected with it, making man a creature oriented towards realizing cognitive, moral, aesthetic, ideological, and social values. Therefore, the broad perspective in viewing the human being induces the author to take the side of ontological pluralism and the resultant methodological-scientific, socio-political, pedagogical, cultural, axiological, and ideological pluralism.<sup>471</sup> It allows one to acknowledge the multiplicity and the autonomy of human beings, while at the same time pointing to their common ontic as well as axiological and spiritual nature. Man is a substance, that is, according to the definition of Saint Thomas, a being existing in oneself as one's own subject, and not as a property of other beings.<sup>472</sup> On the one hand, this determines the

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470 S. Kowalczyk, *Teoria poznania*, Wydawnictwo Diecezjalne, Sandomierz 1997, pp. 155–180.

471 S. Kowalczyk, *Metafizyka ogólna*, Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, Lublin 1998, pp. 73–82.

472 *Ibid.*, pp. 89–119.

autonomy and independence of the subject, and, on the other hand, it is the basis for changeable ailments. Consequently, it is possible to combine the variability of external human properties with internal stability that determines one's identity as a species.

A pluralistic vision of the human nature, taking into account the human's substantiality, protects a person's understanding against the deformations of antisubstantialism. This manifests itself in the form of various currents of apersonal and anti-personal anthropology, undermining, in Kowalczyk's opinion, the very sense of speaking about personalism. He regards as erroneous the negations of substantiality due to the dynamic nature of the organic world and the wealth of biocosmic manifestations, made within the framework of various currents of the processual and functional approach that makes use of evolutionism. Realistically understood, man is not a disembodied thought/soul, just as he is not a set of biological and neurological processes.<sup>473</sup>

As a result of his analysis of human corporeality, Kowalczyk believes that already at this level human exceptionality among other animals is expressed. An erect posture, a developed nervous system, a proportionately large brain, the hand structure, and conceptually symbolic language are only a few selected external features that distinguish human beings. The most important thing, however, is man's ability to modify his own organic predispositions to achieve his goals and intentions. People correct their own bodies, heal them, make them instruments in relations with others. The body fulfils, in Kowalczyk's perspective, a number of basic functions in human life, including: epistemological (enables learning about the world), ontological (constitutes the basis of earthly existence), creative (enables passing on life), activating (allows one to act and achieve goals), and social (allows one to interact with others).<sup>474</sup>

Corporality also allows a human being to experience the limitations of one's own existence in the form of experiences of suffering, illness, aging, and, finally, death. According to Kowalczyk, personalistic perspective warns against falling into despair or acknowledging the misery of human existence. Individual painful experiences can gain meaning through a person's moral and religious orientation and they can teach humility, perceiving the needs of other people, proper hierarchy of values, and responsibility in life.<sup>475</sup> From this perspective, also death is

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473 S. Kowalczyk, *Ciało człowieka w refleksji filozoficznej*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2009, pp. 9–122.

474 *Ibid.*, pp. 134–184.

475 S. Kowalczyk, *Podstawy światopoglądu chrześcijańskiego*, Wydawnictwo Wrocławskiej Księgarni Archidiecezjalnej, Wrocław 1986, pp. 103–115.



treated as a natural event inscribed in the human condition; it arouses anxiety due to the destruction of the current status as a person, but also gives hope for immortality because of the immaterial nature of the human mental powers. The inclusion of this dimension of human existence secures man against the absolutization of temporal forms of existence, both in the form of an optimistic call to enjoy life and in the form of pessimistic deprivation of the sense of life of the suffering and terminally ill people.<sup>476</sup>

The thesis about human immortality can only be maintained if we acknowledge the real existence of the human soul. Kowalczyk is aware of the difficulties this category poses in the era of modern neurological and psychological research. Therefore, he does not avoid recognizing the abundant psychological and phenomenological content concerning the human psyche. A special role here is played by the characteristics of different varieties of consciousness.<sup>477</sup> The most significant dimension of consciousness is self-awareness, or the ability to get to know oneself in the form of introspection and retrospection. Man subjects his own sequence of experiences, acts, experiences or decisions to self-reflection, but he does so in the context of understanding the outside world. Human self-knowledge does not constitute a detachment from reality, but it is a direct cognition of the existence of the soul and an indirect recognition of its immaterial nature. The immaterial "I" is the basis for the experience of consciousness, but it is consciousness that reveals and constitutes ontically the personal "I" of man as the decision-maker of one's acts, especially axiological and ethical ones. This reflection situates Kowalczyk between the Augustinian and Thomistic traditions and develops towards a modern synthesis of the phenomenology and metaphysics of man:

The output of perennial philosophy – inspired primarily by Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas, can be enriched . . . – with a philosophical reflection of the present day. This is not, of course, about an artificial amalgam, but about a selective use and incorporation

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476 "The basic existential problem of every human being is the sense of his life and the meaning of death. This problem cannot be solved rationally, negating the individual immortality of man. The death of the body is an obvious and inevitable fact, but it is not tantamount to the total and definitive annihilation of the human person. The body has many important functions in human life, but it performs its tasks as a manifestation of its internal-personal 'I'. The richness and mystery of human corporeality are related to the transmaterial dimension of man, his psychological and mental life and the sphere of higher values, realized only in the world of people." S. Kowalczyk, *Ciało człowieka w refleksji filozoficznej*. . . , p. 195.

477 S. Kowalczyk, *Zarys filozofii człowieka*. . . , pp. 55–72.

of the threads of modern and contemporary philosophy into the classical philosophy of man. Thomism allows a global, systemic presentation of the concept of a human person, Augustinism makes it possible to capture man in his dynamics and existential anxiety; contemporary philosophy brings objective and axiological perspective. The philosophy of being and the philosophy of the subject, as confirmed by the attempts made, can complement each other.<sup>478</sup>

A synthetic approach to man which adopts a realistic and pluralistic perspective allows one to go beyond the disputes between monism and dualism. In the conception proposed by the Lublin scholar, the positions of materialistic monism (man is a biological body) and idealistic spiritualist monism (man is the soul) are both unequivocally unacceptable. Personalism is a realistic-existential perception of man in all his dimensions, spiritual, but also material-vital. He avoids all the Manicheist divisions that make the source of evil out of matter and body, treating them as ontic good that can be misused. Thus, man is never a mere patchwork of parallel and occasional bodily and psycho-mental processes, synchronized in one mechanism. Invoking, among others, the findings of Saint Thomas, Kowalczyk recognizes in humans two ontically different aspects of being with regard to human nature – a spiritualized body and an embodied human spirit.

The soul is a form which organizes the body, so there is nothing in man that is purely material and carnal. Biological and vegetative life is permeated by the influence of the inner 'I' associated with the soul and its talents. At the same time, man is not pure spirit (*anima separata*); therefore, his mental-spiritual sphere is connected with the somatic-biological sphere. The influence of the body, in the ontological aspect, is beneficial for the functioning of the soul. . . . The influence of the soul is realised by means of the vital force, in the circle of influence of which the whole of the human body is located.<sup>479</sup>

The best expression of the interaction of the body and soul is language, which, as a kind of sound, is not only a physical expression of experienced emotions or a signal of changes in the environment, but also a symbolic transmission of meanings. The symbolic-conceptual nature of language is the consequence of man having autonomous mental powers. In a parallel way, all forms of human activity – from somatic-organic to intellectual-conceptual – are expressed through it. Language also makes it possible to expand one's personal life by entering into relationships with other people. This is one of the manifestations of

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478 *Ibid.*, p. 6.

479 *Ibid.*, p. 225.

the personalistic vision of the formation of society as the opening of the human "I" to the outside world.<sup>480</sup>

### 3. From an individual to society

One of the basic ontological assumptions of personalism in Kowalczyk's approach is the claim that man is by nature a social being; even though he exists as a being "in-oneself," he is also a "being-to-another." This thesis remains in clear contradiction to, on the one hand, collectivism and, on the other, egocentric individualism. Collectivism reduces the understanding of the origin and nature of man to social relations and forces, instrumentalizing and losing human subjectivity, up until conditions are created typical of a totalitarian model of socio-political life. Individualism, particularly in its extreme forms, sees only the "external-biological" relationship of man with society in categories of individual-species. Personalism emphasizes that man, possessing substantial self-identity, by his very nature needs another human being, in the sense of the 'pre-phenomenon' of human socialization which is love.

Love by its very nature – as Kowalczyk claims – is dialogic and alterocentric, that is, directed at other people. Thus, it is prosocial. Love, despite all the limitations of human existence, is the only lasting foundation of social life in every dimension: family, neighbourly, professional, socio-national, state and international. Love is a necessary condition for the normal functioning of smaller and larger communities, it is also their calling and meaning.<sup>481</sup>

Love as the basis of social life is realized in marriage and family. Marriage, as a community of persons and values, seeks fulfilment in itself, but it also seeks promulgation and multiplication by having children. The family is the basic circle of life in which human personality traits and interpersonal relationships are best developed, being a prototype for all social relations. It is on this basis that the family of families, or the nation, develops. Kowalczyk, referring to the classic formula of the Primate of the Millennium, undermines all ontologies that eliminate the genetic precedence of individual people in relation to society, but also the treatment of the latter as a mere sum of individuals.<sup>482</sup> Natural communities such

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480 "Language grows out of the very heart of human being, it is the expression of his personality and, simultaneously, its development. Homo sapiens is a being capable of expressing linguistically the recognized truth and of making contact with other people in terms of the transfer of meaning," Ibid., p. 79.

481 S. Kowalczyk, *Człowiek a społeczność*. . . , p. 200.

482 "The family is not just a quantitative sum of human individuals, but a new ontological quality – a biological and spiritual community of people. Similarly, a nation is not only

as the family and the nation allow us to see the human person as transcending society, but also immanent towards it. It seems that the personalistic understanding of society primarily as a derivative of relationships based on love is a response to the emergence of modern categories of the abstract human individual and nation state.

The classical understanding of man as a member of a given community (*polis, respublica*) allowed, without detriment to his nature (*zoon politicon*), to associate physical and spiritual development with the development of a given secular and later religious and ecclesial community. However, when a human being began to be understood in an individualistic-nominalist way, all his subordination to society began to be treated as a threat to his freedom. Modernity has also developed a model of subordinating the individual to the nation state as a remedy for regaining its civilizational progress in the conditions of the power of the people. Personalism defends the autonomy of a human as a person who exists within a given community, grows above it, with his thought, will and activity. "A person is the addressee of social decisions, but he is not their passive object or, even less so, a tool in their implementation."<sup>483</sup> In relationships based on love, people engage both in the spiritual and physical dimensions, they give themselves over to other people, but also experience a fullness of devotion from them. Therefore, family and national communities understood to be connecting people on the basis of love, do so in terms of their being as a species, but also in terms of spiritual and personal being.

Family and national communities are, according to Kowalczyk, neither eternal nor immutable, but they constitute developed civilizational forms of protecting the social order from anarchist-nihilist individualism and totalitarian-criminal

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a mathematical sum of families, but a 'family of families' – a community containing various dimensions: biological, economic, territorial, cultural, ideological, usually also religious. A human being needs a family, but subsequently – for the fullness of his development – he also needs a nation. From the family, he receives biological life, upbringing and the basics of moral and spiritual culture. It is to the nation that people owe such values as: language, ethnic consciousness, literary and artistic culture, historical memory, a sense of an emotional bond with a great community, customs, education, ethos, etc. Family and nation are two basic natural communities without which a person could not exist and function as a personal subject, knowing his place in social life. The family is therefore a natural and lasting foundation of the nation." S. Kowalczyk, *Naród, państwo, Europa. Z problematyki filozofii narodu*, POLWEN, Radom 2003, pp. 80 ff.

483 S. Kowalczyk, *Człowiek a społeczność*. . . , p. 131.

holism. The author of *Naród, państwo, Europa* [Nation, State, and Europe] refers to F. Koneczny, who considers monogamous marriage, family and nation to be characteristic features of Latin civilization, created thanks to the Catholic Church. Even if this thesis may seem controversial, “all his reflections that show the relationship of Catholicism with the category of the nation”<sup>484</sup> must be regarded as accurate. In this tradition, granting a special position to the family and the nation in the social structure does not translate into a threat of tribalism, ethnocentrism, nationalism, or chauvinism.<sup>485</sup> However, love for one’s own family (patrimony) and nation (homeland) is most desirable for socio-cultural development.<sup>486</sup> The nation-state that grew out of these roots, considered from the axiological-normative perspective,<sup>487</sup> is characterized not only by the desirable care for the socio-economic and cultural interests of the nation, but also by the attachment to the welfare of all humanity. It is impossible to build a supranational community without respect for the common good, and the best school of action for its benefit is the development of one’s own nation state.

In Kowalczyk’s writings we find far-reaching support for national ideas, but understood in the spirit of cultural-civilizational universality, not of ethnic particularisms. This allows for a complementary treatment of both the nation

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484 S. Kowalczyk, *Naród, państwo, Europa*. . . , p. 87.

485 “The attitude of the Catholic Church, critical of the absolutization of the nation, is in contrast to the attitude of The Eastern Orthodox Church and Protestantism. Protestantism undoubtedly contributed to German and English nationalism, and Orthodoxy is permanently connected with the nationalism of those countries in which the majority of people profess this faith. Catholicism is universal by nature, although it also approves of and awakens national consciousness.” *Ibid.*, p. 147.

486 “The problems of the nation and the homeland are closely related. The term ‘homeland’ is genetically derived from the family circle (Latin ‘patria’ from ‘pater’); the homeland is therefore a widely understood family – a person’s lineage. In the Middle Ages the following terms were used interchangeably: homeland, commonwealth (*respublika*), state (*civitas*), kingdom (*regnum*), country (*regio*), family (*gens*).” S. Kowalczyk, *Człowiek a społeczność*. . . , p. 280.

487 Kowalczyk distinguishes at least two meanings of the “nation state” – ontological and axiological-normative. “In the first case, it is simply about the fact that the state is homogenous in terms of population, i.e. it does not have national minorities of major national significance. . . . A nation state understood in the axiological-normative sense is a more or less nationalist state, because the most important institutions of the country – political, cultural, economic, legal, etc. – are oriented towards the welfare of the dominant ethnic group, that is, one nation.” *Naród, państwo, Europa*. . . , p. 98.

and the state, and their existence can be compared to the existential structure of a human being.

The nation is the equivalent of the soul, whereas the state reminds the human body. The disparity of their character affects the diversity of tasks and goals. The goals of the nation are: the preservation of their own culture, the continuation of historical traditions, the defence and dissemination of ethical norms, the knowledge of language, the consolidation of ethnic 'personality.' The aim of the state is to preserve the independence of the country and the integrity of its territory, to enforce social unity and order, to care for the economic well-being of citizens, to protect them against the aspirations of greedy neighbours, to develop education and science, to formulate and protect fair laws, to create a democracy.<sup>488</sup>

In the personalistic conception of S. Kowalczyk, anthropological and ontological assumptions are closely related to moral and social values and criteria. Moral norms and the rules of social life are considered to have been determined by the ontological structure of the human-person. It is this structure that is the direct source of the principles of respect for the universal and inalienable dignity, which requires due respect for human economic, social, cultural, and political rights. It is bound in an inseparable way with the principle of solidarity, indicating the need to create social common good in the spirit of kindness, brotherhood, and love. According to Kowalczyk, Christian personalism particularly emphasizes the role of love in social life, and human freedom<sup>489</sup> and justice, especially in a social sense,<sup>490</sup> are its complement and confirmation. Only a free person can creatively struggle with reality by multiplying goods whose just distribution makes them joint guarantors of human development.

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488 Ibid., p. 115. Sustaining an analogous understanding of the nation and the state to the human soul and body, Kowalczyk also points to the physical and spiritual dimension of the nation itself as part of the personalistic approach: "This understanding of the nation points to two elements that can be defined as material-objective and cultural-subjective. The former, constituting its 'body,' are: territory, a numerically large team of people and usually the institution of the state. The 'spirit' of the nation is: language and literature, science and philosophy, history and tradition, ethos and specific personality, culture and religion." *Współczesny kryzys ideowo-aksjologiczny*. . . , p. 57.

489 S. Kowalczyk, *Wolność naturą i prawem człowieka. Indywidualny i społeczny wymiar wolności*, Wydawnictwo Diecezjalne, Sandomierz 2000.

490 S. Kowalczyk, *Idea sprawiedliwości społecznej a myśl chrześcijańska*, Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, Lublin 1998, pp. 199–206.

#### 4. The values and rules of social life

In the modern world, freedom is the most desirable socio-political value. The understanding of freedom is of paramount importance, because history knows cases in which “liberté” written on a banner was in practice accompanied by unprecedented terror. The greatest crimes were motivated by the liberation of particular individuals, social groups, or entire communities from oppression, poverty, and injustice. Therefore, the achievement of freedom, which for Kowalczyk is human nature, vocation, a duty and a right,<sup>491</sup> should be situated in the context of the structure, nature, possibilities, duties, goals, tasks, and values of the human person. Freedom then has the character of autodeterminism seen in opposition to determinism and indeterminism.<sup>492</sup> Determinism sees freedom as a successfully rationalized (conscious, recognized) necessity that determines the fate of the world and man regardless of human will. Its negation is indeterminism, in which human will is treated as the main creative force in the order of the world.

Consistently understood, determinism excludes freedom, blurring the difference between the human person and the material world. Indeterminism differs from the realities of everyday life and the achievements of natural sciences. An appropriate solution is the theory of autodeterminism, which on the one hand acknowledges the free choice of man, and on the other hand realistically perceives restrictions on freedom.<sup>493</sup>

Autodeterminism sees multiple connections of man with the surrounding nature and human community, and at the same time recognizes his spontaneity, independence, and creativity in action. Man remains a free agent of his own actions in terms of the choice of goals and decisions about their implementation, while in the field of the techniques of their realization, he depends on the laws of nature and life circumstances. “The theory of autodeterminism acknowledges the freedom and subjectivity of the human person, but at the same time confirms his bond to the world of nature and society.”<sup>494</sup>

A better understanding of freedom in the spirit of autodeterminism does not mean, according to Kowalczyk, that freedom loses the character of the mystery of man as a person still remaining beyond the possibility of being closed within the boundaries of rational-speculative schemes. Therefore, all attempts to replace

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491 S. Kowalczyk, *Wolność naturą i prawem człowieka*. . . , pp. 9–94.

492 S. Kowalczyk, *Filozofia wolności. Rys historyczny*, Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, Lublin 1999.

493 S. Kowalczyk, *Wolność naturą i prawem człowieka*. . . , p. 39.

494 *Ibid.*, p. 40.

the sense of internal autonomy, individual responsibility, and internal-moral activity with various kinds of laws and rules, freedom principles derived from the order of nature, individual psyche, or society are contrary to the notion of freedom. Freedom requires the internal moral activity of a person, which would transcend his various conditions, but at the same time he must take into account external realities, especially the presence of another human being.<sup>495</sup> The right to individual freedom implies the same right of other people, because these rights are mutually conditional. The unquestionable right to freedom in social life cannot be understood in the maximal-egocentric sense and interfere with the common good of a given community.<sup>496</sup>

The personalistic approach to freedom indicates its close connection with the sphere of values: truth, moral good, beauty, justice, solidarity, religious faith, patriotism, etc. The connection between freedom and these values is expressed especially in creative human activity. Then, the apparent contradiction between the freedom of the individual and the claim of other subjects to freedom disappears. What ultimately counts is the contribution of each person to giving meaning to their own lives, as well as improving the fate of others. Voluntary, conscious and planned actions are, according to Kowalczyk, the basis of human work and it is in work that the vocation of man as an individual and a social person is fulfilled. Kowalczyk refers to the encyclical *Laborem exercens*: "As a person, man is therefore the subject of work."<sup>497</sup> Man as homo sapiens is also homo artifex, finalizing the creative act of God by transforming the earth by multiplying its goods – satisfying human needs and guaranteeing self-fulfilment. Work is also a tool for communication between people from different groups, backgrounds, or generations, which generates solidarity, partnership, and shared responsibility. The experience of solidarity that emerges from working together often initiates lasting relationships of friendship and mutual respect among people. On the other hand, perversions in the form of the absolutization of work lead to enslavement, violation of consciences, compulsion, and instrumental treatment of man – the *Arbeit macht frei* – of a concentration camp or a gulag.<sup>498</sup>

Work contributes to enrichment, or at least to protection from poverty, of individuals and entire communities, which is the basis for properly understood

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495 Ibid., pp. 52–83.

496 Ibid., pp. 95–198.

497 John Paul II, *Laborem exercens*, in: *Encykliki Ojca Świętego Jana Pawła II*, vol. I, Wydawnictwo Św. Stanisława B.M. Archidiecezji Krakowskiej, M, Kraków 1996, sec. 6.

498 S. Kowalczyk, *Zarys filozofii człowieka*. . . , pp. 134–139.



entrepreneurship. However, it is not about placing it above capital and siding with socialist fancies against liberalism, but about the indication of threats stemming from both these ideologies, which, according to Kowalczyk, are a consequence of the detachment of economics from ethics, economy from morality. It is a wider question of the presence of morality in public life, in this case sharply revealing the conflict between immediate profits and business on the one hand, and values and principles on the other. This does not mean, according to Kowalczyk, that economic activity is contaminated with evil, and even more so realism and rationality cannot be displaced from economic decisions in favour of idle moralizing. Economic activity is a form of a person's involvement, although in various roles which often occur in one man: of an inventor, originator, investor, producer, employee, seller, consumer, etc. These roles cannot be separated from one another and the associated forms of economic activity cannot be separated as well – technical invention, investment (capital), production, labour, trade and consumption (demand). All of them, however, should result from Christian ethics, the standards of which determine the rules of conduct based on the foundation of the family and private property being the effect of human work. Invoking objective market laws cannot be an argument against building the economy on moral grounds, because these laws are only the result of the choice of the material sphere as primary in relation to the moral and spiritual sphere of man.

Economic development is one of the measurable determinants of activity for the common good. According to Kowalczyk, this function can only be performed in accordance with the personalistic criterion, which dictates that one should treat man as an end in himself and never as a means to an end. The real capital that should underlie economic development serving the common good should be the development of more complex and demanding forms of work, based on professionalism, education, solidity, and integrity. For this purpose, it is necessary to take into account the basic principle of justice, according to which everyone should be given what is rightfully theirs. From the point of view of Kowalczyk's personalism, the emphasis placed on the social dimension of justice is quite specific. He believes that it is necessary to include, in addition to legal, exchangeable and distributive justice, also social justice, whose specific feature is "the opposition to various forms of economic exploitation and social harm. The motive for this is the sense of universal brotherhood (resulting from the Christian idea of love of one's neighbour), whose natural consequence is the need for social solidarity. . . . Its specificity is not limited to overcoming existing tensions and cancelling social harm, but also to realize economic and social

progress.”<sup>499</sup> This justice is connected, above all, with the task of the state in relation to citizens, especially those who are less capable of coping independently in society, for whom it is necessary to look for solutions that guarantee basic economic equality.

Its main postulates are: the protection of workers’ social rights, the rights to work and just pay, pensions, access to knowledge and culture, participation in the economic benefits of the workplace.<sup>500</sup>

Social justice expresses the most basic goal of every community understood in a personalistic manner, which is the pursuit of the common good. This good constitutes the basic goal and at the same time the formal cause of human societies. It is realised both in universal human terms, and in terms of specific state communities, as it has an internal and external element. The former is of an ontological and axiological nature and it is a set of values that enables the development of man as a person. The latter is of a socio-institutional nature and it refers to the structures and institutions enabling this development. The common good as the protection of the human person and the values that enable his harmonious development is actualised in the dictates of love. Therefore, the implementation of its assumptions cannot undermine the dignity of the human person and requires the selection of appropriate structural and institutional measures, especially at the level of the functioning of the state.<sup>501</sup>

## 5. The political and systemic order in society

In the personalistic perspective of Kowalczyk, the political and systemic order of society depends primarily on the goal that it is supposed to pursue. If the goal is the common good understood as the creation of values and conditions for the full personal development of a human being, then according to the findings of the Greco-Roman and Christian classics, the state can perform this function. The state is a perfect and complete community, in the sense that it is self-sufficient in meeting the developmental needs of its own citizens, and it also consists of smaller communities. Thus understood, the state is, according to Kowalczyk,

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499 S. Kowalczyk, *Idea sprawiedliwości społecznej a myśl chrześcijańska*. . . , p. 149.

500 S. Kowalczyk, *Współczesny kryzys ideowo-aksjologiczny*. . . , p. 55.

501 S. Kowalczyk, *Człowiek a społeczność*. . . , pp. 232–239. Therefore, both the good of the community in a collectivist sense, as well as the individualistically understood good of individuals should be regarded as contrary to the common good.

a natural creation;<sup>502</sup> it is the best response to human needs resulting from one's attributes as a person – rationality, autonomy, consciousness, good, etc. The state realizes its functions primarily as a tool in the hands of society/nation while maintaining the principle of solidarity and subsidiarity. They do not limit the functions of the state to any minimum, nor do they extend it beyond the necessary requirements guaranteeing citizens the achievement of their own goals and the satisfaction of their needs.<sup>503</sup>

From a personalistic point of view, democracy is the most desired systemic solution. Kowalczyk is aware of the fact that both in classical and in modern concepts of the socio-political order, democracy has not been treated as the best solution, often giving way to the republican postulate of a mixed system or to the communitarian undermining of the universality of democratic procedures and institutions. It seems, however, that in such a case, we are dealing either with disappointment with people and their ability to self-govern, and the fear of imposing the rule of majority, or with seeking opportunities to improve the democratic order through associating it with higher values and aristocratic environments that represent them, or with a postulate of a return to the original communities guided by local principles and values. In these solutions we are dealing with Platonic distrust of the average man locked in chains inside a cave or in a utopian community that completely regulates interpersonal relations. The above positions are the result of disappointment with the weaknesses of democracy, especially in its liberal-procedural variety.<sup>504</sup> In the opinion of Kowalczyk,

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502 Kowalczyk criticizes the individualist-counteractualistic conceptions of the state, especially those of Hobbes and Rousseau, as well as the collectivist conceptions of Hegel and Marx.

503 “The personalistic-communal conception of the state is opposed to both its absolutization and minimization. A properly functioning state should be neither a welfare state, nor a neutral state, indifferent to the fate of citizens who found themselves, for various reasons, in difficult situations. Personalism adopts the concept of an auxiliary state, that is, one respecting the subjectivity of individuals and, at the same time, supporting their multidirectional activity.” S. Kowalczyk, *Zarys filozofii polityki*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2008, p. 120.

504 “Liberal democracy is of a formal and procedural character, which in consequence often leads to decisions that harm the good of man as a person. Democracy is not an end in itself, but a means to ensure the protection and comprehensive development of a human being. This goal is not met if it authoritatively distances itself from transeconomic values – including moral, national-patriotic ideological and religious values. Democracy is for people, not the other way round. It serves the man authentically only when it protects his physical and mental-spiritual life. Social personalism, similarly to communitarianism and republicanism, proposes a personal-communal

a democracy understood in personalistic terms should be the response to the failings of democracy. Approached in this manner, it accepts

human rights and the need to distinguish three types of power in the state community, but also postulates other principles of political life: personalism, the common good, and respect for moral norms. What really distinguishes personalistic democracy from liberal democracy is the rejection of the thesis about the axiological neutrality of the state and the interpretation of the political society as a community. Personalistic democracy is thus a community democracy, which is why it combines freedom with ethical responsibility.<sup>505</sup>

Therefore, Kowalczyk proposes that instead of undermining the value of democracy, axiological character should be given to it, so that it is not only a set of procedures and institutions, but so that it also co-creates bonds based on values. From various historically developed models of democracy, the most appropriate for modern nation states is a parliamentary democracy based on civil society. It is then not only of representative character but also of participative one.<sup>506</sup> The rules of social coexistence, the goals pursued and the measures adopted to implement them are settled not only by the quantitatively understood will of the majority, but they also take into account the criteria of good and truth which prevail in a given community.

Democratic power needs both support and authority. This authority cannot be limited to the legitimization of bureaucracy resulting from the legality of the exercised power. It is necessary to supplement it with traditional and charismatic elements – reason of state, civil courage, autonomy, protection of memory and truth. Authority in modern states is the ability to draw on scientific knowledge (*logos*) used for efficient governance (*ethos*). However, being guided by knowledge cannot be reduced to the data of common sense (*doxa*, *public opinion*) or to the data from natural and technical sciences. Knowledge must arise from

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democracy based on higher values: truth, goodness, justice, solidarity.” S. Kowalczyk, *Współczesny kryzys ideowo-aksjologiczny*. . . , p. 52.

505 S. Kowalczyk, *U podstaw demokracji. Zagadnienia aksjologiczne*, Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, Lublin 2001.

506 “Social personalism prefers the model of a democratic state, but democracy can be twofold: representative and participative. Representative democracy is realized through participation in parliamentary elections and possibly plebiscites. Such a kind of political democracy is indispensable, but not sufficient. What is also necessary is participatory democracy, which is implemented through various types of local governments. The latter form of democracy is continuous, and it is not a one-off and purely formal act.” *Ibid.*, pp. 171 ff.

absolute truth, because otherwise it is deprived of imagination and is governed by the predictability of instrumental-technical or even irrational solutions. It can quickly turn out to be incapable of realizing any of the goals that the state is created for, and therefore it naturally loses its validity. Every authority should be exercised in a responsible manner, which means: “1. excellent recognition of the situation, 2. honest decision-making and possible use of force. . . . Power and authority should be integrated with each other, their separation leads to the deformation of political structures. Authority without power is limited in its social influence, power without moral authority transforms into a dictatorship.”<sup>507</sup> Power which possesses authority, whether it is state-level or local government, besides managing, deciding, representing or leading, is also able to build consensus, co-create civic identity, recognize people’s real needs, serve as an example of ethical behaviour and excellence in public service, and create strong networks of relationships and social ties.

One of the sources of authority is the reliance on Christian values and compliance with the orders of the Catholic Church. Analysing the personalistic assumptions about the relationship between the state and religion, and especially between the state and the Church, Kowalczyk points to the rational need for acknowledging their ontological and functional distinctiveness in the socio-political dimension. However, this distinctiveness cannot entail the elimination of religion from public life,<sup>508</sup> or its isolation or deprivation of any influence on society. Therefore, the atheistic and secular model of separating the state from religion and the Church takes negative forms that seek to eliminate the latter from social life. On the other hand, the model of cooperation which uses the content developed within religion to give meaning to and to define the goals of many spheres of life realized in micro and macro societies should be considered optimal. Political engagement understood as concern for the common good not only allows, but also demands the involvement of believers and Church leaders. “A special area of cooperation between the Church and the state is the activity of the Catholic laity: social, scientific, charitable, pedagogical in families and in education, as well as public and political.”<sup>509</sup>

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507 S. Kowalczyk, *Człowiek a społeczność*. . . , p. 248.

508 “Speaking of a secular state, one should distinguish between its two models: moderate and extreme. [. . .] The latter model of the secularism of the state is extreme and therefore controversial, because the slogan of the secularism of public life is aimed at completely eliminating religion from public life. This model has two versions: Marxist and Libertine.” S. Kowalczyk, *Zarys filozofii polityki*. . . , pp. 160. ff.

509 *Ibid.*, p. 166.

Kowalczyk seems to treat developing positive models of cooperation between the Church and the state as a school of realistic solutions in the sphere of international cooperation. Not accidentally, in his two most synthetic and comprehensive studies of socio-political thought, he places international issues after the findings regarding the place of religion in social life and in the state-church relationship. Such a placement of these considerations has an ideological meaning and shows the international plane in the context of Christian universality and the universality of the Catholic Church. It also has an ontological and political significance due to pointing to the type of relations between nations and states, understood as cooperation of sovereign entities. The determinant of their cooperation is the natural law, expressed in transnational legal constructs such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Charter or the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Kowalczyk regards this as a manifestation of the cultural and civilizational contribution of the Catholic Church<sup>510</sup> to the development of the “international community,” “universal public authority,” “universal world authority,” which avoids the threat of crypto-totalitarian globalization” “Social personalism and the axiology of Christian inspiration can be very useful in the humanization of the globalization process. It is a challenge for the ruling elites which requires responsibility for the fate of individuals and societies.”<sup>511</sup>

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Stanisław Kowalczyk's personalistic conception of society allows for a coherent, methodologically correct, and convincing argument in favour of the universalist dimension of social life resulting from natural law and the common good, all of which refer to personal human dignity. At the same time, it is a conception that highlights the rooting of a man in the national community, which creates conditions for his full personal development under certain historical conditions. Contrary to frequently adopted contemporary socio-cultural attitudes which proclaim modernity at the expense of what is traditional, cultural and social globalization at the expense of the national, and progress at the expense of the religious, Kowalczyk shows the deep meaning of tradition, nation, and religion for the human person. In his view, they also mean a call to struggle creatively with reality, leading to the improvement of human fate according to the will of the only rightful sovereign of humanity – God.

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510 “What is the role of the Church in the process of constructing a universal human community? Christianity is by nature a spiritual community of all peoples. The evangelical command to love one's neighbor is the basis of the idea of universal brotherhood and international solidarity.” S. Kowalczyk, *Człowiek a społeczność*. . . , p. 311.

511 S. Kowalczyk, *Współczesny kryzys ideowo-aksjologiczny*. . . , p. 68.

## V. ON THE SOCIAL QUESTION OF TODAY: JANUSZ MARIAŃSKI'S PERSPECTIVE ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING (*Edward Balawajder*)

The scholarly output of Janusz Mariański is concerned not only with the questions of the leading disciplines he practises, namely the sociology of religion and sociology of morality. Mariański's works also address the issues of Catholic social teaching, and he has had numerous significant scientific and research achievements in this area. These include: a book that was ground-breaking in Poland, "*Struktury grzechu*" w ocenie społecznego nauczania Kościoła ["The structures of sin" in the view of the social teaching of the Church] (1998), equally valuable publications such as: *Kościół a współczesne problemy społeczno-moralne* [The Church and the contemporary socio-moral problems] (1992); *Mieć czy być? Konsumizm jako styl życia – wyzwaniem dla Kościoła* [To have or to be? Consumerism as a lifestyle – a challenge for the Church] (1996); *Kościół katolicki w Polsce a życie społeczne. Studium socjologiczno-pastoralne* [The Catholic Church in Poland and social life. A sociological and pastoral study] (2005); *Spółczesność i moralność. Studia z katolickiej nauki społecznej i socjologii moralności* [Society and morality. Studies in Catholic social teaching and sociology of morality] (2008), as well as dozens of academic articles published in Polish and foreign journals.

In his works in the field of Catholic social teaching, covering many various topics, we find such issues as fundamental values, socio-moral order, democracy and democratic order, the media and social communication, free market and social market economy, protection of the environment and "human ecology," the mass media and new information technologies. The aim of this study is to present them, generally discussing selected thematic sequences. It does not aspire to demonstrate the whole of Janusz Mariański's academic output, let alone to assess it in the perspective defined in the title of the article.

The category of "the social question" is understood as a reference to significant problems of public life, social relations and structures, critical situations in the lives of individuals and societies – and at the same time it indicates the basic principles of solving them, taking into account the dignity of the human person, their rights, and the requirements of the common good.<sup>512</sup> The existing problems

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512 P. Nitecki, "Kwestia społeczna," in: *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. X, Wydawnictwo TN KUL, Lublin 2004, p. 296.

are manifested by the clear delay of positive changes in morality in comparison with the material achievements of civilizational and technical progress, as well as of cultural development. Hence the important and fundamental question: how can these disproportions be reduced to dimensions that can be approved and accepted?<sup>513</sup>

## 1. Sociology and Catholic social teaching

The extent of strictly sociological interests of Janusz Mariański indirectly affected the wide range of issues addressed in his works in the field of Catholic social teaching. It should be strongly emphasized that he consistently guards the distinctive theoretical and methodological status of the disciplines he practises. This does not mean that he excludes the possibility of cooperation between sociology and Catholic social teaching; quite the contrary. It is, in his opinion, all the more indispensable in the face of challenges arising from the wide and complex context of the radical socio-cultural change within which ethical views, world views, value assessments, and lifestyles of many people are shaped and constantly changing. “In the existing state of affairs, do sociologists, including sociologists of morality, have the right to think about the idea of <a good society> and ways leading to its implementation? Is the sociology that is seen as <close to people> to be limited only to description and explanation, without the function of supporting people in their attempts to furnish ‘the common home’ as their dignity requires it?”<sup>514</sup>

Mariański seeks the answers to such questions in the belief that sociology can not only exceed the limitations of axiologically neutral science, but also indicate the desired (expected) future states together with the means leading to them. Sociology, he notes, is not the only interpreter of moral life, because explaining this phenomenon in the light of only one of many sciences would be reductionism that Mariański does not accept. He is aware that the findings of sociology are never final; they are often somewhat provisional in nature and as such they can be improved.<sup>515</sup> Sociology as a science tries to discover certain social

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513 J. Mariański, “Odnowa moralna – podstawą ładu społecznego. Od *Rerum novarum* do *Sollicitudo rei socialis*,” *Roczniki Nauk Społecznych* 1991–1992, no. 1, pp. 27 ff.

514 J. Mariański, *Społeczeństwo i moralność. Studia z katolickiej nauki społecznej i socjologii moralności*, Biblos, Tarnów 2008, p. 13.

515 J. Mariański, “Socjologia moralności w służbie społeczeństwa,” in: *Socjologia jako służba społeczna. Pamięci Władysława Kwaśniewicza*, eds. K. Gorlach [et al.], Wydawnictwo UJ, Kraków 2007, p. 31.



(legal) regularities that allow to explain reality. Since neither the sociologist nor sociological theories are normative for this reality, he or she may, though does not have to, employ normative sciences, including – as Mariański himself does – Catholic social teaching. In this way, he goes beyond the sociological description, “balancing” between sociology and Catholic social teaching, being aware that the dialogue of both these disciplines is difficult and sometimes dangerous, resulting, for example, in an accusation of ideologization of sociology.<sup>516</sup>

How, then, should we treat the social teaching of the Church: as a separate “topic” or as a “horizon”? For Pierpaolo Donati, it is both “the former” and “the latter,” so – in his opinion – there is no need to choose. It is right and legitimate to take into account both points of view. The Church’s social teaching is itself a scientific discipline essentially observing and evaluating social reality from a specific, theological-moral point of view. Mariański seems to share the view of the Italian scholar, who maintains that it is a holistic vision and a cultural “horizon,” a tradition that is renewing itself and developing.<sup>517</sup> As a separate discipline, Catholic social teaching offers its own kind of knowledge, and, as the Italian scholar notes, a sociologist cannot and should not believe the truth of that knowledge *a priori*, but neither can he or she forget about it. Otherwise, his or her thinking would find itself in an inconsistent and inadequate hermeneutic context characteristic of sociological analysis. Mariański similarly maintains that normative criteria cannot be ultimately sociologically justified.

An interest in Catholic-social thought began to appear in the works of Janusz Mariański at the beginning of the 1990s, which does not mean that it had not existed before. It can be assumed that its systematic and creative development was the result of two circumstances, namely the hundredth anniversary of the publication of Leo XIII’s encyclical *Rerum novarum*, as well as the publication of John Paul II’s *Centesimus annus* (1991), which refers to the former, and the upheaval of 1989, which initiated the political and systemic changes in Poland. The social thought of John Paul II became the subject of careful analysis, clearly confirming the social evolution of the Church’s social teaching from an objective (structural) to subjective (personalistic) orientation, initiated by *Vaticanum secundum*.

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516 J. Mariański, *Kościół katolicki w Polsce a życie społeczne. Studium socjologiczno-pastoralne*, Wydawnictwo Gaudium, Lublin 2005, p. 205.

517 P. Donati, *Nauka społeczna Kościoła i socjologia*, „Społeczeństwo” 1995, no. 5, pp. 393 ff.

It is worth mentioning that the first question addressed by Mariański in this period was the category of truth and its role in social life,<sup>518</sup> which is quite symptomatic, as the social teaching of the Church considers it the “mirror” of freedom. This is the value to which Mariański devoted relatively a lot of space.

Mariański came across Catholic social teaching already during his philosophical and theological studies at the Płock Seminary. He developed and consolidated his interest in the subject during his studies at the Catholic University of Lublin (1965–1970), where he met, among others, Czesław Strzeszewski (1903–1999), the creator of the Lublin school of Catholic social teaching (social personalism), and Józef Majka (1918–1998), its co-creator. They both made a historical contribution to the development of the methodological order of this discipline in Poland, whose existence at that time was not noticed at all in numerous various environments, including the church. The few authors who did basically linked its genesis exclusively to the “social question” (the question of the working class) in the version of Leo XIII, limiting themselves to the historical perspective. Mariański, along with a group of students of the above-mentioned Masters, gradually crossed the barrier of the historical perspective (but did not reject it), entering a broader, interdisciplinary model of practising Catholic social teaching, characteristic until today. Social personalism, initiated under the direction of Strzeszewski in his Lublin school, continued and developed in the social teaching of John Paul II, found a faithful and creative continuator in the person and work of Janusz Mariański.

## 2. The methodological status of Catholic social teaching

It is characteristic that Mariański uses the term “social teaching of the Church” much more often than “Catholic social teaching.” This name, as it is known, was first used by Pope Pius XI (*disciplina socialis catholica*) and “defined a separate type of reflection that had already existed before the publication of the encyclical *Quadragesimo anno*, practised by scholars who observed social reality from the point of view of the teaching of the Church and who tried at the same time to present ‘countermeasures’ that enable the community to adapt to the requirements of the new times.”<sup>519</sup> In Poland, it is used more because it has been customarily

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518 J. Mariański, *Prawda w życiu społecznym*, „Miesięcznik Pastorski Płocki” 1990, no. 7–8, pp. 266–274; idem, „Struktury grzechu” w ocenie społecznego nauczania Kościoła, Płocki Instytut Wydawniczy, Płock 1998, p. 42.

519 P. Woroniecki, “Socjologia a katolicka nauka społeczna,” in: *Pomiędzy etyką a polityką*. . . , p. 265.

adopted than because it is substantively justified. The literature on the subject stresses that there is no material definition that is commonly accepted, which affects the way it is practised. The definition of Władysław Piwowarski can be considered the most relevant to the assumptions of social documents of the Church. According to him, “Catholic social teaching includes both social teaching of the Church (popes, universal and local synods, and national episcopates) and theoretical reflection of specialists and Catholic activists who develop and use it in narrower or wider social environments.”<sup>520</sup> Its purpose is to solve the social question “here and now.” Joachim Kondziela emphasizes that Catholic social teaching involves two different categories, that is hierarchical (top-down) teaching of the Church and theoretical (bottom-up) reflection of this teaching practised by scholars, thinkers, and Catholic activists. Both these systems (orders) interpenetrate each other, and this science derives the current knowledge about social life from the disciplines of exact sciences, the results of which are reflected on in the aspect of the “Christian humanum” that flows from the very nature of the Gospel message.<sup>521</sup>

Józef Majka, whose understanding and style of practising Catholic social teaching is perhaps the most noticeable in Mariański’s writings, described this discipline as a set of relationships between human activity in the world (social, political, economic, cultural) and people’s Christian vocation to participate in the life of the Church, “the holy revealed reality of the supernatural pedigree, but also the empirical social reality, an institution of universal and local dimensions.”<sup>522</sup> He strongly highlighted the difference between philosophical cognition and cognition characteristic of exact sciences, between philosophical and theological theses and the claims of sociology.<sup>523</sup> It seems that the principle of the three-step analysis model present in Mariański’s publications corresponds with Józef Majka’s methodological approach to Catholic social teaching. This science cooperates with many scientific disciplines, including sociology, draws from various sources, and makes use of the achievements of many scientific disciplines of various types, which is legitimate in practical sciences. The above-mentioned model of analysis in Mariański’s version first presents the main foundations of

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520 W. Piwowarski, “Katolicka nauka społeczna,” in: *Encyklopedia socjologii*, vol. 2, Oficyna Wydawnicza, Warszawa 1999, p. 15.

521 J. Kondziela, *Osoba we wspólnotcie. Z zagadnień etyki społecznej, gospodarczej i międzynarodowej*, Księgarnia św. Jacka, Katowice 1987, pp. 18 ff.

522 J. Mariański, *Kościół katolicki w Polsce a życie społeczne*. . . , p. 11.

523 J. Mariański, *Klasyk katolickiej nauki społecznej w Polsce ks. prof. dr hab. Józef Majka (1918–93)*, „Summarium” 1999–2000, no. 28–29, p. 201–203.

the Church's social teaching on the selected subject, then provides a general diagnosis of the situation in the world (sometimes with a strong emphasis on the situation in Poland), and finally in the third part formulates educational and pedagogical proposals (recommendations).<sup>524</sup>

"The social teaching of the Church, otherwise known as the social doctrine of the Church, is a doctrinal whole developed constantly and gradually by the social Magisterium of the Church, interpreted and deepened by Catholic scholars within the so-called Catholic social teaching."<sup>525</sup> In a later approach (referring to B. Sorge), he wrote: "The social teaching of the Church revolves around certain basic principles and values. These are: first and foremost, the priority of the human person with their transcendental dignity; solidarity understood as a fraternal relationship for the common good; the principle of subsidiarity, which assumes the right and duty to participate responsibly in common decisions; the principle of the common good understood as defending human quality of life, not only as ecology of the natural environment, but also as spiritual ecology (respecting the higher moral and spiritual needs of the human life, both in the individual and group dimension)."<sup>526</sup>

The social doctrine of the Church, maintaining its basic continuity and dynamic nature, is open to dialogue with various currents of contemporary culture and the rapidly changing situation of the contemporary world. It constantly clarifies the unchanging principles based on the natural and revealed law, especially in the aspect of its specific applications. This approach to Catholic social teaching seems to be the closest one to the Lublin sociologist, who emphasizes the need for constant methodological reflection due to the interdisciplinary character of Catholic social teaching. The human individual in his or her personal and communal dimension is the basic point of reference for the organization of political, social, and economic life. The social and evangelizing role of the Church is based on the idea of human dignity and the values resulting from it. "The social teaching of the Church follows from the understanding of who man is,"<sup>527</sup> seeking new paths and viewpoints, regardless of the changing historical and social contexts.

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524 J. Mariański, *Kościół a współczesne problemy społeczno-moralne. Kwestie wybrane*, TN KUL, Lublin 1992, p. 7; idem, *Spółczesność i moralność*. . . , p. 12.

525 J. Mariański, *Kościół a współczesne problemy społeczno-moralne*. . . , p. 9.

526 J. Mariański, *Kościół katolicki w Polsce a życie społeczne*. . . , p. 220.

527 J. Mariański, *Kościół a współczesne problemy społeczno-moralne*. . . , p. 7.

### 3. The fundamental values

Janusz Mariański considers this category “very important and indispensable” in the development of man and society. The fundamental values form the normative ethos, a foundation of understanding and social action as a smaller or larger range of values accepted by everyone, or at least by the majority of community members, on the basis of which they come to an agreement and dialogue, and undertake positive cooperation for the common good.<sup>528</sup> The state and society need an ethical foundation without which significant structural economic, political, and cultural reforms will ultimately fail. Without accepting fundamental values and their implementation, social life is realistically threatened by moral anomie. In fact, it is not about realizing the desires of particular individuals, different and variable, but about a set of values without which no human being can live, which are (or should be) the object of everyone’s concern and efforts, regardless of their talents, interests, and preferences.

The fundamental values cannot be subjected in their validity to changing social attitudes, views, or beliefs.<sup>529</sup> In their own way, they are given to the public as premises and not as the result of a social contract. It is not the majority that decides whether something is a value or not; after all, values are not “available commercially,” but given in the process of education.

Mariański includes among the fundamental values, above all, the dignity of every human person, respect for their inviolable rights, as well as the recognition of the value of the common good as the goal and the basic criterion of action. Referring to the teaching of John Paul II, the Lublin sociologist emphasizes that out of concern for the future of society and the development of a “healthy” democracy, we urgently need to rediscover the existence of human and moral values belonging to the very essence and nature of man. Mariański’s personalism is consistent in the sense that it does not agree to subordinate the human individual to society as a means (tool) because of his or her intrinsic value. “Both public and private morality are based on an objective truth about the human being.”<sup>530</sup> Therefore, life (private and public) should be distinguished, but not separated.

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528 Ibid., pp. 32–35.

529 J. Mariański, *Spółeczeństwo i moralność*. . . , p. 128; idem, *Demokracja bez wartości? Refleksje wokół encykliki Centesimus annus i sytuacji w Polsce*, in: *Wartości u podstaw demokracji*, eds. J. Nagórny, A. Derdziuk, Wydawnictwo Diecezjalne, Sandomierz 2002, pp. 40–43.

530 J. Mariański, *Spółeczeństwo i moralność*. . . , p. 136.

Other fundamental values of social life originate from the proper understanding of the dignity of the human person. The ones he mentions most frequently are: freedom, life (including the life of the unborn), equality, justice, truth, solidarity, peace, tolerance, patriotism. Even if we are not able to build a perfect, just, and humanistic society, the effort to respect fundamental values is indispensable. Human life requires referring not to ephemeral, superficial values, but to universal values that create a solid foundation and a permanent guarantee of a just and peaceful coexistence of people.

In the process of political (systemic) transformation, conflicts of interpretation often occur in relation to fundamental values. Mariański notes that among the socially approved values, some are more appreciated, others less. However, as such, they are always characterised by considerable permanence, because they meet the real requirements of human existence. If the possibility of metaphysical validation of values is rejected, there only remains reference to pragmatic arguments that are produced rather than discovered as a result of a changing socio-cultural agreement. Society can be open and free only if it does not reject objective values.<sup>531</sup>

#### 4. Democracy without values?

There are various concepts of democracy in which the assessment of the role of ethics in socio-political life is not identical. The personalistic and communal approach to democracy Mariański advocates recognizes the necessity for ethics as a factor integrating social life. His reflections on democracy and the democratic order find the basic inspiration in John Paul II's encyclical *Centesimus annus*.<sup>532</sup> There is no strict definition of democracy in it, but it clearly presents indications that make it possible to resolve the question whether we are dealing with a democratic system or with totalitarianism and its disguised forms. Referring to the view of John Paul II, who supported democracy as a modern form of government in the state, the sociologist primarily draws attention to the conditions that should be met by an "authentic and healthy democracy" in its inseparable connection with truth, values, and human rights. Without this conjunction, it is not possible, and such a system can even be transformed into something that is the opposite of democracy.<sup>533</sup>

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531 J. Mariański, *Kościół a współczesne problemy społeczno-moralne*. . . , pp. 39 ff; idem, *Spółczesność i moralność*. . . , p. 134.

532 J. Mariański, *Demokracja bez wartości?*. . . , pp. 29–71.

533 Ibid., pp. 32 ff.

John Paul II argued with the widespread conviction that the foundation which best corresponds to the democratic forms of politics is agnosticism and sceptical relativism. Mariański draws attention to the multiple consequences of linking democracy with ethical relativism. The basic requirement of democracy, from the point of view of the social teaching of the Church, is an integral concept of the human person, free of reductionism. “Here in Poland, the great debate on the theme of man in no way ended with the fall of Marxist ideology. It continues, and in some ways has even intensified. Debased forms of understanding the human person and the value of human life have become subtler and for that reason more dangerous. Today there is need of great vigilance in this area” – said John Paul II to the representatives of the world of science of the Jagiellonian University in 1997.<sup>534</sup> Indeed, in the contemporary world there is an increasing belief that a person can decide for himself or herself what values he or she needs. Defining his or her goals, he or she is often ready to subordinate them only to calculations or the interest of the majority.

Mariański is a consistent defender of the personalistic vision of man as a rational basis for democracy. He does not accept the reduction of the human to the material dimension, or understanding them as a product of social life. Personalism does not question the individual dimension of the human, but at the same time sees in them persons focused on social life. Recognizing the indispensability of social life, he rejects both individualist liberalism and collectivist materialism.

Mariański is basically uninterested in the etymological description of democracy, due to its general nature. What is important for him are normative-axiological elements that make it possible to adequately characterise it. He stresses that the basic goal of the democratic system is to provide citizens with individual and socio-political freedom. He is also not concerned with various classifications of theories of democracy or its types. Their analytical and theoretical value is not sufficient to justify democracy and its ethical dimension. Democracy, like any other political or social system, should serve the human person, solidarity, and the common good. Political systems should adapt themselves to man, not sacrifice people for the system. Democracy is to serve everyone and all people. For this to happen, it must be based on values and not just on the consensus of

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534 John Paul II, *Meeting with the rectors of the Polish universities, speech in Collegiate Church of Saint Ann, 8 June 1997*, [https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/travels/1997/documents/hf\\_jp-ii\\_spe\\_08061997\\_universities.html](https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/travels/1997/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_08061997_universities.html), sec. 5, (accessed 13 July 2019).

opinions as the only source of legitimacy for political decisions. The basic question is: what kind of democracy do we expect and want to build?<sup>535</sup>

An essential role in the survival of a truly democratic society is played by the principle of subsidiarity, related to the free and responsible participation of citizens in public affairs. The democratic system respecting the idea of subsidiarity creates the optimal conditions for them to be able to become involved in social life and participate in reaching an agreement concerning the form of the common good. The Church is not entitled to advocate a given institutional or constitutional solution; it respects the legitimate autonomy of the democratic order. Because of its identity and mission, it cannot remain indifferent to the values that inspire various institutional choices. Mariański points out that each choice includes a moral aspect and expresses a specific vision of the person, society, and common good.

Ethical democracy is the basis of participatory democracy. It is not enough to complain that the Polish society is not mature enough for democracy; on the contrary, efforts should be intensified to strengthen the social and moral condition of this society. An important statement of Mariański should be noted here: that the Church should not be perceived as an entity authorised to propose the ways of emerging from the remnants of communism. “From the point of view of Catholic social teaching, it should be clearly emphasized that democracy functioning in the country on the Vistula River is full of ambivalence; it is currently in the phase of initial consolidation; it is not a fully ethical democracy, as this is now more an aspiration than the reality [. . .] The current deficits of democracy in social life – especially those of a moral nature – will affect its further development. In a society where large-scale economic and social inequalities are born, dissatisfaction and conflict are becoming widespread.”<sup>536</sup>

## 5. “The structures of sin”

It has been mentioned in the introduction that Janusz Mariański published the book *“The structures of sin” in the view of the social teaching of the Church*, whose significance for the development of Catholic social teaching in Poland cannot be overestimated. Before John Paul II, the categories of “social sin” and “structures of sin” were not examined directly. The background for the interest in them, according to Mariański, was the evolution of the social question – from its class

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535 J. Mariański, *Kościół katolicki w Polsce a życie społeczne. . .*, p. 207.

536 *Ibid.*, pp. 244–246.



(worker) to the universal (world) aspect. With progress and development, there appeared “new signs” indicating real threats to basic rights of people and nations, which John Paul II defined as the “social sin” and “structures of sin.”

Mariański observed that in the social doctrine, both categories include resounding and diverse content. In the light of its social principles, the Church evaluates social situations, structures, and systems, condemns living conditions, assesses the value of the existing structures. They are understood as a set of institutions and practices already existing or being created at the national and international level, directing or organizing economic, social, and political life. Although they are necessary in themselves, they tend to become ossified in the form of paralysing mechanisms that distort social development.<sup>537</sup> Mariański, referring to the thinking of the Second Vatican Council, is of the opinion that one must go beyond merely analysing damaging situations, pointing to the selfishness and short-sightedness of solutions, imprudent economic decisions, to be able to reach the sources of evil that torments the modern world. It is indispensable to refer to ethical criteria. The evil that leads to the structures of sin is particularly evident in the area of development. Obstacles standing in the way of achieving it are not only obstacles to the economic order; they are dependent on the deepest human attitudes. The ‘deformed mechanisms’ and “structures of sin” can only be defeated with a diametrically opposite attitude – an attitude of solidarity with others at the individual level, as well as at the level of the national and international community.

Analysing the socio-structural dimensions of sin, Józef Majka pointed to a socio-political system that can be sinful in its very foundations and create mechanisms forcing people to perform sinful deeds as a condition of their existence. Adam Stanowski distinguished the structures of sin “in a pure state” (censorship, political police) from structures “marked” by sin, which became such although they used to have other, even socially important, goals. Political systems, Mariański observes, often set people tasks that they are unable to perform or create such living conditions and construct such legislation that they are not able to live honestly (a situation of systematic demoralization).<sup>538</sup>

An important novelty in Janusz Mariański’s view is that he does not limit himself to social, political, and economic structures, but extends them to “psycho-social structures” (a system of attitudes and motivations). In this way, the “structures of sin” belong to the resources of human mentality (egoism, lust for

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537 J. Mariański, „Struktury grzechu” w ocenie społecznego nauczania Kościoła. . . , p. 23.

538 Ibid., pp. 24–25.

profit, desire for power, idolatrous worship of money, ideology, class, technology, etc.). Mariański's analyses do not overlook the societies undergoing transformation processes after 1989. This is all the more important because in his view there is no division between the "old" and the "new" societies. Regardless of the form and origin of the "structures of sin," they always inhibit the full development of man, that is, they do not serve the common good. In the face of social structures that affect people's ethical principles, individuals are often powerless, subject to gradual depravity. Living in the "structures of sin" does not absolve anyone from responsibility for their behaviour; it tells us to see the structural sin in terms of one's personal responsibility to God. Mariański rejects the view that these structures are characteristic only for totalitarian, dictatorial, and corrupt power systems. In fact, they occur in all socio-political systems, only to varying degrees and with different chances of their removal.

The presented book, which is the basis of our analysis, interestingly discusses selected aspects of the structures of sin, namely indoctrination and lie in public life, the mass media as carriers of values and anti-values, consumerism, free market in relation to the "structures of sin," the problem of the protection of the environment and "human ecology." What is the message of this publication? It seems that the basic message is as follows: the Church does not condemn social structures as such, but in the light of basic social principles it obliges us to consider how existing structures and systems are compatible or inconsistent with the requirements of human dignity, with a moral and just order social. The Church does not want to engage in a radical political struggle, aiming at a revolutionary transformation of structures that are often marked by the reality of social sin.<sup>539</sup> Secondly, it firmly rejects the attitude of indifference towards the structures of evil. Their real existence obliges every person, especially a Christian, to take responsibility and act for their removal in order to be able to build "structures of good." A positive programme of repairing the world is more important than pointing to its "structures of sin." Thus, the Church's concern is to interpret the phenomena described as the "structures of sin" as fully as possible and to indicate remedies that can overcome them.

A free Church in a free society cannot lose its prophetic and critical function as the admonishing social conscience – stresses Mariański. It cannot limit itself to accusing, but it should contribute to the development of alternative projects of life. In order to fulfil its mission, it must sometimes be nonconformist to a certain degree, or to be able to say "no" even when many say "yes." Such a

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539 Ibid., p. 152.

Church is needed in societies characterised by the structures of sin because it makes us aware of the dangers to which human life is exposed and – at the same time – indicates the signs of hope, whose impact we can gradually observe in the modern world.

## 6. “New things” in economics

At the end of the 20th century, the market economy dominated almost the entire world, resulting not only in the growing interdependence of economic and social systems, but also in the dissemination of new philosophical and ethical ideas based on the changing living and working conditions. The Church carefully examines these phenomena in the light of the principles of its social doctrine and subjects them to systematic reflection and analysis. In the process of restructuring the economy, changes in production systems are taking place due to the use of new, more advanced technologies. This reorganization of production processes leads to increased productivity and, on the other hand, has a negative impact on the area of employment. The globalization of the economy and the development of new technologies create opportunities for progress, but at the same time contribute to the persistence of such problems as unemployment, discrimination, and extreme instability of employment.

Mariański, addressing the subjects from the above field of analysis, focuses his attention on the issues of social market economy, unemployment, and the relationship between labour and capital. In the social teaching of the Church, the term “social market economy” does not appear, but, according to Mariański, this economic model is close to the social doctrine of the Church because it emphasizes the efficiency of the market economy and the quality of social security level. It should not be understood as a kind of a third option between the market capitalist economy and centrally controlled economy. Regardless of its historical forms and models, it combines the principle of individual freedom of economic entities with the principle of socialization. It differs fundamentally from the free market economy without moral rules, but also from the centrally controlled economy. According to Mariański, the expression used by John Paul II, “capitalism with a human face,” seems to refer to this kind of economic organization where elementary humanitarian and social principles are followed, and the subjectivity of the person and his or her responsibility in the whole economic process are preserved. John Paul II, stressing the value of market economy, entrepreneurship, efficiency of operation, private property, free initiative as the basis for economic creativity, clearly calls for the presence of a social and

moral element in economics. He does not accept the allegedly insurmountable antinomy between healthy competition and solidarity, property rights and the common good, morality and efficiency. By rejecting the “wild” market economy, which does not respect values and does not place freedom within the legal and ethical system, he expresses his belief that the market in itself is not able to solve all problems and that it can take various forms and variations. This point of view is characteristic for the analyses of Janusz Mariański, who in his publications is oriented not so much towards a specific economic system as towards a certain ethical and cultural system whose moral and religious dimension is not limited to the production of goods and services.<sup>540</sup>

If man is the goal of all economic activity, then the priority is a correct concept of the human person. Forms of degradation of the human person, also in the space of economic life, have become somewhat subtler, and thus more dangerous.<sup>541</sup> Mariański considers the tendency to reduce man, the subject and purpose of economy, to the economic dimension exclusively, as well as examining development understood in this manner, to be particularly dangerous.

Crisis phenomena are to a large extent related to the reduction of the spiritual dimension of the human person, the loss of an integral vision of them, and the loss of a full prospect for development. The premise of dignity is the source of both the Church’s opposition to the claims of “wild capitalism” and the principle of the priority of labour over capital. The primacy of the value of the person, Mariański stresses, is an unquestionable condition for shaping morally sound economic structures. This means that market economy, which is the proper form of the economic system, should be given the personalistic ideal as a model and direction. However, it is not necessary to expect specific proposals and technical solutions in the economic sphere from the Church, because it does not have the necessary means or the competence in this field.<sup>542</sup>

The logic of democracy and the logic of the free market are marked by a certain incoherence. While the former is based on the idea of equality, the market produces inequalities of income and wealth, forces people to compete, and subordinates the specific actions of individuals to itself. Market freedom is not absolute. The Church, recognizing market forces as a system, at the same

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540 J. Mariański, *Kościół a wolny rynek*, „Homo Dei” 1997, no. 1–2, pp. 143–145; idem, *Kościół katolicki a społeczna gospodarka rynkowa*, „Saeculum Christianum” 2000, no. 2, pp. 199 ff.

541 J. Mariański, *Spółczesność i moralność*. . ., p. 182.

542 Ibid., p. 185.

time acknowledges the existence of the possibility of adopting various solutions, but in general it does not reject the liberalization of the market. The vision of a “market economy” and a “free economy” is not a purely economic vision, but a humanistic one. It is based not only on economic calculations, but also takes into account human capital and moral values. Economic life cannot take place in moral emptiness, and ethics cannot be in the service of a specific economic system. Without legal and ethical regulations, the free market is *de facto* an alienating factor. Ultimately, Mariański concludes, the functioning of the free market depends not only on economic mechanisms, but also on the respect for moral principles.

The issue of globalization of work and economics was also reflected in Mariański's works.<sup>543</sup> He points out that it is realised on the level of technical infrastructure, world socialization of economy, the mass-media and social communication, as well as on the political plane. Globalization as such, resulting in modernization, in the economic and financial sphere illustrates the process of the growing integration of various countries in their exchange of goods, services, and financial transactions. In addition to opportunities that are opening up in the sphere of global economy, one cannot fail to notice the disturbing phenomena, such as increasing social inequalities. The author emphasizes that neither the global society nor the state can survive without ethical foundations, without a common normative moral structure that takes into account social solidarity. From an ethical point of view, various dangers associated with the withdrawal of the finance economy from its primary and essential role of serving the real economy, i.e. the development of individual persons and of human communities, are clearly visible. Mariański, referring to the *Compendium of the social doctrine of the Church* published in 2004 by the Pontifical Council ‘Iustitia et Pax,’ emphasizes that in international organizations the interests of the great human family should be evenly represented, and the process of development cannot be dictated solely by economic rules, overlooking moral principles. Economic development will be permanent as long as it is implemented in the context determined by moral norms.

By rejecting such alternatives as “either the market or morality,” “more market than morality,” the Church believes that they result only from a misunderstanding of the role of morality in the life of the economy. Although there is no “Catholic” model of economic life, it seems that the Church's voice calling business owners, working people, and politicians not to accept globalization in

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543 J. Mariański, *Kościół katolicki a społeczna gospodarka rynkowa...*, pp. 207–210.

its exclusively economic dimension, without ethical responsibility, is becoming more clearly heard. It encourages taking action to avoid the harmful effects of globalization and the development of technologies that destroy people, perpetuate economic and social inequalities existing within individual countries and in relations between them.<sup>544</sup>

“One has the impression – said John Paul II to the members of the Pontifical Academy in 2001 – that the complex dynamism, caused by the globalization of the economy and the media, eventually tends to reduce the human person to a market variable, to a piece of merchandise, which really makes the person a totally irrelevant factor in the decisive options. Man risks feeling trampled by the faceless globalised mechanisms and increasingly loses his identity and dignity as a person.”<sup>545</sup> In turn, in the Message for the World Day of Peace (2000), he strongly emphasized: “An economy which takes no account of the ethical dimension and does not seek to serve the good of the person – of every person and the whole person – cannot really call itself an <economy>, understood in the sense of a rational and constructive use of material wealth.”<sup>546</sup>

## 7. The mass media and new media technologies

“The proper purpose and task of the media is the service of truth and its defence. This consists in objectively and honestly transmitting information, in avoiding manipulation of the truth and in adopting the attitude of not wanting to corrupt the truth. The service of truth is a service to the cause of the whole man, body and soul, expressed in the development of his cultural and religious needs in both the individual and social spheres. [...] Wherever the truth is passed on, the power of goodness and the splendour of beauty are also expressed and the person who experiences them acquires nobility and culture. This is a particular

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544 J. Mariański, „*Res novae w ekonomii*” według *Kompendium Nauki Społecznej Kościoła*, in: *Nowa ekonomia a społeczeństwo*, ed. S. Partycki, vol. 1, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2006, p. 53.

545 John Paul II, *Address of John Paul II to the sixth public session of the Pontifical Academies of Theology and of St Thomas Aquinas, 8 November 2001*, [https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/2001/november/documents/hf\\_jp-ii\\_spe\\_20011108\\_pontificie-accademie.html](https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/2001/november/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_20011108_pontificie-accademie.html), sec. 3, (accessed 13 July 2019).

546 John Paul II, *His Holiness Pope John Paul II Reflects on Working Toward Peace, 1 January 2000*, <https://legacy.scu.edu/ethics/architects-of-peace/John-Paul-II/essay.html>, (accessed 13 July 2019).

mission that makes a large contribution to society's well-being and progress."<sup>547</sup> The Pope's words stress the extremely important role played by communication media in contemporary society in the area of information, development of culture, and education.

In his multi-faceted reflection on the media, Janusz Mariański addressed the problem expressed in the following question: what information in mass society should be transmitted and how can it reach as many people as possible, to have a clear and positive impact on the so-called public opinion, to proclaim truth, justice, freedom, and solidarity in public life, to serve the common good?<sup>548</sup> The media not only describe the world, but they also create it to a certain extent, and thus the author draws attention to the dependence of the media's influence on the socio-cultural context in which they operate. Today, they affect the whole world, and this impact is constantly deepening. Globalization at various levels introduces people into the supranational space, where modern communication media shape the views, attitudes, and behaviours of many people. The mass media, deeply involved in the process of social change, play a particularly active role in it. They contribute to the unification and standardization of forms of collective life, affect the mentality and behaviour of people, shape their values and criteria of assessment. The term "media society" has its reference to social reality in which communication barriers are disappearing, and the only question which is causing more difficulties than before is the right choice of information channels. The media have become an inalienable part of our contacts with reality and function as so-called the "fourth estate" with an immense and ubiquitous power.

Conflicts of values in the media are inevitable.<sup>549</sup> A characteristic feature of Mariański's view is that he considers the controversy over the desired model of the location of the mass media in the social system that respects the principles of ethics to be a debate of worldviews that requires supporting a particular concept of man and society. Reflection on the relationships between moral ideals and the modern media is not willingly undertaken by authors. Mariański boldly enters this field of reflection. For him, the mass media are possible "carriers of values

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547 John Paul II, *Address of the Holy Father Pope John Paul II to the bishops of Poland on their ad limina visit, 14 February 1998, sec. 5*, [https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/1998/february/documents/hf\\_jp-ii\\_spe\\_19980214\\_ad-limina-polonia3.html](https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/1998/february/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19980214_ad-limina-polonia3.html), (accessed 13 July 2019).

548 J. Mariański, *Kościół katolicki a społeczna gospodarka rynkowa...*, p. 29.

549 *Ibid.*, pp. 34–36.

and anti-values,<sup>550</sup> the means of positive or negative influence in a constantly changing and uncertain world. However, they are not only a product, but also a “driving force” of modern social transformations that to a certain extent create human reality, including the social image of religion and the Church.

The means of social communication serve not only to convey information, but also to promote values and to educate in values. Their activity is related to ethical references, which means that they cannot be reduced to the laws of the market. In the letter for the Year of the Family (1994), John Paul II observed that the mass media, even when they try to communicate correct information, fail to serve the truth in its fundamental dimension if they are not guided by sound ethical principles.<sup>551</sup> The Church’s concern is for the media to refer to the integral concept of man. The “media” foundation of anthropology, emphasized by Mariański, exposes the role of the media in their service of fidelity to truth and other values anchored in personal dignity. Communication media can accelerate the integral development of man or completely destroy it. Being related to people’s everyday life, they influence the understanding and meaning of life, because the life experience of many people is an experience gained through the media.

Mariański’s analyses clearly expose the belief that providing information is never morally neutral, that it always – at least implicitly and intentionally – corresponds to the basic choices and value systems recognized by those who work in the media. The right to objective information not only protects human dignity, but also belongs to the most fundamental rights. What follows from it is the requirement to always avoid manipulating the truth or deliberately misleading the audience.

The Church, expressing the ‘balanced humanistic orientation,’<sup>552</sup> as a result of coming into contact with the new media culture, seeks a creative balance between the market and ethics. Mariański proposes that in the area of communication media, the Church should dynamize its evangelizing concern expressed not only in the right of access to the media, but by treating them as a tool of evangelization of ‘fundamental importance.’ Moral responsibility for the media enters the area of “human ecology.” Distorted forms of using the communication media lead to the propagation of anti-values, raise moral reservations, threaten

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550 J. Mariański, „Struktury grzechu” w ocenie społecznego nauczania Kościoła. . . , pp. 45–70.

551 John Paul II, *List do rodzin Gratissimam Sane Ojca świętego Jana Pawła II*, sec. 17, [https://opoka.org.pl/biblioteka/W/WP/jan\\_pawel\\_ii/listy/gratissimam.html](https://opoka.org.pl/biblioteka/W/WP/jan_pawel_ii/listy/gratissimam.html), (accessed 13 July 2019).

552 J. Mariański, *Kościół katolicki a społeczna gospodarka rynkowa. . .*, p. 42.



personal and social morality. This moral corruption originates in the pursuit of material profits, even at the expense of spiritual and moral harm done subtly, always ignoring the overall development of the person with his or her transcendental and religious dimension.

When the media perpetuate secularism, consumerism, and materialism, they cease to serve the inclusive and integral development of society. They are accused of propagating a lifestyle revolving exclusively around consumerism, and of spreading the view that owning “something” is the main motive for human aspirations and actions. In societies moving from shortage economy to the economy of abundance, this is clearly evident. Advertisements, films, and TV series “tempt” audiences with the almost universal availability of consumer goods and promote sumptuous and luxurious consumption. Mariański observes that consumerism understood in this way, promoted top-down by the media and developing from the bottom up in the practice of social life, leads to the formation of pragmatic awareness, not always consistent with its ethical awareness.

In the area of media studies, Mariański undertook the analysis of new media technologies.<sup>553</sup> In his opinion, they favour thinking in terms of the function of acquiring knowledge and creating new virtual communities. On the other hand, by blurring personal identity, they can contribute to becoming lost in everyday life, to certain confusion, and even to the appearance of traumatic experiences with multiple personality and social consequences. Internet and other technologies are much more than just a source of information and a powerful tool for transmitting it; they are also a new lifestyle and a way of communicating with people. The magic of the new medium affects people of all generations; the world is becoming smaller and smaller, and thanks to it, many fundamental areas of human life are transforming. The Church’s concern is for the development of multimedia techniques to also be employed in the devising a programme of evangelization and to serve people making use of newer and newer forms of communication and technology.

Today, the media penetrate all areas of human life; they are becoming a component of not only socio-economic, but also moral-religious processes. Pope Benedict XVI noticed the impact of new digital technologies on interpersonal relations and the change in models of social communication when he wrote in the Message for the XLIII World Communications Day (in 2009): ‘Many benefits

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553 J. Mariański, *Nowe technologie medialne w ocenie społecznego nauczania Kościoła*, in: *E-gospodarka, E-społeczeństwo w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej*, ed. S. Partycki, vol. 1, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2009, pp. 125–137.

flow from this new culture of communication: families are able to maintain contact across great distances; students and researchers have more immediate and easier access to documents, sources and scientific discoveries, hence they can work collaboratively from different locations; moreover, the interactive nature of many of the new media facilitates more dynamic forms of learning and communication, thereby contributing to social progress.<sup>554</sup>

The media have changed and are significantly changing the process of education and upbringing, define the topics of social and private communication, influence the opinions and convictions about what is important in society. Media communication, which is what fundamentally differs post-modern societies from traditional ones, raises questions such as: is it going to increase social inequalities and the gap in the area of information, which is constantly widening? What can we do to make the information and communication revolution, whose main driving force is the Internet, support both the globalization of human development and social solidarity? How will new virtual communities function in the future?

## 8. Out of concern for environmental protection and “human ecology”

Negative environmental consequences of technological and economic progress indicate people’s irresponsible actions towards the surrounding nature, violating its natural balance and not caring about its regeneration. The threat to the natural environment has become a contemporary challenge for humanity in its striving for survival.<sup>555</sup> Mariański emphasizes that the ecological crisis is a consequence of the distorted concept of uncontrolled technical and economic development, which does not take into account the natural environment with its limitations, laws, and harmony.

Entering the era of ecological culture stands for an encounter with the issue of new consciousness – not only ecological, but also moral. On this level, a meeting takes place with the social teaching of the Church, which has been interested in the “ecological issue” since the 1970s. Mariański is one of the few Polish authors who were the first to address this problem. Analysing his work in this research

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554 Benedict XVI, *New Technologies, New Relationships. Promoting a Culture of Respect, Dialogue and Friendship*, 24 May 2009, [http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/messages/communications/documents/hf\\_ben-xvi\\_mes\\_20090124\\_43rd-world-communications-day.html](http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/messages/communications/documents/hf_ben-xvi_mes_20090124_43rd-world-communications-day.html), (accessed 13 July 2019).

555 J. Mariański, „Struktury grzechu” w ocenie społecznego nauczania Kościoła. . . , p. 113.

area, it is not difficult to notice that he primarily considers the discussed issue as an ethical-moral problem. Securing the priority of this dimension, we secure the priority of man (John Paul II).

Ecological issues appear in many of Church's social documents, more or less clearly, and especially in the teaching of John Paul II, who included it among the most important issues of the present day. “Equally worrying is the ecological question which accompanies the problem of consumerism and which is closely connected to it. In his desire to have and to enjoy rather than to be and to grow, man consumes the resources of the earth and his own life in an excessive and disordered way. At the root of the senseless destruction of the natural environment lies an anthropological error, which unfortunately is widespread in our day.”<sup>556</sup>

The fundamental thesis about man created in the image and likeness of God points to the essential perspective which is the source of the principles of people's conduct towards the environment in which they live. The prospects for the development of the human person and a new quality of life are dependent, to a certain extent, on the quality of this conduct. Mariański points out that people standing guard over the ecological order defend the environment not only for themselves, but also for future generations. The macrocosm cannot be degraded in any way to the role of an object subjected to man. He stresses that the idea of man's domination over the world is not explained as consent to destroying the natural environment or wasting natural resources. However, contemporary people, driven more by the desire for possessing things, do not manifest a disinterested and noble attitude sensitive to ethical values which would correspond with admiration for the existence and beauty of created things. Man – the wise ruler, guard, and manager of the natural environment – has a duty to show it respect, because it is God's gift to man. Failure to do so amounts to the so-called ecological sin, which consists in the fact that the good of all is treated as no one's property, unjustly appropriated, or mindlessly destroyed.<sup>557</sup>

Catholic social teaching draws attention to the real danger of the so-called ethical neutrality, also in relation to environmental protection. The Enlightenment ideology of progress, which promised people complete liberation and happiness on earth, required taking away the secrets of nature and subordinating it to man. In reality, it stimulated the overexploitation of scarce resources of nature. The pursuit for expansion and transformation of nature has led to a huge and

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556 John Paul II, *Centesimus annus*, sec. 37.

557 J. Mariański, „Struktury grzechu” w ocenie społecznego nauczania Kościoła. . . , p. 119.

multidimensional development of civilization, but its effect is, among other things, the ecological crisis.<sup>558</sup>

Ecological sustainability is only possible when people are convinced of the absolute necessity of new solidarity and the abandonment of the consumerism lifestyle. The so-called “ecological asceticism” is a proposal to make people aware of the possible consequences of the destruction of the natural environment. Man cannot have a voluntaristic approach to nature. The more technological and scientific opportunities are increasing, the more it is necessary to develop moral awareness in order to overcome and control all those forces which people have set into motion in the service of truly human goals. Mariański suggests that we should constantly ask about an objective scale of values that would allow for determining the prospects for and limits of progress, also in relation to the natural environment. The need to harmonize production with environmental protection is now evident and awaits its real implementation. The negative effects of progress remain a peculiar ethical challenge.

In Mariański’s reflection concerning the presented issues, an important feature that draws attention is the link between ecology and the consumerism lifestyle.<sup>559</sup> “The so-called modern man – in spite of the declared humanistic orientation – in practice succumbs to the materialistic orientation, placing material values above personal (ethical) values. He or she assesses himself or herself and others according to what they have or according to their prospects of increasing their wealth. A manifestation of this falsified hierarchy of values is the consumption mentality, covering all areas of life, both private and public.”<sup>560</sup>

Consumerism creates all kinds of desires without real justification in the biological and socio-cultural needs of man. By strengthening demand, it contributes to the increasing and unjustified consumption of natural resources and to burdening the environment with post-production and post-consumer waste. The transformation of one’s lifestyle from “to have” to “to be” implies the necessity of resorting to the above-mentioned ecological asceticism, both in the individual and social dimension. By changing the lifestyle, it will be possible to realise social, cultural, spiritual, economic, and ecological well-being, which can be

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558 J. Mariański, *Ekospołeczne nauczanie Kościoła w służbie człowieka (w świetle encykliki Centesimus annus)*, in: *Chrześcijańskie podstawy ładu społecznego*, ed. P. Kryczka, Lubelski Ośrodek Kształcenia Samorządowego, Lublin 1993, pp. 110 ff.

559 J. Mariański, *Mieć czy być?* . . . , p. 34; idem, ‘*Struktury grzechu*’ w ocenie społecznego nauczania Kościoła. . . , pp. 132–135.

560 J. Mariański, ‘*Struktury grzechu*’ w ocenie społecznego nauczania Kościoła. . . , p. 132.

achieved by anyone who seeks motivation to change attitudes towards material goods and towards nature.

Mariański’s call for making the concern for the protection and conservation of the natural environment the obligation of the state requires specific measures and ways of implementation. By protecting collective goods, the state creates a space in which a person can, in an authorised manner, pursue his or her own individual goals. Ordinary market mechanisms cannot protect the environment, so a constructive environmental policy is also one of its tasks.<sup>561</sup>

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“In [the] precious legacy [of the Church’s social doctrine] handed down from the earliest ecclesial tradition, we find elements of great wisdom that guide Christians in their involvement in today’s burning social issues. This teaching, the fruit of the Church’s whole history, is distinguished by realism and moderation; it can help to avoid misguided compromises or false utopias,”<sup>562</sup> Pope Benedict XVI wrote in the apostolic exhortation *Sacramentum caritatis*.

Janusz Mariański’s intellectual reflection, whose selected problem areas have been presented to the reader in this article, undoubtedly contains the qualities articulated in the Pope’s enunciation. It has neither unilateral approaches nor the relativistic ones resulting in the “anthropological error.” His research attitude and the style of practising Catholic social teaching, along with the categories of “realism” and “moderation” mentioned in the quotation, also include “cohesion,” “indissolubility,” and “totality.”<sup>563</sup> In Mariański, this discipline has found a competent representative and an insightful analyst who is able to explain on various levels the Church’s social teaching concerning the fundamental problems of the contemporary world and Poland, capturing them not only from the theoretical but also the practical (educational) point of view. He is always “up to date” in the sense that he responds almost immediately to successive statements of the Church’s Magisterium, providing an accurate and timely commentary, taking into account current Polish and foreign literature. The path of the Church and its social mission are not ideologies, political or economic models, or other technological and organizational solutions, but

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561 J. Mariański, *Ekospołeczne nauczanie Kościoła w służbie człowieka...*, pp. 118 ff.

562 Benedict XVI, *Sacramentum caritatis*, [http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/apost\\_exhortations/documents/hf\\_ben-xvi\\_exh\\_20070222\\_sacramentum-caritatis.html](http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_ben-xvi_exh_20070222_sacramentum-caritatis.html), sec. 91, (accessed 13 July 2019).

563 Cz. Strzeszewski, *Czym jest katolicka nauka społeczna?*, in: *Ku prawdzie we wspólnocie człowieka i Boga. Studia dedykowane Stanisławowi Kowalczykowi*, eds. E. Balawajder, P. Nitecki, A. Jabłoński, Wydawnictwo Diecezjalne, Sandomierz 1997, p. 288.

man. It is people who are responsible for shaping a truly human society, and this is a responsibility they cannot evade. The social message of the Church, open to the “signs of the times,” remains invariably at their disposal.

In Poland, there are two ways of practising this discipline. The first one is based on the interpretation of the social teaching of the Church, its exegesis, often without an analysis of the current socio-economic reality and references to it. The second method makes specific situations of social and economic life a starting point, subsequently subjecting them to ethical evaluation, e.g. using the criteria indicated by the social teaching of the Church, in order to make specific proposals corresponding to the conditions of time and place.<sup>564</sup> Undoubtedly, Professor Mariański follows the second model, characteristic of the so-called Lublin school of Catholic social teaching, to whose development he has made and continues to make a significant contribution. Its full evaluation is a matter for the future. In his explication, Catholic social teaching is not a closed theory, an abstract system, but rather an open and dynamic view, which allows for recognizing time and situations effectively, and for identifying the contemporary social question. Its moral and ethical dimension is a priority, and individual detailed issues, although they present many negative images from the reality that surrounds us, do not lack the optimistic signs of hope noticed by Mariański. The defence of the primacy of values is a real chance for human existence to persist in man’s personal dignity and social culture despite real anxieties and threats.

The Church is accused of not distinguishing sufficiently between what is perfect and what is feasible.<sup>565</sup> On the basis of this thesis, many consider its “power” in social matters to be suspicious, or even repressive. Other people, also those from outside the Church circles, on the contrary, emphasize the right of the Church to be present in public space, and even its necessity to do so. Mariański’s argumentation, seeking to balance views, and searching for a cognitive equilibrium can be used to bring together both positions, which is even more necessary when “the criticism of the Church takes place in the conditions of a wider crisis of various manifestations and forms of the current social order, and the decline of authorities at all levels of society.”<sup>566</sup>

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564 S. Fel, J. Kupny, *Wstęp*, in: *Katolicka nauka społeczna. Podstawowe zagadnienia z życia społecznego i politycznego*, eds. S. Fel, J. Kupny, Księgarnia św. Jacka, Katowice 2007, p. 7.

565 J. Mariański, *Zaufanie do Kościoła katolickiego w społeczeństwie polskim*, in: *Spółeczna i polityczna rola Kościoła instytucjonalnego w Polsce. Mity i rzeczywistość*, ed. J. Baniak, Wydawnictwo UAM, Poznań 2007, p. 18.

566 *Ibid.*, p. 19.

## VI. THE REALIST-PERSONALISTIC PERSPECTIVE OF THE CULTURE OF KNOWLEDGE: LEON DYCZEWSKI'S REFLECTIONS ON A CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY

The realist-personalistic perspective makes it possible to organize sociological analyses by considering a person, situated in a particular social here and now, as capable of overcoming their personal interests in order to cooperate with others and for others. The goal of sociological analyses is thus to protect the rational projects of social change against a tendency to detach them from the lives of real people. This may be achieved by taking into consideration people's happiness and by attempting to prevent them from suffering. As a result, the realist-personalistic perspective allows for the optimization of the controlling function served by the systems of human culture. These systems offer social mechanisms for coping with the threats posed by modern programs of knowledge management applied in organizations. These threats stem from the fact that the moral dimension of knowledge is nowadays being replaced with the rationalist idea of knowledge as capital or as company's resource.

### 1. Knowledge in late modernity

Knowledge is an important reference point and an indicator of modernity both in non-profit institutions and large international corporations. A knowledge-based approach aims to optimize knowledge as basic capital responsible for social growth and stability. Not all types of knowledge, however, are equally relevant for this approach. An example of a particularly significant form of knowledge may be tacit knowing: "we can know more than we can tell."<sup>567</sup> In the twentieth century, Japanese authors<sup>568</sup> put forward a thesis that not all knowledge can be communicated *via* verbal means, simultaneously recognizing knowledge as the most important element of organizational culture responsible for an

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567 M. Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension*, Anchor Books, New York 1967, p. 4.

568 I. Nonaka, and H. Takeuchi, *The Knowledge-Creating Company: How Japanese Companies Create the Dynamics of Innovation*, Oxford University Press, New York 1995, pp. 8 ff.

organization's growth and, consequently, profit. Thus, non-codified skills became more important than theoretical knowledge that can be codified, written down, and passed on.<sup>569</sup> However, there is a downside to advancing the validity of tacit knowledge and contrasting it with theoretical knowledge – an ancient form of knowledge (wisdom) is forgotten in the process. That knowledge used to provide guidance about actions and feelings that would result in what Aristotle called *eudaimonia* – happiness or fulfilment.<sup>570</sup>

This form of knowledge is necessary for humans to gain control over their existence and choose goals whose realization is possible under given conditions. Thinkers such as Aristotle, Saint Thomas, or Kant stressed the fact that wisdom is a necessary root of other types of knowledge. They understood the difference between theoretical and practical knowledge, between theory and skills, yet they believed that practical skills founded either on virtues or categorical moral imperatives must be rooted in proper institutions. Consequently, actions did not have to be accompanied by theoretical considerations for there were traditional rules of conduct thanks to which it was possible to avoid lethal mistakes.<sup>571</sup>

The aforementioned approach recognizes the relevance of wisdom for practical knowledge – it is the former that provides the rules for applying the latter. In order for practical knowledge to develop, these rules – even if not always visible – must be followed. Their value is guaranteed by the authority of “significant others” and “generalized others” who introduce us to the actions that limit our lawlessness. For knowledge to properly function as a product of a cognitive struggle between people and problems, it must be transmitted in a personalized manner. Impersonal, objective knowledge requires personal relations in order to be created, developed, and applied. According to one of the premises of critical rationalism, knowledge requires people to freely confront their disparate views.<sup>572</sup> By considering knowledge a skill possessed by particular individuals, uncritical rationalism (or rationalist over-optimism) attempts to introduce impersonal control over the processing and application of knowledge. It is not interested

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569 A. Sopińska, *Wiedza jako strategiczny zasób przedsiębiorstwa. Analiza i pomiar kapitału intelektualnego przedsiębiorstwa*, Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH, Warszawa 2008, pp. 87–89.

570 R. Scruton, *Kultura jest ważna. Wiara i uczucie w osaczonym świecie*, trans. T. Bieroń, Wydawnictwo Zysk i S-ka, Poznań 2010, p. 55.

571 C. Korsgaard, *The Constitution of Agency. Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology*, Oxford University Press Inc., New York 2008.

572 K. R. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*, Basic Books, New York and London 1962.



in how knowledge is produced; instead, it takes for granted what it considers an almost instinctive ability of contemporary knowledge managers to produce knowledge. These managers must be equipped with unique skills that cannot be ascribed to any particular field of knowledge. Rather, they must be ready to constantly develop themselves, as well as able to obtain new information, connect people in task groups, and build optimal communication systems.<sup>573</sup>

## 2. The culture of knowledge: individualist versus personalistic approach

The consolidation of intelligent behaviours in human culture assumes the form of either ordered human cooperation or a programming of the mind; it is the effect of social integration (cultural, normative, functional, or communicative). However, the “we” perspective must not be considered equivalent with clearing communication channels in a game of individual interests. Individuals must be able to rationally control themselves in a natural environment where the passage from childhood to adulthood, from individual egoism to collective responsibility, takes place. One of such environments is the university – it is there that future elites learn how to accept the invitation to enter the social world dominated by the achievements of their ancestors.<sup>574</sup>

The “we” perspective is a heritage that the Western scholarly tradition has best summarised in a statement that we see more for we are dwarves standing on the shoulders of giants. Some may believe that this broader view allows them to achieve more, conquer more, and subdue more. Others may feel that their superior cognitive position is an obligation to curb their reason’s claims and cooperate with others in order to broaden the realm of knowledge. To paraphrase Roger Scruton, it is a choice between the “I” and the “we” attitude. Whereas the former sees individual development as the main goal of all social interactions and urges one to overcome all obstacles on the way to a better future, the latter is more prudent – by accounting for the context of all actions, it advises caution.<sup>575</sup>

Being able to change one’s perspective from “I” to “we” requires one to be able to live in two important social orders – a close one and an extended one.

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573 M. Białasiewicz, “Rola i doskonalenie menedżerów w przedsiębiorstwie zorientowanym na wiedzę,” *Studia i Prace Wydziału Nauk Ekonomicznych i Zarządzania* 2011, vol. 21, pp. 17–27.

574 R. Scruton, *Kultura jest ważna*. . . , p. 84.

575 R. Scruton, *Pożytki z pesymizmu i niebezpieczeństwa fałszywej nadziei*, trans. T. Bieroń, Wydawnictwo Zysk i S-ka, Poznań 2012, pp. 19, 22 ff.

Consequently, it is necessary to distinguish between at least two types of rules necessary to navigate the two orders. One group of rules is more instinctive and natural, and it helps in navigating close-knit communities. The other is arbitrary and allows people to coexist within extended social orders.<sup>576</sup> The latter is more difficult to establish and uphold; in fact, technological progress fuels futuristic visions aimed at recreating the ties that would simulate intimacy in a virtual world. The order of the virtual world sustains relationships based on entertainment, play, conversation, and voyeurism that, thanks to technological advancement responsible for sustaining them, become synonymous with modernity (or, as claimed by some, postmodernity).

Knowledge management, that is the sum of processes aimed at achieving organizational goals through the creation, redistribution, and application of knowledge, assumes the “I” perspective and attempts to manage knowledge in such a way as to broaden the organization’s power and sphere of influence. By neglecting intelligence in its approach to reality, such an attitude results in numerous moral abuses. Managing knowledge creates risks; for example, some information may become classified, some results may become falsified, certain fields of knowledge may be neglected in favour of others, or scientific investigations may become too dependent on research grants. Also, the redistribution of knowledge may lead to its commercialization, the monopolization of results, the misinformation of the public, and political usurpation. Finally, the application of knowledge may lead to the introduction of risky technologies, the application of risky solutions, the imposition of dominant points of view, and the minimization of dissent.<sup>577</sup>

None of the aforementioned abuses yield to rational institutional regulations; the abuses may be prevented only by institutions whose goal is to protect knowledge: universities. Universities have developed rules, norms, and values that serve as a point of reference for other types of knowledge. According to Steve Fuller,<sup>578</sup> scientific knowledge may be considered from two influential points of view. The first view accounts for Karl Popper’s idea of scientific discovery which stresses the fact that public discussion results in daring solutions to problems;

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576 P. McNamara, *Introduction: Governing the Great Society*, in: *Liberalism, Conservatism, and Hayek’s Idea of Spontaneous Order*, eds. L. Hunt and P. McNamara, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2007, pp. 1–17.

577 A. Jabłoński, “Wiedza i moralność,” in: *Leksykon socjologii moralności*, ed. J. Mariański, Zakład Wydawniczy NOMOS, Kraków 2015, pp. 913–919.

578 S. Fuller, *Kuhn vs Popper: The Struggle for the Soul of Science*, Icon Books Ltd., Cambridge 2003.

consequently, it favours the democracy of science over its autonomy.<sup>579</sup> The other view accounts for Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions which advocates that paradigm shifts are caused by scientific elites following the orders of the authorities.<sup>580</sup> It is widely assumed that Popper idealizes science – he describes what the logical structure of empirical discoveries should look like. Kuhn, on the other hand, considers science as it emerges, as a socio-historical paradigm guarded by a chosen group of people. When considered from the point of view of the functioning of scientific knowledge, both approaches reveal how the institutional conditions responsible for the creative limitations of human reason were created; it is within these conditions that people responsible for the quality of knowledge work. Here, knowledge is the result of the “we” perspective, whether understood as a point of view of a community capable of a critical evaluation of its products, or a point of view of a scientific elite responsible for establishing a particular scientific paradigm. The “we” perspective is conditioned upon the joined search for truth, even if this search is motivated by the interests of a small group. However, if knowledge is considered mainly a resource/capital to be properly redistributed, then it must be guarded against those who would appropriate its benefits. This results in the creation of multiple rules, their goal to secure the creation, transfer, and – most importantly – application of knowledge; the task of protecting knowledge is no longer entrusted to intellectuals, but becomes the responsibility of contractors capable of navigating the labyrinth of regulations aimed at maximizing the reason's potential. Consequently, there emerges an individualized point of view: knowledge becomes the source of success and the object of conflict. What follows is the creation of temporary connections between actors endowed with complementary fragments of knowledge. Thanks to their personalized skills and the networks that allow them to process and exploit knowledge, the actors become responsible for innovative solutions.<sup>581</sup>

*Wise men* and *leaders* are replaced by experts who promote the therapeutic benefits of the culture of narcissism.<sup>582</sup> To quote from A. Giddens: “A ‘new paternalism’ has arisen in which experts of all types minister to the needs of the lay

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579 K. R. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, Routledge, London and New York 2002.

580 T. S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1996.

581 W. Czakon, *Sieci w zarządzaniu strategicznym*, Oficyna a Wolters Kluwer business, Warszawa 2012.

582 C. Lasch, *The Culture of Narcissism. American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York and London 1979.

population. Many modern forms of expertise do not derive from the fulfilment of genuinely felt needs; in some large part the new experts have invented the very needs they claim to satisfy. Dependence on expertise becomes a way of life.<sup>583</sup> The situation becomes even more dangerous if the dependence applies to those responsible for establishing the standards of creation, dissemination, and application of knowledge. If they become dependent on experts, no true leaders emerge, and trust and cooperation may be replaced by flight and control.

Wisdom may be gained only in organizations that, instead of competition, offer participation. Our goal is not to stress the superiority of cooperation over competition; rather, it is to point out different conditions in which knowledge functions. The macro-social and evolutionary perspective teaches us that competition, combined with a high level of uncertainty, fuels solutions that increase the chances of survival. On the micro-social level, however, when people agree about their goals and morality, cooperation is preferred.<sup>584</sup> Attempts to combine these perspectives and mix cooperation with competition disturb the order of institutions. Competition and cooperation may be based either on participation or rivalry. In the first case, small close-knit communities are destroyed; in the second, rivalry leads to an open, personal war between all members of a community. As noticed by Karol Wojtyła:

The transition from the multi-subjectivity to the subjectivity of many is a proper and full meaning of the human ‘we.’ Participation – a feature of each “I” thanks to which one may find his or her fulfilment by living and acting with others – does not stand in opposition to such an understanding of social community; in fact, only participation may result both in such an understanding and the creation of social community: the fulfilment of the human “we” in its full authenticity, as the true subjectivity of many.<sup>585</sup>

Assuming, after Friedrich A. von Hayek,<sup>586</sup> that the state of nature described by Thomas Hobbes never existed, we believe that under normal circumstances people cooperated, guided by altruism and solidarity – instinctive expressions of participation. Rivalry, therefore, is a violation of natural human inclinations; it is an evil that destroys cooperation because it destroys the ability to treat other people as equals. Rivalry is not, as claimed by Jean J. Rousseau, an artificial

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583 A. Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, Polity Press, Cambridge 2006, p. 173.

584 F. A. von Hayek, *Zgubna pycha rozumu. O błędach socjalizmu*, trans. M. and T. Kunińscy, Wydawnictwo Arcana, Kraków 2004, pp. 31–33.

585 K. Wojtyła, “Osoba: podmiot i wspólnota,” in: idem, *Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne*, TN KUL, Lublin 1994, p. 411.

586 F. A. von Hayek, *Zgubna pycha rozumu*. . . , pp. 31–33.

destruction of the natural order brought about by civilization. Rather, it is reason undermining the moral order by assuming primacy over that order and, consequently, destroying the artificial intellectual and moral rules. The rules that constitute humanity's cultural and civilizational legacy are artificial because they were created by humans by trial and error in order to help in regulating the extended order. Created in this way, personalized and reified, knowledge was capable of fuelling an organization. Even as part of the spiral of knowledge<sup>587</sup> that originates in tacit knowledge, explicit knowledge is necessary to comprehend the meaning of tacit knowledge.<sup>588</sup> Moreover, tacit knowledge that is developed through imitation is functional only in the most primitive forms of its creation, processing, and application; in order to affect the development of an organization, it must become an element of a broader civilizational heritage that combines the rules of application with moral values.

Liberal capitalism treats knowledge as the effect of a spontaneous order (its spontaneity rendering it difficult to control/hindering its control) whose goal is the common pursuit of truth. Individuals who cooperate and compete with each other create solutions that propel the development of knowledge.<sup>589</sup> A system that emerges (either, in Popper's terms, by trial and error, or, according to Kuhn, as a consequence of a paradigm shift) cannot be considered from the point of view of the less important mechanisms responsible for the creation, processing, and application of knowledge that do not account for the pursuit of truth. If one focuses solely on such mechanisms, the unity of means and goals, form and content, mind and conviction, and scheme and interpersonal relations is lost. In other words, such a point of view destroys the balance between what is individual, spontaneous, and instinctive, and what is common, planned, and rational. If one combines spontaneous creativity with rational, bureaucratic regulations without accounting for the norms and values that constitute traditional institutions of knowledge, one destroys the order responsible for the development of the Latin civilization. The deification of reason and science has led, first, to the "death of God," then to the "death of man," and, finally, to the "death of science." Science has ceased providing standards for developing knowledge and shared the fate of "God" and "man," becoming an unnecessary form of alienation. Everything that does not apply to the "I" perspective is regarded with suspicion as a form

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587 I. Nonaka and H. Takeuchi, *The Knowledge-Creating Company*. . . , pp. 70–73.

588 H. Collins, *Tacit and Explicit Knowledge*, The University Chicago Press, Chicago and London 2010.

589 F. A. von Hayek, *Zgubna pycha rozumu*. . . , pp. 20–24.

of submission to the goals that enslave humans. As the institutions of scientific knowledge collapse, burying the moral rules of practicing science in the rubble, the civilizational foundation of knowledge is destroyed.

The classical model of university education complies with the organizational culture defined by creators rather than reviewers. “The logic of creators cannot be restricted to the learning outcomes evaluated in ranking lists. The ranking lists impose a value judgment on knowledge, which leads to authentic thoughts and freedom of speech being absorbed by the order of everyday life.”<sup>590</sup> Until recently, universities used to be reformed by great scientists, thinkers, or at least political visionaries such as Humboldt, Napoleon, or Newman. In order for the national and European qualifications framework to work, it must be internalized by the people responsible for its implementation. It is not enough to create an education quality committee for each level of university education; rather, quality must be incorporated into the syllabuses. Higher education follows the Humboldtian model according to which the content of a class is strictly linked to the research of the academic teacher. The double role of the scholar/academic teacher (or a teaching fellow) gives primacy to the content rooted in a given scholar’s research.

If it is possible to combine numerous transitory models in a way that would solve the paradox of balanced university development and account both for the idea of the university as a venturesome institution and an innovative academic community, then it could be another step in creating the university of a new generation.<sup>591</sup>

There is no point to give too much credit to futuristic visions and getting entangled in dialectics and inherent contradictions while waiting for the paradox to be solved. A better solution is to uphold the tradition that affirms the ideal of the development of a human as a person.

After all, it is university life that should provide grounds for fulfilling one of the most basic requirements of human nature – the need to transcend an individual self through the search for truth. The justification for the pragmatic idea of human knowledge rests here – in the human person, whose being, dignity, and aspirations transcend society

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590 A. Jabłoński, *Kontrowersje wokół rozszerzenia autonomii uczelni w Polsce*, in: *Segmenty aktywności społecznej a wartości: idee a praktyka*, ed. J. Szymczyk, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2012, pp. 88–109.

591 M. Rosa, and L. Wanat, *Paradoks uniwersytetu nowej generacji – instytucja versus wspólnota akademicka*, in: *Uniwersytet trzeciej generacji. Stan i perspektywy rozwoju*, ed. D. Burawski, Europejskie Centrum Wspierania Przedsiębiorczości, Poznań 2013, p. 21.

and civilization. All other functions of science and goals of the university that stem from such challenges as the needs of contemporary societies, developing economies, civilization's technical needs, or environmental threats are secondary when considered through the prism of personalistic optics; the fact that they dominate the university life either destroys or undermines the very meaning of the search for truth that should be the main objective of the academic community, rooted in the very nature of the human person.<sup>592</sup>

### 3. Catholic university as the last stand of knowledge

In one of his last texts published before his death, Leon Dyczewski discussed the nature of a Catholic university.<sup>593</sup> Dyczewski always stressed that bureaucratization and corporatism were killing the identity of the university. He was aware that in order to rectify the university (and especially Polish university) it was necessary to remember about the most important rules and features of a Catholic university. In *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, an apostolic constitution regarding Catholic universities promulgated on 15 August 1990, John Paul II claims that a Catholic university is part of a tradition that dates back to the very beginning of the institution and remains a unique centre of creativity and knowledge that benefits humanity. As a community of *magistrorum et scholarium* who share the love for knowledge, a Catholic university is devoted to research and teaching. Consequently, it fulfils the mission of *gaudium de veritate*, that is finding the joy that stems from searching for truth in all fields of knowledge, discovering it, and sharing it with others.<sup>594</sup> By referring to the roots of the university, Dyczewski urges all scholars responsible for creating and disseminating knowledge not to change their vocation into a job in the so-called higher education units, thus transforming universities into corporations trading in knowledge.

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592 A. Wawrzyniak, "Posłowie. O filozofię uniwersytetu," in: M. A. Krąpiec, *Człowiek, kultura, uniwersytet*, ed. A. Wawrzyniak, Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, Lublin 1982, p. 480.

593 L. Dyczewski, "Wyższe uczelnie kościelne i katolicki uniwersytet w Polsce. Idea i rzeczywistość," in: *Szkolnictwo wyższe, uniwersytet, kształcenie akademickie w obliczu koniecznej zmiany. Ekspertyza Komitetu Socjologii Polskiej Akademii Nauk*, eds. M. Szczepański, K. Szafraniec, and A. Śliz, Komitet Socjologii PAN, Warszawa 2015, pp. 313–351.

594 John Paul II, *Apostolic Constitution of the Supreme Pontiff John Paul II On Catholic Universities*, 1–11. [https://web.archive.org/web/20090829201704/http://www.vatican.va/holy\\_father/john\\_paul\\_ii/apost\\_constitutions/documents/hf\\_jp-ii\\_apc\\_15081990\\_ex-corde-ecclesiae\\_en.html](https://web.archive.org/web/20090829201704/http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_constitutions/documents/hf_jp-ii_apc_15081990_ex-corde-ecclesiae_en.html) (accessed 3 February 2020).

The most important issue regarding higher education, directly connected to Dyczewski's field of research, is a matter of identity, which begins with the nature and goals of the university. Dyczewski lists community and Catholicism as two major features of the university, placing the search for truth as the third; subsequent features include cooperation, autonomy, quality, and the participation in the Bologna Process.<sup>595</sup> Dyczewski's vision of the university is in accordance with the second part of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, where the university is called an academic community whose actions are scientific and critical.<sup>596</sup> Through research, teaching, and numerous services provided to local, national, and international communities, the university contributes to the advancement of human dignity and cultural heritage.

In *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, John Paul II stresses the fact that the foundation of the university is to serve truth. It is an existential task of combining the search for truth that is yet to be uncovered with the certainty about the source of truth. *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* accounts for Saint Augustine's understanding of knowledge according to which it is possible to approach truth through different interpretations of reality as long as the false vision of reality, one that stands in opposition to faith, is rejected. Each vision of reality is a solution to humanity's most pressing problems, meant to lead to truth in the light of faith. By serving truth, a Catholic university develops human dignity and cultivates the Church's tradition that considers truth an ally of both reason and faith. Considered from that point of view, Catholic universities are required to undergo a constant revival – because they are universities and because they are Catholic. The revival requires one to realize that the Catholic nature of a university makes it more capable of a selfless search for truth, the search that is not conditioned upon any particular interests.<sup>597</sup>

Placing truth as the main goal of the university coincides with the theses of Kazimierz Twardowski's speech – *On the university's dignity* – delivered during a graduation ceremony where an honorary degree was conferred upon Twardowski. Twardowski considers the university an institution whose goal is to obtain truths and scientific probabilities, and to disseminate the skills that help in obtaining them. The core of the university work is research, both factual and methodological. These efforts lay the foundation for the edifice of scientific

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595 L. Dyczewski, *Wyższe uczelnie kościelne. . .*, pp. 320–324.

596 Ibid.

597 John Paul II, *Apostolic Constitution of the Supreme Pontiff John Paul II On Catholic Universities*, 7.



knowledge, the knowledge that is objective, one that demands recognition on the grounds of its logical justification alone, and one that forces itself on the human mind only by the irrefutable force of its argumentation.<sup>598</sup> Twardowski stresses the fact that the nature of the university rests in objective research. Already in the thirteenth century, the academic community gained autonomy expressed in the theses condemned by the bishop of Paris in 1277. The condemned theses included:

That, besides the philosophic disciplines, all the sciences are necessary but only on account of human custom. That there is no more excellent state than to study philosophy. That there is no rationally disputable question that the philosopher ought not to dispute and determine, because reasons are derived from things. It belongs to the philosopher under one or another of its parts to consider all things. That man should not be content with authority to have certitude about any question. That one does not know anything more by the fact he knows theology. That the Christian law impedes learning.<sup>599</sup>

The Condemnations of 1277 reassured the Church's monopoly on a religious interpretation of the world, simultaneously preventing the dissipation of knowledge.

The mission of Catholicism was to take belief in a transcendent world and— through institutionalization, conversion, and the elimination of everything real or imagined that provided an alternative— turn it into a religion open to all. It is here that we find in Catholicism the genealogical origins of the idea of humanity.<sup>600</sup>

Therefore, Dyczewski considers community to be the major feature of a Catholic university. Writing about community, John Paul II claims:

A Catholic University pursues its objectives through its formation of an authentic human community animated by the spirit of Christ. The source of its unity springs from a common dedication to the truth, a common vision of the dignity of the human person and, ultimately, the person and message of Christ which gives the Institution its distinctive character.<sup>601</sup>

When considered from this point of view, stressing the uniqueness of the academic community acquires a new meaning. Dyczewski is aware that the search

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598 K. Twardowski, *O dostojęństwie uniwersytetu*, Uniwersytet Poznański, Poznań 1933, par. 3.

599 J. P. Reemtsma, *Trust and Violence: An Essay on a Modern Relationship*, trans. D. Bonfiglio, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2012, p. 32.

600 *Ibid.*, p. 33.

601 John Paul II, *Apostolic Constitution of the Supreme Pontiff John Paul II On Catholic Universities*, 21.

for truth is an immanent objective of the university; community, however, is the rule that synthesizes all its structural elements. Without community, the search for truth may succumb to bureaucratic authority. Rules dictated by good university traditions are replaced by laws. These traditions build a community whose unity is rooted in values and moral standards. The most visible reference to the values inherent to the academic tradition is the obligation to serve truth and raise the future generations – national elites – to follow the same calling. In spite of abstract declarations about expanding the university's autonomy, if moral obligations are replaced with laws, the university becomes a corporation rather than a *universitas magistrorum et scholarium*. The contradiction of centralism and laissez-faireism finds its dialectical synthesis in centrally planned competitiveness.

The university becomes a contemporary organization where the search for truth is almost imperceptibly transformed into the production of knowledge. That is why Dyczewski advocates for the protection of the communal nature of the university from the dangers of fragmentation, bureaucracy, alienation, mass production, and territorial dispersion. Dyczewski's sociological analysis of the university is complemented by the emphasis he places on the role the university plays in socialization – the so-called spiritual formation. This formation protects students from the closing of the mind and the spirituality this closing creates. Not only do the closing of the mind and liberal neutralism that accompanies it lead to dullness, but they also create antagonisms that significantly surpass all benefits of clear arguments about ideas, views, and stands.<sup>602</sup> Detachment from all ideas makes that detachment the only idea whose protection is beyond any cultural restrictions. It becomes especially visible if it concerns a community traditionally organized around common values and goods.<sup>603</sup> In that case, the majority must follow enlightened rules and renounce their attachment to tradition in order not to threaten the minority. Thus, in the past the university underwent nationalization and became part of a bureaucratic machine whose major goal was to educate office workers. The change met with opposition from the academic community and revived the discourse on the function and meaning of universities, leading Wilhelm von Humboldt and John H. Newman to formulate, in the nineteenth

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602 A. Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today's Students*, Simon and Schuster, New York 1987.

603 L. Dyczewski (ed.), *Wartości w kulturze polskiej*, Fundacja Pomocy Szkołom Polskim na Wschodzie im. Tadeusza Goniewicza, Lublin 1993.

century, two ideas of a modern university. Both projects renounced enlightened utilitarianism, stressed the need for the separation between the university and both the state and religion, emphasized the freedom of teaching and learning, and underlined the universal nature of knowledge.<sup>604</sup>

As noticed by Ludwik Fleck, even though sociological analysis may consider different ways of thinking as parts of mental collectives, there is no universal method of creating science. In culture, “there are always other connections which are also to be found in the content of knowledge that are not explicable in terms either of psychology (both individual and collective) or of history. For this very reason these seem to be ‘real,’ ‘objective,’ and ‘true’ relations. We call them the passive connections in contrast with the others which we call active.”<sup>605</sup> As a result, the development of scientific cognition is conditioned upon the object of cognition and real, objective, and true statements regarding that object. Otherwise, science becomes merely one of many forms of social activity subordinate to collective thinking. More importantly, however, if collective thinking does not provide grounds for developing objective knowledge, it becomes an expression of the authorities’ expectations implemented through various forms of violence.

Both the content of knowledge and its material medium become actualized only as someone’s thought, belief, conviction, or opinion. For the thought to be considered as an expression of truth, it should rest on the authority of either gods or wise men. But, as noticed by Peter Sloterdijk:

Two thousand years after Plato wrote it seems as if not only the gods but the wise have abandoned us, and left us alone with our partial knowledge and our ignorance. What is left to us in the place of the wise is their writings, in their glinting brilliance and their increasing obscurity. They still lay in more or less accessible editions; they can still be read, if only one knew why one should bother. It is their fate – to stand in silent bookshelves, like posted letters no longer collected, sent to us by authors, of whom we no longer know whether or not they could be our friends.<sup>606</sup>

Sloterdijk points out that the grand ideas of the humanities, the wisdom that must be rooted in the authority of the gods and the wise, no longer affect people. Once a deep science about the human condition, the humanities have been

604 Ł. Afeltowicz, R. Sojak, *Arystokraci i rzemieślnicy. Synergia stylów badawczych*, WN UMK, Toruń 2015, p. 187.

605 L. Fleck, *Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact*, trans. F. Bradley and T. J. Trenn, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 1981, p. 10.

606 P. Sloterdijk, “Rules for the Human Zoo: a response to the Letter on Humanism,” *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 2009, vol. 27, p. 27.

transformed into a grand cultural archive. The archivists, in turn, have long lost insight into life and are preoccupied with the search for answers to the questions whose origin has been long forgotten.

The gradual disappearance of the humanist insight into reality, the decline of the institutions traditionally endowed with the task of controlling knowledge, and the deterioration of the academic community replaced by the individualist *cogito ergo sum*, lead to verifiable experiences being regarded as the confirmation of one's perceptions, sensations, and ideas. The shift was connected with a specific understanding of the figure of the idol seen as the resemblance emitted by objects, which creates cognitive illusions<sup>607</sup> that must be overcome. Overthrowing idols that guarantee the objectivity of knowledge is a symptom of the collapse of the rationality principle guarded by wisdom, institutions, and shared experiences. The rationality principle has been replaced by the individual search for the experimental forms of the usable world. The failure of humans who had lost the ability to recognize reality was compensated by the invention of science which allowed them to gain control over nature and regain their dominant position in the world. As noticed by Girard, "in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Westerners made an idol of science and believed in an autonomous scientific spirit of which they were both the inventors and the product. They replaced the ancient myths with those of progress, which might be called the myth of perpetual modern superiority, the myth of a humanity that, through its own instrumentality, gradually became liberated and divine."<sup>608</sup>

According to Dyczewski, from a sociological point of view, the Catholic nature of the university preceded truth. For centuries, Catholicism served as the ideological foundation of the university's mission; by referring to the unifying legacy of sacrum and transcendence, it allowed to overcome the earthly dimension for the 'rites of cognition' of absolute truth. According to Dyczewski, the division of both Western Christianity and modernization resulted in the university becoming an environment preparing individuals to serve the state's numerous departments. Nowadays, the university is primarily connected to the market.<sup>609</sup> Knowledge, no longer associated with wisdom or truth, nor considered a tool useful in overcoming problems, becomes an object of consumerism.

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607 A. Jabłoński, "Iluzja językowa i ikoniczna w społecznym widzeniu świata," in: *Wiedza między słowem a obrazem*, eds. M. Zemło, A. Jabłoński, and J. Szymczyk, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2010, pp. 13–31.

608 R. Girard, *The Scapgoat*, trans. Y. Freccero, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1986, p. 204.

609 L. Dyczewski, *Wyższe uczelnie kościelne*. . . , pp. 322–350.

The social dimension of consumerism is best explained by the rules of McDonaldization listed by George Ritzer: efficiency, calculability, predictability, and control. Ritzer claims that the features characteristic of fast-food restaurants spread to other spheres of social life – education, work, healthcare, travel, leisure, and family. Efficiency is the optimal way to achieve a given goal, for example to travel from point A to point B. Calculability introduces numerical value as a measure of quality, thus allowing control and facilitating comparison. Thanks to predictability, one may expect to find the same goods and services in different corners of the world. Due to meticulous, retail control over the behaviour of social actors, achieved through the implementation of a series of organizational and technical solutions, it is possible to manipulate the actors.<sup>610</sup> Organized according to the aforementioned rules, consumption meets consumers' expectations; what is more, consumers quickly become accustomed to these standards. When knowledge follows the rules of McDonaldization, it produces inadvertent consequences; the greater the complexity and globalization of knowledge, the bigger the risk of failure. The information age increases uncertainty, instability and the risk of the domino effect and catastrophes. Once a certain critical point is crossed, changes stop being merely side effects and start transforming the society. Similarly to the excess of information that results in disorientation, innovation, through unrestricted consumption, starts threatening the world. According to Dyczewski, the university must introduce self-imposed restrictions on the free market spreading within its walls. These restrictions must follow moral standards that will allow for the evaluation of scholars' conduct, as well as the analysis of the consequences of scientific discoveries and the social effects of teaching.

Dyczewski introduces the notion of truth only after providing the aforementioned ethical and formative context. For him, the search for truth consists of activities accompanied not only by joy but also by hardship and sacrifice. He is not interested in the nature of truth but in the existential situation of people who search for, find, accept, and disseminate it. "The true joy one gains from learning truth is inextricably linked with the effort that marks the life of the master and the student. The university, therefore, is a place where humans fascinated with truth, by overcoming their limitations, attempt to explore it and preach it to the world."<sup>611</sup> When considered from this point of view, truth gains a social dimension.

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610 G. Ritzer, *Makdonaldyzacja społeczeństwa*, trans. S. Magala, Warszawskie Wydawnictwo Literackie MUZA SA, Warszawa 1997, pp. 31–36.

611 L. Dyczewski, *Wyższe uczelnie kościelne*. . . , p. 322.

The final features listed in Dyczewski's analysis of the university are cooperation, autonomy, quality, and the participation in the Bologna Process. Although Dyczewski does not discuss these features in detail, he stresses the academic community's autonomy from outside authorities. His aim is to demonstrate that the university's autonomy is a precondition of creativity; without it, scholars become dependent on the culture of imitators and reviewers brought about by the recontextualization of knowledge, namely, information discourse being transformed into regulating discourse. A symptom of that transformation may be, for example, a competition to win the reviewers' favour. An intrinsic feature of the contemporary society based on competition is the tendency to create hierarchies and all kinds of standards for comparison. However, all spots in the race must be redistributed according to egalitarian premises – all competitors must have an equal chance of winning. It is necessary to recognize the fact that the difference between the winners and the losers – whether on the stadium or on the market – neither confirms nor creates a qualitative difference but is merely an outcome of a changeable ranking list.<sup>612</sup> Such a diagnosis indicates the prevalence of the logic of the reviewers. The logic of the creators that Dyczewski argues for cannot be limited to the predictable frame of learning outcomes evaluated in rankings. Ranking lists establish value judgments, which leads to the space of authentic thought and freedom of speech being absorbed by the order of everyday life.

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As a community in search for truth, the university is nowadays under pressure to produce innovative knowledge that has practical application. The attempts at such a transformation undermine not only the university's traditional mission, but also its very essence and *raison d'être*. The university's *raison d'être* is its ability to apply the 'we' perspective (of the academic community) and transcend the order of everyday life for the universalism of truth. Its main goal should not be restricted to posing questions inquiring about 'how' and 'why', but should be directed at the search for the conditions of a fulfilled and happy life.

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612 P. Sloterdijk, *Pogarda mas. Szkic o walkach kulturowych we współczesnym społeczeństwie*, trans. B. Baran, Czytelnik, Warszawa 2003, pp. 76 ff.

## VII. PERSONALISM AS THE FOUNDATION OF REALISM IN FRANCISZEK MAZUREK'S SOCIOLOGY

In this text, personalism is understood as a concept of reality allowing to describe this reality according to the guidelines of epistemological realism which can be applied in sociology. Personalism sets the perspective for describing and shaping social order through the prism of a person, thus introducing a realistic approach into the sociological way of thinking about society. The aim here is to create conditions allowing for the implementation of values into social life. These conditions appear as a hard to predict – yet strongly desired – side effect of the affirmation of the human individual. Thus, for sociologists, personalism is something more than a philosophical concept of the human as a person, which serves as a foundation for the construction of social order. Personalism is also something more than an alternative solution in the debate between individualism and organicism, which takes place in social sciences. Personalism is a research program and, at the same time, a project for a realistic creation of social order based on the affirmation of man as a person.

### 1. Personalism or personalisms

Personalism is one of those terms which do not have one specific meaning. Stanisław Kowalczyk notices that the term 'personalism' was already used in the 18th and the 19th centuries by different thinkers, such as Friedrich Schleiermacher, Charles Renouvier, Wilhelm Stern, Borden F. Bowne, Immanuel Kant, Søren Kierkegaard, Gabriel Marcel, Karl Jaspers, Max Scheler, Romano Guardini, Emmanuel Mounier, Jacques Lacroix, and Jacques Maritain.<sup>613</sup> Additionally, there are different currents of personalism: Thomistic-Augustinian (Stanisław Kowalczyk), Augustinian (Johannes Hessen) Thomistic-existential (Jacques Maritain, Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec, Mieczysław Gogacz), Thomistic-phenomenological (Karol Wojtyła – Jan Paweł II), phenomenological (Max Scheler, Romano Guardini, Roman Ingarden, Józef Tischner), Thomistic-axiological (Tadeusz Ślipko, Tadeusz Styczeń), Christian-social (Emmanuel

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613 S. Kowalczyk, *Nurty personalizmu. Od Augustyna do Wojtyły*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2010.

Mounier, Jacques Lacroix, Jan Piwowarczyk, Czesław Strzeszewski, Józef Majka), realistic/universalist (Czesław Bartnik).<sup>614</sup> This diversity reveals the variety of ideological backgrounds behind the idea of the affirmation of the human person.

From the point of view the herein considerations, the most important aspect of all of the above-mentioned approaches is moral obligation, which results from the recognition of the value of dignity of the human person.<sup>615</sup> Franciszek Mazurek,<sup>616</sup> referring to the fundamental work of Karol Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, sees in it a norm and a personalistic rule which is both positive and negative.

As a principle formulated negatively, this norm states that the person is a kind of good that is incompatible with using, which may not be treated as an object of use and, in this sense, as a means to an end. Hand in hand with this goes the positive formulation of the personalistic norm: the person is a kind of good to which only love constitutes the proper and fully-mature relation. And this positive content of the personalistic norm is precisely what the commandment to love brings out.<sup>617</sup>

Thus, personalism includes a basic recommendation to treat the other person as an end, and never as a means to an end. Treating the other person as an end is not synonymous with adopting a theological perspective, that is, making the person an abstract end or ideal which needs to be attained. What the personalistic perspective is concerned with is treating the other person as a reference point for one's own actions, which allows to assume that the effect of those actions will be the kind of good which goes beyond individual interests.

Personalism, in its treatment of the human person, is a very precise approach; the very term, however, can also undergo inflation in terms of its scope and meaning. The reason for this is the fact that personalism simultaneously pertains to recognizing the human as a person, emphasizing the dignity of the human person and humanism that makes humanity a superior value, and – finally – creating a new concept of anthropology.<sup>618</sup> It is the combination of all of these

614 S. Kowalczyk, "Polski personalizm współczesny," in: S. Kowalczyk, *Z refleksji nad człowiekiem. Człowiek, społeczność, wartość*, Wydawnictwo TN KUL, Lublin 1995, pp. 23–43; K. Guzowski, "S. Kowalczyk: personalizm realistyczno-dynamiczny," in: S. Kowalczyk, *Nurty personalizmu. . .*, pp. 235–246.

615 F. Mazurek, *Godność osoby ludzkiej podstawą praw człowieka*, RW KUL, Lublin 2001, p. 49.

616 Ibid.

617 K. Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. G. Ignatik, Pauline Books and Media, Boston 2013, p. 25.

618 J. M. Burgos, *Personalizm. Autorzy i tematy nowej filozofii*, trans. K. Koprowski, Wydawnictwo Centrum Myśli Jana Pawła II, Warszawa 2010, pp. 153–205.



perspectives and the recognition of all of the consequences that result from their adoption that allow to make the person the key to seeing the complete reality. This allows to creatively respond to all reductionist approaches to the understanding of man which lay at the foundations of great worldviews (scientism, positivism) and social phenomena (socialism, communism, totalitarianism).<sup>619</sup>

## 2. Realism in the understanding of society

In sociology, realism pertains to the debate on the object of the study, which objectively exists and is not merely an abstract construct. According to Jan Turowski, the debate can be described as an argument between organicism and nominalism (between mechanicism and a social agreement).<sup>620</sup> Such a framing seems much more apt than the one proposed by Jerzy Szacki, who saw it as a relation between collectivism and individualism,<sup>621</sup> and drew a line of opposite, ideology-based approaches (communism/socialism-liberalism/capitalism) searching for their dialectical synthesis. Turowski, on the other hand, points to the vivid moral and political consequences which make both seemingly opposite choices versions of the same instrumental approach to treating the person as a means to an end. The solution to this debate, in Turowski's view, lies therefore not in some synthetic balancing, but in adopting a totally different logic in perceiving reality.

The approach which Turowski considers as realistic is the one proposed by Pitirim Sorokin. Known as the functional theory, Sorokin's perspective is rooted

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619 G. Barth, *W poszukiwaniu jedności doświadczenia personalistycznego*, „Polski Personalizm” <http://hosting0800050.az.pl/personalizm/?p=303>, (accessed 16 February 2019).

620 “Both organicism and nominalistic theories turned out to be anti-humanistic, as they ultimately led to the violation of human rights and human dignity, and made it impossible for people to develop their personalities. The organicism theory, through hypostatizing society, and the state in particular, led to a total engulfment of man by the collective, and made man a means for the collective – in practice, a means for those who control the life of the collective. The individualistic theory, on the other hand, by diminishing the value of the common good and the community – through rejecting social ties – turned the majority of the people into a tool in the hands of a few individuals.” J. Turowski, *Socjologia. Małe struktury społeczne*, TN KUL, Lublin 1993, p. 24.

621 J. Szacki, “Indywidualizm i kolektywizm. Wstępna analiza pojęciowa,” in: *Indywidualizm a kolektywizm*, ed. A. Morstin, Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, Warszawa 1999, pp. 9–21.

in the philosophical works of Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas. Turowski ties this realism to the assumption that “in some areas, the human person is autonomous and transcends the collective; in others, however, the human person is subordinate to the collective. Therefore, the realistic theory – and, within it, the Thomistic theory – rejects the Platonic-organicistic theory which claims that the human person is totally subordinate to society. On the other hand, the realistic theory opposes the individualistic approach which cut the human person’s ties to society.”<sup>622</sup> This vision of realism is, to a large extent, of a negative character, as it is concerned with showing the limitations resulting from the reduction of the human person to an element of a larger whole, or making the human person a free atom with no ties to others.

The positive approach towards the relation between the individual and society, which is important from the point of view of sociological analysis, makes the person an end which is an actual reaction to the presence of the other person. It is the fundament of a rational and realistic way of seeing reality, focused on the ‘we’ perspective. This perspective assumes thinking about the future, which comes from the experience of being in relation with others, which is expressed by the most basic dimension of the human consciousness (*con scientia*, in Latin, means knowledge shared with others).<sup>623</sup> Consciousness is information shared by the individual with the rest of the group or kind,<sup>624</sup> thus including the individual into a dimension of existence which is broader than the one resulting from a simple confrontation with another individual. According to Hannah Arendt:

The only trait that all these various forms and shapes of human plurality have in common is the simple fact of their genesis, that is, that at some moment in time and for some reason a group of people must have come to think of themselves as a ‘We.’ No matter how this ‘We’ is first experienced and articulated, it seems that it always needs a beginning.<sup>625</sup>

Contrary to popular belief, attaining the perspective of the real ‘we’ is not about a spontaneous opening to other people or about their unconditional acceptance. This kind of communication intimacy is insufficient for building a ‘we’ based on

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622 J. Turowski, *Socjologia. Małe struktury społeczne...*, p. 26.

623 S. Kowalczyk, *Zarys filozofii człowieka*, Wydawnictwo Diecezjalne, Sandomierz 1990, p. 55.

624 J. Trąbka, *Dusza mózgu*, Wydawnictwo WAM, Kraków 2000, p. 174.

625 H. Arendt, *Willing*, in: H. Arendt, *The Life of the Mind*, One-volume Edition, A Harvest Bok, San Diego, New York and London 1978, p. 202.

a mutual agreement: what is needed here is participation, being an expression of consciousness which reaches beyond individual egoism.

Sociological realism recognizes the importance of social ties, which Władysław Jacher, and others, considered to be the key concept in the entire sociology. The idea is not synonymous with making the individual subordinate to the group, but it assumes that “every group, if it is to last, has to possess something holding it together from the inside, something which causes its members to remain loyal, something which guarantees that the needs of the people within this group are satisfied, something which allows this group to remain integral and develop. To sum up, every group and every kind of collective needs to have its inner bond.”<sup>626</sup> The social bond is therefore a form of collective consciousness – it provides people with a sense of unity and solidarity as natural forms of cooperation.<sup>627</sup> It is difficult to imagine a realistic approach to society without taking into account these relations. Even though their character may be superficial and conventional, it may as well be much deeper and organic, helping in building societies and communities.

In the language of personalism, the deeper character of bonds is described with the term ‘participation.’ It can be understood as a call for entering a community, which allows to fully develop the human ‘we.’

The transition from the multi-subjectivity to the subjectivity of many is a proper and full meaning of the human ‘we.’ Participation – a feature of each ‘I’ thanks to which one may find his or her fulfilment by living and acting with others – does not stand in opposition to such an understanding of social community; in fact, only participation may result both in such an understanding and the creation of social community: the fulfilment of the human ‘we’ in its full authenticity, as the true subjectivity of many.<sup>628</sup>

Participation, therefore, allows the individual to express his personal being directed at another person. It allows to solidify, secure, and develop personal subjectivity through a fulfilment reached by working with others. Participation is an antithesis of alienating man by man – an attitude which comes from disregarding “the depth of participation embedded in the term ‘neighbour’ and by the neglect of the interrelations and intersubordinations of men in their

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626 W. Jacher, *Więź społeczna w teorii i praktyce*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Katowice 1987, p. 9. See J. Szczepański, *Elementarne pojęcia socjologii*, PWN, Warszawa 1970, p. 118.

627 W. Jacher, *Więź społeczna*. . . , p. 13.

628 K. Wojtyła, “Osoba: podmiot i wspólnota,” in: idem, *Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne*, TN KUL, Lublin 1994, p. 411.

humaneness expressed by this term, which indicates the most fundamental principle of any real community.”<sup>629</sup>

The personalistic perspective allows to understand man as a subject who controls his own acts. He is then not the product of his own acts, or, even more so, not a product of a programmed arrangement, system, or any organization with its structure and functions. Man is treated as an entity capable of a critical control and the development of a coherent project of personality, even when he fails to utilize his intelligence. “There are rich resources in intelligence, which means that, against all odds, in the end, it will triumph, unless the humankind degrades, indulging in the kind of happiness typical for swine or wolves. This temptation will always accompany man luring him from far away.”<sup>630</sup>

Thanks to memory, man possesses resources which make up his self-knowledge. “In spite of its specific conscious character, consciousness integrated by self-knowledge into the whole of a real person retains its objective significance and thus also the objective status in the subjective structure of man. In this perspective and due to this status, consciousness appears but the key to the subjectivity of man, and so it in no way can serve as the basis for subjectivism. It owes its role in human subjectivity to its being the condition of experience, in which the human ego reveals itself (experientially) as the object.”<sup>631</sup> It is therefore necessary to develop a sense of realism, free from excessive trustfulness and distrustfulness, which in everyday contacts with people would allow to set the limits of one’s autonomy and gain self-understanding. “One of the peculiarities of the traditional human self-image is that people often speak and think of individuals and societies as if these were two phenomena existing separately – of which, moreover, one is often considered ‘real’ and the other ‘unreal’ – instead of two different aspects of the same human being.”<sup>632</sup> Therefore, the integral concept of man is not the basis of some sociological theory; rather, it is the background of actual sociological analyses. Not only does the integral concept of man require adopting a humanist paradigm of practicing sociology, but it can also be applied

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629 K. Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, trans. A. Potocki, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht 1979, p. 199.

630 J. A. Marina, *Porażka inteligencji czyli głupota w teorii i praktyce*, trans. K. Jachimska-Małkiewicz, Wydawnictwo WAM, Kraków 2010, p. 211.

631 K. Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*. . . , p. 42.

632 N. Elias, *O procesie cywilizacji: analizy socjo- i psychogenetyczne*, trans. T. Zabłudowski, K. Markiewicz, W.A.B., Warszawa 2011, p. 49.

into all research projects as an interpretative framework for the complex character of the social life of man.<sup>633</sup>

### 3. Personalism and sociological analysis

One of the thinkers who recognized the connection between sociological analysis and the spirit of personalism was Franciszek Mazurek. Mazurek unequivocally claimed:

The innate and inalienable dignity of the human person is exceptionally applicable to all aspects and all extents of lives and activities of people (of man). It can be applied to social, political, and economic systems. It can also be applied to different disciplines: philosophy, ethics, economy, pedagogy, psychology, sociology, political sciences, medicine, biotechnology, and even technical sciences.<sup>634</sup>

Subsequently, Mazurek elaborated on his suggestions regarding sociology, pointing to its humanistic tradition represented in the approach of Florian Znaniecki, which – according to Mazurek – provided grounds for “creating a personalistic sociology, as it is the *persona* (the human person) who is the acting, creating, and culture-creating subject.”<sup>635</sup> Mazurek also warned against reductionist tendencies in sociology which lead to the disregard for personal dignity and limit the analysis to matters of personality, individual motivations, or even ordinary reactions to environmental stimuli.<sup>636</sup>

The classics of sociology try to find balance between their considerations about social reality and the recognition of the intentionality of human actions,

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633 According to Ulrich Beck, in spite of extensive sociological research on the lack of security, sociologists usually focus on the lack of social security, disregarding the dramatic decline in the security of life. Beck claims that the state, science, and economy, traditionally responsible for providing citizens with that sense of security, no longer fulfil that function, passing the responsibility for one's security onto the 'self-conscious citizen.' Beck asks how an individual can achieve what neither the state nor science was able to provide? According to him, sociology's goal is to expose the hypocrisy of the second modernity and address all the complicated challenges faced by the citizens of the world risk society. U. Beck, *Spółeczeństwo światowego ryzyka. W poszukiwaniu utraconego bezpieczeństwa*, trans. B. Baran, Wydawnictwo Naukowe SCHOLAR, Warszawa 2012, p. 74.

634 F. Mazurek, “Czy katolicka nauka społeczna może mieć znaczenie dla socjologów,” in: *Spółeczeństwo – przestrzeń – rodzina. Księga jubileuszowa dedykowana Profesorowi Piotrowi Kryczce*, ed. M. Szyszka, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2009, p. 96.

635 *Ibid.*, p. 97.

636 F. Mazurek, *Godność osoby ludzkiej*. . . , pp. 55–57.

even if it is clear that the actors are not aware of the sense of many of their own actions. The creation of ideal models is constantly confronted with the concreteness of reality. Max Weber writes:

Sociology has no difficulty recognising a variety of coexisting, contradictory orders within the same human group, for even the individual can orient his action to mutually inconsistent orders. And this can occur not only successively, as happens daily, but in the selfsame action. Anyone involved in a duel orients his action to the code of honour when concealing his action, or, conversely, orients his action to the criminal code if he gives himself up to the police.<sup>637</sup>

It is therefore assumed that although there is a connection between man and the social structures in which he is acting, these social structures do not influence him in a cause and effect type manner. Contemporary sociological theories do not treat social reality as objectively existing and independent from subjective definitions, and their approach towards the object of research can be characterized as subject–subject (or notion–notion) rather than subject–object (or notion–thing). This approach to social reality can be more or less radical, and thus more or less judging in regards to the studied reality. A multi-dimensional perspective on society breaks with the juxtaposition of statically perceived closed structures and human individuals, proposing in its place the concept of society as ‘interpersonal communication networks’ dependent on human activity, transformed and transforming, not having a fixed form, but influencing, through its structures, the human subjects who transform it – as described, for instance, in the theory of autopoietic systems by N. Luhman, the theory of structuration by A. Giddens, the theory of structuralist constructivism by P. Bourdieu, and the morphogenetic theory of society by M. Archer.<sup>638</sup> Sociology is increasingly becoming a platform for meta-reflection – reflection on human reflection – which serves as an intermediary between the theory and practice of a scientific approach towards organizing the world, contributing to a reduction of the spectrum of the unexpected side effects.

A realistic analysis of social life assumes the need for considering the subjectivity of people’s rationality, although not as an assumption that all people act rationally, but as a recognition of the fact that man, as an acting subject, is

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637 M. Weber, *Economy and Society*, trans. K. Tribe, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2019, p. 110.

638 A. Jabłoński, “Socjologia. II. Kierunki,” in: *Encyklopedia Katolicka*, vol. 18, TN KUL, Lublin 2013, pp. 677–678.

someone who is able to find the right solutions to specific situations.<sup>639</sup> In the language of personalism, this concept of ‘being someone’ is expressed by the notion of *suppositum*.

The person would be an individual whose nature is rational – according to Boethius’ full definition *persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia*. Nevertheless, in our perspective it seems clear that neither the concept of the ‘rational nature’ nor that of its individualization seems to express fully the specific completeness expressed by the concept of the person. The completeness we are speaking of here seems to be something that is unique in a very special sense rather than concrete. In everyday use we may substitute for a person the straightforward ‘somebody.’ It serves as a perfect semantic epitome because of the immediate connotations it brings to mind – and with them the juxtaposition and contrast to ‘something.’ If the person were identified with its basic ontological structure, then it would at once become necessary to take account of the difference that distinguishes ‘somebody’ and ‘something.’<sup>640</sup>

This allows to see that although not all actors engaged in social life act rationally, meaning that they do not rely on reason only, they all act as subjects with self-knowledge, which accounts for the structural-spatial and processual-temporal nature of society.

Commenting on the ideas of Sorokin, I would like to draw attention to the need for an analysis of society as social space, which is analogous to physical (geometric) space, yet, at the same time, substantially different. In *Social Mobility*, Sorokin points out that such an approach is a way to go beyond ‘the labels,’ ‘signs,’ or ‘verbal reactions,’<sup>641</sup> which obscure social reality. When analysing social space it is, therefore, necessary to take into account the actual relation of a given individual to a given group, and then to see this group in relation to other groups

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639 On the relationship between the rationality principle and rational behaviours, see J. H. Goldthorpe, *O socjologii. Integracja badań i teorii*, trans. J. Słomczyńska, Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, Warszawa 2012; K. R. Popper, *The Myth of the Framework: In Defence of Science and Rationality*, ed. M. A. Notturmo, Routledge, London and New York 1997.

640 K. Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*. . . , pp. 73 ff.

641 “If a picture is drawn of a tree whose title is nevertheless, ‘A Fish,’ only one insane may say, ‘This is a picture of a fish.’ Unfortunately, in social sciences such insane statements are still very numerous. Authors still do not understand that the labels and the real situation, the speech reactions of a man and his real behavior may be quite different. If in a constitution is written ‘all men are equal,’ they often conclude that in such a society the equality is realized. If a man abundantly produces sonorous phrases, then for this reason he is judged as ‘open-minded,’ ‘progressive,’ ‘protector of the laboring classes’ and so on, regardless of his real behavior.” P. A. Sorokin, *Social Mobility*, Routledge/Thoemmes Press, London 1998, p. 17.

of population, and finally to compare different groups of population with each other. This allows to understand that any organized social group, in order to maintain its structural integrity, out of necessity, becomes layered. As Sorokin notices,

Christianity started its history with an attempt to create an equal society; very soon, especially after 313 A.D., it already had a complicated hierarchy, and soon finished by the creation of a tremendous pyramid, with numerous ranks and titles, beginning with the omnipotent pope and ending with that of a lawless heretic.<sup>642</sup>

The above statement, apart from its simplifying nature, seems to juxtapose labels with reality. It is quite pointless to question these facts as social stratification results from the natural order of things. The division of people into different levels of the social structure is something which can be undermined only in the name of dangerous stereotypes of universal equality. Thus, instead of fighting reality in the name of utopian projects of changes, it is better to build more realistic models of social diversity, which can lead to the development of reforms countering the unwanted consequences of rational human actions.

A realistic thinking about the social world makes it necessary to take into account the man-specific ability to control time. Natural sciences took control of space and created an abstract way of its comprehension, subjugated to its pragmatic use. Transferring this kind of approach to controlling time results in remaining on the level of measurements and chronological arrangements. What needs to be done, however, is to employ the science-specific desire for a conscious navigation in reality. Instead of fighting science, it is better to develop techniques of 'capitalizing time.' The techniques of capitalizing time, unlike the techniques of controlling space, are not concerned with setting limits, finish lines, or time segments, but rather with limiting one's own freedom through the use of deadlines. "The more wisely chosen deadlines there are in one's life, the more time one saves and has at his disposal."<sup>643</sup>

The task of controlling time, characteristic for the humanities, and thus the main part of sociology, concerns the ability to define the content of the aims which should determine human actions. Marina writes:

What this means is that there is a necessity to strip off the facade of greatness from different, well known historical stories, full of cruelty and hate. As I have already said, we need to redefine history: we need to abolish all forms of glorifying failure and replace

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642 Ibid., p. 15.

643 F. Koneczny, *O wielości cywilizacyj*, Fundacja Pomocy Antyk „Wydawnictwo Antyk Marcin Dybowski,” Warszawa 2002, p. 331.



them with a new model of sensitivity, which will contest praising ignorance and primitive esthetical tolerance towards brutality.<sup>644</sup>

Shifting the discussion to the Polish setting, in order to illustrate the thesis about the need for controlling time through its proper conceptualization, I would like to quote the words of Ewa Thompson:

Civilization begins where a significant percentage of population (and the elites) understands that the words of the ancient Greeks, who claimed that acting without virtues will lead us into murder and self-destruction, have not expired. Barbarism begins where the majority of society (including the elites) starts to believe in the saying 'do what you feel,' let's have fun as long as it's possible. Because finally, after communism, we are free.<sup>645</sup>

The personalistic perspective allows one to organize sociological analyses by determining the place of the future in human thinking. It is concerned with recognizing the fact that a person who is present in a specific social setting is able to act beyond self-interest and work with others for the good of other people. The idea has been vividly described by Roger Scruton in the following way: "I, as an understanding subject, see the world as a theatre of activity in which I and my goals take centre stage. My aim is to maximize my abilities, gain funds which will allow me to complete my goals, convince others to join my side and work with them on overcoming the obstacles that are on my way. This kind of attitude, which is deeply focused on the 'I', is deeply rooted in the psyche. 'I' reaches to the past and takes advantage of its prerogatives. Its ambitions are endless and it recognizes no limits, only obstacles. In emergency situations, the 'I' takes charge and does all that it can do to enhance its power or increase its range of activity. [...] On the other hand, the attitude focused on the 'we' is careful. It sees human decisions as determined, limited by time, space, community, tradition, faith, and law. It encourages us to not always get involved into the whirlwind of events, but rather take a step back and think. It emphasizes the significance of limitations and borders, and reminds us about the imperfection of man and the fragility of existing communities. In its decisions, it takes into consideration other people and different times."<sup>646</sup> This style of thinking establishes a perspective which allows

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644 J. A. Marina, *Porażka inteligencji*. . . , p. 210.

645 E. Thompson, *Nie wracajcie do Barbarii*, „Rzeczpospolita” 2012, 10 November, <http://www.rp.pl/artykul/61991,950318-Nie-wracajcie-do-Barbarii.html>, (accessed 3 February 2020).

646 R. Scruton, *Pożytki z pesymizmu i niebezpieczeństwa fałszywej nadziei*, trans. T. Bieroń, Wydawnictwo Zysk i S-ka, Poznań 2012, pp. 19, 22 ff.

one to organize social reality not through optimizing the efficiency of human actions, but rather through minimizing the risk of the unintended and unwanted effects of rational human actions. Social analyses, under such circumstances, serve to protect rational projects of social change from becoming disconnected from the lives of the common people. Above all, such analyses focus on how to avoid inflicting suffering on people or, using a broader category, how not to be the cause of their unhappiness. This creates a chance for optimizing the control functions performed by systems of human culture, which preserve social mechanisms of dealing with problems. This can be achieved through the restoration of the old and well-known value of the “we” and by avoiding all the extravagances that come with different forms of social engineering, including subjectivity engineering.<sup>647</sup> A practical example of such thinking is piecemeal social engineering, which serves to eliminate the valueless means which can endanger individual human interests. As the author of *Open Society* observes, “the degree of complication which we can tackle is governed by the degree of our experience gained in conscious and systematic piecemeal engineering.”<sup>648</sup>

Perceiving human behaviour in terms of the limited rationality of the human “we” is a practical conclusion pertaining to the opinion of the people on the issues that they consider vital, such as the differences in salaries within society. In highly developed societies, in which the logic of acting is based upon the ability to understand the necessity of the increase in the division of labour, there is a common acceptance of the inequality of people’s incomes. Henryk Domański believes it to be “an illustration of the truth, expressed in the Hegelian thought, that if something exists, it has to exist. Thus, the inequalities become legitimized by the fact of their existence, and their persistence in time stabilizes the social structure and prevents the eruption of conflicts.”<sup>649</sup> Although by referring to Hegel’s ideas one is able to legitimize any absurd claim (if a given interpretation contradicts reality, the worse for the reality), it seems that the acceptance of a certain level of inequality can be explained with people’s ability to think in terms of “we.” The justification of this thesis can be seen in the acceptance of wage disparity, which was believed to come with a general increase of welfare,

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647 K. Wielecki, *Podmiotowość w dobie kryzysu postindustrializmu. Między indywidualizmem a kolektywizmem*, Centrum Europejskie Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2003, pp. 15 ff.

648 K. R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford 2013, p. 603.

649 H. Domański, *Sprawiedliwe nierówności zarobków w odczuciu społecznym*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe SCHOLAR, Warszawa 2013, p. 34.

right before the change of the political system (1988), and a significant increase in the number of those protesting against wage disparity at the time of the world economic crisis 20 years later.<sup>650</sup> The acceptance of this inequality was connected with the hope for a better future; the objection towards inequality, even if it were to guarantee a general increase of welfare, is a product of egoistic selfishness and the prevalence of the zero-sum stereotype.<sup>651</sup>

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To sum up, the demise of the ability to perceive reality from a personalistic perspective lies at the foundation of unrealistic analyses, diagnoses, and postulates for changing social reality. Sociology based on the notion of “we” understood in personalistic terms gains a realistic outlook on social structures and processes, and becomes able to create proper conditions for introducing conscious change for the good of the human person.

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650 Ibid., pp. 163 ff.

651 To illustrate this phenomenon, Roger Scruton gives an example of Jack and Jill. The fact that Jack has more money than Jill is not, in itself, a sign of injustice. However, if Jack belongs to a higher social class than Jill, it leads people to believe that it is at the expense of Jill's class. This way of thinking is accounted for by the Marxist theory of added value, but it is also one of the most important motives for social change in modern times, one that undermines real justice and replaces it with pseudo-justice. R. Scruton, *Pożytki z pesymizmu*. . . , pp. 97 ff.



## VIII. JERZY REBETA'S ANALYSIS OF THE FIFTEENTH-CENTURY PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY VERSUS THE CONTEMPORARY LOGIC OF SOCIOLOGICAL PERSUASION

One of Jerzy Rebeta's most significant academic achievements is the study of Polish social thought during the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance. The goal of the present article is to elucidate how Rebeta's research may be applied to determine the meta-theoretical assumptions of social sciences. This approach may be particularly beneficial in reconciling two contradictory goals of social sciences: their attempt to shape the reflectiveness of social subjects and their goal to remain objective, scientific thought. First, it is essential to clarify the approach to social issues based on practical (moral) philosophy that takes primacy over theoretical philosophy. Secondly, it is crucial to illuminate the connection between the rhetorical functions of language and a given perception of society. Finally, the goal is to consider how rhetorical functions of language affect the public space, which coincides with the postulates of contemporary social theories. Even though Rebeta neither proposed nor followed the aforementioned steps, they are based on his research on the history of social thought – Rebeta considered the achievements of medieval Polish thinkers to be both objective and unique. Therefore, my goal is to present how Rebeta's findings may illuminate contemporary trends in social sciences.

### 1. Social sciences versus practical philosophy

The relationship between philosophy and social sciences has a long tradition that dates back to the philosophical foundation of social sciences which brought about the foregrounding of not only ontological and epistemological matters but also methodology. Sociology's indebtedness to philosophy touches upon such issues as the relation between an individual and a social whole, individualism and holism, psychologism and sociologism, naturalism and constructivism, explaining and understanding, or the relation between the nomological and idiographic model of social sciences.<sup>652</sup> Nowadays, scholars attempt to

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652 A. Jabłoński, *Status teoretyczny i funkcja techniczna wiedzy o społeczeństwie. Wokół myśli Józefa M. Bocheńskiego i Karla R. Poppera*, TN KUL, Lublin 2002.

reconcile these contradictory approaches by suggesting numerous forms of the so-called third way in sociology. This perspective oscillates between naturalistic approaches that consider sociology to be a positivistic science that follows the principles of natural sciences and anti-naturalistic approaches that focus on understanding and interpretation.

Such a search for the middle ground often suffers from the misinterpretation of the practical nature of sociological thinking. The ambition of nineteenth-century thinkers was to replace a metaphysical way of thinking with a scientific (positivistic) one. Leaving aside numerous circumstances responsible for the advent of that approach, the objective was to replace philosophical speculations about social life with empirical research. The fathers of sociology made a mistake of following in Francis Bacon's footsteps. Bacon, who intended to replace Aristotle's "old" *Organon* with *Novum Organum*, initiated an approach that aimed to regulate social life with new faith in scientific progress.<sup>653</sup> Industrialization and technical development transformed that approach into technocratic management of the social order.<sup>654</sup> This approach abandoned the clear division between metaphysics, theoretical philosophy, and practical philosophy, symptomatic for classical thought. As a result, the approach no longer accounted for the classical wisdom according to which the world independent of human actions operates according to different rules than the world created by humans. According to Rebeta, this wisdom was not yet lost on the fifteenth-century social thinkers in Poland. Rebeta claims that scholars from the University of Cracow believed that there existed two competitive criteria: one was practical and its main goal was the well-being of the Polish society and the Polish nation;<sup>655</sup> the

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653 See M. Horkheimer, and T. W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*, trans. E. Jephcott, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2002.

654 A. Jabłoński, "Technokratyzm," in: *Encyklopedia Katolicka*, vol. XIX, TN KUL, Lublin 2014, pp. 575 ff; idem, "Technokratyzm jako zagrożenie dla integralnego rozwoju ludzkiego," in: *Spółczeństwo, gospodarka, ekologia. Perspektywa encykliki społecznej "Caritas in veritate"*, eds. S. Fel, M. Hułas, and S. G. Raabe, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2010, pp. 153–172; idem, "Rozwój naukowo-techniczny a odpowiedzialność moralna ludzi," in: *Caritas in Veritate zasadą życia społecznego*, eds. T. Adamczyk and J. Mazur, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2011, pp. 123–133.

655 "Cracow's social and political practicalism played a crucial role in this process. It considered the well-being and interests of the Polish society, the state, and the Church as important criteria applied to evaluate things, and especially to hierarchize sciences." J. Rebeta, *Początki nauk społecznych. Podstawy metodologiczne*, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław 1988, p. 251.

other was metaphysical and it considered the nature of things to be the greatest value.<sup>656</sup>

Social scholars were aware of that divergence, yet, as science continued to flourish, it underwent simplifications, and empirical positivism became the coping stone of that process. The practical logic of scientific research propelled the thriving of natural sciences, but as social sciences attempted to apply the same logic, their development was curbed by methodology.<sup>657</sup> As a result, many twentieth-century thinkers denied social sciences (including sociology) any scientific credibility, seeing them as postmodernist narrations told from the point of view of the researched group. Analysis was replaced with the representation of minority views with no influence on the mainstream, universal discourse. For instance, Steven Seidman argues that sociologists are the only ones for whom sociological theory still matters; for the other members of the academia it has lost its social and intellectual significance. Seidman undermines sociological universalism, considering it “rhetorics of national and Eurocentric chauvinism or rhetorics of world rejection.”<sup>658</sup> This rhetorics is being accused of reducing the complexity of conflict and power to imaginary notions of domination and liberation. Instead, scholars propose a contextual approach that abandons any claims to universality, and restores the complexity, heterogeneity, and moral ambiguity of social tensions that are endemic to all societies. From this point of view, social theory is perceived as responsible criticism whose aim is to propose social change supported by positive arguments that indicate the consequences of the change for both individuals and society. Seidman argues:

Lacking a transcendental move, the postmodern critic must be satisfied with local justifications of those social forms of life which he or she advocates. The justification perhaps will take the form of endorsing a specific social arrangement because it promotes particular social values that are held by specific communities. This kind of pragmatic moral argumentation must be informed by a sociological understanding that allows one to analyse the impact of proposed changes on individuals and society.<sup>659</sup>

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656 J. Rebeta, “Miejsce retoryki wśród nauk społecznych w Krakowie w pierwszej połowie XV wieku,” *Studia Mediewistyczne* 1990, vol. 26 (2), p. 77.

657 A. Jabłoński, “Ograniczone zaufanie w działalności uniwersytetu,” in: *Zaufanie społeczne. Teoria – idee – praktyka*, ed. J. Szymczyk, Oficyna Naukowa, Warszawa 2016, pp. 287–309.

658 S. Seidman, “The End of Sociological Theory: The Postmodern Hope,” *Sociological Theory* 1991, vol. 9, no. 2, p. 140.

659 *Ibid.*, p. 142.

In this approach, sociology becomes a form of practical knowledge that renders a scientific interpretation of the world merely one way of engaging in social change.

This approach, however, replaces erroneous attempts to reach scientific objectivity of sociological descriptions and explanations with equally erroneous anti-scientific subjectivity and relativism of contextual points of view. An alternative may be to search for objective points of view by rooting sociology in practical philosophy. Fifteenth-century Polish authors were particularly fond of that type of philosophy as it supplemented metaphysical, mathematical, and natural investigations.

They agreed with Jean Buridan that the object of moral philosophy cannot be either human good, or the good of virtuous living [*bonum honestum*], or God, or happiness, or virtue, or human actions; rather, it should be man capable of obtaining happiness ('homo felicitabilis'), man considered as a full, dynamic being. In other words, whereas authors before them considered the object of moral philosophy to be either man's feature or a feature external to man, the masters from Cracow followed Buridan's idea that the object of moral philosophy should be man himself and man as a whole.<sup>660</sup>

This approach stressed the particular virtue of social sciences when compared to particular and formal sciences. The analysis of the writings of fifteenth-century authors indicates that social critique and moral philosophy are superior not only to mathematics and the philosophy of nature, but also to medicine, as they are more useful and more virtuous.<sup>661</sup>

Until it became completely subordinated to Marxist philosophy, Polish socio-political thought had been affected by numerous ideological and scientific movements. However, it never abandoned the republicanism that dates back to the Jagiellonian reign and claims that the socio-political order should be rooted in moral ideals.<sup>662</sup> Krasnodębski notices that this republicanism, rooted in the

660 J. Rebeta, *Miejsce retoryki wśród nauk społecznych*. . . , pp. 75 ff.

661 'The superiority of moral philosophy over most of the theoretical sciences, its superiority over metaphysics, the idea of man as a complete and dynamic subject of all interpersonal relations, considering man in terms of his human capabilities and needs, disregard for theology, practicing moral philosophy as an autonomous science, and considering moral philosophy to be demonstrative knowledge – these are the most important factors responsible for the emancipation of moral philosophy and its more specific branches that played a crucial role in forming social sciences in the future.' J. Rebeta, *Początki nauk społecznych*. . . , p. 252.

662 D. Pietrzyk-Reeves, *Ład Rzeczypospolitej. Polska myśl polityczna XVI wieku a klasyczna tradycja republikańska*, Księgarnia Akademicka, Kraków 2012.



classical writings of Aristotle and Cicero, is the most vital and noble tradition of Polish socio-political thought.

We cannot change the past, replace it with a different, better one. To believe that would be unrealistic, naïve, and voluntaristic. It is a fact that the Polish state developed differently than other West European countries. The patrimonial state of the Piast dynasty was transformed into a state monarchy and then became a Commonwealth [*Rzeczpospolita*]. Since the beginning of the sixteenth century, it was ruled by the nobility [*szlachta*] even though it had a king whom the Polish nation believed to be chosen by the people, not God – or, to put it another way, God’s choice manifested itself in the will of the nation. Since the death of Casimir III the Great in 1370, the king of the Polish Crown was elected, and till the death of Władysław II Jagiełło in 1434, the king was elected during an interregnum.<sup>663</sup>

During the period described by Krasnodębski, when the political conditions for republicanism were being shaped, scholars at the Jagiellonian University commented, among others, on Aristotle’s writings. Also, it was then that the criterion of social practicalism was formed: as Paul from Worczyn used to say, the only sensible reason for sacrificing one’s life was the good of the republic (*mori pro republica est triste secundum sensum*); it was pointless to lose it, for instance in a duel, defending one’s honour (*ex hoc patet, quod omnes errant, qui exponunt se morti pro honoribus*).<sup>664</sup> Paul from Worczyn also claimed: “it is better to enrich someone by offering them something than to practice philosophy”<sup>665</sup> lawyers ‘who are entrusted with governing the state’ are superior to theologians;<sup>666</sup> theologians who ‘mix’ theory with practice (e.g. bishops, abbots) are superior to theologians who practice ‘pure speculation’ (e.g. the Carthusians)<sup>667</sup>. Rebeta’s insightful study stresses the importance of moral philosophy and the criterion of practicalism in Paul from Worczyn’s writings. Also, it notices certain understatements concerning the relation between lawyers and ‘mixed’ theologians; namely, Paul from Worczyn seems unwilling to consider one group superior to the other. “By opting for the first solution, he would support the supremacy of the state over the Church, whereas by supporting the other solution he would advocate for the

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663 Z. Krasnodębski, *Republikanizm po komunizmie*, [http://omp.org.pl/artykul.php?artykul=299#\\_ftnref9](http://omp.org.pl/artykul.php?artykul=299#_ftnref9) (accessed 4 December 2019).

664 J. Rebeta, *Komentarz Pawła z Worczyna do “Etyki Nikomachejskiej” Arystotelesa z 1424 roku. Zarys problematyki filozoficzno-społecznej*, Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolińskich, Wrocław 1970, p. 211.

665 *Ibid.*, p. 209.

666 *Ibid.*

667 *Ibid.*, pp. 209 ff.

supremacy of the Church over the state”<sup>668</sup>. His unwillingness to choose between the two solutions stemmed from applying the criterion of practicalism that did not allow him to make an arbitrary choice. “According to the criterion of social and political practicalism, one must evaluate all things taking into consideration the good of the state and society.”<sup>669</sup> Analysing the roots of Polish republicanism, one must turn to the fifteenth-century scholars from Cracow, whose notion of the state predates the writings of A. Frycz-Modrzewski or S. Orzechowski (where the ideas of Polish republicanism are clearly stated).<sup>670</sup> Also, one should account for the criterion of social practicalism rooted in moral philosophy whose prescriptive nature placed it above such fields of knowledge as metaphysics, theoretical philosophy, natural philosophy, logic, mathematics, medicine, or law.

## 2. Rhetoric as the logic of public persuasion

According to classical assumptions, practical philosophy is strictly connected to rhetoric as the art (*techne*) of argumentation through natural language. As the art of persuasion, it is an intentional and functional composition of words that appeals to reason (*logos*), will (*ethos*), and emotions (*pathos*). Rebeta stresses the importance of philosophy connected with language<sup>671</sup> (logic, grammar, and rhetoric) for the social ideas developed by the fifteenth-century thinkers from Cracow.<sup>672</sup> According to their classification of philosophy, rhetoric was not an

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668 *Ibid.*, p. 210.

669 J. Rebeta, *Miejsce retoryki wśród nauk społecznych*. . . , p. 77.

670 H. Litwin, “W poszukiwaniu rodowodu demokracji szlacheckiej. Polska myśl polityczna w piśmiennictwie XV i początków XVI wieku,” in: *Między monarchią a demokracją. Studia z dziejów Polski XV–XVIII wieku*, eds. M. Sucheni-Grabowska and M. Żaryn, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warszawa 1994, p. 33.

671 The basic division of philosophy, applied in fifteenth-century Poland, was based on the distinction, introduced by Aristotle, between theoretical and practical knowledge. There were also a few more detailed classifications. One of them divided philosophy into speculative (theoretical) and practical. Speculative philosophy consisted of metaphysics, mathematics, and natural philosophy. Practical philosophy included ethics, politics, and economy, and philosophy connected with language (the trivium: logic, grammar, and rhetoric). J. Woleński, “Średniowiecze,” in: *Historia filozofii polskiej*, eds. J. Skoczylski, and J. Woleński, Wydawnictwo WAM, Kraków 2010, p. 33.

672 ‘In contrast to three-part divisions of science, the two-part division applied by the masters from Cracow considered the two parts to be organized hierarchically. . . rhetoric was part of practical philosophy and was strictly connected to moral (social) sciences.’ J. Rebeta, *Miejsce retoryki wśród nauk społecznych*. . . , p. 78.

instrumental science but had broader application as “it took over the goals of ethics.”<sup>673</sup> Together with poetics, it became the “moral logic,” which situated it above theoretical sciences based on logic or mathematic. This was the consequence of the aforementioned criteria that stressed the significance of moral (and social) issues: “man capable of obtaining happiness” and “the well-being of society and the state.”<sup>674</sup>

A proper rhetorical argument is composed of elements that are consistent. This does not imply that one must strictly follow the rules; rather, the utterance should be subordinated to the communicative ‘here and now’ – it should address practical problems that require a solution. Rhetoric is a neutral tool for persuasion, and how it is applied depends on the moral attitude of the orator.<sup>675</sup> The orator begins with the beliefs that a given community already accepts, and their aim is to evoke or strengthen the support for the theses they propose.<sup>676</sup> Whether the audience accepts or rejects the theses depends on the validity of the arguments and the value of the solutions the orator proposes. The validity of the arguments depends on the audience and the credibility of the orator.<sup>677</sup>

Rebeta’s analysis of the function of rhetoric in the writings of fifteenth-century Polish scholars stresses the fact that it was the main branch of knowledge that addressed the notion of “ways of teaching” (*modus docendi*) that could lead to virtuous and noble life. To achieve that goal, the audience had to be affected by the clarity of thought and proper language – two factors necessary to prove a case in court.<sup>678</sup> Successful persuasion should simultaneously affect three spheres of the audience, for emotions, will, and reason are not mutually exclusive. The strategies applied by the orator depend on the rhetorical goal, namely whether the speech’s aim is to inform, evoke emotions, or incite the audience to take particular action.<sup>679</sup> Aristotle listed three types of rhetoric: deliberative (decides about the right course of action during political meetings), judicial (accuses or defends in court), and epideictic (praises or criticizes one’s character during

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673 Ibid., p. 81.

674 Ibid., p. 82.

675 K. Obremski, *Retoryka dla studentów historii, politologii i dziennikarstwa*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, Toruń 2004, pp. 33–35.

676 C. Perelman, *Imperium retoryki. Retoryka i argumentacja*, trans. M. Chomicz, ed. R. Kleszcz, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2002, pp. 22 ff.

677 Ibid., p. 64.

678 J. Rebeta, *Miejsce retoryki wśród nauk społecznych*, p. 83.

679 M. Korolko, *Retoryka i erystyka dla prawników*, Wydawnictwo Prawnicze PWN, Warszawa 2001, p. 16.

oratory competitions). “The species of rhetoric are three in number; for such is the number [of classes] to which the hearers of speeches belong. [. . .] Now it is necessary for the hearer to be either an observer or a judge, and [in the latter case] a judge of either past or future happenings.”<sup>680</sup>

Therefore, rhetoric is applied to promote the culture of realism that transcends empirical and linguistic realism. Both empirical and linguistic realisms destroy certain levels of reality. Both approaches reduce the basis of reality that can be neither experienced nor expressed to that which can become an object of discourse. Rhetorical realism, on the other hand, accounts for reality external to both human experience and linguistic statements. Rhetoric elucidates the fact that the world is composed not only of events, states, experiences, impressions, and discourses, but also of basic structures, forces, and inclinations of being even if they are inaccessible to reason and experience. By focusing on conventional descriptions of reality and arguments supporting these descriptions, rhetoric simultaneously points to a reality external to language that is the necessary condition of events and phenomena that can be either perceived or experienced. Such an element of the real world assumed by rhetoric is the audience – a social reality that is the goal of the argument. By recognizing the reality of the audience, the orator recognizes the conditions necessary for its existence: humans and their reason, feelings, and will, but also their material, cultural, social, or political determinants. It is the audience that forces the orator to choose a given set of rhetorical means.<sup>681</sup>

Respecting the rule of practicisms, the authors analysed by Rebeta proposed theses that not only respected the values and interests of citizens, society, and the state (in accordance with the principle of common good), but also accounted for particular needs and expectations the fifteenth-century inhabitants of Cracow and Poland. As stressed by Rebeta, Paul from Worczyn wrote about the superiority of ‘mixed’ theologians over ‘contemplative’ ones when the Cracow diocese was engrossed in a debate whether the Carthusians should be allowed in Poland.

Obviously, Paul supported those who did not want the Carthusians in Poland and who won the argument. Instead of the Carthusians, Paul respected the Augustinian order, listing it as an example of an order devoted to practical life: ‘aliqua est vita activa, sicut . . . fratres augustinenses.’ One may say that by stressing the importance of the Augustinian order, Paul supported the Cracow community that the order had been a significant part of since the fourteenth century.<sup>682</sup>

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680 Aristotle, *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*, trans. G. A. Kennedy, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford 2007, 1358b.

681 C. Perelman, *Imperium retoryki*. . . , p. 26.

682 J. Rebeta, *Komentarz Pawła z Worczyna*. . . , p. 211.

The scholars from Cracow, similarly to Greeks two thousand years before, were aware that a noble life is impossible without rhetoric. Rhetoric assumes the idea of man that can be summarized in four main points. First, humans are free because they may either form their own arguments or accept the arguments of others. Secondly, humans are rational because they follow rules that make their reactions predictable and understandable, which, in turn, makes it possible to influence them. Thirdly, human interactions are rational. Finally, language is a means of communication that is both strong and subtle enough to convey a message to the receiver and influence them to accept that message and act in accordance with it.<sup>683</sup>

These assumptions indicate that rhetoric applied the very idea of man that lies at the foundation of civic society and democracy. It was practiced by free people, as slaves could only engage in composing texts that hid their serfdom under the cover of elaborate flattery filled with paradoxes.<sup>684</sup> An orator speaking in the agora (a demagogue) or a speaker in the forum (a tribune of the people or a populist) signified the connection between rhetoric and the available knowledge about society. “The political system of Athens allowed all citizens to voice their opinions about public matters; in order to practice the rules of democracy, one had to master the art of persuasion which was tantamount to gaining the audience’s favour.”<sup>685</sup> During the Empire, rhetoric lost some of its political significance. It became art for art’s sake understood as the theory of philosophical prose, dialogues, prose written in the form of monologues, and letters on numerous subjects. “Rhetoric maintained that form until the Middle Ages and was taught as part of the *trivium*; then, it regained its superior form as a theory of artistic (“literary”) utterance, relevant for the subjects gathered under the umbrella term *bonae litterae*.”<sup>686</sup>

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683 P. Bukowiec, “Od pouczenia do pocieszenia. Szkic do analizy pragmatycznej ‘Uwag’ Ignacego Krasickiego,” in: *Retoryka a tekst literacki*, vol. 2, eds. M. Hanczakowski and J. Niedźwiedz, Universitas, Kraków 2003, p. 10.

684 ‘In Greece, slaves were not allowed to speak in public, which is why they spoke silently and with their heads bent. To speak loud was a privilege of a citizen, a free man; it was the sign of his dignity (*parrhesia*). Similarly, in the republic of Rome, rhetoric was the art of public speaking and played an important role. Cicero’s speeches are a reminder of that fact.’ A. Borowski, “Staropolska ‘Książka dla wszystkich,’ czyli ‘Żywoty Świętych’ ks. Piotra Skargi SJ,” in: *Retoryka a tekst literacki*, vol. 1, eds. M. Hanczakowski, and J. Niedźwiedz, Universitas, Kraków 2003, p. 71.

685 K. Obremski, *Retoryka dla studentów historii, politologii i dziennikarstwa*. . . , p. 23.

686 A. Borowski, *Staropolska “Książka dla wszystkich”*. . . , p. 71–72.

The uniqueness of rhetorical argumentation rests in its practical dimension; neither truth nor falsity is an indisputable absolute; instead, they both depend on the audience's evaluation and agreement. Nowadays, the public has access to more or less valuable conjectures rather than to absolute truth or falsity. The value of each conjecture lies in its relation to reality that stresses the inequality of particular things. Therefore, "the value is dictated by *topoi*, defined by Quintilian as the "storage of arguments," that is the place of "preferences that provide arguments for a given thesis. These are implicit premises that people accept because of common opinion and because they express points of view shared by the majority of the audience – motives, statements, proverbs, images, clichés."<sup>687</sup> Rhetoric applies *topoi*, tropes, and rhetorical figures characteristic of a given cultural community. On the one hand, rhetoric's goal is to argue for truth; on the other hand, in its ethical and political dimension, it shapes society.

### 3. Sociology as moral persuasion

Nowadays, it is difficult to apply the rhetoric of medieval Polish scholars to propose solutions regarding practical philosophy. Nevertheless, practical philosophy continues to offer insight into numerous dilemmas addressed by social sciences. Practical philosophy and rhetoric may assist contemporary sociological research in its attempts to overcome the subject-object dualism. To be more precise, the dilemma is to overcome the paradox of sociologists as objective scholars and their active participation in the reality they research. As I argued in another text,<sup>688</sup> this approach coincides with the search for the justification of sociology's

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687 M. Korolko, *Retoryka i erystyka dla prawników*. . . , p. 47; see J. Z. Lichański, *Reklama i retoryka*, in *Polszczyzna a/i Polacy u schyłku XX wieku*, eds. K. Handke, and H. Dalewska-Greń, Sławistyczny Ośrodek Wydawniczy, Warszawa 1994, p. 302; P. H. Lewiński, *Retoryka reklamy*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 1999, pp. 73 ff; C. Perelman, *Logika prawnicza. Nowa retoryka*, trans. T. Pajor, PWN, Warszawa 1984, p. 160. A *topos* is a petrified motif that becomes permanently connected to a given meaning, usage, or a recognizable, 'half-ready' language form. Paul Zumthor claims that a *topos* may be an imaginary topic or a motif responsible for the choice of a given thought or image to illustrate a particular situation. P. Zumthor, "Retoryka średniowieczna," *Pamiętnik Literacki*, 1977, vol. 1, p. 233. According to Kenneth Burke, Aristotle's topics (*topoi*) are 'opinions or assumptions (perhaps today they would be treated under the head of "attitudes" or "values") [that] are catalogued as available means of persuasion.' K. Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1969, p. 56.

688 A. Jabłoński, "Znaczenie retoryki dla współczesnej teorii społecznej," *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL*, 2008, vol. 1.

status as a science that connects scientific argumentation and points of view with the reflectiveness and arguments of those participating in social life. The goal is to account for the plurality of points of view that structure social reality. This dilemma can be solved neither by sociological theory that, in the spirit of positivistic empiricism, applies the methodology of natural sciences, nor by humanistic (interpretative) sociology that is transformed into a polyphony of points of view it attempts to represent. As argued by Jeffrey C. Alexander, if considered as the main evaluative criterion, particular interests of a given group (e.g. Jews, African-Americans, gays, lesbians, feminists), may lead to misunderstandings, prejudice, and conflict.<sup>689</sup> Constructivism in social sciences leads to ideological declarations made by sociologists in the name of a particular social group. Gender and queer theory, together with other postmodernist discourses, undermine the objectivity of descriptions that constitute and legitimize the official socio-political order. However, in doing so, they often present their arguments as universal truths, which mirrors the rhetoric of the narratives they criticize.

Such narratives pose a threat to contemporary sociology (or social sciences in general) for they undermine scientific discourse and reach the limits of what may be expressed in rational terms. The attempts to overcome the idea of reference as well as the epistemological dichotomy between the subject and the object are supposed to free sociology from its indebtedness to metaphysics and theoretical philosophy. Rational legitimization of the universal social and political order is replaced with new forms of social control – seduction and repression in the context of cultural pluralism. The very need for values vanishes, so it is difficult to defend even the postulates of nihilism. “Because it would be beautiful to be a nihilist, if there were still a radicality – as it would be nice to be a terrorist, if death, including that of the terrorist, still had meaning.”<sup>690</sup> Social reality, viewed through the prism of meanings and symbols, is transformed into hyperreality and simulacra. Baudrillard argues:

The transition from signs that dissimulate something to signs that dissimulate that there is nothing marks a decisive turning point. The first reflects a theology of truth and secrecy (to which the notion of ideology still belongs). The second inaugurates the era of simulacra and of simulation, in which there is no longer a God to recognize his own, no longer a Last Judgment to separate the false from the true, the real from its artificial resurrection, as everything is already dead and resurrected in advance. . . . [T]his is how

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689 J. C. Alexander, “Sociological Theory and the Claim to Reason: Why the End Is Not in Sight,” *Sociological Theory* 1991, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 147–153.

690 J. Baudrillard, *Simulacra and Simulation*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor 1994, *On Nihilism*, Par 28, EPUB File.

simulation appears in the phase that concerns us – a strategy of the real, of the neoreal and the hyperreal that everywhere is the double of a strategy of deterrence.<sup>691</sup>

Rhetoric as a tool applied by moral philosophy deprives scholars of their privileged position during a communicative situation. The words of an orator, contrary to those of a poet, are not evoked by inspiration that absolves them of any responsibility; instead, they make them a servant of truth. Heinrich Lausberg notices that even though poetry affects the receiver, this effect is achieved through mimesis.<sup>692</sup> Rhetoric, without renouncing objectivity, shelters researchers from becoming poets whose works are supposed to lead to catharsis and thus liberate people from uncomfortable feelings (superstitions, traditions, myths). Rhetoric helps in uncovering truth, but also affects the audience and thus shapes social reality in “accordance with certain moral principles.

Therefore, a consistent critique of social theory must go beyond the analysis of the shortcomings of existing descriptions and argumentations conducted from the critic’s moral point of view. The critic’s point of view must be the result of a thorough discussion, it must be precise and socially useful. It must be an attempt at finding a middle ground between numerous levels of sociological thought and bridging the gap between humanistic and neo-positivistic sociology. Nowadays, the “scientific continuum” consists of two parts: the first part includes elements that cannot be classified as facts (general premises and ideologies), whereas the second part includes empirical data. Therefore, sociological research “should include all these parts of the continuum and both build theory and gather empirical proofs.”<sup>693</sup> It should synthesize numerous interdependent scientific activities. Therefore, Charles Taylor claims that both social theory that follows the premises of natural sciences and attempts to use neutral language to describe the laws governing social life (e.g. functionalism, Marxism) and interpretative sociology that attempts to empathize with a given community in order to understand it (e.g. the conception of Peter Winch<sup>694</sup>) are mistaken. He argues that the goal of

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691 Ibid., *The Procession of Simulacra, The Divine Irrelevance of Images*, Par. 11, EPUB File.

692 H. Lausberg, *Retoryka literacka. Podstawy wiedzy o literaturze*, trans. A. Gorzkowski, Wydawnictwo “HOMINI,” Bydgoszcz 2002, p. 41.

693 K. Iwińska, “Socjologia jako nauka, czyli znów zadane pytanie: ‘What is so great about science?’” *Studia Socjologiczne* 2006, vol. 1, no. 80, p. 81.

694 A. Jabłoński, *Filozoficzna interpretacja życia społecznego w pismach Petera Wincha*, Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, Lublin 1998.



social theory is to correct popular views, for its greatest strength lies in its potential to challenge human habits.<sup>695</sup>

Paul from Worczyn expressed the ideas formed at the Jagiellonian University in the fifteenth century. Those ideas attached great significance to practical philosophy. "It [practical philosophy] discussed a wide range of problems. On the one hand, it included moral philosophy which, in addition to ethics, focused on social, economic, political, and judicial issues; on the other, it incorporated 'artes mechanicae' that included such skills as weaving, farming, and medicine."<sup>696</sup> Such an approach not only expressed the academic view on the nature of practical philosophy, but also responded to a particular social commission that Paul from Worczyn diligently fulfilled. If the knowledge about the social order is based on general philosophical premises, it poses a risk of totalitarian ideologization, especially if that knowledge is to be used to transform and shape the aforementioned order.<sup>697</sup> Medieval scholars stressed the fact that to know God and angels "is not enough; therefore, not all metaphysicians are happy, but only those who, in addition to knowing God and angels, are morally just, thanks to ethics."<sup>698</sup>

Rebeta notices that the writings of Paul from Worczyn differentiate between two spheres of human life: practical and theoretical. The differentiation is connected with the idea of happiness that the master from Cracow separates from the matters of faith and theology. For him, earthly happiness that stems from contemplative life is superior to practical happiness. It is more noble and leads to practical happiness. However, in the case of noble people – prelates, bishops, and abbots – life is both theoretical and practical, which is superior to mere contemplation.<sup>699</sup> Such a connection between theoretical reflection and practical activity is important not only for practice but also for theory, which is stressed by many contemporary scholars. For instance, K. R. Popper claims that there is nothing more practical than a good theory, but each theory addresses

695 C. Taylor, "Social Theory as Practice," in: idem, *Philosophy and the Human Science. Philosophical Papers 2*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1985, pp. 91–115.

696 J. Rebeta, *Komentarz Pawła z Worczyna*. . . , p. 7.

697 See R. Aron, *The Opium of the Intellectuals*, Transaction Publisher, New Brunswick and London 2011; H. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Harcourt, Inc., Orlando [etc.] 1994; K. R. Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism*, The Beacon Press, Boston 1957.

698 J. Rebeta, "Miejsce retoryki wśród nauk, p. 77; See idem, "Nobilitacja filozofii moralnej i prawa wobec teologii w Polsce w połowie XV wieku," *Studia Mediewistyczne* 1983, vol. 22 (2), p. 81.

699 J. Rebeta, *Komentarz Pawła z Worczyna*. . . , pp. 207 ff.

both theoretical and practical problems, simultaneously maintaining the complexity of human actions, which brings it closer to truth.<sup>700</sup>

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Popper, among other contemporary scholars researching the nature of social sciences, warns against speculations detached from real human problems. It is a mistake to favour ontological and epistemological issues over human beings struggling with important social issues. According to Popper, the philosophical systems of Plato, Hegel, or Marx threaten the open society. Leaving aside the question whether Popper is correct in his interpretation of the ideas of the aforementioned philosophers, his main objection is sound. He argues that the philosophers subordinate the heterogeneity of social life to monistic ontologies (idealism, materialism) and epistemological approaches – rationalist, logical and semiotic speculations.<sup>701</sup> The concept of the open society based on the plurality of views that constantly interact with each other was developed by numerous branches of sociology – from the sociology of communicative action to the sociology of public life. In that developed form, Popper's idea had a significant impact on Polish sociology. Yet, the scholars who applied it often did not account for the practice of social life or used it to reinforce the post-communist order and neo-colonial mass mentality.<sup>702</sup> Therefore, it may be advisable to consult the fathers of Polish social sciences.

They considered the object of social sciences to be man considered as a full, dynamic being, capable of obtaining happiness (*homo felicitabilis*). He was the subject of all human relations: social, economic, political, judicial, ethnic, and cultural. Many masters considered and evaluated man only in terms of human capabilities and earthly needs (*modo humano*) – all the things that were important, necessary, and beneficial for the society and state he lived and acted in, the place where he was meant to fulfil the ideal of earthly happiness.<sup>703</sup>

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700 See K. R. Popper, *Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1994; idem, *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*, Basic Books, New York and London 1962.

701 K. R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford 2013.

702 Z. Krasnodębski, *Peryferia demokracji*, Wydawnictwo Słowo/obraz terytoria, Gdańsk 2003.

703 J. Rebeta, *Początki nauk społecznych*. . . , pp. 251–252.

# CONCLUSION

Both philosophers and sociologists have always been interested in the way humans develop and shape their identity. Developing this interest required an interpretation of the notion of agency in a situation when an individual is being affected by various social phenomena and structures. In academic thought, this subject became the grounds for developing numerous perspectives and images of social life. These notions, even though formulated previously by social scientists, continue to be investigated by contemporary theoreticians and researchers of social reality, including the scholars from the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, and especially the members of the Institute of Sociology whose academic achievements are discussed in the present book. Every study that investigates the origins of social life, the nature of interaction, the structural elements of social reality, and the forms of collective life may contribute to the development of either sociology as a whole or its particular branches.

From the sociological point of view, people are responsible for creating the social world and numerous cultural contexts. Individual actions are motivated by particular axiological norms, religious and social conventions. There is a general belief – accepted by the authors discussed in the present book – that it is impossible to understand any sphere of human life without taking into consideration values, norms, and interests. Values and interests are particularly visible in the way reflexive social subjects experience the world; they continue to motivate people, regulate their behaviours, and help in explaining their attitudes and interactions.

Social sciences offer numerous perspectives on the relation between social structures and values. Each perspective is determined by the applied notion of a social structure and a particular theory of values. Also, there exist numerous descriptions of how humans behave within communities. On the one hand, behaviour is interpreted as subordinate to structural determinism (one's class, profession, etc.) that imposes particular values, norms, or interests on individuals; on the other, certain approaches stress the impact values have on the preferences and activities of individuals who create and transform social structures. The relationship between values and social structures is a major issue discussed by sociologists researching values, in terms of both theory and practice.

The analysis of the discussed authors' works indicates that they accept the subject-object (psycho-social, relational) perspective, thus rejecting singular determinants of social phenomena. Too much emphasis placed on various

dichotomies results in an image of reality that is “split” into extreme spheres (such as physical and mental facts). Consequently, intersubjective meanings “embodied” in social reality, the meanings that constitute that reality, are never investigated. The nature of social phenomena can be understood only through the rejection of extreme approaches and the acceptance of the perspective according to which the subject and the object are complementary planes. Such an approach entails raising the status of the subject and legitimizing the thesis concerning the “social creation of reality.” The fact that social phenomena “appear” in individual consciousness accounts for the special significance of the “humanistic coefficient.” This perspective may be applied in sociological research, and used either in data analysis or in presenting various images of social reality.

The approach stresses the fluctuating nature of social reality; in other words, society is perceived as a constant process. Therefore, it undergoes changes and transformations. The quality of this dynamics cannot be properly evaluated without taking into account individual potentialities of social subjects, their circumstances, and actual practice (social events). That is why all “regularities” that occur in social life result from values, norms, rules, and patterns that humans create during their interactions. The history of social phenomena indicates that they undergo diverse and ambiguous processes. This means that they neither follow some abstract laws of economy, technology, politics, etc., nor are the result of an accident.

The texts discussed in the book illustrate that their authors avoided reductionist approaches when discussing such issues as the nature of social consciousness, social ontology, or the internalization of particular axiological categories. What distinguishes the way these authors understand social phenomena is the fact that they consider these phenomena to be “rooted” in the consciousness of particular persons, interpersonal interactions, and individuals’ intersubjective beliefs. It must be emphasized, however, that by stressing the psycho-social perspective or taking into consideration the correlation between particular phenomena, objects, and processes, the authors did not question the real and methodological “sovereignty” of those beings. Even though there are differences between them, they remain in symbiosis. They cannot be considered identical with each other. The relation between individualism and holism, or between the private and the public, consists of a sphere of common phenomena and behaviours that both perform unique, singular functions and accomplish the goals of particular categories. As a result, the categories these terms denote should be considered as sets that are overlapping rather than identical.

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